Author:
Hartl, Jakob J

Title:
Precarious choices

On the influence of young people's precarity on abstention from elections

Precarious choices

On the influence of young people's precarity
on abstention from elections

Jakob J Hartl

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for award of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law.

School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies

Revised Version February 2020

Word count: 60,392

Abstract

Why don't young people vote? This thesis develops a synthesis of theories of precarity by Marie Jahoda, Pierre Bourdieu, and Judith Butler in order to connect youth transitions and political participation. The novel conceptualisation understands precarity as a socially induced condition of psychosocial disintegration which inhibits political participation.

This approach is empirically assessed using data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England 2004-10, with participants being 13 to 20 years old. Using Latent Class Analysis (LCA), experiences of precariousness are identified in each wave along six dimensions proposed by Jahoda. In longitudinal perspective they are together situated in a space of precarity, using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). This way, trajectories of young people between states of precarity over time are observed and condensed into a typology of four classes of youth practice. Adding these classes of social practice to the conventional models of voting and alienation yielded significant findings, thus proving the guiding hypothesis about the impact of precarity on young people's abstention from elections.

In addition to the aforementioned theoretical contribution, this research speaks to literature in the field of youth studies and political participation research, and argues for a thorough entanglement of youth transitions and civic subjectification. Thirdly, the thesis champions the use of MCA for youth research, especially with longitudinal data.

Dedication and Acknowledgements

Thanks to Will Atkinson and Paula Surridge for their supervision, for helping me navigate through the PhD process, and for showing understanding and sympathy for my detours and, at times, dawdling.

I am deeply thankful for my parents' unwavering emotional support, for their blind trust in me, for not having to justify leaving securities behind to pursue insecure goals. Thanks also for the material support.

When I started this journey in 2015 Iris Schwarzenbacher decided to join me. Four years later, she has become my intellectual sparring partner, accomplice and comrade, lover and friend. Without you, I wouldn't have made it, or it wouldn't have made sense. Danke Danke Danke!

This work is dedicated to Theresa, Emma, Benedikt, Paul, Simon and Lena, and those yet to come.

Author's Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: ..... DATE: .....

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Introduction

Why do young people abstain from elections? Young people's declining political participation, their political apathy and alienation has been of major concern for policy makers for several years now. But besides efforts of e.g. teaching democracy and politics at school, young people's abstention remains a problem: in fall 2016, the UK had voted for Brexit and the US for their 45th president. Both votes were accompanied by complaining and lamenting about young people's political apathy, in particular after a marginal majority in the United Kingdom – especially in England – had voted to leave the European Union: since most young people who partook in the referendum voted "remain", the assumption was that if only more young people had voted, the result would have been a different one. This assumption homogenises young people in at least two ways. Firstly, framing the positions towards Brexit predominantly along generational lines assumes unequivocal support for the EU by young people. But secondly, the underlying assumption is an equality of opportunity to participate among young people.

In a theoretical or legal perspective, universal suffrage guarantees equality regarding the right to vote. In a sociological perspective, legal structures are just one condition among others: political equality is not just a legal matter but a social one.

This thesis takes issue with the assumption of political equality of young people – when all are equal, some are always more equal. Instead, it argues that political participation, especially in institutionalised forms, is the result of or rather preconditioned by feelings of integration, belonging and entitlement. The ensuing question is, how these feelings come about, what fosters them and what discourages them, in general and specifically among young people. Therefore, this thesis argues that young people's political alienation, apathy or participation needs to be understood through, with, and in their transitions and lifeworlds.

The first chapter sets the scene for this thesis. Political participation research and studies on voting behaviour use theories and apply models, which are hardly applicable to young people since they were developed against a backdrop of the golden age of capitalism and a corresponding conceptualisation of civic adulthood. The rather recent reaction to this, namely from the theorists of late modernity and consorts, fail however, to acknowledge the lifeworldly relevance and

violence with which social inequalities structure young people's lives and affect their political participation. Thus, a refined approach, based on the theories developed by Pierre Bourdieu, is suggested as a way forward for research into young people's political participation, building above all on his concept of *précarité*.

The second chapter delves into the literature on precarity and related concepts to differentiate the proposed re-conceptualisation from the existing literature. To mould this new approach, Bourdieu is seconded and further substantiated with Judith Butler's conceptual pair of precariousness and precarity, which also carries a methodological implication: precariousness signifies the very experience, i.e. a phenomenological account of *what* is happening, whereas precarity denotes the socially induced condition, i.e. a structural account of *why* it is happening. Marie Jahoda finally complements the theoretical triplet to build the working concept of this thesis: precarity is a socially induced condition of psychosocial disintegration which prevents political participation.

The following chapter looks for related approaches in the literature on youth and youth political participation. The result thereof is comparably meagre, since little research into young people's political participation thoroughly entangles transitionary processes and the development of civic adulthood. However, the proposed framework of precarity helps reassessing the significance of institutions like education or employment for political participation, even in late modernity. After addressing some of the ongoing conceptual debates in youth studies, the concluding section of this chapter pulls the threads together to outline the (empirical) work programme of the thesis.

After discussing methodology, data, and methods in chapter four, the ensuing chapter starts out exploring states of precariousness among young people aged 13 to 20 in England between 2004 and 2010. Using Latent Class Analysis on longitudinal data, these states are first described in cross-sectional perspective, i.e. for each year separately, and correlations with gender, ethnicity and class are investigated. Thus, by embedding the experience of precariousness into the social conditions producing them, states of precarity at each age are identified.

The following chapter six utilises the longitudinality of the data researched to construct a space of precarity of English youth. Using Multiple Correspondence Analysis, the various and varying experiences of precariousness are related to each other, to allow for the drawing of trajectories of

cumulative precarity over time. At the end of this chapter, a typology of youth is finally developed, describing four classes of young people's practice to navigate through a space of youth, structured by class, lifestyles, and mental health.

The final chapter then addresses the initial research question: why don't young people vote?

1 Politics between life and class

The state of research on young people's political participation (YPPP) appears a contested and ambiguous field. The reason therefore is (at least) twofold. On the one hand, "young people" or "youth" as such is a contested word (and 'just a word' according to Bourdieu): a huge and ever-growing body of sociological and psychological literature engages with the mere definition of this life stage, producing phrases from 'late childhood' to 'emerging adulthood'. Many researchers simply apply a numerical age definition, i.e. considering 'youth' as a certain age range. However, the span of this age range differs between three (15-18) and twenty-three years (11-34) and everything between. This inevitably leads to very different scopes of this research, from a short height of puberty to a life phase encapsulating many of the major transitions and life decisions, e.g. the transition from education to work or higher/further education, starting to earn, moving out of the parents' home, starting a family etc. Thus, a different strand of research moves away from this arbitrary definition based on life years and suggests a conceptualisation of youth along these transitions instead. Scholars in this tradition thus define different sets of developments and transitions as constitutive for youth. This results in different approaches to adulthood alike, and obviously affects the research on YPPP and has its own specific repercussions as it reflects the rejection of traditional politics.

The second reason for the problems with YPPP lies with the latter part, political participation. What is political? What is participation? While the first question is and was the object of extensive deliberation, the YPPP literature offers an answer, which is directly related to the second question on participation. The demarcation line here runs between those scholars who focus on formal or "traditional" politics such as voting and partisanship on one side and those who employ a broader concept of politics, including such neologisms as "iDemocracy" and "clicktivism" but also political activism along other than party lines, like micro- and cause-politics, on the other. Thus, the former strand of research adheres to the traditional modes of participation in liberal representative democracies and subordinates any other kind of political activism to the ultimate end of parliamentary decision making while the latter refers to a more comprehensive concept of the "*zoon politikon*". By expanding the realm of the political, YPPP becomes more fluid, a matter of identities and activities beyond institutions. It comes as no coincidence that this strand is more closely related to theories of the late modernity and the "death of class". This strand champions

agency of young people and their definition of the political and refutes the imposition of a top-down notion of the political on young people and the rash verdicts of political apathy among young people on grounds of low turnout. But no matter the degree of informal political activities, formal political processes are highly efficacious and powerfully shaping realities and futures – as most recently became palpable (again) with the Brexit referendum and the election of the 45th president of the United States.

The other strand of YPPP research is nevertheless challenged by these new forms of politics.[1] This is not least due to an oversimplification of the theoretical models applied to voting and abstention, or rather a missing or deficient adaptation of these models to the lifeworld of young people. In addition, abstention and its reasons appear an under researched field in these contexts of traditional politics. This is partly due to a false inversion of the reasons for party support which does not reflect dynamics of political alienation or apathy. One reason for this fallacy is grounded in the research tradition on political support, stemming from research by Lazarsfeld and others in the 1940s and 1950s. Their equation of political support with party support led to an interpretation of abstention as a simple lack of appealing and electable parties, i.e. parties that would reflect and champion the voters' class interests. Secondly, and related to that, reasons for abstentions are seldom studied. Besides the mentioned influence of the party-centred research, this is also due to difficulties in researching the issue. Obviously, the question of class interests as basis for voting decisions is even more complicated when considering young people, who are arguably often still in the process of establishing a class position, identity, or consciousness, while emancipating themselves from or reproducing their parents' class.

Thus, this chapter tries to organise these different strands of research and to test their applicability and implications for researching YPPP. The review starts with the dominant explanation of the socio-economic status (SES) model of political participation and discusses its merits and problems, both in general and with regards to the application to YPPP. Subsequently, the main contender hypotheses, known as theories of individualisation and late modernity, are discussed and put on trial for their contribution to research on YPPP. Finally, countering the former

[1] A thorough historical investigation of the relationship between non-partisan activism and representative democratic processes however would, besides the technical features, challenge the novelty of these 'new' forms of politics.

hypotheses, a modified understanding of class politics is developed and put forward as a new way of understanding the gaps identified in the literature discussed.

1.1 The socio-economic status model of electoral participation – merits and problems

In his review on electoral turn out among British youth, Phelps (2012: 290) rightly notes that 'the literature on young people's politics has tended to be rather divorced from the mainstream political science literature.' One might add that this divorce did not result in shared custody for YPPP; it rather seems, the fields stopped talking to each other. This was one explanation why the predominant political science concept for explaining political participation and turnout alike, is hardly considered by researchers on YPPP.

Although challenged, questioned, and amended even by some of its proponents (e.g. Verba in Brady et al. 1995) the socio-economic status model of political participation is of persistent significance. The roots of the concept lie with the parents of public opinion and political preference research, the aforementioned Lazarsfeld, as well as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and their disciples. Lazarsfeld (1944) provides a de facto blue print for the cleavage theory developed later by Lipset and Rokkan:[2] three cleavages, SES, religion, and residency (urban/rural), of which SES is the most significant, form an 'index of political predisposition' (Lazarsfeld et al. 1993 [1948]) which has a strong forecasting power on the electoral decision, i.e. choice of party. Obviously, these three indicators already confound different forms of sought representation (Pitkin 1972) since each of these attributes potentially refers to descriptive or substantial representation to different extents. However, this does not deter an empiricist like Lazarsfeld – and hardly any of the researchers in his tradition. The SES model, describing the lower turnout among citizens with less income, lower education, and/or lower occupational status is regarded a well-established fact. In their meta-analysis of studies on voting behaviour, Smets and van Ham (2013) find that education, as one SES variable, was included in almost three quarters of the studies under

[2] Obviously, Lipset and Rokkan's cleavages are (conceptually) deeper than Lazarsfeld's attributes; however, they refer finally to the same conceptualisation of class as will be discussed later.

consideration, and income was also among the more frequent explanatory variables.[3] In the majority of studies, SES or related measures proved to be significantly positive for turn-out. However, as the authors rightly remark, the SES model is highly under-theorised and remains mostly descriptive or predictive. Still, some theoretical ideas aiming at adding explanatory power to the thesis are put forward in the literature. Brady et al. (1995) propose in their 'resource model' a marriage of SES and rational choice (RC) theory. The typical RC model assumes a rational actor evaluating costs and benefits of (taking) an action, e.g. voting. The authors claim that, while RC models have been around in political science for some time, the cost side of the models had been under-investigated by SES approaches, because the variables usually used (occupational and educational status) are not directly translatable into goods to pay for occurring costs. As approximations, scholars tend to rather speculate then contemplate about higher costs for people of lower SES for gathering information on the election, a merely challenged assertion by Downs (1957).

In his highly influential economic theory of democracy, Downs' central hypothesis is that politicians and parties put forward policies to gain votes which put them into office/power; they do not seek to gain office to serve particular people or a greater good. In other words, their personal motives overrule their social function. The democratic market suffers, as all markets, from incomplete information of the participants in the market. Obviously now, the lack of information or political sophistication is not equally distributed across the electorate and according to the economic axiom of marginal utility, each voter needs to decide whether gathering the information needed to make the "right" decision, i.e. to vote for the party winning and assuming power, is worth the effort, i.e. the costs. Since these costs are proportionally higher for people of lower SES, they are less likely to acquire information which could serve as a basis for informed decision making on election day. Instead, it appears opportune to minimise investment in political information. 'As a result, democratic political systems are bound to operate at less than maximum efficiency. Government does not serve the interests of the majority as well as it would if they were well informed, but they never become well informed.'

[3] Employing education as proxy for SES is a common procedure in behavioural studies since it is more stable than income at date of the survey and bears information on the respondents' social background as well.

(Downs 1957: 148) Cynical as its conclusion is, this economic theory of the political appears to be the theoretical backbone of the SES model in political science.

Brady and colleagues (1995) put forward their resource model of money, time, and skills to substitute the original SES variables with their outcomes (money for income, skills for education, and time with an inverse relation to SES), actually trying to bolster Downs' argument with survey evidence. Combining voting, donations to political parties/causes, and time spent on political activities into an index of political participation, they find their hypothesis proven. However, separate analyses of the different modes of political participation yield different results with income becoming insignificant on voting, whereas skills are hardly significant with a small effect size. Instead, political interest remains the most important factor for the decision to vote.

Although the resource model, like its predecessor the SES model, was and is widely received, the authors do not live up to their promise of explaining the links between SES/resources and political participation and thus leave little for the application to YPPP. This is partly due to the aforementioned problem of representation which in return feeds back into the question of citizenship, or more broadly, the relationship between the state and its citizens. For the US, Leighley, Nagler and colleagues (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Hill et al. 1995; Leighley and Nagler 2007, 2014) put forward a very simple, yet compelling explanation: the state and its citizen perceive each other predominantly in terms of taxation and redistribution. Thus, a higher income automatically increases a citizen's investment and engagement in politics. In return, politicians and political campaigns are aware of this mechanism and thus tailor their arguments and rhetoric accordingly to this constituency. While this argument may appear counterintuitive, since people with lower SES would be expected to vote for redistributive policies, it fits the deliberations by Piketty (1995, 1998). According to the latter, the different attitudes towards redistributive policies in the US and Europe result in a general rejection of such policies in the US since they are seen as undermining status gains, whereas in Europe beliefs of entitlement are still prevalent, leading to the perception of 'social climbers' as 'nouveaux riches' (1998: 116).

When it comes to the applicability of SES models to young people, we face obviously various difficulties. In fact, SES models are hardly considered in the literature on YPPP at all (see the review by Phelps 2012). Where SES variables are considered, e.g. by Henn et al. (2005), they are hardly discussed in detail nor tested against each other in multivariate models. Henn and

Weinstein (2006) show, although they hardly elaborate on that issue, that 43% of young people do see voting as something like a 'civic duty'. In their conclusions, they summarise this inconsistency of being neither apathetic nor engaging but do not seek for any reasons for that in young people's attitudes or life realities or circumstances. Using pooled data of US election studies, Blais and Rubenson (2013) observe that this sense of civic duty declined in the US, but so did external political efficacy while internal political efficacy stagnated (ibid.: 108; see below) Their theoretical underpinning lies with the value change theory by Inglehart (2008). Already at the end of the 1970s, Inglehart suggested an intergenerational value change, which is roughly based on Maslow's pyramid and socialisation theory: 'Material sustenance and physical security are immediately linked with survival, and when they are scarce, people give top priority to these "materialistic" goals; under conditions of prosperity, people become more likely to emphasise "post-materialist" goals such as belonging, esteem, and aesthetic and intellectual satisfaction" (ibid.: 131) but since values are mostly formed early in the life course, these changes do not take effect immediately, but are observed rather in the subsequent generations' values. Post-materialist values are thus linked to self-actualising ways of doing politics and therefore to turn-out decline (see below, chapter 1.2). In accordance with this theory, Blais and Rubenson did indeed find this generational effect of values on voting, regardless of the life cycle (2013: 110). Whereas some of the literature discussed here suggests differences in turn-out to be a genuine question of youth behaviour, their findings thus suggest a more general shift in political participation due to value change during the post-war period. Choosing a different approach of political generations, Grasso (2014) emphasises politicising events or rather coming of age during particular periods, to make her point why some generations are less likely to be politically active than others. This way, she tests a political generation hypothesis against a societal modernisation hypothesis. According to the former, cohorts differ in their political repertoire due to the modes of participation salient during their storm and stress years, whereas the latter is an adaptation of Inglehart's theory of intergenerational value change. Her findings reject the value change theory, since participation in social movements, demonstrating, and even signing petitions are most prevalent among the 60s-70s generation, i.e. among those people who grew up with political unrest in most of the ten western European countries she observed. But age too proved significant

in all of the models presented, both in linear as in non-linear terms.[4] Thus, even though the paper is an interesting attempt to research age, period, and cohort effects to make the point for political generations, the life cycle effect persists – alongside class differences.

Another line of argument regards political interest. In a more recent paper (Henn and Foard 2014), political interest becomes somewhat of an activity happening in a closed sphere and the closer people are to that sphere (i.e. in (higher) education, from middle-class backgrounds), the more likely they are to participate in elections. Or, as in the overview in Henn et al. (2005), the analysis mistakes an explanandum – 'young people have lower levels of political knowledge than do older age groups; have a distinct lack of interest in (formal) politics; display comparatively weak commitments to political parties; and are less likely than older people to be members of such organisations' (2005: 557) – for an explanans of the other explanandum, namely the low turnout at elections. However, more significantly, class politics was according to Phelps' (2012) review of sociological models of voting behaviour, hardly ever reviewed or updated: the school of thought established in the 1940s and 1950s by Lazarsfeld and Berelson, which understood voting as an expression of (classed) identity and, as a result, classed political interests, prevailed. But this view on voting behaviour is hardly adaptable to changes in the social fabric (like migration) and not easily applicable to young people's experiences: young people are either still in the process of "finding" their class, which relates to the multiple transitions they undergo, but also experience a phase of identity (re)construction (e.g. gender identities), which limits this identity approach to class even more. This is reinforced by a view on class politics as party politics only, thus confounding class and partisanship. Thus Phelps claims: 'Critical to understanding today's young voters is that they have grown up in an era where the influence of structural forces in shaping their voting behaviour, particularly social class, has declined.' (2012: 284) In other words, this approach rips young people off any classed experience, i.e. any experience of social inequality and its potential feedback into their (non) voting behaviour.

[4] Notably, Grasso's omission of voting but inclusion of party membership seems a bit arbitrary.

1.2 Late modernity and new ways of political participation

The account of class as presented by Phelps stems directly from one of the key texts of individualisation theory: 'I would like to show that, as a result of shifts in the standard of living, subcultural class identities have dissipated, class distinction based on status have lost their traditional support, and processes for the "diversification" and individualization of lifestyles and ways of life have been set in motion.' This quote, taken obviously from Beck's 'Risk society' (1992: 91), is today considered a coffin nail for class analysis. In an earlier article (1983), Beck drafted his research programme, stating that 'in the course of processes of individualisation […] existing and ongoing inequalities [take] the characteristic of *statistical inequalities in distribution*, which are ever less interpretable in their efficacy ["lebensweltlich interpretierbar"], in that sense as they would result in obvious inequalities of individuals or groups.' (1983: 68)[5]

Before discussing the implications of late modernity on YPPP in more detail, it is important to realise that the suspension of social inequality in the course of sociologies of late modernity is not by mistake or due to a misinterpretation or mistranslation. Beck duly reflects on the decrease of the securities class and status used to bear up to the 20th century.[6] However, there are two fallacies to his conclusion. Firstly, Beck, although obviously taking Weber (rather than Marx) as a point of departure, effectively conflates class and status by applying a similar social efficacy to 'Klasse' as observed to 'Stand.' This is the reason why he cannot think class other than as identity in an absolute, i.e. non-relational way.[7] The second fallacy, which results from the former, is that this conceptualisation of class *as* status and the (correctly) observed loss of secure or fixed trajectories, provided by a person's 'Stand' dismisses the relative *in*securities which prevail for the disadvantaged classes. But even if class positions would translate directly into identities and these identities lost positive, productive significance, it does not mean they cease to have negative

[5] 'Im Zuge von Individualisierungsprozessen nehmen fortbestehende oder sich erneuernde Ungleichheiten den Charakter von *statistischen Verteilungsungleichheiten* an, die immer weniger lebensweltlich interpretierbar in dem Sinne sind, daß sie sich in eindeutigen Ungleichheiten von Personen und Gruppen niederschlagen.'

[6] It is noteworthy, that the German term 'Stand' goes beyond the English 'status' and should rather be translated as 'estate' as Turner (2019) noted. When Beck describes a society beyond 'Klasse und Stand' (class and status) he does not just refer to sociological categories put forward by Marx and Weber, but to a rigid and highly efficacious social ordering and reproduction system. This is the 'Lebensweltlichkeit' of the concept, which has eroded.

[7] Another irritating aspect of this claim are Beck's political implications, which do *not* start from Weber's third pillar of social structures, which are obviously parties.

significance. Thus, Beck's assertion of a classless society is both conceptually wrong, because he can only describe a society without 'Stände', and empirically false because there is no evidence for an end of the unequal distribution of the means of production, i.e. of capitalism.

Nevertheless, the notions of a social theory beyond class and status had far reaching repercussions, not least through their translation into political science and political sociology. It was indeed not a long way from 'beyond class and status' to 'beyond left and right' (Giddens 1994). But besides the debatable analysis of the end of traditional partisanship, the individualisation hypothesis had several implications for research into YPPP. This obviously coincided with the unprecedented forms of politics in a digital age (Vromen 2003; Vromen and Collin 2010; Vromen and Coleman 2013; Loader et al. 2014; Vromen et al. 2014; Xenos et al. 2014; Loader et al. 2016). This shift, or rather expansion of the public sphere also provided a response to Putnam's (1995) thesis of declining social capital among the "baby boomer"-generation, which is rather curious, given the many logical and empirical flaws of Putnam's observation and analysis (see Portes 1998).

Beck (1986, 1992), Giddens (1994), and Putnam (1995) became the three (con)founders of contemporary research into political participation, not least YPPP, in late modernity. Beck claimed the death of class and thus of class politics in the 'society of citizens' (Beck 1997: 143). In an 'end of history' tone, he sees the end of parties looming because the individual, released from the chains of tradition, would not anymore follow a party where her/his individual voice is not heard; partisanship is a 'habitual' (Phelps 2012: 284) thing like class, and after class has died, no young person is socialised in any classed way anymore. This is not least rooted in the new labour contracts, in which the 'entrepreneurial self' (Bröckling 2002, 2007) takes increased self-control in the rationalised economy[8] and obviously meets Beck's claim of a '*real* opportunity to fashion the conditions of their own life.' (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 37) Giddens supports this claim of the 'political privatism' when he argues for responsibility, the 'freely undertaken' commitment which he claims to be the guiding principle for politics. Interestingly, he suggests both collective and individual responsibility, but only individual agency: 'Life politics is a politics

[8] Cf. Butler (1997: 3): 'The master, who at first appears to be "external" to the slave, reemerges as the slave's own conscience. The unhappiness of the consciousness that emerges is its own self-beratement, the effect of the transmutation of the master into a psychic reality.'

of identity as well as of choice.' (Giddens 1994: 91) And: '"Life politics" – concerned with human self-actualisation, both on the level of the individual and collectively – emerges from the shadow which "emancipatory politics" have cast.' (Giddens 1991: 9)

This is 'the New Labour Lord' (Atkinson 2010b: 26) at his best: life politics is in fact an imperative to abandon emancipatory politics in the late modernity. In a Fukuyama-like interpretation of the time to come, Giddens not only claims the end of 'left and right' but asserts the fulfilment of the project (or struggles) of emancipatory politics. While he admits that there is still a need for emancipatory politics in some fields, he leaves no doubt about the levelling dawn of life politics: where the antiquated politics of emancipation 'obey[ed] imperatives suggested by the ethics of justice, equality and participation' the politics of the age to come aim at '[t]he creation of morally justifiable forms of life that will promote self-actualisation in the context of global interdependence' in a 'post-traditional order' (Giddens 1991: 215) Two points are remarkable here: firstly, the oppositions set up are based on the same (deliberate?) conflation and confusion of Klasse and Stand as categories detached from lifeworld experiences, we find in Beck's thesis. They are understood as narrow ideological straightjackets, which demand 'obedience' to 'imperatives' whereas the reflexive individuum of the late modernity freely 'creates' her own (moral) 'self-actualised' identity. This striking ideological twist follows just after the (correct) observation that 'emancipatory politics is concerned above all with overcoming exploitative, unequal or oppressive social relations' (Giddens 1991: 215). Thus, while he admits there *were* these adverse social relations, his ongoing assertions claim nothing but the end of these unnatural relations and therefore of these unnatural politics of ethics – thus, he introduces the '*nature* of *life* politics' (Giddens 1991: 215).[9]

Secondly, this naturalisation of the dawning politics of the late modernity is also mirrored in Giddens's usage of the psychotherapeutic language, borrowed from Maslow (cf. Atkinson 2010b: 26). This lingo naturalises individualisation as a human need and depicts the reflexive individuum as the one, which has 'shed the shackles' (Giddens 1991: 215) as if it achieved internal enlightenment of the self, which frees it from all the constrains of culture and

[9] This is even more interesting, as Giddens states not only class, but also women's and race struggles as examples of emancipatory politics.

releases it to nature. Obviously, nature is cruel, which again turns the revelation into an imperative, since 'it also introduces the new burden of having to constantly reconstruct an "inherently fragile" narrative of self-identity (Giddens, 1991: 185–6) and fosters a heightened likelihood of shame over the adequacy of one's identity and the inability to match up to one's "ideal self".' (Atkinson 2010b: 26). This links back to the pressure of self-optimisation, criticised by e.g. Bröckling (2002) or Butler (1997). In a capitalist dog-eat-dog world, the dog better is a self-entrepreneur.

The implications of Giddens work for political participation in general and for YPPP in particular are twofold. On the one hand, like Beck, he plays on the "end-of" piano, to mark a break and departure,[10] proclaiming the vanishing of class and thus class politics. On the other hand, his reflexive individualisation met with, and reinvigorated the vocabulary of political self-efficacy. The concepts of internal and external political efficacy were developed in the 1950s as a challenger to the predominant approach by Lazarsfeld, outlined above. Although the main idea put forward by Campbell et al. (1954) concerned party identification in the US election 1952 (cf. Campbell et al. 1953), the appendix on political efficacy contains a first systematic conceptualisation of political efficacy. There, they define it as 'the feeling that *individual political action* does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform *one's civic duties*. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can *play a part* in bringing about this change.[11]' (Campbell et al. 1954: 187) Parts of the YPPP literature drawing on "self-actualising political efficacy" seem to willingly ignore the details of this original conceptualisation to combine their approaches more neatly. In the society they envision, individuals take 'individual political action' to self-actualise themselves in their politics of 'lifestyle' and 'choice'. This is even easier applicable to young people in their formative years (Jones 2009).

It is now possible to short-circuit the problems of individualisation, political efficacy, and rational choice approaches to voting. Political efficacy, as a unidimensional feature of engaged citizenship,

[10] Interestingly, Giddens (1991: 213) criticises emancipatory politics for lacking direction, a tendency 'to be "away from" rather than "towards"', without providing a positive (in both sense of the word) outlook himself.

[11] This definition applies, as Niemi et al. clarify, to external efficacy, while internal efficacy refers to 'beliefs about one's own competence to understand, and to participate effectively in, politics' (1991: 1407).

was part of the narrative of the golden age of western capitalist democratic societies, as Craig et al. (1990) describe it. It was not until the 1970s, that internal and external efficacy began to depart, both in political and academic terms. Politicians became increasingly (portrayed as) detached and the political apparatus an enigmatic, overcomplex, and potentially corrupt, system. Obviously, youth movements or the students of '68 played their part in this disentanglement, when politically knowledgeable individuals with potentially high internal efficacy, had no (short-termed) external efficacy whatsoever. For the UK, some authors suggest, that the violent suppression of the miners' strike, which can also be viewed in the same manner – highly internally efficacious people, deprived of external political efficacy –, had a lasting effect on political disengagement of generations to come (Bright 2012). But even without the implications of the neoliberal project on political participation, the narrative of voting as a futile endeavour can be traced back to Downs (1957), who deemed it economically irrational to seek internal efficacy, because the costs are too high, given the marginal chance of being externally efficacious. The retreat to 'political privatism' is thus justified.

The apparently changing nature of politics (the influence of the academic discourse and research to facilitate this change is, as all too often, mostly tacitly ignored) shifted the focus of YPPP, although it can be argued that the field rather separated into those who stuck with the politics of election, representation, and emancipation and those, who followed the new narrative of 'life politics' in the late modernity. While the latter rightly demanded a broader conceptualisation of 'the political' (see for example O'Toole et al. 2003), this went along with a renunciation of electoral politics altogether. Instead, research into YPPP became predominantly concerned with '"cause-oriented" styles of politics (Norris, 2003) and "micro-politics" (Pattie et al., 2003)' (Henn et al. 2005: 558). Henn and Foard (2014: 361) too point to the widening cleavage between 'unorthodox methods of mass social and political action' on the one hand, while on the other hand, political participation in elections keeps declining. O'Toole (2015) lays out the roots of the new YPPP research project in a late-modernity perception of politics, adding another opposition to those offered by Giddens (1991: 215), namely 'dutiful' versus 'engaged' citizenship. Since life in late modernity starts after emancipatory politics, the studies referred to by O'Toole throughout make implicit assumptions about equalities of several kinds, not least with regard to young people's socio-economic situation, education, etc. or they start from a comparison of apples and pears: the declining turnout of young people is transferred one to one to a soaring of other forms

of participation, without problematising the considerable overlap of voting *and* "self-actualising" activism. This has relevant repercussions and qualifies not least the question of internet activism. One example is Twitter, which is considered the most influential network of web activism. Out of roughly 15 million registered Twitter users in the UK 2016,[12] approximately 30%, or 4.5 million were aged 15 to 24, a share of 56% of the total population aged 15 to 24.[13] Thus, even a Twitter campaign engaging 89% of young people (which is highly unlikely/almost impossible), would still reach out to only one in two young people. For the other 50% of the youth population, Twitter remains a semi-public sphere they read about in other media.

While remaining faithful to the narrative of life-politics, some researchers of YPPP do start to acknowledge persistent inequalities in the new fields and ways of political participation (Xenos et al. 2014), to address the possible divisions the inequalities in access to these new forms yield or reinforce (Loader et al. 2014), and remain cautious of the implications a retreat of young people from the old to the new politics has on the representation of young people's interests in liberal democracies (O'Toole 2015). This is even more critical, considering findings such as those by Melo and Stockemer (2014), who indicate not only that political abstention is contingent of educational attainment and current educational activity, which simultaneously points towards the persistent influence of class positions on the degree of political alienation (see also Henn and Foard 2014). They also found that experiences and feelings of discrimination are politically activating with regard to non-traditional forms, but have a negative effect on the likeliness to vote (Melo and Stockemer 2014).

Summing up, the narration of late modernity had and has significant impact on research into YPPP. On the one hand, because class positions are not yet fully developed which makes young people the barer of the classless future. But on the other hand, it sometimes seems as if Gidden's ill-informed political sociology was picked up uncritically by political scientists who were tired with cleavage theory and class politics.

[12] Note that this includes various levels of activity.

[13] https://www.statista.com/statistics/278320/age-distribution-of-twitter-users-in-great-britain/ https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland

1.3 Class politics – a revenant and her impact on political sociology

Twenty years before Beck and Giddens started their onslaught on class and class politics, Sartori (1990) attacks Lipset for his perception of elections as 'democratic class struggle' (1983[1959]: 230). His two main arguments against Lipset (and Rokkan and others) is that, firstly, their notion of class politics is based on a Marxian class theory, more precisely on a Marxian theory of class consciousness. This, so his second line of criticism, can only be a construct, since there can be no interest but self-interest, which is impossible to be collectively shared, since, as the economist informs him, '"if the members of a large group seek to maximise their personal welfare, they will *not* act to advance their common or group objectives."' (Sartori 1990: 155) This economically informed assessment is, besides its sociological and psychological ignorance, missing Lipset's point.

At the heart of the cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 1990), which is the basis of class politics as attacked by Sartori, lies the observation of multiple struggles in the social and political field. In their field diagram, Lipset and Rokkan identify a horizontal axis of conflicts which 'produce alliances of similarly situated or similarly orientated subjects and households over wider ranges of localities and tend to undermine the inherited solidarity of the established territorial communities.' (1990: 96) While pre-industrialised polities were structured predominantly along lines of spatial proximity and kinship (and although these lines of division do persist), modern parties are built rather on the foundations of 'similar situations', i.e. experiences which bring along shared objectives and interests. Certainly, this notion of class does comply with Marx's conceptualisation. However, it is revealing that Sartori is concerned only with class politics brought forward by the working class without any mentioning of shared or similar interests of any/the ruling class. This is even more prevalent in his mockery about the impossibilities of representation which he cannot imagine going beyond 'empathy' or 'reflection'.[14] Nevertheless, Sartori strikes a tone which echoes in Beck's and Giddens's work: major parties have (necessarily?) become "catch-all" or "broad church" parties to appeal to an electorate, which is (perceived as) increasingly individualised. Since their appeal does not reflect a narrowly and exhaustively defined class anymore, they cannot pursue class politics. And when class parties

[14] In fairness, he could not have read Hannah Pitkin 's (1972) seminal work on representation.

cease to exist, so do class politics. But if there is no class interest represented anymore, there is no class interest in the political realm. And since '"interest" is a synonym for "activity"', as Sartori (1990: 152) claims, class is dead and the classless individual is resurrected into the 'life politics' of 'identity' and 'choice'.

The sociologists of individualisation observed a decreasing influence of classed traditions and norms, and abolish class; political scientists, buying into the over-identification or equation of class parties with social classes (certainly partly the fault of the acting political parties), observe an increasing mismatch between parties and electorate and do just the same.[15]

Yet, from a sociological perspective, the original proposal put forward by Lipset and Rokkan is appealing. In fact, their political sociology starts out with an almost phenomenological proposition of solidarity of people in 'similar situations.' This, notwithstanding the further developments of the theories of cleavages and class politics, surprisingly matches the approach to class brought forward by Pierre Bourdieu. He criticised Marxist approaches to class for referring to 'paper classes', social constructs which do not relate to the lived experience of its hypothetical members but to a certain attribute only (Bourdieu 1987). While Lipset and Rokkan do see economic struggles as the predominant political struggle, and thus formative for democracies, since the 19th century, their starting point is an area cutting ability of people who suffer/enjoy the same living conditions to form alliances and, consequently, parties.

Party formation is not the central point here but voting and voter alignment is. In a first attempt to think class politics in a new and productive way which is also applicable to young people, a shift from the commonly used categories of cleavages to shared experiences are key.

Interestingly, although not surprisingly, research addressing young people in this way, is rather found in the field of youth studies, than in political sciences/sociology. For example, Hacket (2004) brings into the discussion the concept of 'delayed adulthood', borrowed from Judith Bessant. This contemporary phenomenon describes that 'young people today […] no longer have access to economic independence through employment. […] Government policy has exacerbated

[15] This holds even more true for YPPP: in the PSA's own YPPP volume, edited by Mycock and Tonge (2014), neither socio-economic status nor social class are of major concern, with only two out of ten articles even mentioning social inequalities and its possible impact on YPPP.

this situation by interventions such as youth training schemes.' (2004: 75) The result of this delay, she argues, is a kind of incomplete citizenship. While one should be critical of this implicit equation of citizenship with employment, her argument points towards the opportunity (or need?) to organise e.g. in trade unions, i.e. to collectivise experiences. This point is striking, as it contradicts the findings by Henn and his colleagues that being educated/in education would foster political interest and participation. Hacket on the contrary points towards the possibly isolating function of education for pay, claiming that the debt burden awaiting graduates results in 'concentration on an individual future and leaves little room for collective political action.'(ibid.)

Bessant (2004) points to another problem of YPPP. The standardisation of young people's lives entails a decrease in enfranchisement, a curtailing of self-determination. What Bessant unfortunately leaves untouched is that this experience, the subjective degree of self-determination, is not class-neutral.[16] Her 'delayed adulthood' is mirrored in the short history of politics and sociologies of youth in the UK by Roberts (2013). Before the 1970s, youth was mainly perceived in terms of the school-to-work transition, which led to a strange division of labour in the social sciences with sociology focussing on the broad middle group while the extremes were left 'for the attention of criminologists and other specialists'. It was the demise of the youth labour market in the late 1970s which changed the public and sociological image of young people from 'young adults' to 'old children'. With no entry employment possibilities available for the majority, governments began to issue training placements, raised the compulsory schooling age, and made higher education 'the new default option for Britain's young people.' (Roberts 2013; (Bourdieu 1993: 97–98) This led to the establishment of a new normativity, a new legitimacy of transition routes which delegitimised deviances: it is the natal hour of NEETs (Not in Employment, Education, or Training) as a sociological and political category. Research swayed with discourse and the middle was somewhat left behind. Meanwhile, however, this middle ground of young people, who, in the 1990s, were neither NEETs nor at top-tier universities, came under pressure, exactly because the industries they used to enter got increasingly 'rationalised'

[16] To anticipate an example from the LSYPE data, upper class parents are very much likely to determine their children's subjects for year 10, however they are also much more likely to discuss this with their children and persuade them, thus giving the child a feeling of (partly) taken the decision themselves.

and because they were most affected by trends of casualization and the like: 'Some aspects of the predicaments of middling youth today were experienced by the least qualified […] several decades ago.' (Roberts 2013)[17]

Roberts bolsters Bessant's link regarding the lack of self-determination and political participation when he states that young people from affluent, highly educated backgrounds 'tend to be skilled consumers, adept at claiming their citizens' rights.' (Roberts 1997: 357) Thus the link comes full circle: even though the experience of insecurity may affect young people from all backgrounds, it is met with very different degrees of self-awareness and self-determination, which is indeed linked to their attitude towards citizenship. Similar evidence is provided by Fenton and Dermott (2006), who clearly show that aside from the narrative of the flexible creative worker, labour market insecurity and forced flexibility affects lower ties of young workers much more than upper.

Roberts and Bessant raise an important point regarding the flawed application of classical political participation theory to young people: they all assume a somewhat complete(d) class position of the first-time voters.[18] This may had hold true for past times, where young people at voting age had passed the most important transitionary stages, had left home, often founded a family, were in employment and unionised, or, since higher education was even more exclusive than today, had indeed such strong 'Standesbewusstsein' (status consciousness) that they could make a status-informed electoral choice. By contrast, Phelps (2012), does not even mention SES or the resource approach anymore in his review of youth turn out. Although he acknowledges that 'young people from less advantaged backgrounds […] have not had the luxury of becoming

[17] Although "youth' is just a word' (1993: 94) in Bourdieu's relational sociology, the collective experience of young people in compulsory education does create a position where young people are, along class-lines, prospective inheritors of positions held by their parental generation. Bourdieu's analysis of the 'educational inflation' also still holds true and puts young people in a state of insecurity, since they lose certainty about how and when they will inherit the desired positions (given that the position still exists, one may add, given the degree and speed of de-industrialisation and automatization Bourdieu could not anticipate back then). This shared insecurity goes 'beyond all class differences' (1993:101) although the initial advantage of the dominant classes prevails.

[18] The problem of citizenship and voting/abstention has further implications, hardly addressed by political science. Common research into political participation apply an 'ad-hoc'-citizenship to their participants, neglecting different geneses of civic identities. While this problem is more obvious with regard to young people, it also applies for groups like immigrants.

"post-materialist" in their political attitudes' (2012: 283) he defies the efficacy of any classed experience on youth turnout with reference to the weakened structure of political cleavages, meaning identities.[19]

1.4 A way forward – young people, Bourdieu, and insecurities

So, what could be a way forward? As has been shown, the "old" class politics and cleavage theories as well as common resource or SES models are either outdated – on the part of traditionalism, late modernity theories do apply –, or they are not perfectly applicable to YPPP due to the transitionary stage young people find themselves in, while at the same time, social inequalities among young people do undoubtedly exist and persist, and are efficacious in shaping political participation – both regarding the means deployed and the overall likeliness to participate.

The proposed approach draws predominantly on a Bourdieusian understanding of inequalities and classes, and identifies insecurities as a key feature for an altered understanding of social inequalities and political participation. Bourdieu (2011[1986]) identified three forms of capital – economic, cultural, social – which individuals accumulate over their lifetime. These capitals are interchangeable, which can be illustrated thinking about the translation of education (cultural capital) into occupations with higher remunerations, i.e. economic capital. For Bourdieu (1985, 1987, 1989, 2010[1984], 2011[1986]) the forms of capital are not isolated assets, but constitute an individual's position in the social space, that is, all forms of capitals are always relative and relational. A class analysis in Bourdieusian terms thus relies not only on one factor, e.g. the possession of the means of production, as in Marxian terms, but takes into consideration both the volume and the composition of the individual's capital. This again is relational, and it is a question of symbolic power (and symbolic violence) to negotiate and define the value of the different capitals in relation to other qualities and quantities of capitals. Symbolic power in the social space is of utmost importance for political participation, as Bourdieu shows in *Distinction* (2010[1984]): the ability and likeliness to form, formulate, and articulate a political opinion is heavily dependent on the individual's possession and activation of their capitals.

[19] This misunderstanding is almost ironic when he later refers to the 'habitual' character of class.

While Bourdieu's concept of the political field has had a faithful following for some years, empirical research in political sociology is rare but recent: Flemmen (2014), Flemmen and Haakestad (2018), Harrits (2013), Harrits et al. (2010), Jarness et al. (2019), and Keere (2018) made notable contributions in this regard, examining what they call 'political space', spaces of 'political resources' or 'political practices' and the respective homologies with social spaces in Norway, Denmark, Flanders or within a subset of the social space. While these approaches are important ground-breakers for future applications of Bourdieusian concepts and methods in political sociology, most of them start out on the premise of realised political participation.[20] Atkinson (2017: 65–68) too makes this observation and, with references to the aforementioned problem raised by Bourdieu in *Distinction*, asks, whether the undecided- or the "don't know"-position is not a 'position-taking' in its own right, i.e. whether the principal homology to be investigated is the one between the position in the social space and the position *towards* the political space, i.e. the sense of entitlement and belonging to the polity, necessary to partake in it. In a more conceptual work Harrits 'dissolves the question of exclusion from within or without by insisting that inclusion or exclusion is a matter of agreement between an individual class *habitus* (i.e. social biography) and the field structure, *illusio* and *doxa* (i.e. field history).' (2011: 241). Deploying qualitative methods, she demonstrates how among the upper classes 'politics is a normal and natural practice' to which they are entitled as 'natural and legitimate political agents' (ibid.: 245) whereas among most working-class interviewees she finds 'a high degree of political estrangement.' (ibid.: 251) But what the upper- and working-class share is the misrecognition of the relationship between class and political power. This misrecognition, however, is not by accident or the consequence of an unintended unsuccessful socialisation (containing 'elements of coercion and dominance' (ibid.: 238)) into a shared democratic habitus; rather, this disenfranchisement of some and entitlement of others is part and parcel of the functioning of the Janus-faced state (Bourdieu 2014: 227).

Bourdieu, obviously, aimed at developing a more general conceptualisation of the social world and thus did not research young people in particular, of course with the substantial exception of *The Inheritors* (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990), which focussed on the elements of the education

[20] Furthermore, none of these studies engages with young people nor is age deemed a relevant category in any of these studies.

system in France reproducing the social order.[21] However, while his interest was more in the questions of symbolic power and the social construction of knowledge creation as a tool for suppression (Bourdieu 1976) and simultaneous integration (Bourdieu 2014), the aforementioned *Inheritors* led to a rather lopsided approach to young people through a Bourdieusian lens, in which young people are seen solely as offspring of a certain background (Crozier et al. 2008a; Crozier et al. 2008b; Crozier et al. 2011; Crozier and Reay 2011) and a focus is laid on their habitus formation in, through or against their background.

However, young people do not stand outside the social space. And subsequently, although their family background is highly significant, they are themselves, as (young) individuals partaking in the struggles of the social space. They struggle obviously with their parental generation and the norms and formations carried by the older generation(s); they do act in various fields and are part of power dynamics in the cultural spheres. But most significantly, young people possess, accumulate, and exchange all different forms of capitals. While a lot of the economic capital is obviously inherited and, depending on the age of the young person, not necessarily at their immediate command, young people's economic capital is an important signifier and thus distinctive asset to have or have not. Similarly, starting with their different inheritance, young people do acquire qualitatively and quantitatively differing cultural capitals. In the same way, their social capital is significantly formed at that age. The investment in attending Eton might be measured predominantly in economic capital; the return is not least measured in social capital.

Following Bourdieu's capital theory, an application to political participation would suggest an amendment of the resource model, using the mentioned forms of capitals as different resources (like time, money, and skills as suggested by Brady et al. 1995). Yet, this approach would neglect two important aspects of Bourdieu's theory. Firstly, the resource model, like the SES model, treats the resources under consideration in an absolute, i.e. non-relational way.[22] As a result, shortage of one or another resource becomes an essentialist characteristic of the respective person. Bourdieu, on the contrary, makes clear that one cannot understand neither the

[21] Translations, even of book titles, are often missing out on significant semantics. The French title referred much more to the character of education as a form of capital, which is passed on to a next generation. In German, the text first appeared in a volume titled 'The illusion of equality of chances' (Die Illusion der Chancengleichheit) and has become almost proverbial.

[22] Similar needs to be criticised about the Great British Class Survey by Savage et al. (2013); more on this later.

quality nor the quantity of an individual's capital if not related to that of another individual. But, secondly, an analysis of the distribution and composition of capitals in a given society or population needs to reflect the structures of symbolic power which value and evaluate the individual's capital; it needs to engage with the 'symbolic struggles over the power to produce and to impose the legitimate vision of the world' (Bourdieu 1989: 20).

Young people thus partake in intermediate and therefore twofold symbolic struggles: on the one hand, they are subject to the symbolic power structuring their life and especially the transitions they undergo at this age; on the other hand, they reproduce and legitimate this symbolic power in their everyday life through their habitual dispositions and their ability to adhere to the legitimate culture, aspirations, consummation, behaviour etc. Willis (1983[1977]) exemplarily showed, how young people are agents, as Bourdieu would call them, who form and adapt their expectations and attitudes responsively to the demands of the dominant culture. Facing the general societal demands (the first symbolic struggle), they develop their specific responsive attitudes towards these demands, which find their expression in their attitudes and routines and feed back into their direct environment (second symbolic struggle).

Pursuing political sociology[23] with Bourdieu therefore needs to embed the experience and act of political participation into the lifeworld experience of (young) people. Political participation is not an isolated activity, a separated field in Bourdieusian terms,[24] where questions of power and capitals are suspended.[25] Instead, political sociology through a Bourdieusian lens tries to explain political behaviour in the context of symbolic power and struggles, which can be done best with a phenomenological approach. This means focussing on the everyday experience of citizens to trace the influence of these experiences on the likeliness to vote.

---

[23] Political sociology is, as many fields, an ever-questioned term. Taking sides with Bottomore (1979), political sociology here is used to describe sociological research into the foundations of politics and not the sociological examination of parties and politics dynamics.

[24] Unfortunately, Bourdieu himself contributed to this perspective on the politics through his examination of the political field, although the examination of the field of politics does not at all imply the detachment of this field from the prevalent social powers, shaping the social space.

[25] Ironically, the decline of class and status traditionalism actually increased the effect of structural power and violence, since traditionalist mass mobilisation endowed powerless groups with (temporary) political power, detached from their disadvantaged position in the social space.

While some researchers on YPPP claim a Bourdieusian understanding of e.g. class and ethnicity (e.g. (Marsh et al. 2007), there is little thorough engagement with Bourdieu's ideas in political sociology but rather a fig leave approach to abandon class politics while still engaging with "class". In general, there is hardly any engagement with phenomenological approaches to political participation (also without engagement with Bourdieu's difficult bulky scientific prose). Phenomenological approaches in political science are most likely found in political psychology (even if political psychologist, especially of the positivist variant, are cautious to call it phenomenological). The literature on well-being and health, e.g. Mattila and Rapeli (2017), points towards a variety of life-world-explanations for political behaviour, from voting to general trust in politics and political institutions. Recent research in this realm by Ojeda (2015) and Hassell and Settle (2017) bridges psychological approaches to voting behaviour in a prolific way for research into YPPP. Using experiments and field experiments Hassell and Settle (2017) show how stressful situations or even the memory of them affects voter turnout. In their experiment, the reminder of insecurities and threats, like economic hardship, illness of themselves or their families, significantly lowered the self-reported likeliness to vote. Notably, the effect size differs with regard to 'habitual voting', i.e. the effect is larger for people who had not voted before. While the authors do not differentiate for age groups (although they control for age and age squared, to control for non-linear effects of age on voting behaviour), the group of non-habitual voters likely includes young people who are eligible to vote for the first time. The second experiment (although a field experiment with unknown uncontrolled covariates) yielded further significant results for YPPP. Instead of asking the participants about actual stressful events using pre-formulated questions, the researchers wrote postcards to the prospective voters before an election, asking them to write about experiences of stress. The analysis of the answers showed, that respondents who wrote about future experiences of stress were most likely not to vote. The overall effect of the stressor treatment was again larger for people who had not voted in the preceding election. Two import things can be taken from these experimental findings for YPPP. Firstly, stress, insecurities, anxieties have a demobilising effect, which is significantly stronger for people who have not voted before. By implication, the findings suggest that voting as political participation is more likely, if a certain level of security is provided. And secondly, this effect is even stronger

for projected stress.[26] Thus, the security fostering voting is a sustainable security; overcome hardship has a less negative effect than hardship ahead. For YPPP, this means anxieties about the future (and arguably, young people have less lifetime behind them to refer to) impact voting.

Similar was found by Ojeda (2015), who shows the significance of depression on voting behaviour.[27] But instead of focussing on recent or current indications, he shows how adolescent depression affects voting behaviour later in life. Depression with its psychological traits of feelings of hopelessness and lack of self-efficacy can be translated rather directly into a deprivation of political efficacy, external as well as internal. But with reference to the resource model of political participation (Brady et al. 1995), Ojeda further suggests that the avolition and frailty accompanying depressions also decrease the resources necessary for political participation. While these effects are rather apparent for current depressive moods, the striking finding is that past, namely adolescent depressions contribute to habitual non-voting. Although parts of this effect are mediated by variables like education (adolescent depression adversely affects educational participation which is positively correlated with voting), the negative direct impact of adolescent depression on voting prevails. So even while voters may recover from their negative mental states – democracies are at risk not to recover from their citizens' depressions. Although Ojeda introduces depressive moods as supplementary to the resource model, he does not conceal that depression is in itself a matter of social inequality as the prevalence of depression is higher in the working class (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010).

With both stress/insecurity and depression remaining indicators of social inequality and the prevalence and significance of social class (Evans and Tilley 2017: 24–26), the *New Politics of Class* (Evans and Tilley 2017) is increasingly a question of political participation and voting, lesser an issue of party alignment (ibid.: 172). However, as Evans and Tilley also show (2017: 173), this phenomenon is a rather recent one in the UK, gaining significant momentum from 1997 onwards, i.e. under the New Labour regime. While the authors seek explanation for this mainly in the change of political discourse especially of the Labour party under Blair, they do not engage

[26] Similar was found by Thoits (1994) who emphasised, how unsolved stressors differ in their impact, i.e. in their psychological symptomatology on people.

[27] The survey data used in the paper discussed does not allow for clear cut differentiation of depressions and depressive moods. Thus, the terms are used interchangeably.

with the wider societal impact of neoliberalism on the constitution of the self (Bröckling 2007). Drawing on the observations and explanations by Leighley and Nagler (1992), the authors warn of a vicious circle, new to British politics (but common in the US), where the disengagement of the working class led to an abandoning of the working class as a constituency, thus accelerating the problem of not being represented in policies and politics. Similar is put forward by Ojeda who describes a 'political cycle of depression' which would entail three steps: '(1) individuals with depression are unlikely to participate in the political process, (2) the lack of participation leads to underrepresentation and a lack of policies that benefit those with depression, and (3) the lack of beneficial policy outcomes perpetuates the experience of depression. And so it repeats.' (2015)

While political science and psychology thus come to similar conclusions, there are two important questions, which demand a genuine sociological answer. Firstly, the clinical explanations for the consequences of depressions on political participation are (mostly) unsatisfactory. In particular, when considering the mediating effects on stress (Hassell and Settle 2017) and depression (Ojeda 2015), one wonders how habitual voting and education should alter fatigue and avolition. A hint in the right direction is given by Ojeda, when relating depressions to political efficacy (although this is not further explored in his conclusions). Political efficacy can arguably be understood as a phenomenological problem. Thus, stress and depression have a negative impact on people's perception of being efficacious, of 'having a voice' as Bourdieu (2010[1984]: 260) put it – a problem he attested mainly to the working class and women in 1970s France. The observed variables of stress and anxieties thus become more than "just" psychological traits; they are social and socially powerful categories because of their impact on perceptions of the self and society. Which leads on to the second problem: while there is a broad consensus about neuro-physiological causes of depression, research is equally in agreement on the significance of social determinants of this condition. The cited experiments made this point as well. And although depressive moods, stress, anxieties and other troublesome conditions must certainly not be equated, it is necessary, especially because of their sociological implications, to understand these conditions as *social* conditions and, like Foucault (1971) exemplified it, as products of a specific social order.

Bourdieu's sociology can connect and examine both problems. His theories of habitus, symbolic power, and capital elucidate simultaneously the production of these adverse conditions and how

and why these conditions hush those affected by them. While most of Bourdieu's political sociology is concerned with analyses of the political field (Wacquant and Bourdieu 2005; Swartz 2013; Bonikowski 2015), the political implications of symbolic power and violence can be found in many of his works, not least in his cited opus magnum *Distinction* (2010[1984]). Nevertheless, a key text to a political sociology which focusses on the aforementioned conditions of political mobilisation is *Algeria 1960: The disenchantment of the world* (1979). In this study on peasants under colonial rule, Bourdieu describes political apathy as consequence of an existential insecurity: *précarité*.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented theoretical explanations for political participation, especially voting behaviour, with particular consideration of these approaches for YPPP. It showed on the one hand, how the general political participation literature is pre-eminently occupied with party politics and focusses on the socio-economic status or the resource model for the explanation of abstention – an approach yielding difficulties for the application on young people outside (before) the labour market. On the other hand, the specific literature on YPPP appears nowadays dominated by approaches which take the theories of late modernity and individualisation at face value, thus avoiding a proper engagement with social inequality among young people and its significance for political participation. In comparison to these dominant strands in politics and political sociology, evidence from political psychology suggests the impact of lifeworld experiences on voting behaviour: stress, anxieties and depression affect political participation, especially when occurring in adolescence. At the same time, class politics have become less and less a question of party politics than of abstention/political participation at all. And to complete the first circle of this spiral problem, the mentioned psychological conditions are more prevalent among the working classes. Thus, a phenomenological sociological approach to YPPP is introduced, which is able to synthesise and explain those two phenomena as related and relational, as it understands both class and stress/anxieties as social phenomena which shape perceptions of political efficacy. This approach was first put forward by Pierre Bourdieu, who described *précarité* among Algerian peasants as a condition of existential insecurities, leading to political apathy. The following chapter will critically engage with this concept, combining it with and contrasting it to other uses of the vocabulary of precarity and precariousness.

2 Precarity is everywhere

Social marginalisation and labour market insecurity, deprivation and casualization: the 'Precariat' is of growing concern both in academia and among policy makers on national and European level. Most analyses of this allegedly new phenomenon take the real existing welfare state of the 'golden age of capitalism', i.e. 1945 until 1971, as a starting point. Neoliberal attacks on Keynesian economic policies together with a plethora of other social and economic dynamics (e.g. the shift of the economic weight from industry to the service sector; increased labour market participation of women; the accelerated globalisation of capital and labour) led to the destabilisation of what was once known to be a 'path from cradle to grave' and triggered previously inconceivable phenomena like casualization, zero-hour-contracts, and agency work across almost all professions. Thus, many contemporary accounts of precariousness depict the problem as a very recent, unprecedented form of social insecurity, marginalisation or exclusion. This has several implications: firstly, the historical situating means an isolation of the condition in time and thus impedes bridging recent experiences of precariousness to historic experiences and thus to the 'universality of the experience', as Butler phrased it. This is enforced, secondly, through the focus on industrial relations which is also potentially misleading, because while precariousness as a universal experience is not unprecedented, the contemporary complexity of the global division of labour is. Thus, macro theories of precariousness struggle in their catch-all approach if they remain on the level of industrial relations. Thirdly, the "discovery" of precariousness in contemporary societies is often interpreted as a shortcoming of existing class systems (and struggles) and thus succeeded by a reification of the condition into a new class, the 'Precariat'.

In contrast to these accounts, this chapter seeks to develop a more comprehensive conceptual approach by introducing Butler's terminology of precarity and precariousness and by developing a Bourdieusian understanding of precarious conditions of existence to excavate the inherently political character of precarity.[28]

[28] Following Lorey (2015), this text uses *precariousness* to describe the very condition of being precarious, while the neologism *precarity* is used to refer to the social, political and legal embeddedness and thus effectiveness of the very condition.

Picking up the themes of the opening paragraph, the chapter starts with a short genealogy of the major terms and dissects recent and significant contributions to the discussion, with special attention being paid to Guy Standing's idea of a 'Precariat' as a new 'dangerous class'. In contrast to them, the second section introduces the thick theoretical conceptualisations brought forward by Judith Butler and refined by Isabell Lorey. Pierre Bourdieu's idea of *précarité* is then presented as a more sociological account of precarity. Subsequently, the chapter tries to make sociological sense of the philosophical ideas, by tying together the phenomenological roots of Butler and Bourdieu and describing her ideas through his vocabulary of capitals and habitus. This synthesis also reinstates the political character, both in cause and consequence, of precarity. The theoretical bedrock is then supplemented, drawing from the works of Marie Jahoda. Her social-psychology of "positive mental health", together with a more psychological or even psychoanalytical understanding of Bourdieu's concepts, links the topics of the chapter back to the research question of young people's political participation (YPPP) to show why the gaps identified in the literature could (and should) be understood as questions of precarity and how this new notion of precarity is prolific for research on political participation and YPPP in particular.

2.1 A short genealogy of precariousness and precarity

Most approaches to precariousness depart from a deficiency discourse where precariousness is described as a multidimensional deficit compared to a defined norm. Precariousness is therefore seen as a kind of deviation.[29] In a short history of the usage of *précarité* in France, Barbier (2002) interestingly shows how the term first emerged in sociology in the 1970s as a rather broadly understood term to describe a social condition without any reference to either status or employment, and it was only at the end of that decade that precariousness denoted a social status primarily related to employment. At the beginning of the 1990s precariousness was linked to

[29] This approach opens up several pitfalls. On the one hand, the arbitrary or temporary character of any norm implicitly is at perils for a race to the bottom. While Marchart (2013: 9–10) makes obvious how this approach leads inevitably to an infinite regress of negative conditions if the conceptualisation stays within the orbit of paid labour, Castel (2003) shows how economic developments go hand in hand with changing industrial relations. If precarious working conditions thus become the rule in a new economic setup, e.g. in the age of "platform capitalism", a deficit notion of precariousness becomes superfluous. In the same vein, the simultaneity of non-simultaneity, that is the coexistence of an 'old' industrial workers Proletariat and the "Cybertariat" (as Ursula Huws calls it), curtails this conceptualisation to different industrial sectors and thus limits the analytical power while qualifying the descriptive usefulness.

labour law, referring to precarious employment contracts (but still contracts), whereas at the end of the 1990s, Bourdieu famously exclaimed precarity 'is everywhere' (Bourdieu 2003), an analysis joined by e.g. Boltanski and Chiapello. While the French use of *précarité* is rather academically framed, Casas-Cortés (2014) shows, starting with 'precariedad laboral' in 1980s, how social movements in Spain but also in France (where Bourdieu was a key public intellectual in support of these movements) and Italy and finally in the EuroMayDay movement made use of and further developed the concept.[30] The four intertwined conceptual meanings of labour precarity she identified are '(1) labor after the rollback of welfare state provisions; (2) the new paradigm of intermittent and immaterial labor; (3) the unceasing mobility of labor; (4) the feminization of labor and life' (Casas-Cortés 2014: 207). Precarity, as a fighting term, had inevitably become a catch-all phrase and found various applications especially in the analysis of precarious work of migrants and other marginalised groups. Despite (or because?) of their origins in social movements, most of these notions remained somewhat in the mentioned deficiency discourse. The most fruitful theoretical debate evolved from the feminist thread, which was predominantly led by activist groups like the 'Precarias a la Deriva' in Spain, who appear to be the first to have expanded the notion of precariousness to life beyond labour regimes (Precarias a la deriva 2004).

This expansion of the concept beyond industrial relations is mirrored in Marchart's (2013: 14–15) differentiation between a narrow, a wider and a comprehensive definition of precarity. The first one is confined to labour market norms and stuck in the deviation discourse. But equally significant, this narrow definition assigns precarity the status of a fringe phenomenon where precarity is a marginal and thus a marginalisation problem. Hence, the vocabulary of the 'left-behind'. This social positioning serves a twofold function: it confines the social space of integration, assigning the precarious a space outside this sphere (Castell also talks about the 'spheres of integration', a figure also picked up by Standing) while at the same time containing the problem *outside* the normal social fabric. It is noteworthy that the topographical determination was developed and used, not least, for political campaigning: the 'left-behind

[30] It is worth noting, that these debates arrived with significant delay in two major European countries: Germany and the UK. While this would go beyond the realm of this thesis, the absence of the debate in Blair-Giddens-UK and Schröder-Beck-Germany is intriguing and should be examined.

Precariat' ('Abgehängtes Prekariat', Müller-Hilmer (2006)) was constructed as a stratum of society which cannot be politically mobilised any more.[31] (Marchart 2013: 15)

Summarising the discourse on precarity, Marchart offers a typology or schema of precarity definitions (see Figure 1). Interestingly, Marchart, while critically examining the employment-centred approach offered by Castel, Dörre and colleagues, appears still to be stuck in an economic definition of precarity and a teleology towards (secure? normal?) employment, thus, in a deviance discourse. Of course, this approach is therefore also falling short of fully integrating people outside the labour market.

Figure 1: Three definitions of precarity (Marchart 2013: 24)

Society of precarity (comprehensive definition)

Hard to define characteristic of

- Post-Fordism (regulation theory)
- Security- and 'precarity-society' (governmentality studies)
- Cognitive capitalism (post-operaism)
- the 'new spirit' of capitalism (pragmatic sociology)
- the current hegemonic formations of society (discourse analytical hegemony theory)

Precarity as a sphere of society (wider definition)

Confinable phenomenon of an expanding 'sphere of insecurity', linked to conditions of paid work (Castel, Dörre, and others)

Precarity as societal 'fringe' (narrow definition)

Precarity as marginal phenomenon, to be tackled in socio-technical terms ('lower-class'- and 'exclusion'-debate)

Nevertheless, the overview on the precarity discourses shows how various theoretical traditions align in their analysis of the inescapability of nowadays precarity. They all share, according to Marchart, a 'radical relationalism' (2013: 51), leaving behind both the paradigms of individualism and structuralism. And they agree on the pervasiveness of precarity, leading to a '"latent state of

[31] It is noteworthy that the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, which commissioned this study in Germany, is the scientific/political foundation of the German Social-democratic Party (SPD).

psychosis" which eventuates as soon as the "permanent precarious condition becomes a matter of course"' (Bologna 2006 cited in Marchart 2013). This characteristic of precarity as a universally pervasive condition has not least severe implications on the perception of social positionality and class. Following Bourdieu's (1999) study on everyday life in neoliberal capitalism, Pelizzari (2007) points towards the restructuring effect of precarity on the social structure. Even though precarity *is* a universal trend, as explicated by various theorists mentioned before, its implications are anything but equally distributed. On the contrary: while Fordism provided the working class with security which worked as a 'moratorium of exclusion' (Groh-Samberg 2006: 245), the degradation of these securities furthers the emphasis on inherited advantages, e.g. cultural capital. That way, precarisation – Pelizzari stresses the procedural character of precarity (2007: 66) – reinforces class fractions and hierarchies by adding the ability to deal with insecurities as a transversal feature and additional line of class differentiation, which in turn needs to be understood in their intersection not least with ethnicity and age (Kalleberg 2009: 10).

As Busch et al. (2010) clarify, following Dörre (2010): the discourses on precarity definitely have their *origins* in changes in the labour market and employment structure in post-Fordist capitalism. Only a non-segmented, fully unified labour market can live up to the promise of complete societal integration via employment. While, arguably, there has never been such an integrated labour market, the chances of *dis*integration *via* the labour market used to be very low. This is the main game-changing aspect of precarity in the industrial relation perspective: today, precarious employment, the never-ending status passages between education and employment, unemployment, re-education, re-employment and so on put (young) people at risk of being pushed into a second labour market, which has become more and more established in all strata of society.

2.1.1 The Precariat (and what is wrong with it)

The social position of precarious workers has become a recurring problem for social research, culminating in the question whether this deviation from "normal" labour market arrangements actually constitutes a new social class. Notably, also the discourses of precarity Marchart analyses are rooted in, and partly confined to, their national and social contexts, a fact which applies to all social inequality research as Haller (2007) strikingly shows, and it is of special significance that the vocabulary of precariousness and precarity 'arrived' in the United Kingdom significantly later

than in continental European sociology (see footnote 30).[32] Nevertheless, at the latest with the publication of Guy Standing's 'Precariat' (2014b), precarity has entered the sociological mainstream discourse.

In two volumes, Standing (Standing 2014a, 2014b) develops his account of a new global social class system, which includes the Precariat, which is 'becoming a new dangerous class. […] The very success of the "neo-liberal" agenda, embraced to a greater or lesser extent by governments of all complexions, has created an incipient political monster. Action is needed before that monster comes to life.' (Standing 2014b: 1) Before criticising this reification of precarious conditions, it is important to understand Standing's account of social classes, which are 'determined primarily by specific "relations of production", specific "relations of distribution" (sources of income), and specific relations to the state.' (Standing 2014a: 13) Two things are important here: firstly, the relationality he proposes differs significantly from the 'radical relationalism' found in the accounts of precarity discussed above. Regardless of their different narrow, broad or comprehensive definition, the referenced scholars identify precarity as a working-class condition; relationality describes, as Castel calls them, different spheres of (dis)integration from the 'normal' working class. Instead, Standing's idea is to relate classes not so much with each other but to define them in relation to, i.e. access to, labour rights, non-wage income (e.g. state benefits), and representation. Secondly, these criteria also point towards the deception of Fordist capitalism as a golden era of societal integration – citizenship indeed – via the labour market.

What makes the Precariat a class, at least 'in-the-making', are therefore again deviations from a norm. Standing is mainly concerned with depicting the Precariat as not being part of the 'old' working class. Declining the Precariat through his criteria catalogue, Wright sums up: 'The Precariat is thus defined by three overarching criteria: *precariousness* within the relations of production, *vulnerability* within the relations of distribution, and *marginality* within the relations

[32] The critique of infamous, nasty 'methodological nationalism', uttered repeatedly not least by Ulrich Beck, is part and parcel of the individualisation agenda to abolish socio-historic genesis of social inequality and its mechanisms and discourses of legitimisation – knowing, that by 'transcending' these discourses, social sciences cannot address lifeworld problems of political power and social inequality. This is not to say that equating society with nation-state-populations is not problematic; but ignoring the efficacy of local, regional, national formations of a populace is not less problematic for the reasons mentioned.

to the state' (2015: 162) and concedes, that it was the concurrence of these criteria, which would make the Precariat distinct from the working class.

But is this really the case? Right after the publication of the first volume, Standing's Precariat received a lot of criticism from leftist scholars, criticising his idea of an emerging class mainly on the grounds of traditional Marxist ideas (Breman 2013; Palmer 2013). More recently, and after the publication of the second volume on the 'Precariat charter', Wright (2015) brought forward a more nuanced critique from a Marxist point of view. Using the metaphor of capitalism as a game, with rules and moves, Wright argues that the Precariat should not be seen as a distinct class, neither in-the-making, nor in-becoming. The Precariat, just like any other working class (if internal differentiation is assumed), is on the losing end of capitalism and they all share the same interest with regard to changing the game. Standing's 'hostility to what he calls "orthodox labourism", by which he means not reformist trade-unionism' (Breman 2013: 134) may be the reason for the alleged distance between the Precariat and the Proletariat, which is deceptive of the reality of wage labour. Secondly, regarding the rules of the game, i.e. the different attempts to tame capitalism in different national contexts,[33] the Precariat is again part of the working class in as far as the respective national social strata allocate similar positions to both. It is again Standing's rage against labourism which seems to lead him to assume that policies for the advantage of the Precariat would not be welcomed by the "old" working class, while at the same time he obviously assumes that policies for the "old" working class would harm the Precariat. Investigating the 'Precariat charter', Wright shows that all of the 29 proposals Standing made to ameliorate the conditions of the Precariat are in the interest of any working people. (Wright 2015: 170) Finally, when it comes to the moves in the game, the Precariat, fractioned as it is (Standing 2014a, 2014a: 29–30) is not more or less divided than the working class, with class positions who are simultaneously exploiting and exploited.

A Bourdieusian critique of the idea of a new "class" is twofold, although both touch on the question of reflexivity. Firstly, one may question whether the attributes for the depiction of a new class are exhaustive, even more so for Standing's allegedly global focus. In presenting a wide

[33] Notably, the contradiction between finding a 'new global class' while making the relation to the state a feature of class position is somewhat bemusing.

variety of evidence for his claim of this 'class-in-the-making', Standing strangely disentangles the object of his analysis – a globally growing mass of workers outside traditional industrial relations – from his analytical standpoint, which is that of an English middle-class professor. This is most palpable in two regards. Firstly, Standing's unswerving comparison of Western European industrial relations with work and labour arrangements in the Global South is almost bemusing. In Marchart's typology (see Figure 1), Standing seems to follow the 'narrow definition' approach and he not only sticks with the narrow labour market characteristics of precarity, but also locates the Precariat at the global and social margins. The latter point is connected with the problem of his detachment from his object of research and lack of reflexivity. Applying a post-colonial lens, major parts of the book can be read as an awakening from the slumber of western capitalisms to the globalised exploitation of workers, which has been going on for years and finally reaches the shores of Europe and the US.

The second main criticism from Bourdieu's viewpoint is the problem of the 'classification struggle' and, thus, the lack of engagement with the researcher's own position, and the causes and consequences of classification. Bourdieu touches upon the core of the classification struggle when equating it with the 'struggles about the meaning of the social world' since this is nothing less but the 'basis of the representation of the groups and therefore of their mobilization and demobilization' (2010[1984]: 481). This argument is related to Marchart's point on the 'left-behind' Precariat, where he pointed to the fact, that the classification was actually made to rule out mobilisation of and thus policies for this very "class" in the first place.[34] Even more, classifications ultimately serve the existing order by 'freezing' (Bourdieu 2010[1984]: 482) any given power relation at any given time. While this is apparently a general problem of research into social stratification, inequality, and deprivation (how poor is poor enough to be poor?) this problem is even more significant in the politicised way Standing sets the Precariat opposite the working class (and not the elite). This way, the Precariat is constructed as a class, dangerous primary for the Proletariat, strangely making the working class the "haves" opposite the Precariat as "have-nots".

[34] It is a bitter irony that the researchers erred on the non-mobilisation, leaving the social democrats, who commissioned the study, at an all-time low while the extreme-right populist party gained appealed to many voters of the "left-behind Precariat".

This again informs the third and most significant criticism of the idea of a Precariat from a Bourdieusian perspective, namely the problem of reification of precarity for the purpose of constructing a defined "spectre". Not only results the reification of the phenomenon in the narrowing of the discursive definition; it also suggests a binary understanding where one is either in or out of the Precariat. This undermines not least the analysis of precarisation: while Standing does provide a number of macroeconomic factors which led historically to the establishment of the Precariat, his breakdown does not allow for an analysis of the individual experiences of becoming part of this Precariat, nor the identification of different factors contributing to the descent into the Precariat (which are very likely conditional of age, gender, ethnicity etc.). In short: reifications of precarity, as done by Standing (2014b) or Savage et al. (2013), miss the point of understanding precarity as a condition, as a stage of (dis)integration.

The criticised approaches to precarity share first and foremost the centrality of employment. If any, feminist theorists expanded the notions, changing the focus from a contractual relation to a relation to the lifeworld, de facto unveiling the pervasive character of precarity as affecting the perceptions of everyday life. If precarity affects the whole human being, the theorisation of precarity likewise needs to address the entirety of the lifeworld experience and not just insecurities in employment relations. Thus, it comes as little surprise that it was again feminist thinkers who contributed substantively to a new base for re-thinking precarity.

2.2 Precariousness as a universal experience

2.2.1 Butler's universal precariousness

In the early years of this century, Judith Butler (2006 (2004)) entered the debate on precariousness and precarity with her influential essay collection *Precarious Life*.[35] In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing 'War on Terrorism', Butler developed a conceptual pair, namely precariousness

[35] Although Butler is obviously most reknown for her 1990 book "*Gender Trouble*" we refrain at this point to reflect on her earlier work. This is mainly due to significant shifts in her philosophical leanings from post-structuralist to phenomenological approaches in her more recent works, which are significant here (see also footnote 41).

and precarity. This concept, further developed in '*Frames of War*' (2016 (2009)), explores precariousness as a universal experience whereas precarity describes the social and societal creation of this experience:

> *'Lives are by definition precarious: they can be expunged at will or by accident; their persistence is in no sense guaranteed […] Political orders, including economic and social institutions are designed to address those very needs without which the risk of mortality is heightened. Precarity designates that politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death.' (2016 (2009): 25)*[36]

In both essay collections, Butler approaches precariousness and precarity from a phenomenological perspective, mainly referring to Emmanuel Levinas's elaboration on the "face". In *Precarious Life*, she introduces Levinas's notion of the face as the extreme precariousness of the other and thus of oneself, implying that whatever persona is concealing the face, it is an ever-present reminder of the highest vulnerability, but not just as representation but as presentness of the sheer existential base line of human existence (Butler 2006 (2004)). In *Frames of War* (2016 (2009)) she takes this concept further and into the realm of the political, of power: 'The "being" of life is itself constituted through selective means; as a result, we cannot refer to this "being" outside of the operations of power, and we must make more precise the specific mechanisms of power through which life is produced.'(ibid.: 1) This leads on to the question of the eponymous frames of life (and war): 'Indeed, there ought to be recognition of precariousness as a shared condition of human life […].' (ibid.: 13) and '[p]recariousness has to be grasped not simply as a feature of *this* or *that* life, but as a generalized condition whose very generality can be denied only be [sic!] denying precariousness itself.' (ibid.: 22; emphasis in original) And finally: 'Although precarious life is a generalized condition, it is, paradoxically, the condition of being conditioned.' (ibid.: 23)

[36] It is important to highlight that precarity is in no way commensurable with Beck's notion of 'risk' (1986, 1992). Precariousness and precarity are mutually constitutive; only a perfectly asocial life, a post-societal life, is precarious without being subject to precarity.

What Butler describes around the examples of killing, dying, and human suffering in wars, are the ontological basics of how human life, which is inevitably and always a social life, and which has to be understood as mutual and reciprocal framing and recognising, where recognition is a precondition of recognising. These basics apply both to the most intimate as to the most "forensic" relations, as Hobbes would put it. As a matter of fact, the majority of these processes of recognition and recognising are of the latter nature, since the power structures of the modern nation state demand recognition by its citizens (as well as by its 'denizens' (Standing 2014b)).

This power relation of precariousness is further dissected by Isabell Lorey (2015) who distinguishes three dimensions of the precarious: firstly, she borrows the term of precariousness from Butler, describing the aforementioned condition of life. The second dimension elaborates on Butler's notion of precarity, going beyond the existential level and embedding precariousness in the socio-political power realities encountered:

> *'[…] precarity is to be understood as a category of order, which designates the effects of different political, social and legal compensations of a general precariousness. Precarity denotes the striation and distribution of precariousness in relations of inequality […].'(Lorey 2015: 12)*

Thirdly, Lorey develops the dimension of 'dynamics of *governmental precarization*' (ibid.: 13; emphasis in original), merging Foucaultian terminology of self-governance with that of precariousness.[37]

In her discussion of Butler's terminology, she outlines how '[t]hese conditions enable historically specific modes of being, […] which would not be viable without their being embedded in social, political and legal circumstances. At the same time, however, it is precisely these circumstances that endanger life.' (Lorey 2015: 18) This relationality commences at the time of birth, where the bodily existence of human being is fundamentally destined by its sociality, as no one can survive without the care and reproductive efforts of others. But albeit this existential sameness, precariousness is always a shared, relational difference, a difference again constituted by the

[37] While this is not the place to elaborate on this further, it should be noted, that the ambivalence of 'governmental precarization' as simultaneous integration and domination will be of concern later.

aforementioned embeddedness in and expressed by specific conditions of life. Thus, precariousness 'does not exist independently from […] hierarchizing precarity' (ibid.: 20). The state as organising structure of the social becomes therefore the agent of distribution of safeguarding from the harshest degree of vulnerability and, likewise, its enactment. This, of course, is closely related to the idea of the state as a caring welfare state. Lorey, criticising Castel (2003), therefore rightly questions the inherent mechanisms of in- and exclusion of the welfare state, employed in its protective function ever since. Castel refers to the welfare state as the institution to ease precariousness of the "normal" citizen, i.e. (historically?) the male breadwinner, but turns a blind eye on the implicit dialectic of imposing precarity onto any deviating existence by doing so. This also links to one of the causes of the 'emergence of the Precariat' identified by (Standing 2014b: 60), who names 'feminisation' of labour (i.e. the flexibilization of working hours and contracts and increase of the share of low-paid and low-skilled jobs on the labour market) one of the reasons for the growing of his Precariat. Thus, the negativity of this account misrecognises the conditions of existence, which persisted for ages, and do still persist, for a majority of humans, namely women. By reproducing a normativity of entitled citizens, this notion of the welfare state produces the "normal" citizen, which in turn poses the question, whether or to what extent the exclusivity of social security and the distribution of social insecurity are part and parcel of social normality, which is again (re)produced via social integration.

Butler's proposal of a paired terminology is so intriguing exactly because she combines a positive notion of precariousness with the deficiency aspect of precarity: through her 'phenomenological existentialism' (Coole 2008) we can understand the experience of exposure and violence as universal threads which are at the same time always experiences of the failing of institutions of security.

2.2.2 Bourdieu and *précarité*

Many scholars of precariousness cite two French sociologists as (re-)inventors of contemporary scholarship of precariousness: Robert Castel and Pierre Bourdieu. Castel's 'From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers: Transformation of the Social Question' (2003) was originally published in French in 1995 and Bourdieu's most referenced text on precarity is an intervention at a conference in 1997. Both texts are now in their twenties and thus coming of age. But while

Castel's engagement with the topic was widely received in industrial relation studies and labour sociology in France and Germany, Bourdieu's contribution to the conceptualisation of the terms and the debate as such was hardly received in the Anglophone world; not even Guy Standing (2014b) deemed it necessary to read beyond this one short text. This section, on the contrary, will show that Bourdieu not only provided thick descriptions of precariousness which could alter our understanding of precarity, but also offers a theoretical framework for the understanding of both historical and contemporary accounts of precarity. Beyond that, he also provides an empirical toolbox for the assessment of precariousness beyond labour markets and industrial relations and stresses the inherent political relevance of precarity.

Bourdieu engaged with the question of precariousness notably in 'Acts of Resistance' (Bourdieu 1998: 81–87), referring mainly to his works in 'Algeria 1960' (1979). However, there are several other accounts of what one can call precarious conditions or precarity in various different fields in many of Bourdieu's major works (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Bourdieu et al. 1999; Bourdieu 2005, 2008, 2010[1984], 2014). What these accounts share is the theoretical framework of fields, habitus, and social space. However, it is in his earliest work on Algeria, where the political implication of precarity is most palpable. But to contextualise this politically loaded account of precarity, it is necessary to position these conditions of precariousness in Bourdieu's theoretical framework and with its specific tools.

The concept of habitus as a 'structuring structured structure' is apparently received differently in the Anglophone world than e.g. in German sociology (compare (Krais and Gebauer 2002; Atkinson 2016); in the understanding of many Anglophone sociologists in Bourdieu's tradition, it is the field, together with its eventual *topos*, that is at the heart of Bourdieu's theory. For instance, Atkinson (2016: 14) cites a common understanding of sociologists, that one must first position the field, which is the primary unit of research, in relation to an overarching field of power, secondly find and define positions in the field in accordance to the individual's capitals, and thirdly develop the individual's habitus found in these positions. This results in the notion of a theoretical complicity of habitus and field, since the latter constitutes the former in the research process.

Although Bourdieu's field theory lies at the heart of the relationality of his approach (Bessant et al. 2019), this thesis rather leans on a Bourdieusian understanding, which ascribes more

significance to the habitus. Bourdieu himself offered a deeper, universal understanding of his concept: 'The habitus, as the word implies, is that which one has *acquired*, but which has become durably *incorporated in the body* in the form of permanent dispositions. […]. […][T]he habitus is a capital, but one which, because it is embodied, appears innate' (Bourdieu 1993: 86; emphasis added). The emphases on acquisition and embodiment of these dispositions poses a different question to our understanding of the relationship between habitus and fields, namely about the process and place of this acquisition. While socialisation theorists distinguish between primary and secondary socialisation – the former often being equated with 'family' – and although Bourdieu inspired educational scientists (e.g. Crozier et al. (2008b)) know about the influence of the family on habitus formation, Bourdieusian *sociologists* caught in the theoretical dyad of habitus and field face the problem of mapping out (sub-)fields to locate the initiation of habitus formation. This is somewhat surprising, given that, again, Bourdieu himself pointed towards the acquisition process, when he compared his concept to Chomsky's generative grammar (Bourdieu 1993; Krais and Gebauer 2002; Nash 2010). Like the latter, the habitus is formed and acquired as a system of production of attitudes and behaviours in any social interaction, starting in early childhood. But while habits may be acquired or learned at and until a certain age, the habitus as not only a structured but also structuring structure is permanently reproducing, restructuring, and reincorporating itself into its bearer, i.e. the individual in social interaction.[38]

This turn from the field determination and specification of the habitus to the autopoietic character of habitus is important when considering precariousness in Bourdieu's observation of experiencing *précarité* in Algeria: 'For these men, […] totally subject to every determinism, […] there is nothing solid, nothing certain, nothing permanent' because they are 'deprived of the patronage which the age-old traditions guaranteed to the meanest *khammes*' (Bourdieu 1979: 66, 1979: 65). When Bourdieu described the situation of the 'sub-proletarians' in Algeria he described a 'Geworfenheit' ('thrownness'), as Heidegger would put it, of an individual into changed economic and social dispositions which their habitus is not equipped to deal with. This Geworfenheit is the imposition of foreign rules (in the case of Algeria: colonial force) upon

[38] One explanation for this difficulty in the understanding of the habitus-field relation may be Bourdieu's ethnographic work he referred to for most of his life. Differentiation of primary and secondary socialisations do not make any sense in an integrated immediate social structure without the differentiations of public and private in the way common to contemporary western societies.

defenceless individuals, destroying 'the norms and mental schemes' of the colonised society (ibid.). This imposition is a threat to the habitus of the sub-proletarians, as is the collapse of tradition and certainty, putting them both individually and collectively at risk. Collectively, because their modes of social reproduction and thus of habitus formations becomes illegitimate; individually, because every bearer of the respective habitus becomes illegitimate under the changed rules. Of course, the (in)ability to adhere to the 'rules of the game', to understand the 'illusio' is not independent of individual material conditions. As cited above, the habitus is a capital, and endowment with the less innate forms of capital (i.e. economic, cultural, and social) enables adaptation efforts to be made – and to succeed.

Maintaining the example of Algeria 1960, precarity appears as a universal experience: a thrownness in strange dispositions which threatens the conduct of life because it threatens the bearers of a habitus enacted in and by the social structure. But some are more equal in this experience, because their endowment with relevant forms of capital enables them to adapt better than others. And the inability to adapt is grave: it means a de facto de-valuation and de-positioning of a social identity, or the loss of it. The sub-proletarians experience their habitus to be incomplete for a field they are not prepared for. But the alienness to the field and the inability to adapt to it harm the habitus because the failure becomes incorporated.[39]

The sub-proletarians in Algeria 1960 find themselves not just thrown into a field they cannot cope with, but into a structure that imposes conditions upon them which were alien to them before. It is the conditions they find themselves in, which make them 'sous-prolétaires'. The topographical notion of 'sub' indicates the marginalisation experienced, and what is more, a positioning in a class system, which is originally not intended. The people Bourdieu describes – stranded in the cities, in housing arrangements they are not used to, with no profession or commission – find themselves in an *utopos*, a non-place. If habitus is the product of '[t]he conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence' (Bourdieu 1990: 53) the volatility of the precarious non-topos becomes a grave predicament because these conditionings will nevertheless produce the 'system of *durable*, *transposable* dispositions,

[39] This topos was eventually picked up by sociologists of education when researching the experience of working-class students, e.g. Bradley and Ingram (2012); Reay (2012).

structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures' – the habitus (ibid.; emphasis added). Investigating the 'durable' and 'transposable' character of habitus, the lasting damage done by the experience of precarity becomes clearer. Habitus is 'a present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future' (ibid.: 54). In other words, habitus' ability to organise and generate practices is inherently directed towards the future. Practices are not only day to day acts but ways and modes of perceptions of realities, of circumstances, of conditions which, being retentional references, confine the ability for protention, i.e. the imagination and -anticipation of the self, which goes beyond the present, the impression, as Husserl calls it (Gallagher and Zahavi 2005). Habitus is 'embodied history, […] forgotten as history' and therefore 'active presence'. Because habitus is, as Bourdieu paraphrases Goffman, a 'knowing of one's place', '[a]gents shape their aspirations according to concrete indices of the accessible and the inaccessible, of what is and is not "for us" […]' (Bourdieu 1990: 64). But '[t]he relation to what is possible is a relation to power; and the sense of the probable future is constituted in the prolonged relationship with a world structured according to the categories of the possible (for us) and the impossible (for us), of what is appropriated in advance by and for others and what one can *reasonably* expect for oneself.' (ibid.; emphasis added)

The rationality of expectations is a recurring topic in Bourdieu's account of precariousness. In both texts, he addresses directly the aspect of temporal insecurity: '[B]y making the whole future uncertain, [casualization] prevents all *rational anticipation* and, in particular, the basic belief and hope in the future that one needs in order to rebel, especially collectively, against present conditions, even the most intolerable.' (Bourdieu, 1998: 82; emphasis added) The emphasis of the rationality of the anticipated future is a topic more elaborated in his Algerian works. The precarious sub-Proletariat's lack of a life-plan impedes the development of a 'rational temporal consciousness' because 'actions, judgements, and aspirations can [not] be ordered'. Without a life-plan, the precarious escape 'into daydreams or fatalistic resignation.' (Bourdieu 1979: 62) It is no surprise that this quote refers mainly to political action, the revolutionary potential of the sub-proletarians and the peasantry, respectively. In these early writings, Bourdieu maps out in quite explicit terms how precariousness induces political apathy via the disorganisation or deprivation of temporality because it 'prohibits the formation of the system of rational projects and forecasts [i.e. the ability for protention] of which the revolutionary consciousness is one

aspect.' (ibid.) Therefore, the Proletariat, and not the sub-proletarians who had really "nothing to lose but their chains", can bear the revolutionary consciousness:

> *'This realistic aiming at the future (*l'avenir*) is only accessible to those who have the means to confront the present and to look for ways of beginning to implement their hopes, instead of giving way to resigned surrender or to the magical impatience of those who are too crushed by the present to be able to look to anything other than a utopian future (*un future*), an immediate, magical negation of the present.' (ibid.: 63; emphasis in original)*

In conclusion, the habitus troubles of a precarious existence stem from the encounter with a field alien to the habitus in and through which it was acquired. And the consequence is first and foremost the loss of temporality and ability of protention. Without *retention* to a past experience in the field, the current *impression* becomes overwhelming, unbearable, and *protention*, in the sense of a 'realistic aiming at the future' (ibid.) is rendered impossible. In other words, precarity is not just a momentary experience, but directly affects the concerned person's future because the latter relies on the ability to process the presence.

The question now is, how the precarious person ended up there in the first place. In the case of Algeria, as mentioned afore, colonialism imposed unto the colonised the new social and economic order like a natural force – and with force. But subjugation under the state equals integration into the state the former necessitates the latter. And while the age of (traditional) colonialization might be over, the mechanisms of integration and subjugation, unification and domination, are more than ever inherent to the modern state.

'[U]niversalising integration' and 'alienating integration as a condition of domination, subjugation, dispossession' (Bourdieu 2014: 227) are the two faces of the state. On the one hand, the modern state built numerous institutions, of which the education system is of specific importance (see below; cf. – among many – (Bourdieu 1976; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990)), to integrate individuals into 'a population'.[40] Besides the more apparent significance of education

[40] Here, at the latest, the significance of youth (which will be discussed in a later chapter) as crucial for the integration process should become apparent. While Bourdieu focussed on the education system as the main instrument of state power, we can embed this system in a wider system of means of integration into capitalist

for labour market integration in collaborative, capitalist systems of production, Bourdieu also stressed the importance of education, i.e. an education system, for political integration, thus political participation. In *Distinction*, Bourdieu exemplifies the educational preconditions of 'having a voice'. By simply displaying the share of 'don't know' responses in public opinion surveys according to respondents' educational attainment, he makes clear that the formation of a political opinion is contingent of different degrees of political integration, or 'legitimate agency' and thus proximity to present, albeit somewhat disclosed, power structures: men are more likely to 'have a voice' than women as do people with higher education than those with only primary education (Bourdieu 2010[1984]: 400–407, 2014: 226).

This already points to the second face of the state, domination through integration. Using the example of involuntary bachelorhood in the peasant society of his home region, Bourdieu shows how the unification of the 'matrimonial exchange system' led to changes in the socio-economic fabric which resulted in or produced a marginalised group (Bourdieu 2008). In a previously self-contained world, where 'matrimonial exchange […] had the social function of safeguarding this [social] hierarchy' (ibid.: 50) '[u]rban models and values […] have invaded the territory' (ibid.: 60). Institutions like 'match-makers' and the whole of the social order entangled with the matrimonial exchange market are shaken by the unification of a hitherto protected market into a national market. And the result is nothing less than the invention of the peasantry as a dispossessed, disadvantaged group: 'The production of the state implies the production of the provinces as a lesser existence, as the deprivation of [everything done in the] capital.' But: 'The integration of those dispossessed of capital is the condition for a form of dispossession and a form of subjugation.' (Bourdieu 2014: 228insertions in original) But as it is with habitus in the social structure, this experience is not confined to any kind of abstract level, but is a 'devaluation of all the products of the peasant mode of production and reproduction, […] the peasant's very being, his language, his attire, his manners, his baring end even his "physique" […]' (Bourdieu 2008: 181).

society, which includes, of course, work resp. wage labour, but, more importantly the transition into self-responsibility and thus (constrained) agency.

Concluding on the theoretical pillars to be taken from Bourdieu's works for the conceptualisation of precarity, we found that Bourdieu described precarious existences as alienness to the social field, as a thrownness into conditions which do not refer to the environment which primary structured the habitus in the first place. Disabling retention, precarity yields inability for protention, for thinking ahead and projecting the self into a future. However, the confrontation with an alien field is as such an expression of incomplete integration into the state or the reflection of the negative function of state integration, i.e. subjugation and domination.

2.2.3 Making sociological sense of Butler with Bourdieu[41]

'Algeria 1960' (1979) is the bridgehead to connect Butler's with Bourdieu's understanding of precarity/*précarité*. The central point is the above quote from Butler about the failing 'social and economic networks of support'. Here, Bourdieu's idea of capitals (economic, cultural, social) prove useful. However, the forms of capital are never to be understood without the power structures that valuate or devaluate them. This is important, since Butler's focus is on the forceful and violent (cf. Ettlinger 2007) deprivation of these capitals whereas Bourdieu adds to an understanding of the insidious – but nevertheless forceful – process of deprivation of capitals via their devaluation. While one can describe the situation of the sub-proletarians in Algeria as a thrownness in Heidegger's terms (who was also influential for Bourdieu , cf. (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2005: 275)), this does not necessarily imply a sudden experience of deprivation of capitals. In fact, the stranded peasantry thought they could find employment in the city, i.e. to find their capitals valuated or to accumulate new forms of capital respectively. It is only then, during and after this experience of the devaluation of their capitals that they realise the failing of their 'networks of support'.

In return, Butler's idea of precariousness helps to understand the precondition of what happens next to the affected. The experience of deprivation – insidious or sudden – reveals the precariousness of their sheer existence. The precarious sub-proletarians lack any recognition, any valuing of their existence and thus themselves lose the ability to recognise, since being recognised

[41] Butler was criticised for a profound misunderstanding of Bourdieu in some of her earlier works, especially in *Excitable Speech* e.g. by Rademacher (2001). However, Butler's more recent work is much better informed and offers new alleys for an integration of hers and Bourdieu's thinking, e.g. Rothmüller (2010); Villa (2011); Nentwich et al. (2014).

is the precondition for recognising, as Butler elaborates from Levinas. Now, if Atkinson (2016) is right in equating Bourdieu's capitals with recognition, the synthesis becomes even more apparent: precarity as a politically induced misrecognition means a politically induced devaluation/deprivation of capitals. Following from that, the experience of precariousness – misrecognition and inability to recognise – harms the structuring structure of the very being, it damages the habitus. And since one of the core functions of the habitus is the organisation of access to past, present, and future, one can understand how the experienced devaluation becomes so powerful for the practice of the affected. Following the notion of habitus as embodied history, precarity can be seen as damaging the habitus with lasting effect, since the experience of precariousness is inscribed into the bodies of the precarious. This meets Butler with her feminist, bodily aware notion of what precariousness means. The consequence is again found in Bourdieu's reading of Husserl: the universal insecurity these people experience deprives them of their ability to project themselves in any future situation; not knowing one's place debases retention and impedes protention.[42]

For both Bourdieu and Butler (and Lorey), precarity is inherently political as the state's (dis)integrative functioning damages resources of retention, and thus has a detriment effect on the ability to protention and curtails future prospects. Lorey's more state/power focussed approach to precarity is again better understood with reference to Bourdieu's reflections on the state. As Lorey writes, precariousness is, despite its universality, always hierarchically organised via the state. Bourdieu's two faces of the state, the universalising and the alienating integration, explain the mechanism behind this organisation. The state's faces are functions of valuing and devaluing of capitals, of recognition and misrecognition of capitals, habitus and individuals. Recognising, valuing, ordering of capitals means nothing but the organisation of the threat to the exposure to precarious living conditions, i.e. precarity. The recurrent social relationality conditions the ability to protention, or in other words, it is the degree of precarity or the degree of exposition to precariousness, which determines the ability of protention. Equating

[42] The similarities between Husserl's phenomenology of time consciousness and Bourdieu's observation are striking. Husserl writes in plain text, how all our impressions and thoughts refer to a 'stream of constituting phases' which becomes in turn objectified in 'sensations, memories, expectations, wishes […] as expressions of the inner consciousness' (Husserl (1928: 409); own translations) while for Bourdieu, 'the experience of time […] arises […] in the relationship between the practical expectations or hopes which are constitutive of an *illusio* […]' (Bourdieu (2000: 208))

the thrownness into an alien field with the most precarious conditions of existence, the state is therefore, by means of integrating and dominating, either fostering or curtailing prospects as it provides the social, political, and legal structures which turn precariousness into precarity.

Precarity is not just political in its causes but also in its consequences. Lorey indicates this with her reference to Foucault and the 'governmentality' of precarity. However, given the aforementioned relationship between capitals, the state and precarity, the political consequences are also palpable in Bourdieu's approach. Firstly, the Algerian observations show how the sub-proletarians inability to rationally imagine any future leads to political apathy, an observation he made again in 1990s France: 'The unemployed and the casualized workers, having *suffered a blow to their capacity to project themselves into the future* […] are scarcely capable of being mobilized.' (Bourdieu 2003: 83). The absence of security leads to political paralysis qua inability for protention.[43] Secondly, Bourdieu's considerations of the necessary capitals for 'having a voice' mirror this experience among established strata in 1970s France. To develop, hold, and utter a political opinion demands the right forms of capital, i.e. the valuing and recognition of these capitals. Thus again, the state as the main mechanism for valuing of capitals in the public sphere silences the precarious, via devaluation and misrecognition.

Finally, bringing the discussion about precarity back to its starting point, a large number of researchers of social movements identified precarity as their driving force e.g. behind the MayDay movement (Puar et al. 2012; Casas-Cortés 2014). This seemingly contradicts the claim about the politically paralysing effect of precarity; but it is noteworthy that most of these movements start from the experience of total exclusion from an exclusive 'society', resembling the experience of the sub-proletarians: thrownness, inability to adapt, devaluation, total precarity.[44] Many of the social movements using the terminology of precarious, precarity, or precariat do so in an attempt to reclaim and positively reinterpret the margins of this society – but via this attribution they are at risk to become self-exclusionary by ceasing to reclaim their place inside this society. Rendered

[43] Of course, some people deliberately chose casual over permanent work contract, a recurring topic especially among individualisation theorists. But this choice is not independent of endowment with the correct forms of capitals since '[t]he choice of instability is reserved for those whose qualification makes it certain that they will easily find a new job. For the rest, there is only forced instability and the fear of dismissal, which overcomes all other considerations.' (Bourdieu 1979: 40)

[44] This applies in particular to research on the precarity of migrants Jørgensen (2016).

in Bourdieusian terms, these groups react to the process of alienating integration by rejecting the universalising integration and thus integration into the state all together. Hence these groups' protests are less aimed at political mobilisation in order to gain representation, but mostly reject representative democracy as part of the TINA – 'there is no alternative' mantra of established politics (Jørgensen 2016).[45]

While these protests are significant and highly visible on their heydays, their topographical and social significance was and is usually rather confined. As argued in chapter 1, these forms of protest are likely to be overestimated regarding their lasting effect on politics and society – except, if they manage to transform into more stable political actors like *Barcelona en Comú*, the Catalan party emerging from the *Indignados* protests, did. Neilson and Rossiter (2008) suggest, that the ephemerality of these protests, especially in western democracies, is due to the design of these democracies as Keynesian welfare states: in the end, the precarious always seek support from the caring welfare state instead of fully embracing the chance of living outside the capitalist modes of production. One might argue that they blunder into the same trap as those researchers who reify the concept of precarity: the question of precarity is a question of a *graded* disintegration, not so much a question of in-or-out, precarity is an ongoing process not a static state.[46]

2.3 Excursus to Marienthal

The previous sections presented Butler's and Bourdieu's ideas on precarity/*précarité* as a universal experience. To further the claim of universality, the following passage introduces the work of a third thinker, who made a significant contribution to an understanding of the socio-psychological detriment of precarity. For fifty years, from her doctoral thesis (2017 [1932]), to her seminal work in Marienthal (together with Paul Lazarsfeld, Hans Zeisel, the unquoted Lotte Schenk-Danzinger and many others, published in English (1972)) until the 1980s (e.g. (1982)), Marie Jahoda worked on the adverse effects of unemployment on societal integration and mental

[45] Consequently, those groups face significant troubles when later trying to integrate into formal and institutionalised politics, as happened with the *Movimiento 15-M* or *Indignados* movement and *Podemos*.

[46] Again, migrants and refugees are a significant exception to this, since they are prohibited from integration in principal.

health.[47] Work/employment in her studies is always considered from the viewpoint of the societal integrative function of these activities in capitalist societies. Thus, the findings of social disintegration and mental health, which also have implications for political participation, do speak to the findings on precarity/*précarité*, outlined before.

Jahoda is the author of the manuscript of *Marienthal – the sociography of an unemployed community* (1972). Although this study is a renowned modern classic of sociological research, some central points shall be provided in the following. In 1929, a textile factory, the main employer of the settlement Marienthal in Lower Austria shut down. While some younger people emigrated, about 1,500 people remained in the village. Of the 478 households the researchers found at their arrival, 367 (77%) had no member of the family in paid employment; among the 93 households with at least one person at work, only 22 had work in Marienthal, the majority worked in neighbouring villages or in Vienna, which was a 35 minutes train ride away (Jahoda et al. 1972: 19,11). The young research team of nine women and six men[48] observed and interviewed the people of Marienthal, took accounts of time and money spending, observed nutrition and eating behaviour, held essay contests among the school children and young people about their Christmas wishes or aspirations for the future, but also engaged in charitable relief and educational work to ease the situation of their participants and/or to empower them.

The unprecedented plurality of methods provided the material for, what one would now call a thick description of a 'weary community' (Jahoda et al. 1972: 36) which eroded because of the precarity triggered by unemployment. Political and social participation declined rapidly (ibid. 40), and so did engagement with cultural activities (ibid. 38). Life became structured mainly by the fortnightly payments of the unemployment relief, which resulted in irrational spending of money on luxury goods like chocolate, doughnuts and salami, while the general diet had shifted from butter to lard and from pork and beef to horse, dog, and cat meat (ibid. 55, 26). As striking and disheartening these ethnographic accounts are, it is Jahoda's typology of households, which combines socio-economic circumstances with mental structures, which is most interesting here. She categorizes the households (not the individuals interestingly)

[47] As will be explained in more detail later on, mental health is not occupied with mental illnesses only.

[48] http://agso.uni-graz.at/marienthal/projektteam/00.htm

into three main groups of decreasing mental health: the 'resigned', the 'unbroken', and the 'broken' (ibid. 52pp). 'Unbroken' families showed a high degree of resilience despite the economic hardship and actively sought for new employment. More importantly however, they maintained 'Lebenslust' (Jahoda et al. 1975: 71), i.e. a zest for life and hope for the future.

'Resigned' families on the contrary are characterised by defeatism, the families in this group share an 'attitude of drifting along, indifferently and without expectations, accepting a situation that cannot be changed.' (ibid.) They are 'epigrammatically' summarised: 'no plans, no relation to the future, no hopes, extreme restriction of all needs beyond the bare necessities [but] an overall feeling of relative well-being.' (ibid. 53) The last point seems at odds with the label 'resigned', as Jahoda herself admits, since an everyday understanding of resignation does not entail 'relative well-being.' Key to an understanding of this 'resigned' group is however what Jahoda called 'erwartungslose *Grundhaltung*' in the German original text (Jahoda et al. 1975: 70) and which translates rather into basic, fundamental, or indeed habitual attitude. Thus, Jahoda's 'resigned' accommodated themselves somewhat in their defeatism which allows for the eventual 'moments of serenity and joy' (Jahoda et al. 1972: 55) in the presence whereas 'the future […] has no longer a place in the thoughts or even dreams of these people.' (ibid.)

Nevertheless, these households (like the unbroken) kept the household orderly and took care of the children. This also applies also to the first type of the 'broken' category, the households 'in despair'. However, those households are characterized by the eponymous 'despair, depression, hopelessness, a feeling of the futility of all efforts, and therefore no further attempts to find work or to ameliorate the situation; instead, constant comparisons of the present with a better past.' (ibid. 54) Finally, the 'apathetic' families are completely passive, indolent, in neglect, indifferent. 'The household is in such disarray that it no longer satisfies even the most immediate needs; it becomes completely irrational.' (ibid.)

Describing the observations from Marienthal in Bourdieu's terminology, the zone of precarity begins among the 'resigned'. It is in this group, where the affected people start to lose touch with reality, which is to a major extent expressed through the perception of presence and future. While they are still able to endure their hardship in the presence, their lack of any desirable futures (accessible not even in dream and thought) discerns them from the 'unbroken'. Notably, Jahoda distinguishes between this impaired mental health and the manifestations of mental

illnesses in the subsequent groups of people 'in despair' or 'apathy'. The 'unbroken' perceive unemployment as a temporary and transient phase which does not 'break' their habitus; their perceptions of themselves and their environment still match, the embodied history can be perpetuated. For the 'resigned', on the contrary, this history has come to an end; they maintain the status quo as good as it gets, but their ability for protention has gone. With the loss of employment, they lost their 'relation', i.e. their sense for the future, and thus, to the present. Of this group downwards, Jahoda also reports irrational spending on sweets and comic books, or the planting of flowers instead of vegetables in the small garden allotments. Zawadzki and Lazarsfeld (1935), who found the same types among Polish unemployed, show that only the 'unbroken' remain politically and socially active, partake in demonstrations or organise in other ways (this was also found in cross-national comparison by Jahoda (1982: 27)). While the 'resigned' have lost hope for tomorrow; among the broken, especially among those 'in despair' (or 'distress', as Zawadzki and Lazarsfeld call them), fear has replaced hope.

Fast forward fifty years, Jahoda finds that some of the psychological traits she found among unemployed in the 1930s are observed among employed workers in the 1980s. Skipping the 'golden age of capitalism', she describes how not only the working poor[49] but also industrial workers who are not deprived (yet) constitute

> *'[b]y virtue of such employment […] a stratum of society […] of degraded, frustrated, unhappy, psychologically unhealthy people in employment whose personal morale is as low as their productivity, who are unable to provide a constructive environment for their families, whose lack of commitment in employment colours their total life experience and, depending on the size of the group, the level of civilisation of the society in which they live. ' (Jahoda 1982: 42)*

And just like Bourdieu observed among the Algerian sub-proletarians, she leaves little doubt that these precarious people are not the bearers of any revolution (ibid. 43), as they are lacking 'the

[49] It is noteworthy that the working-poor are by no means a new phenomenon – in his seminal study on poverty in York in 1899, Rowntree found 52% of the poor families had a main breadwinner in regular employment (Jahoda (1982: 16)).

basic belief and hope in the future that one needs in order to rebel, especially collectively, against present conditions, even the most intolerable.' (Bourdieu, 1998: 82)

2.3.1 Jahoda's concept of positive mental health

Discussing the question what would alter damaging working and employment conditions and what is needed to 'humanise' them (ibid. 62), Jahoda addresses her second most important field of work, namely her concept of 'Positive mental health' (Jahoda 1958). Emphasising the problems of a *positive* approach to mental health, she shows how there is a tacit agreement on positive mental health, which is a normative concept and thus related to the normativity of citizenship: in a dialectic turn, the problematisation of mental illness, i.e. negative mental health, muted the discourse about the normative assumptions about positive mental health, which, not least, constitute the able minded citizen. While Foucault (1971) obviously contributed significantly to our understanding of the societal construction of insanity, his focus lay mainly on the deviations from a norm, thus approaching the norm predominantly via the negation of the deviation. This approach, although psychologically and psychoanalytically informed, sticks with the manifestations of (in)sanity. The identification of mental health problems like stress and their unequal distribution across different strata of society too is commendable and important (Aneshensel 1992: 23; Thoits 2010: 43). While this sociologically informed research is significant for understanding the impact of long lasting stress on physical and psychological wellbeing, including the problem of stress proliferation (Thoits 2010: 45), the premise is yet again the absence of stress, i.e. mental health is pathologized instead of understood as a function of psycho-social integration. Thus, the construction of manifest insanity or stress as deviation from manifest sanity or resilience does not allow for inference to the latent structure of what Jahoda calls positive mental health. On the contrary, she elaborates on how the preoccupation with mental health through deviations from it blurred the analysis of mental health: the mere absence of mental illness is a common but nevertheless insufficient criterion for mental health.[50] At the same time, this illness-focussed approach left the mentioned tacit understanding of good mental health and its normative implications on citizenship untouched.

[50] The parallels to the problem of conceptualising 'precarity' are unintended but striking.

Jahoda argues that mental health and mental illness are distinct things and not two ends of a scale. If they were, the absence of illness would be sufficient to define health. Still, it is correct that features of mental illness affect mental health: the mentally healthy carries the potential of mental illness and vice versa. In the same way, states of precarity and states of security are not on a continuum. A person by all means considered socially secured carries the potential of precariousness while a precarious person could be secured (therefore, reifying the status as Standing and others do is distorting rather than clarifying anything). In analogy to the mental health question, it is pivotal to understand the circumstances or mechanisms which trigger either or. Although Jahoda's research presented so far, approaches mental health from its absence due to its focus on unemployment (Jahoda et al. 1972; Jahoda 1987), Jahoda is cautious never to conflate mental illness with impaired mental health. Her approach is influenced by Maslow and her guiding question is therefore human need and the thrive to a pragmatic understanding of means to meet these needs. The narrow focus on employment conditions is not owed to her socialist convictions but is simply an acknowledgement of the centrality of employment to the majority of people living under real existing capitalism where they have to sell the workforce to maintain themselves. But in an employment centred society, paid work is an institution, pivotal for such diverse things as identity, self-worth or time structure. Whereas some of these functions are more closely related to the primary function of earning money (e.g. self-reliance or autonomy), employment has in other respects become comparable maybe to the significance which religion or the alternation of the seasons had in previous/other societies.

So what are the traits of positive mental health according to Jahoda? Her systematic review identifies six dimensions (1958):

1. Attitudes toward the self
2. Growth, development, self-actualisation
3. Integration
4. Autonomy
5. Perception of reality
6. Environmental mastery

While each dimension will be discussed in more detail at a later point, some points shall be raised here to demonstrate how diminutions of 'positive mental health' meet both Bourdieu's account of *précarité* and find a parallel in Butler's ideas of precarity. The first dimension, 'attitudes toward

the self', entails motives and feelings, but also self-evaluation and group and role identification. This is quite immediately translatable into a Bourdieusian framework, since one of the central inflictions of *précarité* is exactly the loss of positive identification. This dimension is also mirrored among the young black unemployed in Ullah's (1987) study and speaks to contemporary discourses on precarity which refer to Honneth's concept of recognition, which again finds a parallel in the translation of Bourdieusian forms of capitals into forms of recognition (Atkinson 2016). The second dimension, 'growth, development, self-actualisation' refers to motivational processes, utilisation of abilities and future orientation but also 'investment in living', which involves interests and relations to objects and people outside the Self. Here again, the parallels to the conditions of the sub-proletarians and their confinement to the immediate present are obvious. Further, this dimension can be understood with Butler's easing of fundamental needs, i.e. the overcoming of the principal precariousness of life as essential for living.[51] The dimension 'integration' in Jahoda's framework refers mainly to resistance to stress, anxiety- and frustration-tolerance and resilience. These traits are founded on Gordon Allport's concept of a unifying outlook on life which he defines as 'autonomous master-sentiments that give objective coherence and subjective meaning to all the activities of their possessor's lives.' (Allport 1937 cited in Jahoda 1958: 39–40) Although this definition is more normatively positive, the parallels to Bourdieu's notion of habitus are apparent. Similar to habitus, the unifying outlook on life works as a structuring structure; the main difference however is, that Allport's concept is not as clearly embodied as Bourdieu's habitus. But once again, time, the relation to presence and future are significant in this regard. Possessing a 'unifying outlook' brings with it the 'possession of long-range goals, regarded as central to one's personal existence.' (Allport 1955, cited in Jahoda 1958: 40) Again, it is clear that the Algerian sub-proletarians are deprived of these goals in their *précarité*. While 'autonomy' is rather self-explanatory, covering inner regulation and independent behaviour (including non-conformity!), the fifth dimension, 'perception of reality' is central for the phenomenological approach to precarity proposed here. Jahoda argues that this question cannot and should not be addressed through a correct/incorrect dichotomy, since this leads towards an objectification of deviations

[51] At the same time, this overcoming is inherently social, since the 'social and economic networks of support' Butler (2016 (2009): 25) make life liveable.

from an objective reality which is applicable only to mentally ill persons, and instead proposes 'relative freedom from need-distortion' (Jahoda 1958: 51) as the criterion on which to assess mental health regarding the perception of reality. This cumbersome phrase means that a person can view the world as it is without distorting the matters one is not content with or concerned about, while still considering them. The example she gives to illustrate this, is how all parents strive for their children to excel at school. The mentally healthy parent will accept the evidence for the child's success or failure, no matter whether it is in favour of the child. Nevertheless, the parent would not drop their wish for their child to be successful. Other examples would be the unbroken in Marienthal or the 'unconcerned' in 'a northern city' (Ullah 1987) in England: they accept their situation as it is without dropping their ambitions. Contrary to them are the resigned/disaffected: they dropped their efforts to find work not least because they distort their perception to meet their expectation (Kunda 1990). Again, as was argued before, the overly ambitious expectations of the sub-proletarians Bourdieu observed show this need-distorted perception of their reality. Linked to this criterion is finally the last dimension, 'environmental mastery'. Jahoda cites a number of psychological approaches to this aspect of mental health and summarises them under six headings: 'ability to love; adequacy in love, work and play; adequacy in interpersonal relations; efficiency in meeting situational requirements; capacity for adaptation and adjustment; efficiency in problem-solving.' (Jahoda 1958: 53)

While the different dimensions identified by Jahoda are conceptually distinct, they are clearly interrelated. Yet, they can serve as different dimensions for assessing mental health and the negative impact of precarity/*précarité* on each of them separately. The point here to demonstrate– in combination of Jahoda's works on unemployment and mental health – how the traits of mental health suffer under the conditions of precarity, i.e. features of mental health (or their absence respectively) are informative on the states of precarity, just as Bourdieu described them: the sub-proletarian might not necessarily be mentally ill, but s/he is not mentally healthy. Many of the habitus problems Bourdieu describes in Algeria – perceptions of presence and future, ability to cope with unforeseen events, ability for adaptation – are exactly what Jahoda finds to be features of mental health, which she herself observed 30 years before Bourdieu in a small village in the township of Gramatneusiedl.

Later applications of Jahoda's work includes Ullah (1987), who discusses young black unemployed and finds three categories of attitudes, which also correspond to Jahoda et al.'s typology: the disaffected (corresponding the resigned), the unconcerned (corr. the unbroken), and the distressed (corr. the ones in despair among the broken). According to his ethnographic accounts, the 'disaffected' were both most angry about politics and most aware of the racist discrimination they experience in their everyday lives. In contrast to them, the 'unconcerned' black respondents did not recognize racism as a problem at all. One of the respondents tellingly stated: 'I feel no way in being black, 'cause I'm proud of my colour.' (Ullah 1987: 134) Although this lack of awareness can certainly be read as an adaptation to structural racism, Ullah emphasises how the 'unconcerned' decrease the salience of being black just like they refuse to identify as being unemployed. While the 'disaffected' youth give in to the racism they experience and, by identifying as black unemployed youth, accept their assigned place, the 'unconcerned' remain self-determined in the construction of their identities. For the 'distressed' finally, their main identification is purely negative, namely as unemployed, a state they suffer from and which they want to overcome. Although Ullah did not link this typology to his research of political attitudes among young unemployed people (Banks and Ullah 1987), the mental structures found in the ethnography do well translate into the findings on voting behaviour and political interest: with only 31% (reported) turn-out, black male unemployed youth appeared to be the most politically disaffected and disinterested (with almost two thirds stating to be 'hardly' or 'not at all' interested in politics; ibid.).

Qualifying Ojeda's (2015) and Hassell and Settle's (2017) findings on the effect of depressions and anxieties on voting, they can thus be understood not just as the effects of mental illnesses on political participation but as indications how a damaged mental health damages citizenship. And indeed, Jahoda's and other accounts of mental health do include societal awareness and participation. Again, the problem of the tacit understanding citizenship is palpable: theories and theorists of democracy and citizenship like Marshall (1950) or Lipset (1983[1959]) based the (imagined though desirable) equality of their fully responsible and accountable citizen on the grounds of a plethora of underlying assumptions, which are either outdated (see Bessant and Roberts on the development of a political identity through labour market integration) or have hardly ever been applicable, like the fully informed citizen (Downs), or simply fall short of the psychosocial complexity of a practice like political participation.

2.3.2 Reading Jahoda with Bourdieu

While some shared points between Jahoda's and Bourdieu's work were outlined above, a further integration of them requires a more psychological reading of Bourdieu or a turn to the 'psychosocial'.[52] Recently, a growing scholarship engaged with the theoretical frontiers of Bourdieu's oeuvre and tried to bridge his concepts to psychology and/or psychoanalysis. Thus, this section starts with an overview of attempts to put or read more psychology and/or psychoanalysis into Bourdieu (and also the limits to do so), and continues by fathoming the possibilities of a further integration of Bourdieusian analysis of social space towards a 'structural psychology' (Schmitz and Bayer 2017) which fits quite well with Jahoda's plea for a 'non-reductionist social psychology' (1989).

As Reay (2015) writes, Bourdieu himself was open to and encouraged a more psychological understanding of his ideas in *Pascalian Mediations*, and she and others (e.g. Silva 2016a, 2016b) elaborate extensively on Bourdieu's borrowing from Freud and psychoanalysis. One starting point for this endeavour is obviously the concept of *habitus*, which resonates with Freudian ideas of id-ego-superego. But other concepts like "libido" or "repressed conflicts" and "defence mechanisms" too refer directly (while mostly unreferenced) to Freud's work (see also Steinmetz 2006; Atkinson 2016).[53] However, there is a deeper problem with the attempts to integrate Bourdieu's sociology and psychology, namely the centrality of class in Bourdieu's work. The application of field theoretical approaches to a plethora of social phenomena watered down the idea of habitus as well, introducing a myriad of hyphen-habitus, like 'Western habitus, police habitus, professional habitus, affective habitus' (Silva 2016a). While this approach is appreciated by some for advancing the application of Bourdieusian ideas 'beyond sociology' (Silva 2016a), it implicitly disentangles habitus and field from their parental concept: the social space.

[52] It goes beyond the realm of this thesis to indulge in a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between (Bourdieusian) sociology and (Freudian) psychology. This needed not least entailing a reception (and translation) history of both oeuvres and would need to thoroughly engage with the development of psychoanalysis after Freud.

[53] As Reay notes, Bourdieu was very reluctant to adopt psychoanalysis in his earlier works. This might not least be due to his opposition to and need for demarcation from the leading French psychoanalysts of his time. In other words, his opposition was not so much against Freud than against Freudians, just like he rather rejected Althusser's Marxism than Marx altogether.

Contrary to such approaches, Reay (2005) argues for a 'psychic economy' of class. She argues that a (too) politicised understanding of class consciousness for too long stood in in the way of a sociological understanding of the psychic implications of social class (for an in-depth analysis of class-consciousness vs. class habitus see Eder 2013). It comes as no surprise that it was again feminist scholars, 'educated working-class women' as Reay puts it, who transcended their experiences of multiple intersecting discriminations and advanced theorising in this direction. Linking practice to psyche, Reay argues – and empirically demonstrates– that class "morale" is tangible in day-to-day interactions of children, that the process of socialisation and subjectification is not to be disentangled from social class, just as this process is shaped by gender and race.

Atkinson's (2016) 'relational phenomenology' makes a similar point more systematically (and with more reference to Bourdieu) or rather makes a psychoanalytical understanding of habitus susceptible for an integration of the 'psychic economy' of class. Digging deep into child and development psychology, Atkinson elaborates how the foundations of habitus formation are laid out in the earliest stages of childhood; it is easy to figure how different these first experiences of an infant, shaping not least their sense of certainty and trust, are, depending on the social class it is born into (ibid.:2016: 81). And these differences are perpetuated throughout early childhood and all the consecutive development stages, which lastingly shape a child's ability to accumulate capitals via the ability to channel their libido (ibid.: 91). Yet, Atkinson emphasises that 'children are not born into a social space and its corresponding symbolic space' (ibid.: 96). This assertion needs more scrutiny. While the latter part seems obvious and while neonates are clearly not yet agents in the social space, and although there are a lot of considerable tensions in the process of inheritance and reproduction of parental positions in the social space, it seems odd to not recognise the efficacy of symbolic power already affecting the child's social position even before actively inhabited. While the 'family […] dominates lifeworld experience' (ibid.: 97) the way and how this family shapes the 'sense of the familiar and the possible' (ibid.) cannot be independent of the parents' position in social space (cf. Bourdieu et al. 1999: 199); thence while symbolic violence and power might be mediated by the family, children are still subject to them from day

one, since the familial field, as the foremost field encountered, is already shaped by the multitude of fields the parents and other agents of the familial field dwell in.[54]

Anyhow, the approach of relational phenomenology and psychic economy points towards two possibilities for an integration of psychology and a Bourdieu-infused sociology, especially when focussing on his latter works. In his *Theory of Practice* Bourdieu disavowed psychoanalysis altogether, reducing it to a 'biological reductionism' (2006) while at the same time arguing with, through and around psychoanalytical arguments, simultaneously lending from this tradition and condemning it; something Steinmetz gleefully labels with the psychoanalytical terms *Verneinung* and *Verdrängung* (denegation and denial).[55] At the same time, Bourdieu was not hostile to psychoanalysis but rather towards its main French proponent, Francois Lacan (Steinmetz 2013).

Another answer for Bourdieu's reluctance to fully embrace psychoanalytical theory for his own might be that he was suspicious of the primate of the un-conscious in Freud's and his disciples' theory. Instead, Bourdieu claimed 'a correspondence […] between social structures (strictly speaking, power structures) and mental structures.' (Bourdieu 1991: 5) Most clearly, his account of the relationship between sociology and psychoanalysis is formulated in *Weight of the World*:

> *'Sociology does not intend to substitute its explanatory method for that of psychoanalysis. It only intends to construct in a different fashion certain facts that the latter takes up as objects of inquiry fixing on aspects of reality that psychoanalysis dismisses as secondary or insignificant or treats as screens to be traversed in order to reach the essential.' (Bourdieu et al. 1999: 177)*

This reference to the reality – through which processes and phenomena should be investigated – corresponds interestingly to the position of child-developmental psychologist Charlotte Bühler whose 'theory is holistic in comparison to Freud's in that unconscious hedonistic drives and the homeostatic pleasure principle are not given sovereignty in Bühler's work.' (Derobertis 2016) Just like Bourdieu, Bühler used psychoanalytical approaches in her own theory of child development. But with her roots in a phenomenological approach, the outer world and its impact on the driving

[54] See also Fromm's criticism of Freud's overemphasis of the bourgeoise family constellation.

[55] However, it may be noted that Steinmetz is deeply sympathetic to Bourdieusian theorising.

forces of child development could not be overruled by the Freudian drives. However, Bühler's *Lebenspsychologie* (psychology of life) was at the same time very naturalistic as she was – just in line with the zeitgeist of her time – interested in the biological determinants of the psyche. This was partly due to her methodological approach, using secondary sources such as diaries of members of the bourgeois class with rather stable life courses, thus leaving enough room for the questions of biological determinants. However, one of her students put Bühler's *Lebenspsychologie* on trial with regard to people of the working classes and, while starting out with the same concepts partly based in psychoanalysis, successively replaced the biological determinants with social and cultural ones. This student was Marie Jahoda.

Unfortunately, Jahoda never developed her own sophisticated theoretical framework in any opus magnum (Jahoda: 'By and large, sociologists are even worse than psychologists in calling every thought they have a theory' (Fryer 1998); see also (Wacker 1998)), albeit her *Current concepts of positive mental health* (1958), which was already elaborated on in the previous sections, and her long essay *Freud and the dilemmas of psychology* (1977) can be duly considered theoretical work (cf. Parker (2015)). However, for the sake of an integration of Jahoda's psychology and Bourdieu's sociology, it is necessary to look also into her empirical work and try to extract the possible links between them through her methodologies and research fields.

Most explicitly in a programmatic paper (1989) against the schism in social psychology (but arguably already in her doctoral thesis (Jahoda 2017 [1932])), Jahoda argues – and works – against the oppositions she identifies with Freud on the one and Durkheim on the other side: the purely psychological vs. the purely sociological approach to social psychology – an opposition Bourdieu felt very similarly regarding his contemporaries, Adorno vs. Lazarsfeld (Bourdieu et al. 1991: 269; Kranebitter and Reinprecht 2018), the latter of course having been Jahoda's first husband. And both tried to overcome these traditional approaches through a radical integration of theory and practice.

They also shared the idea of field analysis, although Bourdieu obviously moved way beyond the social psychology notion taken from Lewin, which Jahoda applied (Fryer 1986; Swartz 2016). In addition, Jahoda's combination of Lewin's idea of circular causality with Bühler's phenomenological psychology approximates very closely Bourdieu's idea of habitus as a structuring structured structure and embodied history. In another parallel, just like Bourdieu,

Jahoda condemns social research from the 'commander's hill' (Fryer 1986) while at the same time diversifying methods and taking genuine interdisciplinary approaches (most notably in *Marienthal*) to do 'good' social psychology, i.e. 'truly illuminating the functioning of people in their social context' (ibid.).

The aim of this section was, on the one hand, to introduce Marie Jahoda as a suitable accomplice for a research project within a Bourdieusian framework and on the other hand, to introduce Jahoda's concepts of positive mental health. As mentioned before, Jahoda's six dimensions of positive mental health can be understood as degrees or levels of social integration, which reflect the mediation of precarity, which she witnessed in Marienthal, just like Bourdieu did in Algeria.

2.4 Conclusion

Starting out with a *tour d'horizon* of precariousness, precarity, and precariat, we scrutinized current use of these conceptual pairs or triplets, to settle for a synthesis of a triplets of thinkers who provide the necessary conceptual pillars for the ensuing empirical analysis: from Butler we take the distinction between precariousness and precarity – the former describing the very experience of the individual, the latter the social embeddedness and conditionality of it. Bourdieu's *précarité* translates her findings into and makes them applicable for sociological analysis – his observations of precarity in Algeria describe a thrownness into an alien field which the individual's habitus is not equipped to sustain in. The similar observation Jahoda made in Marienthal finally provide the bedrock for the analytical tools for this research – precariousness is the experience of psychosocial disintegration and we can approach this experience via the six dimensions of her concept of positive mental health.

Political participation now is not least a function of social and psychosocial integration while political apathy and alienation are correlates of precarity. Adopting a broad view of precarity, way beyond the deviance from any kind of a "normal" employment contract, we can understand precarity as disintegration and deprivation from social embeddedness and support networks. With Jahoda, this precarity can be described along six dimensions of positive mental health, which refer again to the findings on depression, stress and anxiety, especially regarding anticipated problems, which were found to directly affect voting behaviour. While both Bourdieu

and Jahoda described mainly processes of disintegration, their ideas suggest, that we need to look into processes of *integration* of young people to understand their political participation.

3 Young people's experience of precariousness

While the preceding chapter introduced the concepts of precariousness and precarity in more general terms, this chapter reviews some of the literature on youth in general and young people's political participation (YPPP) in particular, through this analytical framework. This chapter thus starts out with the general problematisation of youth in the conceptual framework developed so far – is youth 'just a word' (Bourdieu 1993), is it a transitionary phase or a section of the population? Understanding precarity as a question of (dis)integration, the procedural character of youth (regardless of its conceptual framing) implies an unsteadiness which needs to be reflected in the way youth is understood in this context.

Related to the latter are questions of the problematisation, in the Foucauldian sense, of youth, namely the focusses on educational "careers" on the one, and early school leavers (ESLs) or youth not in employment, education, or training (NEETs) on the other end of the ellipsis. We will thus ask for their (dis)integrational power, i.e. their fostering or hindering of experiences of precariousness. In the second part of this chapter we will then bind these deliberations more firmly back to the problem of YPPP and discuss literature on YPPP through the precarity lens.

3.1 Myths of Youth…

In a shrewdly written review essay, Jahoda and Warren (1965) debunk many of *The Myths of Youth* which lend the text its title. Attacking leading (now classic) names in the field, such as Erik Erikson, James Coleman or Carolyn Wood and Muzafer Sherif, they stress the preoccupations of these studies with terms like "youth culture" or "subculture" and for garnering a general suspicion of erratic and/or deviant or even delinquent behaviour. This was not least due to an approach to young people which is bifocal in its sampling and unidimensional in its analysis: most studies, they argued, researched either highly educated young people, e.g. on campus, where a locally and temporally (semi)closed group can arguably develop a distinct "culture"; or they focussed on the other hand on young people of disadvantaged backgrounds in extreme situations and gleefully reported about violence etc. In addition to that, the authors also stress the neglect of female

youth.[56] While the latter point is likely not the case anymore in contemporary youth studies, the bifocal approach is also criticised nowadays (cf. Roberts (2013)), and more importantly, Jahoda's criticism, that little research aims at giving a comprehensive picture of how young people live, i.e. investigating their practices, is still relevant.

The implicit problem to start with, is of course one of definitions. Following Jones's (2009) overview of the history of youth research, *youth* was invented mainly during the age of enlightenment as a social or societal construct, until rather recently not available for children who had to work or women, who were conceived to be either girls, i.e. their fathers' property, or women, i.e. their (prospective) husbands' property and of course (prospective) mothers. However, youth *research* was invented rather by psychologists, than by sociologists, who researched *adolescence* as a bio-psychological and cognitive development or learning process. This approach allowed for once to identify rather clear-cut criteria of adolescence as proposed by the aforementioned Erik Erikson or Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget. However, it also meant that deviations from these learning curves could easily be pathologized and, of course, the normativity of these processes and developments was very much implicitly reproducing the class and gender norms of the time.

Erikson and Piaget are still authoritative references in contemporary research on young people (and children), in both sociology and psychology, due to the simple fact that the psychological (and neurological) developments during that biological age is relatively undisputed. Nevertheless, whereas this psychological adolescence is finite, the end of sociological youth is much harder to define. Jahoda suggests using Charlotte Bühler's 'bio-social approach: Youth is an in-between period beginning with the achievement of physiological maturity and ending with the acquisition of social maturity, that is with the assumption of the social, sexual, economic and legal rights and duties of the adult' (Jahoda and Warren 1965: 138) and further suggests that youth as such is quite simply the lag between physiological and social maturity – if they were assumed simultaneously, there would be no youth.

[56] This is indeed only consequential given the invention of youth as a male white upper-class privilege in the 18th century.

This idea of a social maturity is prolific, since it facilitates a discussion about a classed, racialised, and/or gendered, in toto a *social* maturity. Thus, while the starting point of youth, following Bühler, can be physiologically defined, its end point becomes the sociological focus. This leads to one of the main topics of youth research, namely the question of youth as transition and the pathways and destinations, passages and detours young people take to achieve social maturity, whatever that may mean for the individual at a specific point in time.

Youth and youth research – whether in sociology, politics, or psychology – are in this regard emblematic for a general problem of and in the social sciences: time. In authoritative essay on cohorts and social change, Ryder (1965) compellingly makes the case for longitudinal cohort studies as the preferable approach to address this. To build his argument, Ryder goes ad fontes, i.e. back to one of the discipline's founding fathers, namely Durkheim. The latter's ideas, which initiated not only structural functionalism but permeate sociology as a whole up to this day, operate not least on his concept of organic solidarity: in premodern times, in particular in eras previous to the division of labour all elements of society functioned in a similar way like cogs in a machine (mechanic solidarity). The industrialised capitalist world however functions more like an organism wherein highly specialised organs perform very distinct tasks to keep the organism alive (organic solidarity). As appealing this analogy might appear, it is immanently conservative, since it poses the persistence of the organism over the one of the organs (or cell etc.). This is crucial when we want to understand social change, since in this biological perspective, the possibilities for change are rather limited and necessitate a system change. However, the reality of the 'demographic metabolism' (ibid.: 843) of society is, that the components of society constantly change, since it is 'receiving raw material by fertility and discharging depleted resources by mortality.' (ibid.: 844) While this account might seem prosaic (or even graphic), it emphasises the very temporality of the parts from which human society is ultimately made of, and puts their life course under the looking glass for the understanding of social change.[57] Thus, social change is intrinsically linked to the metabolism, i.e. aging of humans. But age bears a 'dual significance – as a point in the cohort life cycle and as a temporal location'. (ibid.: 847) Anticipating the debate over "social generations" (see below), Ryder reminds us that theorising

[57] Ryder (1965: 846) duly recognises migration as the third yet less important factor, which is astounding since he is writing from an Anglo-American standpoint in the late 1950s.

social change and time needs to acknowledge the juxtaposition of age and time, of cohort and period, of life cycle and generation *and* the heterogeneity of individuals at these juxtapositions, conditional of class, ethnicity, gender, etc., since 'contemporaries […] respond and contribute to social history in different ways unless they are also coevals.' (ibid.: 848) While we do not agree with all of Ryder's positions half a century later,[58] his consequent emphasis on the combination of period and cohort is most important for our understanding of youth because 'the typical emphasis of [the statistical cross-sectional view of culture] on simultaneity between corresponding events from different lives implies over-valuation of the existing situation – "the sociological error par excellence."' (ibid.: 859) Wrapping up this short digression, Ryder reminds us of the temporality of the objects of sociological research and thus of the ephemerality of the concepts we use to research them, which lies at the heart of most of the debates we need to discuss in the ensuing section.

3.2 …and their sociologies

Most researchers agree on youth as a transitory phase since most concepts of a social maturity contain aspects like economic independence or founding a household or a family, which hardly applies to children, i.e. to a period before youth. However, longer compulsory schooling (Bessant 2004) and prolonged education to work transitions (Roberts 2013) mean that young people remain youth longer than in previous eras, which inspired some to new labels like 'emerging adulthood' (Arnett 2000). The latter concept can be understood as being based on Erikson's idea of a 'psychosocial moratorium' (Martelli and Pitti 2015: 179) and while Arnett's initial points of departure (the delay in many traditional markers of adulthood such as completed education, gainful employment, economic independence or starting a family) are more or less undisputed, his conclusions drawn are the subject of a heated debate (Bynner 2005; Arnett 2006; Côté and Bynner 2008; Côté 2014). While Arnett claims that these delays are unprecedent and thus demand a new conceptualisation of young adulthood, the main line of criticism by Bynner and Côté is that Arnett homogenises young people and turns a blind eye on processes of social exclusion along the lines of class, ethnicity, and gender. Using data from British cohort studies,

[58] E.g. his emphasis on the Erikson idea of a moratorium or his understanding of socialisation.

they compellingly show how the social class gradient for higher education increased between the 1946 and the 1970 cohorts, i.e. class related disadvantages in educational attainment got worse (Côté and Bynner 2008: 257). Thus, while Arnett sees a new periodicity of biographies emerging, Côté and Bynner remind us of the class based asynchronicity of trajectories. And Côté (2014) elaborates further on the inconsistency of Arnett's claim that emerging adulthood is experienced across social classes while admitting at the same time, that the extent to which young people experience this, differs across classes. This reminds, firstly, of the original concept of *youth*, as developed by Rousseau in the 18th century for a small fraction of society, namely male nobility. But it also echoes the problems of youth research, which Jahoda alludes to, when she writes (with Warren) about the scholarly construction of youth and youth cultures on the empirical basis of research into college students (1965: 140).

Although they mention it only in passing, Côté and Bynner (2008) also allude to another important debate about Beck's theory of individualisation, which brought forth the 'choice biography'. While considerable space was devoted to Beck (and Giddens) in chapter 1 regarding their impact on political participation research, the following shall briefly describe, in concert with the notes on Arnett, a more recent debate in youth studies. Woodman (2009) set out to defend Beck against (intentional) misreadings and misinterpretations along two main arguments. Firstly, in an exegetical reading of Beck's texts he does not find evidence of the use of "choice biography" by the late German sociologist himself. Secondly, however, Woodman makes a more profound point, regarding Beck's overall theoretical project: at the brink of the 21st century, sociology is in need for new concepts beyond "structure and agency" or "class and status" (see footnote 6), the former being infamously dubbed a "zombie category". Roberts (2010) responds to these claims by firstly producing evidence for Beck's promotion of the idea of choice biography. More importantly however, he defends middle-ground positions in the field of youth studies, which acknowledge structure *and* agency, and proceeds to also link Beck's to Arnett's propositions, which too overemphasise agency, regardless of structural constraints. Roberts then defends the use of "class" by firstly reiterating the debate between Beck and Atkinson, and by producing cursory empirical evidence for the pervasive and persistent power of the "zombie category". Woodman (2010) returns to the debate with an article, which firstly defends Beck but ultimately argues that any theorist would produce some contradictions and concludes on an invitation to reconcile Beck and Bourdieu, which, for youth studies, apparently means reconciling

transition and cultural approaches (cf. Furlong et al. (2011)). The next intervention in this debate is made by Threadgold (2011), who takes a middle ground in the debate, defending Woodman's reading of Beck and their implications for youth studies, but also Roberts' emphasis on the prevailing relevance of class. Finally, Roberts (2012) closes the debate, reiterating his criticism of Beck and Woodman in a more conciliatory tone, but also picking up Threadgold's challenge regarding Beck's rejection of class analysis as being rooted in a "methodological nationalism" (cf. footnote 32) as being close to insulting, before concluding that class remains significant despite the (alleged) dissolution of class consciousness.

While we side with Roberts for the most part in this debate (cf. the criticism of Beck presented in chapter 1), a couple of points might need adding to these debates. Firstly, the omission of Giddens' work appears odd, given not only the intellectual complacency between Beck and Giddens – which not least Atkinson (2010a) was eager to highlight –, but also their significance for (social democratic) policy making in the 1990s (Levitas 2000). This is even more surprising, since Roberts is (rightly) pointing to the problematic policy implications of Beck's ideas. A second omission regards the aforementioned concept of emerging adulthood. Beck and Arnett both shifted the discourse on youth towards the agency end of the structure-agency debate and, put generously, both share an optimistic world view, the latter describing himself as seeing things in '"glass half full" terms' (Côté 2014: 185).[59] However, their ideas of a psychosocial moratorium (Arnett) and a do-it-yourself-biography (Beck) are contradictory, since the latter would not allow for the former. The solution to this conundrum lies once again in a recollection of the "old frames" of class, ethnicity, and gender: as Côté (2014) points out with direct reference to Erikson's later work, this moratorium, its voluntariness, length, and design are heavily conditional of social class. In the same vein, Roberts (2012) highlights that both Beck and Woodman admit that the extent and the implications of social change they observe are contingent on class.[60] In other words: individualisation understood as detraditionalization is undisputed, but the consequences are still classed.

[59] Beck's optimism on the other hand is rather of the "it's too late to be pessimistic" (Arthus-Bertrand) kind: almost thirty years ago, Beck (1990) argued that, while the social question ("soziale Frage") had been the guiding challenge and logic of conflict of the first modernity, the ecological question ("ökologische Frage") is the main challenge of the second modernity.

[60] Although, Beck *did* question the lifeworldly relevance of inequality in his early works (see footnote 5).

In another way, however, one needs to question the universality of concepts like emerging adulthood and the like, since it might well be that the old, standard conception of youth suffers the same shortcoming as the deficit definition of precarity: just like the "normal labour contract", '[t]he normative linear timetable of events which informed earlier research […] was becoming out of date, and may in any case belong to a mythical "golden age".' (Jones 2009: 88) This means on the other hand, that there has always been a variety of transitions into adulthoods, in plural, which differed (the transitions as well as the adulthoods) and continue to differ along the '"old" social divisions – such as class, gender, "race" and place – [which] continue to create differences in the experience of the transition to adulthood […].'(Antonucci et al. 2014a: 18)

This makes simple binary typologies problematic: differentiating between slow- and fast-track transitions (Jones 2002, 2009) or 'fast and slow lanes to adulthood' (Bynner et al. 2002) risks perpetuating the same normativity of transitions and concealing pluralities of transitions and reproducing the aforementioned bifocality. Roberts (2011) e.g. describes young people in 'jobs without training' (JWTs) which, due to the normativity of a certification market, are increasingly treated like a new form of NEETs (Avis 2014). This alludes to the complicity of youth research and social policy, an unequal relationship in which the latter dominates the discourse by setting policy targets like lowering the share of NEETs or increasing the number of youths in vocational training, thus urging youth researchers into investigating those particular groups, thus contributing to the increasing 'missing middle' of youth research (Roberts 2011; Roberts 2013).

Conceptualising youth as linear transition seems futile when young people are either trapped in 'cyclical transitions' (MacDonald and Marsh 2000) or "trick" the ONS through ever prolonged educational moratoria. This is not least driven by the framing of social maturity as de facto economic adulthood, something youth research is obviously not solely responsible for. However, alternative perspectives seem necessary to overcome this narrowing to economic aspects to really understand dynamics of multidimensional transitions including housing and family transitions (ibid.). While arguing *In Defence of Studies of Youth Transition* MacDonald et al. (2001) acknowledge that analysis of youth cultures *and* youth transitions alongside each other can profit both approaches, regardless of the respective focal point. Ten years later, Furlong et al. (2011) similarly claim to bridge the bifurcation between structural transition and cultural individualisation approaches, but actually dismisses any middle-ground approach and ultimately

argue for a "social generation" approach (following a superficial reading of Mannheim (1928), cf. also France and Roberts (2015)) which has a lot of pitfalls, as the authors themselves acknowledge. Instead, a proper "middle ground" position can indeed bridge and integrate these perspectives.

Bessant et al. (2019) make this point by introducing a proper Bourdieusian perspective. Such a research endeavour would demand a departure from substantialist approaches, including the structure vs. agency binary. Instead, a Bourdieusian youth research understands youth (like all ordering categories) as subject to a classificatory struggle. Bourdieu's emphasis laid on an understanding, that youth, just like generation, gender or class are socially constructed and this very construction is subject of a 'play of power relations' (ibid.: 3). These classificatory struggles are ultimately about the forms of capital while these power relations are characterised by the endowment with (the right) capitals. Recollecting the discussion of Ryder before, we can make explicit, that these classification struggles take place in a particular 'temporal location' (Ryder 1965: 847). A sociology of youth, which looks for young people's agency in an old people's structure is thus futile. Instead, with Bourdieu, we should research young people's practice and understand it with Ryder in their temporal location.

While making these important suggestions, Bessant et al. (2019) unfortunately do not provide instructions or a best-practice example for Bourdieu inspired youth research. However, Uprichard (2008) suggests a way forward, namely by considering young people as simultaneously 'being and becoming'. Although partly framed in Beck's "project"-lingo this prolific alternative approach to youth transitions focusses on time horizons and temporality. In a comparative study of young people in Britain and Norway, Brannen and Nilsen (2002) identified attitudes towards time which they condensed into three ideal types of how young people view their future. What makes this study so significant, is not least that it involved young people of all backgrounds and at different occupational or educational stages, thus avoiding the aforementioned bifocality. Their typologies indicate pronounced class and gender differences: 'Deferment' was found to be most salient among young females in vocational training, who emphasise living in the present, pursuing short-term goals and not thinking too much about the future. 'Adaptability', in contrast was more salient among university students, who are comparably confident in mastering their future while being quite realistic about the challenges they might face. Finally, the model called 'Predictability' was mostly found among young men of Asian background in the UK, striving to

climb the social ladder, who studied mainly to become breadwinners of their families in a predictable future.[61]

Although Brannen and Nilsen do not identify a particularly troubled group, the differences between social classes and the correlates of perceptions of time and social class are apparent and mirror the theses posed in the previous chapter about time horizons and precariousness. Jones (2009) too refers to a growing literature on inequality of future prospects emphasising that 'longer-term planners are young people who have resources and who are able to deploy them […] They therefore tend to be middle class and from advantaged social backgrounds'(ibid.: 107). At the same time, young people from disadvantaged backgrounds or with experiences of domestic crises, failure or insecurity are much more inclined to opt for 'survival strategies' instead: 'Short-term strategies are most likely to be adopted by those with the least power to change their circumstances.'(ibid.: 106) An experience they share with Bourdieu's sub-proletarians and Jahoda's unemployed: understanding disadvantage as a lack of the correct, legit capitals, i.e. modes of recognition, young people (like Arbeitslose and sous-prolétaires) are stalled in their presence, unable to anticipate a realistic *and* desirable future.

3.3 From economic to civic adulthood

Although these refined approaches are susceptible for the proposed thesis, the transition literature mostly (implicitly) focuses yet on what we might call economic adulthood, blanking out questions of political participation.[62] This is surprising, since civic adulthood, e.g. in the form of suffrage, is one of the last classic remaining markers of adulthood independent of education or employment status. This is of course partly due the reasons laid out in chapter 1; but it is yet surprising that few scholars systematically linked transition and participation studies.

A notable exception is Constance Flanagan who provides an interesting list which she calls

[61] Interestingly, their comparative group in Norway consisted of working-class men in high quality vocational training.

[62] Notably, in a recent volume like Antonucci et al. (2014b), merely two articles explicitly problematised civic adulthood and the political impact of young people's precarity respectively.

'characteristics of citizenship: belonging to at least one group, attending religious services at least monthly, belonging to a union, reading newspapers at least once a week, voting, being contacted by a political party, working on a community project, attending club meetings, and believing that people are trustworthy.' (Flanagan and Levine 2010: 161)

All of these characteristics are less likely among young people in the US today, than in the 1970s; only a tenth characteristic, voluntary work, is more common today albeit rather for CV related than for civic reasons (ibid.). What is intriguing about this set, notwithstanding earlier expressed scepticism towards such lists, is its class-bridging character, with some items appearing more typical for middleclass, others for working-class youth. This goes beyond the usual lamenting about declining union membership but addresses the more general problem of inequity in accessibility and responsiveness of institutions. E.g., the often observed education effect in YPPP, namely that young people especially in higher education are more likely to vote or take political action, is not just a question of resources (in Verba and Nie's sense). Educational institutions foster engagement with the world and society, i.e. they foster social integration. Youth, on the other hand, who lack these institutions helping them to develop a sense of community, lack this experience (Flanagan et al. 2011). Flanagan (tacitly debunking Beck and Giddens) asserts that while most social institutions are yet to adapt to contemporary protracted adulthood, this 'institutional lag' (ibid.) affects young people of disadvantaged backgrounds significantly more, since simply '"being there" in an institutional context increases the likelihood of exposure to conversations about political issues and to normative pressures to be informed about current events, to take a stand or to join a cause.' (ibid.: 32; this de-placed isolation is reminiscent of C. Wright Mills' criticism of white-collar workers, cf. DeLuca 1995).[63] Yet, the institutional settings which society does provide for the disadvantaged, like the micro-management of NEETs, may even enforce the disintegrative effect of individualised treatment, what can be understood with Bourdieu's Janus-state (2014), which integrates and alienates at the same time. On the other hand

In the UK, Furlong and Cartmel (2011) researched political participation at the same time through a youth research lens. They are less positive about the integrative power of educational

[63] In her discussion of political power as symbolic violence, Harrits (2019:251) too shows how union membership accounts for lack of political resources.

institutions, stressing 'increased emphasis on individualised performance with individuals increasingly held to account for outcomes and forced to make choices that have significant personal costs' (ibid.: 16) This point is also emphasised by Hacket (2004), who focusses on the isolating effect of indebtedness after graduation. This translates into differential insecurities, conditional of endowment with not least economic capital, which further affect the ability to choose voluntary insecurity as a kind of investment for a better job in some industries (Bradley and Ingram 2012). Most importantly however, Furlong and Cartmel conclude, that 'UK politics is rooted in class-based cleavages underpinned by collectivism' (2011: 26) and that young people sought rather individual solutions to negotiate their increasingly complex transitions. In this regard, the synthesis of transition and participation research leaves us with a rather bleak outlook, since the increasingly problematic education-employment nexus is still constitutional for this approach to liberal democracy. This lifecycle concept, as Bessant highlights, follows Marshall's (1950) conception of the 'citizen-as-worker'-democracy, where 'citizenship is gained through employment, a living wage and an adequate standard of living while it also demonstrates the value of being moral, independent and able to meet one's civic obligations.' (Bessant 2004: 390) Which reiterates the question, how civic adulthood can be achieved in contemporary societies. In this regard, Standing's *Precariat* is also of little help, since he too has a strong tendency to homogenise (see above), thus each of the respective markers of precarious youth employment needs again to be contextualised regarding their economic and social resources (Bessant 2018). This leads back to the above discussed debate about individualisation and social generations: the champions of these concepts repudiate class theory because they are actually stuck in an outdated class theory, based on employment based categories, which are obviously subject to change (France and Roberts 2015). This is a striking parallel to the problems of the conceptualisation of precariousness and precarity discussed above (see chapter 2.1).

At the same time, a thorough integration of youth and political participation research would have dismantled some of the angst around political apathy of young people. O'Toole (2015) and others show convincingly, that a simplistic 'crisis narrative' of political participation is stuck in conventional forms of participation, like voting or working in a political party, and that new generations did and constantly do invent new forms of participation. Of special significance in this regard is online activism, which has been heralded by many as the future of political participation. In the introduction to their special issue on online citizenship, Loader et al. (2014)

welcome the 'networked young citizen' as torch bearer of a new form of citizenship and politics and, while duly remarking that this is supposed to be an ideal type and that they refrain from generalisations, in the same breath install this new model as the evolutionary pinnacle of citizenship.[64] The same authors (Xenos et al. 2014) also present data on participation, which deliberately omits questions of inequality to prove their point how social media would increase political engagement.[65]

Sloam (2014a), albeit embracing the new tools for organising street protests in increasingly tough times of austerity and cutbacks to public institutions significant for youth, elaborates on this problem of unequal access. Borrowing from Amnå and Ekman (2013), he identifies the activated 'standby citizens' as 'highly educated' and 'technologically savvy' (Sloam 2014a: 218) and comparing different forms of participation (2014b), he makes once more the point how these new non-conventional forms are themselves at risk of marginalising those that lack the necessary resources.[66]

While "resources" are again easily understood in terms of Bourdieu's capitals, research by e.g. O'Toole and Gale (2010) among ethnic minority activists also indicates a high sense of community, i.e. a sense of integration, which in the end also echoes van Deth's claim that 'political participation is organisation' (2009). Thus, the individual ability to organise, to participate, depends, once again, on integration and resources. In a similar vein, Amnå and Ekman's (2013) approach resembles aspects which we find also in at least two of Jahoda's dimensions, namely Growth and Environmental Mastery. And Flanagan and Levine's (2010) list of civic characteristics too ends on a note, which echoes the psycho-social integration put forward by Jahoda. In other words, non-conventional YPPP is just as likely affected by youth precarity as institutionalised forms of political participation.

[64] It is noteworthy, that the populist Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy, arguably the most successful "internet party", was already around when this article was written.

[65] Beyond the questionable quality of their data, a more recent meta-analysis of 36 studies on social media and participation by Boulianne (2015) sheds further doubt on the reliability of many of these studies and their farfetched interpretations respectively.

[66] Similar was shown by Schäfer and Schoen for Germany (2013) who reiterate that voting is still the most accessible form of participation.

3.4 Conclusion

In chapter 2, the absence of precariousness was described as (the feeling of) successful integration into the immediate and general social fabric, which widens time horizons with solid starting points and concrete aims and thus enables and facilitates social and political participation. A cursory look into the transition literature is thus rather sobering, since the picture painted there is one of increasingly unstable passages. Some societal core institutions like education and the labour market became dysfunctional for an increasing share or young people, either because they find themselves in a limbo outside of them or their educational experience (or its afterglow as debts) works rather isolating than integrating.

In the proposed framework, it is this disintegration we need to understand if we want to simultaneously understand youth development and their transitions, and political participation. It is thus pivotal to understand young people as agents and to 'carve out civic engagement from its pre-understood anchorage, so as to disentangle it from specific "civic" experiences in explaining differences in engagement' (Amnå 2012: 622), in other words, to look into young people's practice: we cannot understand young people's political participation if we do not understand how they fare generally. Such an approach must at the same time be relational, i.e. view young people's experiences in relation to their peers' and always embedded into their lifeworld to avoid constructing even more "paper classes" like NEETs, ESLs, or JWTs. This way, we can also tackle the challenge Ryder put to us since we observe, research, and understand a particular youth in their time (and space).

The deliberations in chapter 1 showed that we need more holistic approaches if we want to understand young peoples (non-)engagement with politics. Political participation is not a mere function of human capital, skills, or resources but depends on an interplay of inherited and acquired capitals which young people incorporate; it requires a sense of belonging, the ability to project a future beyond the daily needs, security in social interaction and a feeling of integration which we can understand through Jahoda's dimensions of psychosocial integration.

As elaborated in chapter 2, approaches which craft or even reify precarity as a deviation from some kind of "norm" or "normalcy" are – besides their volatile point of reference – incapable of covering the dynamics of a social world changing at an ever-faster pace. Subsequently, these

approaches are constantly in need of redefining demarcation lines or setting up new lists of ever shorter standing validity. Given the dynamism of young people's lives, these approaches inevitably fail to reflect young people's experiences: a narrow employment orientated definition of precarity would either pack youth as a fraction of society into "the precariat" or deny young people this status all together as long as they are not part of the labour force, or pathologize experiences of precariousness.

Understanding precarity as a multidimensional condition and process is thus crucial. Firstly, it does not reduce youth transitions to (and thus further fetishizes) the education-employment transition but attempts to include a variety of aspects which foster or discourage social integration. Secondly, understanding precarities as conditions highlights on the one hand their temporality and on the other reflects their power of conditioning various aspects of social life, as argued especially by feminist scholars. And thirdly, conceptualising precarity as a process also captures more adequately its cumulative character: similarly to the way France et al. (2018) argue for researching elite youth (or youth elites?) through their cumulative advantages or rather their process of accumulation of advantages over time, a procedural understanding of youth precarity reflects the accumulated precarities over time.

This is rendered with this framework of precariousness/precarity: it addresses the problems of economic and educational (dis-)integration in transition with their psychosocial significance. Separating observation (precariousness) and categorisation (precarity), young people's experiences and activities are taken and put into relation with other experiences first before asking for the circumstances of their social production.

The ensuing chapters will now probe this concept empirically and address the research questions of this thesis:

1. Can we describe young people's lifeworld over the course of youth through their experiences of precariousness and if so,
2. Can we understand these experiences as socially induced precarity? And finally,
3. What adds this concept to our understanding of voting behaviour?

But first, we must clarify how we attempt to do this.

4 Methodology and data

Building on the theoretical considerations, this chapter presents the methodological and methodical procedures deployed as well as the data used to test the hypothesis of precarity as significant for voting and abstention among young people. It starts with a description of the data and discusses some of its limitations as well as the motivation and ways to tackle them, especially the imputation procedures imposed. What follows are the introduction of the main methods used for the analysis, namely Latent Class Analysis (LCA) for the identification of precarity and Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to identify patterns and trajectories of precarity over time in a relational perspective. The closing section of the chapter finally makes the case for a less paradigmatic and more pragmatic approach to methodologies and methods in the social sciences.

4.1 The data, their limitations, and possibilities

The Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (henceforth LSYPE) is a longitudinal survey, conducted from 2004 to 2010 by a research team at the Institute of Education at the University of London (University of London et al. 2012).[67] The respondents were born before September 1990, which means the data set covers the life years 13/14 to 19/20, since the data collection took place in summer mainly. The survey, with a starting sample of approximately 15,000 respondents, collected data on young peoples' lifestyles, (mental) health and risk behaviour (e.g. petty crime, smoking, alcohol, other drugs), sexuality and leisure time activities, but mainly on attitudes towards education and school, problems at school and educational career choices. The research design for the first four waves (2004-2007, age 13/14 to 16/17) consisted of face-to-face interviews with both the young person and the main parent, and a computer assisted self-completion questionnaire to guarantee for confidentiality on the more sensitive topics such as sexuality or drug use. The last three waves (2008-2010, age 17/18 to 19/20) collected data about the young person only, using online, telephone, or personal

[67] The project was continued under the name 'Next Steps' and a follow-up sweep was carried out in 2015. Given the high attrition rate, especially among those presumably most affected by precarity, the research was not extended to this additional wave.

interviews. In addition, the first four waves also contained a household grid, i.e. further information on household composition, siblings, second parents, income, house ownership, etc.

Like all survey data, the LSYPE has several limitations, some of which are more general while others concern this data set and the research question of this thesis more particularly. Firstly, like for all panel data, attrition is a problem. From wave 1 to wave 7 the total number of respondents almost halves from over 15,000 in the first to about 8,500 in the seventh wave. While this is in itself important, the attrition rate becomes problematic as dropping out of the panel does not happen at random: like most missing data, non-response is not Missing Completely At Random (MCAR, Rubin 1976, 1987), meaning there was no relationship between non-response in any one variable and missing values of another variable; it is rather Missing At Random (MAR), which means that the missing value in one variable is conditional of non-missing values in other variables. One classic example to illustrate this is Bourdieu's 'having a voice' mentioned in chapter 1: in *Distinction,* he elaborates why stating a political opinion is conditional of gender and class, i.e. why women and working-class people are more likely to respond 'don't know' or 'no opinion' when asked about certain topics (Bourdieu 2010[1984]: 407). Likewise, dropping out of a survey project like the LSYPE does not happen completely at random, the willingness and ability to stay in contact with the research team is highly related to the household's (the parents') class and ethnicity: using Free School Meal eligibility (FSMe) and Key Stage 5 results as predictors, Siddiqui et al. (2019) showed that the participants in the final wave 8 (LSYPE/Next Steps-participants were interviewed another time in a survey in 2015) represent mainly the 'survivors' of the 'meritocratic' sieving out of pupils over time, resulting in a sample significantly skewed towards the dominant classes. Yet, the data claims to be representative for the respective age cohort and post-stratification survey weights are supplied to adjust for deviations. While all descriptive statistics will thus use weights, the more complex analyses will use unweighted data since neither the poLCA R algorithm employed for the Latent Class Analysis (Linzer and Lewis 2011) nor the MCA procedure in StataSE allow for post-stratification weights to be applied.

Related to this problem is another more general survey research problem. As King et al. (2001) compellingly and convincingly showed, the customary exclusion of cases with missing values from statistical analysis (listwise exclusion) poses a significant while overlooked problem for

inferential statistics, because it is based on the premise of MCAR, without probing this assumption. In addition to the aforementioned problems of attrition and non-responses being conditional of social class, gender, ethnicity etc. the statistical analyses conducted in this thesis are therefore at risk to contribute to the marginalisation of some young people by excluding them from the analysis, i.e. muting them once again; social exclusion by means of statistical exclusion. Thus, the data preparation included an imputation procedure using Multiple Imputations by Chained Equations (van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011) to retain as many cases as possible.[68]

The second problem lies with the original purpose of this study and the research conducted for this thesis. Being a panel study mainly on educational trajectories, the questionnaire becomes more specific every round, thus reducing the number of variables put to and applicable to all respondents. For instance, the detailed information on educational pathways leads to a fragmentation of the data set as soon as educational pathways start to diversify, i.e. from Key Stage 4 onwards (age 14/15, wave 2). Combined with the aforementioned attrition problem, this results in a second main limitation of the data.

Finally, wave 5 posed a specific problem, because of the different mode of data collection. As mentioned before, waves 1-4 (age 13/14-16/17) were conducted using household interviews, including the main parent. In wave 5, respondents had to be re-recruited to participate in the study, thus attrition is rather high from wave 4 to 5. Because a typical strategy to reduce dropouts or item non-response is shortening the questionnaire, wave 5 consists mainly of basic questions, which did not allow to operationalise the relevant concepts. Thus, the following analysis uses waves 1,2,3,4,6, and 7 of the LSYPE to analyse precariousness and precarity and their effect on political alienation and abstention.

4.2 Methods employed

The thesis is based on a theoretical framework that understands precariousness as a condition, not a class (as Standing and others do),[69] while applying a relational Bourdieusian methodology.

[68] The MICE algorithm is briefly discussed below.

[69] See also chapter 2.

This requires finding a middle ground between a respondent and a variable oriented data analysis. Instead of approaching the data in the scholastic logic of pure deductive research by simply imposing a concept on the respondents, we need to derive (information on) the varying experiences of precariousness directly from the respondents, i.e. from the data, without evening out categorical differences. Thus, Latent Class Analysis (LCA) was the method of choice for this endeavour. Secondly, the theoretical considerations of chapter 2 also suggest, that we need to understand precarity in a relational way, i.e. observed differences in the degree of precarity are not a deviation from some kind of average or norm but are to be understood as distances between positions in a social space. Thus, we employed Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to visualise this space and to identify patterns of movement in it using cluster algorithms with squared Euclidian distances.

The final part of the thesis will, building on the preceding analyses, address the main research question about the impact of precarity on non-voting with regression models on individual level.[70] While these methods are rather common, the two main methods to identify and situate states of precarity are outlined below in more detail. Firstly however, the missing value problem with the LSYPE data needed addressing.

4.2.1 Imputation

Missing values present a both methodological as well as practical-analytical problem to survey research. On the latter, the exclusion of cases from an analysis due to missing values in some variables reduces the total number of cases in the analysis and thus impedes the reliability of the analysis. While this might not be that big a problem when working with large datasets, it is still significant when asking research questions about smaller groups, e.g. when focussing on intersections of class, race, and gender. The former problem relates to the unequal distribution of non-responses, conditional often exactly on the aforementioned power relations of class, race, and gender. Simple listwise deletion of cases is thus likely to amplify the voices of the dominant class (and gender and race) while silencing the dominated, which is not only a theoretical and

[70] Although turnout at the General Election 2010 in England varied significantly between constituencies from 44% to 77% (http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/electoral-data), it goes beyond the realm of this project to account for geographical variation.

ethical, but also a methodological issue, as King et al. (2001) have shown. Therefore, the data preparation included the imputation of missing values in the mediating variables, i.e. the variables used to find the states of precarity.

Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE; van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011) offers several imputation algorithms; depending on the format of the variables under consideration, different imputation methods can be employed. The main demarcation line here is whether the variables are in fact metric (or interpreted as metric, like it is often done with Likert scales) or categorical, i.e. each value is considered to bear discrete information. The former case is obviously less sophisticated: typical procedures are mean or median imputation, i.e. missing values are replaced with an average value of the observed data. The latter case is more difficult, since the assumption is that each response pattern needs to be respected because there is reasonable presumption that, e.g. 'agree' and 'fully agree' represent not just slightly different degrees of agreement (which would forward the case for treating the variables as metric) but that there is a covert reason why respondents gave one answer instead the other.

In that case, the task for imputation is to identify response patterns which substantiate an estimation of the missing value. Here again, one can either try to identify similar respondents, e.g. using propensity score matching to identify statistical twins of the non-respondent and then replace the missing value with the observed value of the respondent-twin. The different approach, used for the imputation here, is to focus on the response pattern as such and to draw for each response a decision tree. In that case, each observed value is modelled as the end point of a sequence of decisions, i.e. observed values. While a typical decision tree has one starting point only, e.g. a bifurcation between female or male which is then followed by the decision between different ethnic groups and so on, the algorithm used here is Random Forest imputation, which means that each of the predictor variables is used at any of the nodes. Thus, all predictor variables are shuffled and randomly used as starting points and at any other position in the decision trees, contributing to the Random Forest. While a typical multiple imputation procedure would conduct all following analyses with several imputed data set and the original data set (using listwise exclusion of missing values), this was not feasible for this project since the complexity of the dataset exceeded the computational power available.

The number of cases with imputed values ranges from 617 values (or 7.3% of the valid cases) on alcohol consumption in wave 1 (at age 13/14) to many variables with no need for imputation at all. On the whole, 1.6% of all cases in the final analysis had values imputed for the variables used in the LCA (see tables in Annex Chapter 4). On average across all variables in the analysis, 85% of the variables used were complete and 96% of the variables had less than 3 values imputed.

4.2.2 Latent Class Analysis (LCA)

The first part of the empirical work will comprise two analytical steps and will use LCA for the identification of degrees of precariousness. While LCA was introduced to sociological research by Lazarsfeld in the 1940s (Lazarsfeld 1955) it is recently more common in psychological research, especially in research on risk behaviour (Lanza et al. 2003; Cleveland et al. 2010; Collins and Lanza 2010; Lanza et al. 2010; Lanza and Bray 2010; Vasilenko et al. 2015). The application on (covert) conditions like depression (Hybels et al. 2009; Evans-Polce et al. 2016) points towards the usability for the presented research.[71]

In short, LCA constructs groups based on response patterns, i.e. defining values on an underlying dimension, which, in most cases, can be understood as an ordinal scale. Several features of this analysis are important differences to other means of dimension reduction like factor analysis. Firstly, compared to exploratory factor analysis (EFA), LCA aims at identifying groups and not just at finding underlying dimensions. While EFA is a useful instrument to explore a set of variables, LCA rather arranges the variables and their values corresponding to an underlying dimension and predicts the probability of each case to produce the respective response pattern. Also, EFA, like principal component analysis, uses correlation coefficients and is thus ultimately based on averages. This practice is problematic in several ways, mainly because it homogenizes scales and thus diminishes or flattens differences within a scale; further it offers no solution for

[71] This is not the space to delve into criticisms of Savage et al. (2013) and their "New Model of Social Class". However, their application of LCA deserves some attention here. Firstly, they did so on solely methodical grounds, arguing LCA would yield better results than e.g. k-means clustering. Secondly however, they disregard the main feature of LCA, its ability to deal with categorical data, and standardise their data instead, making the same problematic assumption of continuity of variables. Thus, one may disregard this as a good example of an application of LCA. Chan and Goldthorpe (2007a) application to measure cultural omni- vs. univores is likewise a bad example, since they too make hardly use of the features of LCA and it appears rather a fig leave for their theory than an original finding (cf. Chan and Goldthorpe (2005, 2007b)).

missing values, which are information in their own rights (cf. Bourdieu 2010[1984]) or demand list-wise exclusion of missing values, which potentially fundamentally skews distributions because it is unlikely that missing values are completely randomly distributed (King et al. 2001). In LCA, on the contrary, missing values respectively the likeliness not to respond to certain questions is fully taken account of since 'don't know' values are included as another category.

Secondly, since LCA uses probability functions, the extent of arbitrary decisions on the degree of homogeneity made by the researcher is significantly reduced. The latter is a common point of criticism of clustering mechanisms in general but there is also theoretical reasoning not to use conventional clustering methods for the proposed analyses: while clustering algorithms are purely explorative in the sense that various dimensions are likely to emerge, LCA is more theory bound in its approach. In addition, the problems regarding missing and average values apply for most cluster algorithms likewise.

Instead of looking for correlations, LCA identifies response patterns and combines these patterns until, following the EM-algorithm (expectation and maximisation), no significant improvement of the trade-off between complexity and comprehensiveness is obtained. Following Lanza et al. (2003) the probability formula for each pattern in an LCA (here with three variables) with the responses i, j, k can be noted as

$$P(Y = y) = \sum_{c=1}^{C} \gamma_c \rho_{i|c} \rho_{j|c} \rho_{k|c}$$

with γ_c representing the probability of being in class c, $\rho_{i|c}$ the probability of response i to the first item, subject to being in class c, and so on. Obviously, the initial solution would collate only identical response patterns into a group. Since this would yield too many groups for further examination, the number of latent classes is defined in a second step using chi-square statistic, χ^2, or log-likelihood statistic, G^2. Following Lanza and colleagues' advice, the solutions with the lowest BIC value is considered for the minimum and the one with the lowest AIC value as the maximum number of latent classes. Subsequently, all LCA solutions in between are analysed on contextual terms to make sense of the identified categories beyond their statistical significance.

As discussed above, the 'don't know' option was also used in the LCAs, based on the aforementioned covert significance of item-non-response, but also because LCAs, due to their

ability to fully use all the information of categorical variables, can reveal a latent meaning of the 'don't know' answers in combination with other response categories and patterns. Nevertheless, case numbers still necessitated collating categories in some variables, to fulfil the minimum requirements of the Law of large numbers (minimum group size n≥30).

Another noteworthy characteristic of LCA in this context is the assumption of local independence of variables, i.e. no variable's value is directly conditional of the other variables in the LCA. Thus, while the aim of LCA is to identify response patterns, each variable's value is in itself meaningful and must not be the result of the other variables in the model. This means in return, that each variable used in different contexts retains meaning, is part of specific response patterns and thus contributes differently to different LCA models. Take for example the importance of religion to the young person's way of life. This importance might mean different things when combined with drinking alcohol or attending religious services. Therefore, it is legitimate to use one variable together with different others to assess the dimensions under consideration.

In the first part of the empirical work (chapter 5), LCAs are conducted for each of the six waves of the data set to identify firstly Jahoda's six dimension and to then excavate different degrees of precariousness. It is likely that the results, i.e. the number of groups found on both levels, will differ between waves but this is neither a problem nor unexpected. On the contrary, we assume that the changing degrees of felt and experienced difference are reflected in the data over time. Figure 2 below illustrates the proposed procedure for wave 1: in a first step, each (latent) Jahoda dimension (here: Attitudes (AT1) and Growth (GR1) in circles) is identified using the manifest variables V1, V2, V3 (in squares) and so forth. The manifest variables are allowed to differ both in numbers of categories and number of missing cases, which are treated as another response category.

At the end of the first step, we retain 6 dimensions in each of the 6 waves investigated, i.e. 36 variables (Attitudes 1, Growth 1, …, Perception 7, Mastery 7), using the modal probability function (Goodman 2016). In a second step all 6 dimensions of each wave are again subjected to another Latent Class Clustering Algorithm. It is noteworthy that at this point we deviate somewhat methodologically from the LCA idea since the aim is not to identify latent dimensions or categories on one latent dimension respectively, but simply to use the LCA algorithm for

clustering purposes. As mentioned before, the LCA approach to compare response patterns means to fully retain the categorical character of the variables under consideration. Therefore, it makes a meaningful distinction e.g. between two cases with the same value on Attitudes, Growth, and Autonomy but different values for Integration, Perception, and Mastery.

Figure 2: Two-stage LCA model



At the end of stage 2, we thus retain one variable per wave for the degree of precariousness endured, based on the aggregation of the original experiences into six dimensions (see Figure 3). The degrees of precariousness yielded on this stage range again between 3 and 6 categories.[72] The figure below shows that each wave's states of precariousness are constructed independently; while the varying number of variables and the changing questions over time render a proper construct reliability test impossible, the anticipated movements between states and waves (e.g. state 1 in wave 1, and state 2 in wave 2) implicitly test, how good the measures of precariousness in each wave are. It needs to be reiterated at this point, that a narrow idea of construct reliability contradicts the methodological approach of this research to a certain extent: precariousness as an experience takes different shapes and forms according to living circumstances, age, etc. but can

[72] The ensuing chapter 5 illustrates this aggregation process in more detail, using wave 3 as example.

lastly always be understood as a lack of social support networks (Butler 2016 (2009)) and psycho-social integration (Jahoda 1958, 1982).

Figure 3: Second stage of LCA model and transitions



Three main lines of criticism of this approach should be addressed. Firstly, the constructs of precariousness proposed here are arguably highly aggregated: in total, 234 manifest variables are aggregated to 6 states of precariousness (latent variables) only. Thus, one might view these states identified merely as statistical constructs or artefacts without proper reconnection to the realities of the young people under consideration. This criticism would hold true, if we had constructed some kind of index of precariousness. However, this is exactly what was avoided using LCA, since we did not use any kind of mean or median value of Likert scales to retain the states of precarity but on the contrary, we can trace back any state of precariousness to a specific response pattern in the manifest variables.

A second and related criticism would address the intermediate level: why not try to retrieve the states of precariousness directly from the responses given. To counter this, there is firstly a methodical point to be made. Utilising 234 manifest variables to construct 6 latent states would account to an average of 39 variables per wave in total to identify the former. This is neither logically sensible nor computationally feasible (Collins and Lanza 2010). Using the intermediate 6 dimensions, the average number of variables per LCA drops to an average of 6.5 variables per dimension and wave (234 variables / (6 waves* 6 dimensions)). Secondly, and more importantly, it was argued in chapter 2 that we needed to develop a psycho-social approach to the concept of precariousness to render it productive for this research. Thus, we needed a systematic approach to understand young people's experiences as psycho-social integration, which is exactly what Jahoda (1958) provides.

A third criticism lies in the doubled two-stage approach taken here, which first estimates Latent Class Analyses for each dimension of precariousness (i.e. the dimensions of positive mental health) in each wave independently before welding them into another categorical variable via a "supra-LCA", denoting precariousness in each wave or age year, a 'plain vanilla'-approach, according to Rijmen (2013). This approach is however methodologically in line with e.g. von Davier and Rost (1996) who also use the highest probability for membership of each class for their second-order LCA (ibid.: 328; see also Goodman 2016). In contrast, had we estimated each of the six dimension and the supra-LCA at the same time, as suggested by Rijmen (2013), we would have needed a comprehensive test theory for the association of each dimension of precariousness and their overall composite indicator. However, assessing the change of influence of each dimension on the overall experience of social integration would be a different, although intriguing, research endeavour.

Summing up the application of LCA in reverse manner: we aim at identifying precariousness at six consecutive timepoints, using the same six variables in each wave (i.e. a Repeated Measure LCA) since precariousness is operationalised as social disintegration measured via Jahoda's six dimensions of positive mental health; the latter are estimated in each wave separately using different manifest variables in the Latent Class Analyses to account for the changing manifestations of each dimension conditional of time and age.

4.2.3 Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA)

Correspondence Analysis (CA) and Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) are known especially for their use in Bourdieu's work, especially in *Distinction* (2010[1984]), and are thus connected to a whole alternative strand of research into social structures and social class (see chapter 1). The main idea of these approaches, which are also known as Geometric Data Analysis (GDA), is firstly, to turn away from a variable approach of inferential statistics to a structural approach to data. This means, instead of asking for probabilities and significance levels to prove that a probability observed in any given sample is not by accident, the GDA approach takes description seriously, i.e. before looking for causation the aim is to fully understand the data set, the observations (Le Roux and Rouanet 2005: 6). This leads, secondly, to a thoroughly relational methodology since the axes of a CA or MCA are constructed on the basis of the distances between individuals and their responses to each other.

In short, the aim of a GDA is

- *'to sum up, and describe the most important information in the table or the matrix in ways that elementary contingency table analysis cannot do;*
- *to give a geometric representation of this information, and in this way;*
- *facilitate the interpretation of the structures and associations in the analysed data.' (Hjellbrekke 2019: 2)*

Instead of delving into the mathematical details of the procedure in dry run (Le Roux and Rouanet 2005: 179), the following is rather a methodological justification for the steps undertaken in chapter 6. While constructing a social space in which one could situate the states of precariousness would have been desirable, the LSYPE data simply did not include the relevant variables to soundly construct such a social space. Instead, this research makes use of another important feature of MCA which is the ability to identify structures over time. After the states of precariousness (second level LCA) have been introduced in chapter 5, we will investigate them in relation to each other in a longitudinal perspective, i.e. we will show the relation between precariousness at age 13 and age 20 by investigating the dimensions which explain the relations in a contingency table of all responses (Burt-Matrix) best. After displaying the clouds of categories and individuals, the interpretation of the retained axes provides important insights into the trajectories of precariousness. Firstly, the contribution of each state in each wave can be interpreted regarding their significance for the development of psycho-social integration over time. As mentioned before, we would expect differing numbers of categories in different waves and solidification of some but also resolution of other states of precariousness. Investigating the contributions of each state in each wave informs about the experiences at any given state which had the most impact on the structuring of the total space. In a second step, we can investigate this "space of precarity" by adding socio-demographics as supplementary variables and investigating their significance using analysis of variance procedures on the factor coordinates. Thus, although we cannot construct the typical social space and situate the states of precarity in it, we can construct a space of precarity and describe positions and movements in it along cultural and economic capitals.

Besides the general appeal of constructing a social space in a Bourdieusian manner,[73] using MCA for the proposed analysis was also driven by both theoretical and pragmatic reasoning about ways to combine synchronic and diachronic approaches to youth. The diachronic approach would have investigated each wave of the data separately and described the respective experiences of precariousness along structural variables (e.g. class, ethnicity, gender) at each age year. The purely synchronic approach on the other hand could have deployed e.g. simple sequential analysis, which Abbott calls 'linear stage models' (1995: 103), and which assume progressive, unidirectional development over time. Abbott's idea of '*interactional field theories*' (ibid., emphasis in original) departs partly from the idea of strict linearity of developments and allows for delayed or non-consecutive factors affecting later sequences. Nevertheless, this approach is not able to establish positions in a *relational* understanding, which might solidify or resolve over time, since it sticks with individual trajectories. With MCA, instead, we can depict (the researched seven years of) youth as an entity which is structured by different forces.

4.2.4 k-means clustering

Finally, we want to find a typology of trajectories. To this end, the MCA approach is expanded towards another clustering procedure. Utilising again the coordinates of individuals in the space of precarity, k-means clustering with squared Euclidian distance was used to group individuals and their movement across time.

K-means clustering aims at combining cases into a given number of classes in such a way, that the square sum of variance within each cluster is minimised, i.e.

$$SQ_{within}(K) = \sum_{k} \sum_{g \in k} \sum_{j} (x_{gj} - \overline{x}_{kj})^2 \rightarrow min$$

with g denoting the individual case or object, k the cluster's center and j the respective variable.[74] The term

[73] Although there never was an actual MCA of the total social space in *Distinction.*

[74] The notations follow Bacher et al. (2010: 299–300).

$$\sum_j (x_{gj} - \overline{x}_{kj})^2$$

can also be read as squared Euclidian distance $d^2_{g,k}$, hence, the minimalization procedure can be denoted as

$$SQ_{within}(K) = \sum_k \sum_{g \in k} d^2_{g,k} \rightarrow min$$

thus fitting the mathematical requirements to work in the Euclidian space constructed via the Multiple Correspondence Analysis.

In contrast to the hierarchical agglomerative Ward algorithm, k-means is iterative: in an initial step 0, objects are assigned to clusters randomly and cluster centres are computed. In the following step 1, objects are reassigned to clusters according to proximity to the cluster centres

$$g \in k \Leftrightarrow k = \min_{k^*=1,2,\ldots,K} (d^2_{g,k^*})$$

in step 2 cluster centres are computed anew;

$$\overline{x}_{kj} = \sum_{g \in k} x_{gj} / n_{kj}$$

with n_{kj} denoting the number of objects in cluster k with valid values in variable j. Steps 1 and 2 are then repeated until the squared Euclidian distance between objects and cluster centres reaches a minimum

$$SQ_{within}(K) = \sum_k \sum_{g \in k} d^2_{g,k} = \sum_g \min_{k^*=1,2,\ldots,K} (d^2_{g,k^*})$$

In order to determine the ideal number of clusters, we computed a Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F statistic (Calinski/ Harabasz 1974 in Backhaus et al. 2008: 432)

$$CH(K) = \frac{SQ_{within}(K)}{SQ_{between}(K)} \frac{n-K}{K-1}$$

which is provided by Stata; the number of clusters with the highest Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F value is then chosen (cf. ibid.).

While k-means is suitable for the task of identifying groups in a Euclidian space, it is noteworthy, that this algorithm tends to form spherical clusters of similar size. While this could be problematic if there were significant outliers, both the statistical and the visual inspection (see Figure 8 and Figure 9) raise no such concerns.

4.2.5 Logistic regression analysis

The final question on abstention in chapter 7 will be approached with a logistic regression analysis. The baseline of this approach is the probability function

$$\pi = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha+\beta x)}}$$

i.e. the research question is, whether an event, e.g. belonging to a group or voting, occurs or not. This function can be transformed into a GLM suited form as

$$\ln\left(\frac{\pi}{1-\pi}\right) = \alpha + \beta x$$

enabling a (pseudo-) linear estimation of coefficients. This approach belongs to a different paradigm of statistical methods than GDA (see below) but is deployed here since it allows for the identification of characteristics, e.g. parental education, and their singular effect on the event under consideration. A similar accuracy might have been possible through visualised regression techniques, i.e. a statistical comparison of MCA spaces; however, the data available did not allow for the construction of a "proper" social space. Thus, logistic regression models (binomial and multinomial) were used in the ensuing chapters.

4.3 Alive and kicking – the case for methodological pragmatism

The focal point here is not sociology of scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, the variety of proposed methods in this research demands taking a position regarding the integrability of the methods. Although GDA has been around for a considerable time now, text books like Le Roux and Rouanet (2005) or Hjellbrekke (2019) still find it necessary to present a history of this approach, something no textbook on e.g. log-linear modelling would deem necessary. This points towards legitimation problems of this approach in the field of quantitative sociology, in which many researchers seemed to have subscribed to econometric methods and variable based approaches,

a development which is also deeply entangled with the rise of methodological individualism and rational choice theories, promoted by the Chicago school of the Coleman and Becker era. The naturalisation of "the market" as the sole force of social integration and action demanded a "natural science"-approach to society and the according scientific methods. Besides adding to the wedge between quantitative and qualitative social research, this was rather unchallenged in the light of an increasing amount of data and the new computational powers available to work them.[75] The relationship between theories of rational choice, the advance of econometric methods and methodological individualism is not causal – one can obviously conduct even qualitative research within the rational choice paradigm. However, as a triad they dominate not least quantitative youth research, since these methods – even more in their longitudinal application – allow for modelling of individual success or risk factors in a research which focusses on youth as a phase of multiple, at times simultaneous transitions between different forms of education, education and employment, founding of a household on one's own etc. This approach has significant merits, e.g. in identifying how specific factors or a combination thereof amount to an educational disadvantage for e.g. women of colour. Nevertheless, research in this vein often underestimate systemic or structural questions since the focus lies on the individual and their individual chances and obstacles. Or, as Vester (2006) put it, rational choice approaches are good in modelling the very moment people make a decision at a transition point, but turn a blind eye on the way between each of these passages. More holistic, structural approaches of GDA did not fit into this paradigm and were thus seen as pariah outside France.[76] However, the reaction of the attacked seemed and still seems to be just that of a Gallic village, given derogative phrases like 'sample-minded' (Le Roux and Rouanet 2005: 6) to describe researchers in the inferential statistics paradigm and the demands for a 'definite departure' from their research (ibid.: 10).[77]

[75] A notable exception in this regard is the Marxist sociological tradition, where the attempt to reconcile Marxism with rational choice and methodological individualism as "analytical Marxism" was heatedly debated (c.f. Levine et al. (1987); Weldes (1989))

[76] Notably, more recent developments in the UK (e.g. Atkinson (2017); Savage et al. (2013), Belgium (e.g. Keere (2018)), Norway (e.g. Flemmen (2014) or Germany (e.g. Barth and Schmitz (2018)) indicate a revival or popularisation of these methods across Europe, although (yet) far from becoming mainstream.

[77] It should be noted, that some researchers always rejected to sign up to one camp only, e.g. van der Heijden, Peter G. M. et al. (1989) who suggested a combination of logistic regressions and (M)CA.

This research suggests a more pragmatic approach, with LCA (quantitative) and MCA (geometric) being equally central for the research conducted, as are the logit models (quantitative) in the final empirical chapters. This eclecticism is on the one hand oriented towards the basic sequence of scientific research which starts with ontology and epistemology before proceeding to methodology and methods instead of fixating the methods to assess which questions can be asked: our research question of individual abstention suggests a loglinear modelling of likeliness to vote; the holistic and relational understanding of precariousness over time, as laid out in the theoretical considerations, calls for MCA as the most suitable method; the process of deriving these states as latent classes of manifestations of different psycho-social integration finally made LCA the method of choice.

On the other hand, we aim to make the argument for the integration of diverse methods into a relational methodology. Following Özbilgin and Vassilopoulou (2018: 153), a Bourdieusian relational approach means, firstly, to examine social phenomena in their social and historical context; secondly, this approach allows for investigations of '"the space between", through which insights are generated relating to where agency, action, and structures have causal interdependence and where they intertwine and cogenerate social interdependencies and intersubjectivities.' (ibid.) Finally, Bourdieu's relational approach simultaneously considers 'objective structures, situated activity, and subjective experience' (ibid.) when depicting the social world. Notably, Bourdieu is neither the inventor of relational methodologies nor is his approach the only one which claims relationality. Most importantly, Social Network Theory (SNT) is immanently relational in its approach. However, as Fox (2014) points out, SNT, especially as argued for by Bottero and Crossley (2011) is to a certain extent 'power-blind' and underestimates the efficacy of objective relations, which 'link agents to each other and to social structures' (Fox 2014: 208) and which are or become incorporated, i.e. habitus.

Finally, all methods employed here do share one central feature: they allow to retain the categorical character of the responses. Starting with the imputation algorithm, all methods reject an averaging out of categorical differences: The Random Forest imputation sought the most likely outcome, the LCA algorithm focussed on response patterns, and the MCA approach also allows

for categorical differences and does not need to quantify distinct responses.[78] This requirement to all the methods employed is in line with deliberations from survey research as well as with theoretical considerations about the very situation of answering a posed question. The seemingly overcomplex approach for the measurement of experiences of precariousness is thus not a matter of methodical pretentiousness but prudence, in particular with regards to the inclusion of the "don't know" category as a valid answer, which cannot be meaningfully dealt with in other approaches like summative indices. An imputation of "don't know" answers would have, on the other hand, violated the self-imposed claim for inclusion of people who are less likely to be present and thus represented in survey studies.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter gave an overview of the methods used and the justifications to do so. The various sub-questions in this research demanded using various methods of different paradigms which meant, signing up to one camp only was neither feasible nor desirable. Thus, the point was made for a more anarchic and thus question-driven approach while securing the principal perspective on data. Doing quantitative sociology implies a positivist stance, but it does not mean signing up to a reductionist sociology, even though this might appear 'almost too difficult to be tackled' (Jahoda 1989).

The following chapters put the methodology and methods developed here to work: chapter 5 will present firstly an illustration of the operationalisation of precariousness and the results of the LCA for wave 3 (age 15/16) before proceeding to a first analysis of states of precariousness along variables of cultural and economic capital, i.e. along the main coordinates of the social space according to Bourdieu (2010[1984]), but also along gender and ethnicity as transversal and intersecting societal forces, shaping young people's lifeworlds. Chapter 6 then puts these states of precarity into relation with each other by constructing and investigating the space of precarity, using MCA and k-means clustering before chapter 7 finally addresses the political character of these states and the trajectories between them over time.

[78] Obviously, k-means works with average/mean values, but was applied on the individual coordinates in a Euclidian space, i.e. not on categorical variables.

5 Finding precariousness

This chapter's objective is firstly a descriptive analysis of the latent classes of young people's experiences of precariousness, as defined by Jahoda (1958), and secondly to put them into relation to the respondents' lifeworld, i.e. to identify them as states of precarity. The analysis will therefore deploy three pivotal characteristics shaping the societal contexts the respondents dwell in, namely their gender, ethnicity and class, using parental social background and own socio-economic class at age 19 respectively. In other words, we assess precariousness phenomenologically, through young people's experiences but by investigating their differential exposition to psychosocial injury and violence, paraphrasing Butler (2016 (2009): 25), we can understand them as 'politically induced condition[s]' (ibid.), i.e. precarity, since, with Bourdieu (1989), we understand these societal contexts (gender, ethnicity and class) not in a substantialist but a relational way.

After discussing the operationalisation of experiences of precariousness, the first main part of the chapter introduces the aggregates of experiences of precariousness, identified using LCAs, as described in chapter 4. Although each dimension composite's contribution to the states of precariousness is an interesting finding too, the following presents a short cut by describing the states of precariousness along the manifest variables used to construct the 6 dimensions (Attitudes, Growth, Integration, Autonomy, Perception of reality, Environmental mastery) in each wave.

However, it is not before their positioning in the social space that they are understood as states of precarity. To this end, the second main part of the ensuing chapter analyses degrees of precariousness across waves along the mentioned characteristics of class, race, and gender to lay the foundations for the space of precarity presented in the next chapter.

5.1 Operationalisation of precariousness and precarity

As was developed in the preceding chapter, the central concept of precariousness and subsequently states of precarity is approached through Jahoda's six dimensions of positive mental health. To this end, 3 steps of operationalisation and computation were conducted:

1. Selecting variables for each wave in order to operationalise the six dimensions of Jahoda's concept of positive mental health, respectively for all waves;
2. Constructing each of the six dimensions for each wave by using Latent Class Analysis (LCA);
3. Computing a combined cluster variable by subjecting all six dimensions of each wave to another LCA in order to identify differing degrees of precariousness.

In total 234 unique variables (see Annex Table 1 to Annex Table 6) were utilised to identify Attitudes, Growth, Autonomy, Integration, Perception, and Mastery respectively in each wave. Thus, the following section describes or rather illustrates the operationalisation of each dimension for wave 3.

Operationalising complex psychological traits in data set which was not designed for that purpose is a tricky task. The implicit normativity of Jahoda's concept of positive mental health is particularly problematic, since this lures both reader and researcher into valuing and devaluing not necessarily the right answers. E.g. the question about the young person's intentions after Year 11 suggests "Stay on in full-time education" (response 1) as the "good" or "right" answer, while "Leaving full-time education" (response 2) is the "bad" choice and, tellingly, taking a detour and returning to full-time education (response 3) is not even explicitly provided by the interviewer.

Another problem lies in the deviations from concepts not designed particularly for young people. E.g. Jahoda's second dimension of positive mental health is called "Growth, Development, Self-Actualization" and she identifies two subdimensions, namely "Motivational Processes" and "Investment in Living" which she also suggests as the basis for the empirical research, for which she also makes suggestions such as "Utilization of abilities; future orientation; differentiation" and "Interests outside S[elf]; object relations; concern with work, others, ideas, etc." (ibid.: 96) Operationalising "concern with work" which is part of Jahoda's idea of "investment in living" with school related work items seems obvious but has some limitations as well, although school and work arguably share their disciplinary character. Nevertheless, items for the operationalisation of other subdimensions like the orientation towards other people or general "interests outside the self" are readily available in all waves.

The first dimension in Jahoda's conceptualisation is "Attitudes towards the Self". While the Self and attitudes towards it are hardly tangible using secondary quantitative data, Jahoda (1958: 83)

clarifies her understanding of an accessible concept of the Self which becomes palpable through an individual's 'traits, motives, feelings, interests, or values.' (ibid.) Thus, the operationalisation of "Attitudes" relied mainly on questions about feelings towards school, especially questions which related less to teaching in lessons but rather to overall feelings and attitudes. Additionally, a question about self-projection into a farther-away future was included. This is complemented with a question on physical health (in other waves also about mental health), since this too serves as an approximation for the accessibility of the Self. For the assessment of precariousness, the "don't know" category is even more interesting, since it is the strongest expression of problematic "Attitudes towards the Self".

In order to operationalise "Growth" for the third wave, 8 variables were selected. Following Jahoda, those variables cover topics such as future aspirations, practices and assessments regarding school live (as approximation to Jahoda's notion of "investment in living") as well as orientations towards other people. As mentioned in chapter 4, "don't know" answers were coded non-missing for the purpose of the LCA, and remaining missing values were imputed. Other missing values, e.g. produced by omission of a question due to an absent father or mother, were also coded non-missing and included in the analysis. In contrast to the "Attitudes" dimension, the school related items now for "Growth" refer more to the content and the experience of schooling.

"Integration" is arguably the trickiest dimension to grasp, as Jahoda herself argues (1958: 89) and even more so using survey data. The original concept, borrowed from Allport, emphasises on an 'articulate philosophy' (ibid.: 90), which is hardly empirically obtained. However, Jahoda offers an alternative for her systematic, which focusses on '[a]nxiety- and frustration tolerance and resilience' (ibid.). Thus, the variables chosen here are items which regard bullying on the one hand and once again particular feelings towards schooling.

"Autonomy" on the other hand is easier to grasp, although here once again an age adequate conceptualisation of autonomy is the challenging task. Jahoda suggests two aspects of autonomy, namely 'self-determination' and the 'ability to take care of oneself' as relevant for autonomy. The latter is an integral part of her studies into un- and underemployment (1982) and further elaborated there partly in purely material terms, i.e. the availability of money to partake in social activities etc. Thus, this dimension is approximated here via young people's own income from

gainful employment or receiving pocket money. The former (self-determination) however is operationalised firstly via the timing of the decision for future plans but also through the assessment of whether one gets good marks for hard work, i.e. the experience of reward, which should bolster self-determination. This was again complimented with the question about self-employment as an indication of a strong thrive for independence (even if imagined only).

"Perceptions of Reality" is somewhat misleading since this dimension focusses on correct assessments of oneself. To assess this, we focus on the question of need distortion, e.g. the variable on higher education plans asked young people, whether they think they will ever apply for university and if they did, whether they think they would get an offer. Respondents free from need distortion are then those, whose assessments about these two questions match, while young people who respond they would probably not apply but if they did certainly get an offer are considered not free from need distortion. Other variables for this dimension try to apply this problem to school situations while thirdly questions of drug use were also included in this dimension (in all waves) since frequent substance (ab)use can be considered problematic in the light of perceptions of the self.

Finally, "Environmental Mastery" is operationalised mainly via deviant behaviour in wave 3 while in other waves, this dimension entailed also questions on relationships and the like.

When investigating the variables in Table 1, either for each dimension or across the six dimensions, we need to address another assumption of the LCA model, namely local independence (Collins and Lanza 2010: 44). This assumption states, that the variables constituting each latent variable, i.e. the dimensions of positive mental health in our example, must be un*conditional* of each other, which obviously does not mean un*related*. This problem was tackled through combinations of conditional variables into one, e.g. the manifest variable *L3HEPlan* about the young person's plan to go to university and their assessment of their respective chances is a combination of two variables on likeliness to apply and to be accepted to university. Combinations like this not only guarantee local independence in this regard but also allowed further to measure an interesting aspect concerning divergence of two presumably related variables, i.e. we are in particular interested in cases where young people answered they were not likely to apply for higher education, but stated they would most certainly be accepted.

Table 1: Overview operationalisations wave 3

Attitudes	L3hea1cYP YP: Quality of YP's health in last 12 months
	L3ambitbYP YP: How much it matters to the YP to be self-employed/have own business in the future
	L3yys4YP YP: Feelings about school: Most of the time I don't want to go to school
	L3yys6YP YP: Feelings about school: On the whole I like being at school
	L3yys9YP YP: Feelings about school: I am bored in lessons
Growth	L3plann16YP YP: YP's intentions after Year 11
	L3dec16aYP YP: When YP decided to stay on FTE after Year 11
	L3HEPlan: YP plans and assessment of likeliness to go to university
	L3yys2YP YP: Feelings about school: School is a waste of time for me
	L3yys3YP YP: Feelings about school: School work is worth doing
	L3yys7YP YP: Feelings about school: I work as hard as I can in school
	L3yys10YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is a waste of time
	L3yys11YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is interesting to me
Integration	L3yys4YP YP: Feelings about school: Most of the time I don't want to go to school
	L3yys8YP YP: Feelings about school: In a lesson, I often count the minutes till it ends
	L3namesYP YP: Whether YP upset by name-calling, incl. text/ email, since last interview in
	L3excpalYP YP: Whether YP excluded from a group of friends since last interview
	L3moneyYP YP: Whether YP made to hand over money or possessions since last interview I
	L3thhitYP YP: Whether YP has been threatened with violence by students in last 12 months
	L3achitYP YP: Whether YP experienced violence from students since last interview
Autonomy	L3dec16aYP YP: When YP decided to stay on FTE after Year 11
	L3ambitbYP YP: How much it matters to the YP to be self-employed/have own business in the future
	L3yys12YP YP: Feelings about school: I get good marks for my work
	L3jobYP YP: Whether YP works in paid job at all during term-time
	L3jobfamYP YP: Whether YP does any paid or unpaid work for business run or owned by family
	L3famsupYP YP: Whether YP receives any pocket money/ allowance/ support from parents/ relatives
Perception of reality	L3plann16YP YP: YP's intentions after Year 11
	L3HEPlan: YP plans and assessment of likeliness to go to university
	L3yys5YP YP: Feelings about school: People think my school is a good school
	L3yys10YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is a waste of time
	L3yys11YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is interesting to me
	L3yys12YP YP: Feelings about school: I get good marks for my work
	L3ALC: Frequency of alcohol consumption
	L3SMOKE: Frequency of tobacco consumption
Environmental mastery	L3yys1YP YP: Feelings about school: I am happy when I am at school
	L3truantYP YP: Whether YP played truant in last 12 months
	L3canntryYP YP: Whether YP ever tried Cannabis
	L3sprayYP YP: Whether graffitied on walls in the last year?
	L3smashYP YP: Whether vandalised public property in the last year?
	L3shopYP YP: Whether shoplifted in the last year?
	L3fightYP YP: Whether taken part in fighting or public disturbance in the last year?

The example for the operationalisations in wave 3 should illustrate the type of variables and their treatment: the variables presented here are both assessments and descriptions of practices, which meets both Jahoda's and Bourdieu's approaches to social research.[79] In addition, from wave 2 onwards, each dimension was supplemented with the LCA solution of the preceding wave, i.e. the Growth variable identified in wave 2 was added to the set of variables for Growth in wave 3.

In a second step, the selected variables were used to construct a measure of each dimension of positive mental health, using LCA. As discussed, the LCA algorithm was used primarily as a cluster algorithm taking full account of the categorical characteristics of the variables used to identify the dimensions under consideration. The results of this step differ slightly between waves, e.g. in waves 1 to 3 we find 5 latent classes for the dimension "Growth", while in waves 4 to 7 the LCA identified only 4 latent classes each (see Annex Table 455 to Annex Table 466). The choice of LCA solution was informed by values of the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criterion (Collins and Lanza 2010) but also their development, i.e. the curve they describe when plotted.[80]

To sum up the first two steps, based on a wide range of variables, 6 new variables were obtained in each wave using LCAs, each measuring one dimension of Jahoda's positive mental health. In a scholastic or Cartesian reasoning, the next step would be to get those latent classes in order, i.e. to establish a hierarchy for each dimension, turning them into scales and indices. However, as developed above, the theoretical imperatives of both Bourdieu and Jahoda are rather not to rank those categories but to proceed with the next step.

For each wave, these six dimensions were again combined to obtain one single variable per wave, "precariousness", in order to provide a comprehensive account of positive mental health of respondents. The obtained number of categories of these variables range from 3 to 6 groups and chi^2-tests of all variables of all dimensions are highly significant, indicating the relevance of each of the variables for the construction of positive mental health. The number of latent classes was

[79] Jahoda grew more and more critical of the use of quantitative methods in social psychology over the years and recommended qualitative methods to the research of her proposed dimension of positive mental health; nevertheless, the research enterprise proposed here tries to reconcile her ideas with quantitative methods, not least because the methods and computational power available today allow for a much refined application of her ideas, e.g. with LCAs as described below.

[80] The complete R-Output with conditional item response probabilities, AIC and BIC for all waves and dimensions can be found in the annex.

again chosen on basis of the AIC and BIC values and on their respective entropy scores.[81] Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the LCA algorithm is probability based, which means that, notwithstanding avoiding the levelling out of differences through mean and average values, the algorithm may still produce a "middle" which represents modal values, i.e. the majoritarian experiences.

This section's purpose was to illustrate the proceedings of the construction or identification of precariousness. To understand these experiences as precarity, we will investigate them regarding class, race, and gender, but a first analysis needs looking into these experiences.

5.2 Descriptive analysis of latent classes

In the following section, the latent classes of precariousness are presented regarding the manifest classification variables for each wave. However, in order to structure the findings, the tables are arranged along the six dimensions again (see Annex Table 467 to Annex Table 472).

Wave 1 – major groupings

In wave 1, the aggregated LCA identified 3 states of precariousness. In general, state 1 is the majoritarian middle; state 2 appears at the end of disintegration while state 3 shows the highest degree of integration, i.e. appears the least precarious. Understanding precariousness as degrees of social disintegration, the description of these degrees of precariousness is implicitly oriented towards the overall, i.e. the average degree of (dis)integration. Nevertheless, there appears to be a trade-off between the wider social and family life: state 3, which shows the highest degree of socially desirable attitudes and practices, does well at school and shows some awareness of their status but has at the same time the least contacts outside the family. In this regard, the middle group 1 appears more balanced. Group 2 on the other hand shows little attachment to home and family, here the home appears as a conflictual area, which provides little resources for social integration. School, on the other hand is a place for development neither, since students in this group don't like being in school and feel alienated from it. This feeling goes hand in hand with

[81] The latter values are not too much above the 0.8 threshold, indicating a reliable although not very robust solution. Given the exploratory character of this two-stage approach, we found the results sufficient and proceeded with the analysis.

the awareness of their school being left behind – a feeling diametrically opposed to the feelings of entitlement which is palpable in the responses from students in group 3. Theirs is an experience of safe spaces, both at home and at school where they are introduced to and brought up in the ideology of meritocracy, viewed from the winning side, of course.

Wave 2 – precariousness diversified

After only three groups in the first wave, experiences of precariousness diversify at age 14/15, resulting in six groups. Starting again with the questions on school and school performance, there appear to be three groups among the six identified by the LCA: group 1 and 2 doing rather well while 3 and 4 are failing and 5 and 6 are again somewhat in the middle. However, the section on physical and mental health allows for further differentiation of these three groups: groups 2 and 6 appear to be more self-aware and confident, although the latter group is far less education oriented than the former. Equally, groups 1 and 5 seem more precarious within their subgroups with group 1 appearing to be less autonomous in their playing of the game and suffering from the pressure exerted on them by parents, teachers etc. Group 6 is also rather interesting as this group appears the most outgoing and socially open one while group 5 prefers the privacy of their or their friends' home. Groups 3 and 4 are definitely the most worrisome, with high levels of deviant behaviour, alcohol and tobacco use and, in group 4, indications of depressive moods.

Wave 3 – precariousness starts to solidify

In wave 3, the degrees of precariousness identified are reduced again to 4 categories, with two apparently more secure groups (2 and 4) and two rather insecure groups (1 and 3). Asked about the timing of their plans for their immediate future, it is clear to see the difference between *l'avenir* and *un future* – the secure groups knew about their future pathways long time before, while the insecure make short termed decisions. Notably, the long-term decisions are prevalent among those who stay in FT education, indicating the imperative of schooling – craftsmanship is no legitim aspiration. This indicates also feelings of entitlement: the dominant classes do not need to consider recent educational performances because their trajectories are clear.

Wave 4 – home as resource in/or troubling times

Wave 4 contained again questions on mental health. This block of questions – mainly considered under the dimensions "Attitudes toward the Self" and "Integration" – indicate in particular the different abilities to cope with stress, but also how different groups are strained differently. In short, group 1 appears to *actively* opt out of education and schooling. This group is doing particularly well regarding mental health and appears most social and outgoing, including pub evenings and club nights. Their counterpart is mainly group 2, which presents a group in a middle-class integration process, where everything is aimed at higher education. This comes at some cost, with respondents showing considerable feelings of stress and pressure. However, this group has a functioning backing from parents and family at home and is at the same time trusted with pocket money which adds to a sense of autonomy. Group 3 finally appears somewhat disappointed – not knowing what they want or can do next, they still say that school has let them down and didn't equip them for their lives to come. They indicate to struggle with self-confidence, suffer from depressive moods and feel they cannot overcome the difficulties they face. Their support networks are little and definitely outside their home although they do not necessarily feel safe on the streets where they live either.

Wave 6 – life and style

As outlined in chapter 4, there is a major change in methodology and survey method after wave 4. Until wave 4, students and their parents were interviewed personally; wave 5 re-recruited participants for online or telephone interviews, skipping a lot of questions to avoid discontinuation. Thus, the analysis gets back to the respondents at age 18-19. This means a major differentiation has taken place already, about 35% of the total population at wave 6 had enrolled at universities, half of them started gainful employment, and a remainder is NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) or other. As mentioned also before, the survey team considered the individual trajectories in their questionnaire design, thus leaving little questions to *all* respondents. This made operationalising all six dimensions considerably harder and demanded more reverting to opinions and attitudes but also including more information on relationships and drug use.

Thus, the LCA identified 6 groups which differ not least regarding the aforementioned characteristics. We find some groups being more family oriented, although here as well we find differences between group 5 for which family orientation means parental family, while e.g. group 2 already lives with partners. Groups 3 and 6 on the other hand are less family oriented, are rather single and seek comfort from friends, not family or partners. Alcohol and drug abuse are another relevant line of differentiation, with groups 2 and 6 showing rather high shares of risk behaviour, while group 5 reports hardly any drug use. Finally, there are relevant differences regarding trust in the integrative power of employment, with groups 1 and 4 showing high work resilience and stamina while groups 3 and 6 would quit any job they do not like.

Wave 7 – early adulthood or prolonged childhood

The six groups identified in wave 7 show significant differences in their approaches to paid work in particular. In three of the six groups (1, 4, 5), a majority states that one must stick to a job if one gets one, indicating precarious employment situations prevalent for themselves or around them. Equally explicit is the position of respondents in two other groups (2, 3), rejecting this attitude of work at all cost but proclaiming desire for some level of self-actualisation. This is mirrored as well in the different attitudes towards career prospects and it goes hand in hand with attitudes toward success and luck; the general ideology of meritocracy is however prevalent in all groups. Another difference is once again found on the family dimension, with around 10% cohabiting with their partners (groups 1, 4, 5) while others clearly emphasis their friendships over family (group 2).

Summing up the states of precariousness identified by the LCA, it is clear to see how the different dimensions contribute and constituted the different states to varying degrees. This is not so much due to a weak operationalisation of the dimensions in different waves but rather due to the differing importance of these dimensions throughout the life course. E.g. attitudes towards family are relevant throughout youth but they change significantly in context and meaning: for younger people, it is mainly about getting along with parents (and siblings), about family as a resource or conflict zone; at age 19/20 this underwent a contextual shift, with some people already having or about to found their own family, while others just finished fresher's year.

It was stressed several times before, how Jahoda's six dimensions are difficult to operationalise for young people and over the life course. Thus, it is neither surprising nor problematic to have found such varying degrees of precariousness in the different waves, since they are yet only heuristics positioned next to each other. To establish a first link between them, we will now investigate them regarding class, ethnicity, and gender before connecting the dots in the following chapter.

5.3 Experiences in context

While the previous section's purpose was to illustrate how the states of precariousness can be understood as degrees of societal integration, the latter needs to be related to different sociodemographic characteristics in order to relationally understand them. Therefore, this section looks into the correlations between gender, ethnicity and social class, and the respective states of precariousness in order get closer to an understanding of these very states as degrees of precarity, i.e. to uncover their social conditionality. While gender (or biological sex respectively), reported as a dichotomous variable,[82] is a rather simple indicator in this respect, ethnicity and social background and class yield more complex ramifications, both theoretically and empirically, which will be discussed in the respective sub-sections.

For the sake of brevity and readability, the following analyses are presented only for wave 3 and focusses on significant deviations from the average distributions of each characteristic.

5.3.1 Gender

Gender is an essential category both for the understanding of youth as well as for habitus formation. Thus, the observation of different gender compositions in the states of precariousness is no surprise; the question is rather, what these differences tell us about gendered modes of social integration, and further, whether the observed differences persist across time or not.

[82] The author is fully aware of more fluid gender identities, however, the data at hand does not allow for proper consideration of trans, non-binary or other queer gender identities. While this is obviously a limitation of the analysis – even more so since these identity struggles predominantly start and evolve during youth – gender as a central structuring axis of the social space and social fields (cf. Bourdieu (2001)) is hereby considered as good as possible.

In Table 2, significant differences between the genders in each state of precariousness can be observed. Starting with the starkest difference, we find in state 2 a share of males of over 60%, while the total share of male respondents is just about 49%. Recalling the description above, state 2 in this wave has relatively little problems, with positive attitudes towards schooling although over 30% intend to leave full time education and most of them deem higher education very unlikely for them. Over 33% in this group work during term time for pay and almost 30% do not receive any pocket money. At first sight, we see here a quite clearly gendered experience of working-class integration, where young men aged 15/16 express attitudes and orientations which already fit the narrative of male bread winner. This is presumably connected to a certain degree of *amor fati*, since they simultaneously show Autonomy although a majority decided on their future plans just in the last 6 months, i.e. a good example of differing time horizons, of *avenir* versus *future*.

The complementary gender group here are individuals who experience state 3, with over 55% females. For most of them (over 70%), their future plans were set over a year ago and they are most likely to go to university. Importantly, they show high degrees of self-determination and perceive these decisions as their own although they were most likely made with or by their parents, thus while their pathways might be just as heteronomous as those of the working-class boys described before, they retain an (efficacious) illusion of agency. An interesting finding in this regard is further the very low levels of alcohol and tobacco consumption (over 90% never even tried smoking) and almost non-existent deviant behaviour.

Table 2: Gender and states of precariousness at wave 3

States of prec.	Male (row %)	Female (row %)	Σ
1	49%	51%	21%
2	**60%**	40%	18%
3	45%	**55%**	25%
4	48%	52%	37%
Σ	49%	51%	100%

n=8,453

Notably, most experiences are less gendered than the ones of state 2 but this is partly due to the group sizes as well, since the latter is experienced by only 18% of the population whereas the share of state 3 is just about average (i.e. ¼). In a quick conclusion on the effects of gender on experiences of precariousness at age 15/16 we could identify two groups with very different

lifeworlds of which one is preponderately male while the other has an above-average share of females. However, the experiences described above point also towards class differences here, i.e. we are most likely to observe an intersection of class and gender here, wherefore causations are hard to imply here.

5.3.2 Ethnicity

Ethnicity and race are of specific interest regarding their effect on youth and habitus formation.[83] Likewise, one also expects a similar effect on social integration and precariousness: in a predominantly white society, social integration is still a white endeavour. Likewise, the segregating force of ethnicity works on many levels from spatial to educational and occupational segregation. Thus, ethnicity in many regards is a central force in shaping an individual's lifeworld.

Interpreting again the most significant deviations from the mean distributions, we find a concentration of white individuals in the state 2 discussed before. We can thus expand the above description of a male working-class experience to a *white* male working-class experience at age 15/16. Another experience which is predominantly white, is state 1. Looking into their experiences, we observe mainly negative attitudes towards schooling and little likeliness to go to university. Similar to state 2, they too decided on their future plans rather recently (60% in the last 12 months). Most notably however is that this groups endures regular physical and/or verbal abuse from peers while they are at the same time often involved in petty crime and fights. Rounding up the picture, 58% in this group drink and 38% smoke regularly.

On the other hand, we find in state 3, which was described as doing quite well and showing rather middle-class values and attitudes, an overrepresentation of South Asians and Black African respondents. This could mean, that the presumably middle-class values they expressed are often aspired ones, i.e. an expression of aspired social mobility. This will be further investigated in the section on social background. This group was also identified as showing an overrepresentation of females, thus yielding the question, whether this overrepresentation of ethnic groups is the same across genders. Thus, we calculated the degree of overrepresentation for females and males

[83] Ethnicity as an ascriptive characteristic is always problematic regarding the categories under consideration. Using secondary data, one is confined to the categories available.

separately, to find that the overrepresentation does differ by gender: in this group, we found higher shares of males of Indian and Black African background, about equal shares for Pakistani youth, and higher shares for females of Bangladeshi but also "other" backgrounds, the latter comprising mainly respondents of Chinese or "other Asian" backgrounds. Finally, "other" ethnic backgrounds are also overrepresented in state 4, here however, we find more males of this ethnic group than females. Experiences in state 4 are very similar to the ones of state 3 but with more deviant behaviour and higher shares for drinking and smoking.

Table 3: Ethnicity and states of precariousness at wave 3

States of prec.	White	Mixed	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Black Caribbean	Black African	Other	Σ
1	**93%**	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	21%
2	**94%**	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	18%
3	81%	2%	**4%**	**4%**	**2%**	1%	**3%**	**3%**	25%
4	84%	3%	3%	3%	1%	2%	2%	**3%**	37%
Σ	87%	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%	100%

n=8,417

Wrapping up the findings on ethnicity and precariousness at age 15/16, we can firstly complement the picture for state 3, which represents the experience of South Asians, notably Indian males and Bangladeshi females, as well as Black African males and "other" females as well as white females. We thus observe some first intersections of ethnicity and gender, while we also found some hints at an intersection of ethnicity and class for states 1 and 2.

5.3.3 Social background

Social background and social class are key for the proposed understanding of precarity as the socially induced condition of precariousness. While gender and ethnicity are powerful determinants of the lifeworld, Bourdieu's theorem considered mainly the total volume and the composition (economic and cultural) of an individual's capital as defining for one's position in the social space. Investigating young people, questions of the if and how of reproduction of social class are salient (besides the question of the measurement of social class): is it correct to simply assign the parents' class to their offspring or do young people partake in the production and reproduction of social class? And if parental class is deployed, whose social class counts, the mother's or the father's or both? And if the latter, how can one assign a family's class? Using the higher class of either parent might confound the true value of the total volume of capital available

to the child, e.g. in the case of two doctors, where one's partner is a doctor too but the other one's partner is a manual labourer, using simply the highest class in the household would assign both households to the same social class. Additionally, a substantive body of research (Korupp et al. 2002) shows that social reproduction, especially in the field of educational trajectories, is conditional of the parent's and the child's gender, suggesting different mechanisms of social reproduction between mothers and daughters, and mothers and sons, etc. Closely related to that very question is the case of single parents, mainly single mothers, whose ex-partner's class may still have some influence on modes of social reproduction and, of course, family constellations beyond the heteronormative as well as patchwork-families.

The following tables present the mothers' and fathers' NS-SEC class when the young respondents were 15/16 years old. For the mothers' NS-SEC, we see significant deviations from the mean distributions only for states 1 and 2, i.e. those states which we identified before as probably having a lower-class background. The deviations found are subsequently negative ones, i.e. we find significantly lower shares of mothers with NS-SEC classes I and II stati. At the same time, we find the highest shares for semi-routine occupations in state 2 and "not currently working" in state 1.

Table 4: Mother's current NS-SEC class and precariousness wave 3

States of prec.	Higher Managerial and prof. occ.	Lower managerial and prof. occ.	Interm ediate occ.	Small employers and own account workers	Lower superv. and technical occ.	Semi-routine occ.	Routine occ.	Not currently working	Not present
1	**2%**	**18%**	12%	3%	6%	17%	8%	**30%**	5%
2	**3%**	**16%**	11%	4%	6%	**21%**	8%	27%	5%
3	5%	29%	12%	3%	5%	13%	4%	26%	3%
4	6%	28%	14%	3%	5%	15%	6%	22%	2%
Σ	5%	24%	12%	3%	5%	16%	6%	25%	3%

n=8,372

For the fathers' occupational stati, the findings are similar, despite the overall differences in the occupational structure, with one notable exception namely the absence of fathers, which is significantly more prevalent among young people of state 1. Using for the same analysis the higher status of mother or father respectively yields the same results, namely that social class differences are more palpable or relevant among the troubled young people in stati 1 and 2.

Table 5: Father's current NS-SEC class and precariousness wave 3

States of prec.	Higher Managerial and prof. occ.	Lower managerial and prof. occ.	Interm ediate occ.	Small employers and own account workers	Lower superv. and technical occ.	Semi-routin e occ.	Routine occ.	Not currently working	Not present
1	**7%**	**14%**	2%	7%	13%	7%	12%	10%	**30%**
2	**6%**	**15%**	3%	6%	14%	6%	13%	12%	26%
3	17%	24%	4%	7%	10%	6%	7%	9%	18%
4	15%	23%	4%	7%	10%	6%	8%	7%	21%
Σ	12%	20%	3%	7%	11%	6%	9%	9%	23%

n=8,247

In light of the assumed intersections of class and gender, over- and under-representations were also computed for females and males separately but did not yield deviating results except for state 3, where fathers of NS-SEC class I are overrepresented among male respondents, i.e. making these experiences, which are overall more prevalent among females, is more likely for males with a father in "Higher Managerial and professional occupations". Due to case number constraints, the intersection of ethnicity and class could not be computed. [84]

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter established the states of precariousness, identified via the Latent Class Analysis of Jahoda's six dimensions of psycho-social integration. Over the years observed, the different dimensions appeared to have varying significance regarding the overall states of precariousness, which appears sensical, given the changing salience of aspects like Growth, operationalised via educational aspirations vs. Mastery, covering relationships etc., over the years. Analysing these states of precariousness along their constituting manifest variables provided some insight into the complex set of personal troubles, future orientations and mundane issues like smoking and drinking. However, the analysis of gender among the young people helped to set things in context for the first time, with states of precariousness which are more likely to affect young women than men or which forecast certain gender identities, e.g. the white working-class men. Adding

[84] For several years, sociologists criticised the NS-SEC or Goldthorpe's scheme respectively on various grounds and suggested Bourdieu-inspired approaches to social class. Atkinson (and Rosenlund (2014)) developed a simple and intuitive scheme by aggregating income (economic) and education (cultural capital) for a refined schema of occupation, based not on NS-SEC classes but on 4-digit SOC codes. Since the data necessary for coding this scheme was available for two rounds of the LSYPE, we investigated this class scheme as well, but did not identify relevant deviations from the findings presented here.

ethnicity, we found some intersections with gender, like the different dynamics among males and females from Indian or Bangladeshi backgrounds. Finally, the analysis of social background, yielded on the one hand results, which were anticipated on the grounds of gender and ethnicity and on the other hand confirmed the overall picture of a class hierarchy of states of societal integration, i.e. we can now understand the experiences of precariousness as societally inflicted, socially induced states of precarity.

However, the overall aim of this analysis is not a cross-sectional investigation of "personal troubles and public issues" – this would have been and was done much more prolific with qualitative methods and data. Also, we do not want to make the mistake of reifying the found states – they are passages and do not represent a manifest typology of youth. Instead, the objective now is to draw lines of development through these passages, to identify trajectories across time from age 13 to age 20 and investigate them in relation to each other as well as with regard to class, race, and gender. This is the task of the ensuing chapter and it starts with the creation of a time-space of precarity.

6 Movement in the space of precarity

This chapter now turns the analysis upside down or rather inside out: following the idea of a structural psychology (Schmitz and Bayer 2017), a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is conducted, using the states of precarity as active variables to create a space of precarity. The analysis of this multidimensional space is the first central objective of this chapter: starting with the clouds of categories (Figure 4 and Figure 5), we will investigate the contributions of different states of precarity to each of the relevant axes before turning to the clouds of individuals (Figure 6) to investigate it according to the relevant characteristics identified in chapter 5 using ANOVA procedures and typicality tests in the Euclidian space.

Secondly, in this space we can observe movements between the states of precarity over time to assess stability and changes in young people's experience of precarity from age 13 to age 20. However, since using a total of 28 states of precarity in 6 waves, i.e. time points, is neither feasible nor interpretable, the individual MCA coordinates of respondents are finally used to break down the 28 classes and to identify trajectories over time. The chapter then concludes with a close investigation into the sociodemographic characteristics of these condensed classes to prepare the grounding for the analysis in the final chapter about states of precarity and young people's political participation.

6.1 A space of precarity

As became palpable in the previous analysis, the experiences of precariousness change just like the young people under consideration change – but so do the possibilities and modes to assess these states. It could thus be argued, that the analysis has an inherent and implicit reliability and validity problem, since the measure of precariousness in the different waves cannot be held perfectly stable. For such an indicator, it would have been necessary to ask the exact same question in each year of the survey. But given the volatility of young people's lives and the rapid changes it undergoes exactly between 13 and 20, it is hard to imagine an operationalisation of precariousness and societal integration which remains perfectly the same throughout the time surveyed.

Therefore, using MCA is a fruitful approach to show the correspondence between different states of precarity over time, i.e. to identify patterns of social disintegration, expressed at age 14 maybe by feelings of depression and at age 20 by "having no-one to turn to" in times of trouble. For this endeavour, an MCA of all states of precarity in all the six waves analysed is presented in Figure 4 below. Starting with a visual interpretation of the vertical axis, we can firstly follow the coloured dots for each wave to find them vertically aligned. Sometimes with greater distances, e.g. waves 1, 3 and 4, sometimes with smaller distances, e.g. wave 6. We also see that all waves span the whole space developed here. The space is in itself mainly structured by the vertical axis, accounting for 63% of the inertia, while the horizontal axis accounts for less than 9% and the third axis for another 7%.[85] Using a Burt-matrix, the total inertia of the MCA is 0.161 of which the first three axes explain a total of 78.4%. Since a total of 28 states of precarity were used in this analysis, states with an above average contribution, i.e. those which contribute more than 1/28 or 0.036 to each of the axes will be further analysed in the following section.

6.1.1 Axis 1 – class rules

Seven states of precarity show an above-average contribution to the construction of the first axis of the space of precarity. All of them are states of the first four waves, i.e. they mirror experiences of precariousness up to age 17. In wave 1 (age 13/14; dark blue in Figure 4) states 2 and 3 contribute the most, which matches the visual investigation of the space of precarity with state 3 in the top left quadrant and state 2 on the bottom of the plane. Referring to Annex Table 467 to Annex Table 472, we find stark differences between those two states, with state 2 faring bad on all of Jahoda's dimensions whereas state 3 does exceptionally well. In wave 2 (age 14/15; claret), only state 2 shows significant contributions to this axis – again, this state of precariousness is notable for faring very well on all dimensions. They do particularly well with regard to self-determination and show the second highest inclination to higher education. In wave 3 (age 15/16; green) states 1 and 3 contribute to this axis and we find the respective points at the top and bottom ends of the graph: state 3 shows excellent health and self-determination, and little to no deviant behaviour or experiences of violence; state 1 is the exact opposite. It is further noteworthy that wave three or rather the experiences of precariousness at this age had the overall highest

[85] Their meaning however becomes tangible only with reference to the analysis in chapter 5.

contribution to axis 1, i.e. this dimension of precarity appears to be most pronounced at this age. In wave 4 (age 16/17; yellow) finally states 1 and 2 both contribute significantly to axis 1. Interestingly, at this age the main determinant appears to be work vs. (higher) education orientation while mental health questions appear irrelevant.

In diachronic perspective, we can follow the relevant states of precarity from top to bottom of axis 1: features which appear to decrease from top to bottom are all questions connected to future orientations, attitudes toward schooling and self-determination. At the same time, we find an increase in deviant behaviour and use of alcohol and other drugs further down the primary axis.

In a preliminary conclusion, we could dub the vertical axis as middle class vs. working class youth, since it presents classic, almost textbook manifestations of classed youth: at the top end of the first dimension we find meritocratic beliefs, ability and willingness to adapt to bourgeois expectations and values, the absence of mental stressors and the prevalence of longer time horizons in a space of autonomy provided for by parental support. At the lower end, we find heteronomy instead of self-determination, recurring verbal and physical abuse from peers which is met with tobacco, alcohol, and other drugs, paid for in parts with money from jobbing during term time.[86]

Notably, this axis explains the lion share of the total inertia in the space of precarity presented here. In other words, the main determinant of precarity seems to be one of class differences, something which will be further investigated in the cloud of individuals.

6.1.2 Axis 2 – family matters

The secondary axis explains about 9% of the inertia. Looking again for the most relevant points, i.e. those categories which made an above average contribution to the axis, we can identify four states in waves 3, 6 and 7. In a diachronic perspective again, we can start at the far left end, in state 1 of wave 7 (red), i.e. at age 19/20. This state is characterised by polarised views on future orientation, i.e. we find inconsistent attitudes towards planning ahead and self-determination. What becomes clear in their attitudes towards employment, is a desire for stability and a rejection

[86] This is a noteworthy deviation from Jahoda (1982) assessment of paid work which to her is an integral part of personal autonomy.

of hedonistic attitudes. The most outstanding feature of this group however is the high share of young people living with their partner and the strong family orientation. While this point appears to be the sole gravitational centre on the left-hand side for this axis, we find three points on the right end of axis 2. State 4 in wave 3 (green) shows rather high educational aspirations, even higher than their peers discussed above. Compared to them, they nevertheless show slightly less Autonomy and self-determination, making e.g. aspiring for higher education appear to be less a *choice* than a *must*, which points towards some degree of social mobility and the related expectations from parents etc. The next contributing point is state 2 of wave 7 (red), with rather low family aspirations and medium life satisfaction but a sound degree of self-determination, which is also palpable in their attitudes towards work, where they rather seek self-actualisation than just means to sustain themselves. Finally, the young people in this state also showed the highest share for consumption of drugs other than alcohol and tobacco. The final contributing category is state 6 in wave 6 (turquoise), which shares many features with the state just discussed: they also have rather high drug use and some hedonistic attitudes towards work and little orientation towards family and partnership.

While this axis will also be further investigated in the cloud of individuals, a preliminary label for this axis might be domestic vs. bohemian orientation. In addition to the sociodemographic variables, we shall thus look into family arrangements like having own children for this axis.

Figure 4: The space of precarity; MCA waves 1 to 7; dimensions 1,2



Green and magenta lines connect the most relevant states/modalities of the first and second axis respectively.

6.1.3 Axis 3 – mental health makes the difference

Axis 3 provides a little less explanation of inertia than axis 2, i.e. has a little less significance for an understanding of a space of precarity, but since the share of over 7% might yet be interesting, this axis is also investigated. In the space below, the vertical axis shows just the same as before, an axis most likely to reflect inequalities of social class. The horizontal axis now indicates another important dimension, which can be identified again by examining the states of precarity contributing most to it, i.e. state 6 in wave 2 on the left and states 3 of wave 4, state 1 of wave 3 and state 4 of wave 2 again on the right hand side.

Young people in state 6 of wave 2 (claret) show the highest work orientation and a considerable share works during term time at age 14/15. They enjoy excellent mental health and a sound future orientation and a good degree of self-determination. However, they don't see themselves in (higher) education but in gainful employment which they need because they like to go out a lot with their friends. Opposite of this state, we find the third state of wave 4 (yellow). Young people in this state suffer from poor mental health, they view home as a conflict zone and do not

feel comfortable at school. In addition, many young people enduring this state said, they had no one to talk to about problems. Moving further to the right, we find state 1 in wave 3 (green), which was identified before as the lower end of axis 1. In the context of mental health issues, this state experiences physical and verbal abuse rather regularly; in return, they also show considerable degrees of deviant behaviour. Further, they have rather low self-determination combined with short time horizons. Finally, young people in state 4 in wave 2 (claret) suffer from abuse and violence and spend a lot of their free time alone.

Summing up axis three, this axis seems to indicate a genuine dimension of psychosocial wellbeing, not least indicated by the experience or absence of bullying and the like. But there are some more things to say about this axis and the states contributing most to it. Looking at the vertical axis, we find all of them below the baseline. And: some of the states described here have a significant gender imbalance, with the states on the right-hand side being predominantly female, while the state identified as faring rather well is enjoyed mainly by young men.

Figure 5: The space of precarity; MCA waves 1 to 7; dimensions 1,3



Green and orange lines connect the most relevant states/modalities of the first and third axis respectively.

For a preliminary summary, we can pin down the following: firstly, the space of precarity is predominantly structured by class and bourgeois integration. Secondly, the attitudes towards family versus a bohemian lifestyle constitute a second dimension, affecting both the present parental family and own aspirations towards having a family. In addition, a third dimension of the space of precarity is a gender-sensitive mental health or psychosocial wellbeing dimension, including experiences of bullying. While these dimensions have their distinct and disjunct meaning, they are not independent but show contextually meaningful connections which are noteworthy for the final analysis of the political character of precarity: on the one hand, bourgeois integration is entangled with bourgeois values and feelings of entitlement or disenfranchisement; the secondary axis points towards the asynchrony of lifeworlds, where some young people enjoy a bohemian life while others already take responsibility for their own families, which too changes perspectives on politics; the political dimension of mental health finally was introduced already in chapter 1, thus we would expect this dimension to affect political participation once more. And finally, putting axis 3 in relation to the primary axis, we can observe a certain psychological "class dividend" with people at the lower end of the class spectrum being more exposed to the psychological dimension than others are, which indicates some homogeneity at the upper echelons. Investigating these indications is the purpose of the ensuing section.

However, something else is important in the specific approach presented here: time. Social inequalities of all kinds undergo transformations over an individual's lifetime. These changes and different age-related behaviours are an Achilles' heel of praxeological approaches to social class like the one proposed by Savage et al. (2013), where age and time (both in life course and generational perspective) interfere with the interesting variables of the analysis. Using longitudinal data instead, the space of precarity presented above is structured by three axes which run from age 13 to age 20, identifying the significant forces of societal (dis)integration, i.e. uncovering the social forces inducing precarity, which are at work *across* youth: class, lifestyles, and mental health.

6.2 Individuals in the space of precarity

The previous section established a space of precarity as a multidimensional space which is constructed on the basis of the states of precarity identified using LCA. While these building

blocks were the main concern so far, the second step in the investigation of this space focusses on the individuals in this space. Therefore, we project the individuals into this space, in Figure 6 using the first and second axis in the graph on the left, and along the first and third axis in the graph on the right, analogous to Figure 4 (axes 1, 2) and Figure 5 (axes 1, 3).

In a first visual exploration, we can identify some kind of a diamond shape for axes 1,2 with a rather wide top and the whole cloud appears skewed towards the right. Along axes 1,3 however, the cloud of individuals is clearly triangular or pyramid shaped. Recalling the cloud of categories discussed above, the shapes mirror the arrangements of categories in the space: in the first graph, we see a tendency to the bohemian lifestyles whereas family orientations appear to be less salient in this sample of young people; on the mental health axis on the right, we see higher density on the left of the graph, however we also see the aforementioned intersection of class and mental health, since the spread increases down the vertical axis, i.e. the salience of mental health (both positive and negative) increases among those who are less able to adopt to bourgeois values.

Figure 6: The Cloud of Individuals in the space of precarity; dimensions 1,2 and 1,3; MCA waves 1 to 7

Following Hjellbrekke (2019: 74), we can now further investigate the axes in the cloud of individuals by retrieving the individuals' coordinates, using analysis of variance to investigate relevant differences between different groups. In a second step, we will then conduct a typicality analysis for the relevant items of each of the variables.

Table 6 presents the Eta^2 values for the coordinates of each of the three axes. Notably, most of the Anova statistics were significant which is not too surprising given the case number sensitivity of f-tests. However, the effect sizes (η^2) are rather small for most analyses, indicating only mediocre effects of each of the variables on the individuals' position on each axis.

Starting with axis one, we see highly significant but modest effects of variables of economic capital (parental household income and tenure) but a medium to large effect of cultural capitals in the form of parental education; grandparents' education on the other hand is far less relevant. Ethnicity on the other hand has a modest effect again, while the gender effect appears negligible. Turning to the young person's more recent living conditions, we find a modest effect of having own children but a very strong effect of the young person's own occupational status (incl. NEETs and full-time students). Keeping in mind that most of the events shaping the space of precarity and all of the events contributing most to this very axis happened before they attain their SOC status, i.e. lie in the young person's past, this value is quite remarkable and point towards the power of trajectories through youth in determining future lifeworlds.

For axis two on the other hand, we find relevant effects only for parental education and current occupational or educational status. So, while we find class differences of different kinds along axis 1 (bourgeois adaptation), the relevant traits for the position on the axis of lifestyles is mainly found in educational background and the young person's own current education/occupation.

Finally, the sociodemographic characteristics relevant for an individual's position on axis 3, which was dubbed the mental health axis, are their own occupational class as young adults, but even more importantly, their gender. Thus, the effect size indicates that the mental health axis is actually gendered, just as we already assumed when analysing the relevant states of precarity.

Table 6: Eta² Values and significance levels for between group Anova results

	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Household income (parents)	**.059*** **	.017***	(n.s.)
Tenure (parents)	**.043*** **	.011***	.002**
Parental Education	**.089*** **	**.049*** **	(n.s.)
Grandparents' Higher Education	.016***	.014***	(n.s.)
Ethnicity	**.043*** **	.002*	.004***
Gender	.006***	.013***	**.023*** **
Own Children	**.045*** **	.002***	.002***
Own SOC (incl. NEETs, FT students)	**.240*** **	**.065*** **	**.021*** **

*p-values *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05; n.s.: not significant*
Most relevant η^2 values in bold print.

For the most relevant variables of each axis, i.e. parental education, gender, and the young person's own SOC, we now conduct a typicality analysis, using the respective variables as supplementary variables to the space of precarity (see Annex Figure 1). Utilising the formula

below from Hjellbrekke (2019: 68), we obtain a test value for each category of the respective variables

$$Z = \sqrt{n \frac{N-1}{N-n}} \frac{Y\bar{k}l}{\sqrt{\lambda l}}$$

However, following Le Roux and Rouanet (2010: 72) we can also interpret the latter expression of the formula, $\frac{Y\bar{k}l}{\sqrt{\lambda l}}$, as the importance of each category for the respective axis.[87] As a rule of thumb, Le Roux and Rouanet (2010: 71) suggest, any importance greater .5 is notable, and any importance greater 1 should be considered significant. Table 7 shows the importance of each category of the three variables for each dimension, with the notable values per axis in bold print.

For axis 1, the working class vs. middle class dimension, we find the most relevant categories all among the SOC status categories, which is quite interesting since the states of precarity contributing most to the first axis were all of the first four waves, during which the young people were mostly living with and dependent on their parents. Thus, in Blau and Duncan terms, this axis which ought to represent *origins* is highly differentiated with respect to the young people's *destination*. Equally intriguing is the reverse effect observed in dimension 2, which was dubbed family values vs. bohemian lifestyle. This axis' main contributing points are all of the later waves 4 to 7, however one of the most important categories for this dimension is yet, whether at least on parent obtained a degree. For dimension 3, the dimension of psychosocial wellbeing, the most important SOC categories are the two highest stati, but also two manual labour jobs and being NEET, as well as both Gender categories.

Proceeding to the main test of typicality, we now investigate, whether the position of each of the categories of the relevant variables on each axis is significant or not, using test statistics. As mentioned above, these test statistics are case number sensitive, which means, that most of the values on the right-hand side of Table 7 are significant on a $p < .005$ significance level.[88]

[87] Given the case number sensitivity of the test values, the interpretation of this ratio of each category's mean distance from the barycentre ($Y\bar{k}l$) and the square root of the inertia of each dimension ($\sqrt{\lambda l}$) might be even more informative.

[88] For the same reason, lower significance levels are omitted.

Table 7: Importance of categories and Typicality test

		Importance Dim1	Importance Dim2	Importance Dim3	*Z* Value Dim1	*Z* Value Dim2	*Z* Value Dim3
Parental education	Degree	**0.759**	**1.435**	0.082	33.6	63.6	3.6
	HE below deg.	0.161	0.365	0.127	6.4	14.4	5.0
	GCE A Level	0.243	0.187	0.036	9.9	7.6	1.5 (n.s.)
	GCSE A-C	0.496	**0.577**	0.136	24.1	28.0	6.6
	Qual Level 1	**0.815**	**0.968**	0.173	16.7	19.8	3.5
	Other qual	0.025	**0.909**	0.354	0.3 (n.s.)	12.0	4.7
	No Qual	0.139	**0.773**	0.345	5.1	28.3	12.6
Gender	Male	0.164	**0.543**	**0.627**	14.3	47.4	54.7
	Female	0.161	**0.535**	**0.617**	14.3	47.6	55.0
SOC status at age 19/20	Managers and Senior Officials	0.439	0.034	**0.690**	3.5	0.3 (n.s.)	5.5
	Professional Occupations	0.303	0.493	**1.108**	1.7 (n.s.)	2.8 (n.s.)	6.2
	Associate Professional and Technical Operations	**0.563**	**0.917**	0.218	7.3	11.8	2.8 (n.s.)
	Administrative and Secretarial Occupations	0.888	0.493	0.091	15.6	8.6	1.6 (n.s.)
	Skilled Trades occupations	**1.846**	**2.828**	**1.843**	37.7	57.8	37.7
	Personal Service Occupations	**0.879**	**0.985**	0.282	18.0	20.1	5.8
	Sales and Customer Service Occupations	**0.601**	**0.730**	0.118	16.4	20.0	3.2
	Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives	**1.650**	**2.777**	**1.998**	15.3	25.8	18.6
	Elementary Occupations	**1.005**	**1.180**	0.445	25.2	29.6	11.2
	NEET	**1.403**	0.382	**0.590**	37.7	10.3	15.9
	FT Student	**0.800**	**0.790**	0.200	80.8	79.8	20.2

Left-hand table: importance values >0.5 in bold print.
Right-hand table: all significant on p<0.005 level except n.s.: not significant

While the unidimensional typicality tests did not add too much to our understanding of each axis, we also want to know, whether the findings above persist in bidimensional perspective, i.e. whether e.g. the position of the Parental Education category "No Qualification", which we found to be significant on all dimensions in the unidimensional perspective, is also significant when

viewed in the plane of two axes. Deploying again Hjellbrekke (2019: 69), we can calculate a χ^2 test statistic with

$$\chi^2 = n \frac{N-1}{N-n} d^2$$

where d is the mean position of each category on both axes under consideration in a Euclidian space

$$d = \sqrt{\left(\frac{Y\bar{k}l1}{\sqrt{\lambda l}1}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{Y\bar{k}l2}{\sqrt{\lambda l}2}\right)^2}$$

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8; since this test is also case number sensitive most values are significant on a $p < .001$ significance level. Nevertheless, there are some interesting differences between the findings below and above which indicate specific relations or unrelatedness between the dimensions with regard to the categories under consideration; further to that, the findings below also help to qualify those presented above.

The test hypothesis for the analysis below is, whether each category point is significantly contingent on two axes, i.e. whether the position in the factorial plane between two axes is significantly not random. Starting with the plane between axis 1 and axis 2, we find some kind of polarisation with parental education "Degree" and lower educational credentials like GCSE and Level 1 qualification as well as "No Qualification" being highly significant while the upper middle levels of educational attainments are not. Recalling the oppositions of these axes, class on axis 1 and lifestyle on axis 2, this indicates how their interaction is most relevant at the top and bottom of the educational ladder. This is mirrored in the "destination" perspective, where the highest values are found for "Skilled Trades occupations" on the one hand and "Full Time students" on the other. Finally, we also see a Gender effect in terms, which, seems to be mainly due to axis 2, when comparing these figures with the one on Gender in the table above. In the plane of axes 1 and 3, i.e. class and psychosocial wellbeing, we find hardly any "origin" categories significant, with only "Degree" being significant by a sound margin (the threshold value for 2 degrees of freedom is 13.8). However, we do now see a strong Gender effect, as we expected, again however mainly due to axis 3. Finally, looking at current SOC stati, the most solid findings are again found

among skilled manual work; interestingly though, we also see a rather large value for NEETs, which substantiates the point made above about a psychological class dividend.

Table 8: Bidimensional significance of categories

		χ^2Value Dimensions 1,2	χ^2Value Dimensions 1,3
Parental education	Degree	116.8	25.8
	HE below deg.	6.3 (n.s.)	1.7 (n.s.)
	GCE A Level	3.8 (n.s.)	2.5 (n.s.)
	GCSE A-C	28.2	12.9 (n.s.)
	Qual Level 1	32.7	14.2
	Other qual	10.9 (n.s.)	1.7 (n.s.)
	No Qual	22.6	5.1 (n.s.)
Gender	Male	28.1	36.6
	Female	27.8	36.3
SOC status at age 19/20	Managers and Senior Officials	1.5 (n.s.)	5.3 (n.s.)
	Professional Occupations	1.9 (n.s.)	7.4 (n.s.)
	Associate Professional and Technical Operations	14.9	4.7 (n.s.)
	Administrative and Secretarial Occupations	18.1	14.0
	Skilled Trades occupations	233.0	139.0
	Personal Service Occupations	35.6	17.4
	Sales and Customer Service Occupations	24.5	10.3 (n.s.)
	Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives	97.0	62.4
	Elementary Occupations	60.3	30.3
	NEET	56.8	62.3
	FT Student	127.6	68.7

All significant on p<0.001 level except n.s.: not significant

Bringing the analysis of the space of individuals to a first close, we examine the axes for intra-group heterogeneity along the three characteristics identified as significant for the different axes. This can be done, e.g. by simply comparing the standard deviation – the smaller the value, the more homogenous is each group in the space of precarity.

Starting again with axis 1, we find the smallest values for the standard deviations among those whose parents hold at least a degree and the largest among those with no or other qualification. Interestingly though, we do not see a continuous increase in heterogeneity but a rather mixed picture with more homogeneity among children of working-class backgrounds (Leve 1 qualifications and GCSE A-C). This could be due to insecure upward

mobility of parents who obtained A-levels or higher education below degree level. This is somewhat mirrored in the young peoples' own occupational positions, where we find most homogeneity among typical blue-collar professions while the most heterogeneity is found among full-time students and those in personal service occupations.

For axis 2, on the other hand, we see a negative correlation between homogeneity and parental education, i.e. the lower the latter the more homogenously we find the respondents of the respective groups on the left of the graph, i.e. on the family-orientation side. Interestingly, we see quite significant differences regarding homogeneity between female and male respondents, with males, notwithstanding their higher standard deviation, rather on the family side of this axis. Regarding current living situations, notably only full-time students have a mean value on the right, i.e. the bohemian lifestyle side of the axis. All others occupational groups tend towards family orientations and again, we find those in blue-collar occupations being the most homogenous in their tendency towards family over bohemian lifestyle.

On axis 3, the mental health dimension, the standard deviations are the highest, i.e. we observe the most heterogeneity there. With the exception of "Other Qualification", all group means are close to 0; young people whose parents' highest qualification is "other" though tend towards "no mental health issues". Regarding gender on the other hand, we see the aforementioned differences between female and male respondents, with males showing or rather reporting significantly less mental health problems. Finally, on this axis we find the lowest mean values again for blue-collar workers while NEETs reported the most mental health issues and subsequently scored highest on this scale.

Table 9: Standard Deviations of selected groups

		Standard Deviation Axis 1	Standard Deviation Axis 2	Standard Deviation Axis 3
Parental education	Degree	.918	.997	.906
	HE below deg.	.955	.998	1.051
	GCE A Level	.992	.998	1.076
	GCSE A-C	.943	.975	1.134
	Qual Level 1	.927	.900	1.138
	Other qual	1.041	.933	.959
	No Qual	1.046	.923	1.107
	n=8430	1.008	1.001	1.062
Gender	Male	1.006	.996	1.047
	Female	1.005	.991	1.051
	n=8525	1.009	1.000	1.061
SOC status at age 19/20	Managers and Senior Officials	.771	1.070	.902
	Professional Occupations	.933	1.140	.789
	Associate Professional and Technical Operations	.903	1.057	1.159
	Administrative and Secretarial Occupations	.841	1.012	1.145
	Skilled Trades occupations	.712	.825	1.096
	Personal Service Occupations	.918	.951	1.173
	Sales and Customer Service Occupations	.890	.934	1.155
	Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives	.694	.873	1.160
	Elementary Occupations	.898	.945	1.186
	NEET	.776	.945	1.196
	FT Student	.922	.996	.918
	n=7903	1.008	1.000	1.061

The analysis of the cloud of individuals in the space of precarity underpins the findings about the cloud of categories: class inequalities are the main structuring factor in the space of precarity: the respective axis 1 showed most significant and strongest differences on between-group variances. The secondary axis is mainly one of lifestyles, palpable also by the differences in inherited cultural capital; the mental health axis 3 finally is also an axis of gender differences but yielded also some interesting differences regarding the current living conditions.

6.3 Individuals in relation – classes in practice

In total, the preceding analyses in chapter 5 yielded 28 states of precarity over 6 waves – using Jahoda's (1958) dimensions of positive mental health, we found meaningful latent classes of precarity in each wave, i.e. for each year of the young person's youth we identified different

degrees of psycho-social (dis)integration. In the analyses of this chapter so far, we put those states in correspondence to each other by constructing a space of precarity, which spans a total of seven years, i.e. we put precarities at age 13 in a relation to precarities at age 20 and identified three axes which structure these relations, which we can also read as trajectories.[89] But so far, these trajectories remained on a conceptual level: we observed proximities of precarities on an aggregated level, arguably transcended from the original responses and respondents.

Thus, the task for the ensuing section now, is to systematise these findings once more into a typology and inscribe them to the individual. To this end, we return to the cloud of individuals and apply a k-means cluster algorithm on the individual coordinates of the three axes.[90] To assess the best number of clusters, i.e. the optimum ratio of within and between variance, a Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F statistic was employed, suggesting a solution of four clusters in the three-dimensional space. Before we put these clusters to work as individual characteristics of young people, we can analyse them with regard to the states of precarity again.

The table below shows in a simplified way the distribution of significant deviations of the shares of young people enduring the respective states at each wave. We can interpret these clusters now in a synchronic or diachronic way. In the former, we can read the positive deviations like a Sankey diagram of influx and outflux from wave to wave. For cluster 1 for instance, we see an overrepresentation in state 2/wave 1 which is then divided into states 3 and 4 in wave 2 but reunited again in state 1/wave 3, moving onwards to state 3/wave 4 and then parting again into states 1 and 2 in wave 6 and states 1 and 3 in wave 7 respectively. These different in- and outfluxes are observable in all clusters indicating the internal validity and reliability of the identified states of precarity.

[89] In contrast to a Markov modelling of individual developments, this approach lets us understand the changing significance of differences across time.

[90] Most MCA clustering is performed using the hierarchical Ward algorithm but using k-means clustering is an equally suitable algorithm for this endeavour, since it too works on the basis of squared Euclidian distances. Further, its iterative algorithm produces spherical clusters while minimising external heterogeneity and maximising internal homogeneity more efficiently than the hierarchical Ward algorithm, c.f. Bacher et al. (2010).

Table 10: Clusters of states of precarity

		Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Σ
Wave 1	Σ	19%	29%	30%	21%	100%
	1	-	+	-	+	55%
	2	++	-	--		20%
	3	--	--	++	--	25%
Wave 2	1	--	+	+	--	15%
	2	--	--	++	--	26%
	3	++		--		8%
	4	++		--	--	11%
	5		+	--		20%
	6	-		--	++	22%
Wave 3	1	+	--	--		16%
	2	-	--	--	++	14%
	3	--	--	++		30%
	4	-	+		-	41%
Wave 4	1		--	-	++	31%
	2	--	+	+	--	44%
	3	++	+	-	--	26%
Wave 6	1	+	--	+	-	22%
	2	++	--			8%
	3				--	10%
	4	-	-	--	++	27%
	5	--		+	--	14%
	6	--	++	-	--	19%
Wave 7	1	+	--	+		18%
	2	--	++	--	--	16%
	3	+				9%
	4	-	-	-	++	21%
	5		--	+		16%
	6	-	+	+	--	19%
	Σ	19%	29%	30%	21%	100%

n=8,525;

Over-/under-representation: ++ =>100%; + = +5%points; - = - 5%points; -- = < 50%

For the diachronic approach, we return to the cloud of categories in the space of precarity to trace the cluster movements described above, i.e. connect the states of precarity over time, which the individuals of each cluster enjoy or endure disproportionally according to Table 10. This way, we simultaneously locate them in the space of precarity as such, since we locate the whole movement according to the axes of this space.

Figure 7 shows the clusters as groups of movements in the space of precarity with axis 1,2 and 1,3 for direct comparison. We see the states of precarity predominant in cluster 1 connected by the

black line. In the graph on the left, we see how cluster 1 is firmly on the lower side of the vertical axis, but while the states of precarity endured over the first three years are in some proximity, they seem literally all over the place in waves 4, 6, and 7 on the secondary dimension of lifestyles. Not so in the right-hand graph. Here we find the black lines of cluster 1 all in the bottom right corner; the states in waves 4, 6 and 7 might have moved up on the vertical axis, but they still resemble all states on the rightmost side. Now while dimension 2 indicated lifestyles, dimension 3 was identified as an axis of gendered mental health. This cluster can thus be dubbed "Feminised Precarity". The red line, on the other hand, draws the trajectories of cluster 4. Two remarkable features of this cluster are that it is the only one whose path never parts and which never "shares" a state of precarity with another cluster (except for the start) from age 13 to age 20, thus indicating a homogenous population and strong trajectories throughout youth. Secondly, this cluster shows similar movement in both dimensions 2 and 3, i.e. combining family values (dimension 2) with good mental health, which is obviously easier for men than for women. This group is called, paraphrasing Connell, "Male Working-Class Dividend". The blue line is somewhat in between, sharing starting points with cluster 4, the Male Working-Class Dividend, but later states also with the Feminised Precarity and one of its end points is shared with the golden line at the top. Looking at dimension 2, the cluster is predominantly on the right-hand side, i.e. where family plays a lesser role; regarding dimension 3 however, there is more movement, indicating stress or some other mental health problems. We might call this group an "Insecure Middle". And finally, the yellow or golden line is reserved for the "Gold Standard". This group appears to have inherited the most capitals, embodied and material, to give them the best start in their life. Over waves 1 to 4, i.e. up to their A Levels, this group is stably at the top, their paths have been set and there is not too much to worry about. It is only in wave 6 and 7 that we find more conflictual states among this group, resulting in two very different end points of their trajectories, although the highest share is bound for state 6 at the top of wave 7.

Figure 7: The space of precarity and Cluster movements; MCA waves 1 to 7, dimension 1,2 and 1,3



Lines connect states with significant overrepresentation in the respective clusters (see table above); cluster 1 in black, 2 in blue, 3 in yellow, 4 in red

Feminised Precarity, Male Working-Class Dividend, Insecure Middle, and the Gold Standard are constructed on the grounds of lifeworld experiences, condensed into six dimensions as suggested by Jahoda without reference to any socio-demographic characteristics. While being considerably transcended from the original variables, these four clusters do represent classes of practice – instead of "paper classes" – of young people in England 2004 to 2010.

Figure 8 and Figure 9 now present the same data as Figure 6, with the dots in the scatter plot coloured according to the cluster membership. Starting again with the factorial plane of axes 1 and 2, we find the individuals of the Gold Standard (yellow) firmly in the top left corner of the graph, i.e. on the end of bourgeois integration and family orientation. Their counterparts are individuals of the Male Working-Class Dividend (red) who are equally clearly in the bottom left quadrant, i.e. with working class integration and family orientation instead of bohemian lifestyle. For the latter, we turn to the Insecure Middle (blue), which shows differing degrees of bourgeois and working-class integration, i.e. along the vertical axis, but is clearly located on the right-hand side of the space of precarity, i.e. at the end of bohemian lifestyle. Somewhat covered up in this plane appears finally the Feminised Precarity (black), which dwell about in the middle, with a slight tendency towards the left but definitely below the horizontal base line, i.e. on the negative end of bourgeois integration.

Figure 8: Cloud of Individuals in the space of precarity, dimensions 1,2



However, turning the picture towards dimensions 1 and 3, individuals of Feminised Precarity become visible clearly on the right-hand side of the graph, faring not too well on psychosocial wellbeing. Interestingly, individuals of the Insecure Middle show a quite clear tendency towards good psychosocial wellbeing, while the Gold Standard appear a little more prone to stress and other mental health problems. The Male Working-Class Dividend finally is clearly located in the bottom left corner.

Figure 9: Cloud of Individuals in the space of precarity, dimensions 1,3



To come full circle now, we reposition these lifeworlds into their social environments. To this end the tables below present the results of a multinomial logistic regression to assess class membership according to a baseline model controlling only for gender and ethnicity (model 1), one containing the information on inherited cultural and economic capitals (model 2), and a full model including additionally young people's own occupational class (model 3). For a problem centred approach, we chose "Gold Standard" as the reference category; due to small case numbers in the occupational groups, we collapsed the first two, i.e. the most prestigious occupational categories. Since the comparison of regression coefficients in nested models is limited, we will confine the interpretations across models to the tendencies (Karlson et al. 2012).

Moving down the vertical axis, we start with Insecure Middle. Compared to the Gold Standard, we find hardly any socio-demographic differences, neither with regard to ethnicity and gender, nor on the inherited capitals, with the interesting exception of "degree" for parental education. The picture remains seemingly unclear in model 3 when including the current occupational situation. Here we find only negative coefficients, including being a fulltime student, which points to the very small number of NEETs in the Gold Standard group. Nevertheless, the logit model

suggests that the differences between the Insecure Middle and the Gold Standard are less one of class differences than genuinely lifestyle and mental health questions.

Table 11: Multinomial logit model of Class membership for Insecure Middle, Ref.: Gold Standard

Insecure Middle	(1)		(2)		(3)	
White	0.283	(0.18)	0.234	(0.19)	0.233	(0.19)
Mixed	0.279	(0.23)	0.217	(0.24)	0.225	(0.24)
Indian	-0.293	(0.20)	-0.285	(0.21)	-0.275	(0.21)
Pakistani	-0.327	(0.22)	-0.257	(0.22)	-0.269	(0.22)
Bangladeshi	-0.365	(0.23)	-0.234	(0.23)	-0.242	(0.23)
Black Caribbean	-0.003	(0.26)	-0.0503	(0.26)	-0.047	(0.26)
Black African	-0.215	(0.25)	-0.260	(0.25)	-0.256	(0.25)
Other	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)
Male	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)
Female	-0.071	(0.06)	-0.059	(0.06)	-0.049	(0.06)
Income <10,4k			0	(.)	0	(.)
<15,6k			0.002	(0.13)	0.011	(0.14)
<26k			0.067	(0.12)	0.072	(0.12)
<36,4k			0.116	(0.12)	0.131	(0.12)
<52k			0.023	(0.13)	0.042	(0.13)
>52k			0.059	(0.13)	0.076	(0.13)
Degree			0.371**	(0.13)	0.388**	(0.13)
Higher Education below degree			0.172	(0.13)	0.186	(0.13)
GCE A Level			0.066	(0.13)	0.086	(0.13)
GCSE A-C			0.181	(0.12	0.198	(0.12)
Qual Level 1			0.072	(0.19)	0.087	(0.19)
Other qual			0.151	(0.23)	0.158	(0.23)
No Qual			0	(.)	0	(.)
Managers and Senior Officials; Professional Occupations					-0.094	(0.34)
Associate Professional and Technical Operations					-0.812**	(0.27)
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations					-0.347	(0.23)
Skilled Trades occupations					-0.417	(0.28)
Personal Service Occupations					-0.700**	(0.22)
Sales and Customer Service Occupations					-0.621***	(0.19)
Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives					-0.365	(0.51)
Elementary Occupations					-0.528**	(0.20)
NEET					0	(.)
Full Time Student					-0.458**	(0.15)
Constant	-0.117	(0.18)	-0.330	(0.21)	0.097	(0.25)
Observations	7283		7283		7283	
Pseudo-R^2 (Nagelkerke)	0.079		0.153		0.256	
AIC	2.661		2.597		2.489	

*Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$*

In contrast, Feminised Precarity differs on all accounts from Gold Standard. In model one, we see positive effects for White and Mixed ethnicity and a highly significant negative effect for Indian background. We also see a small positive effect for female, thus confirming the proposed label of this group. In the second model controlling for inherited capitals, the existing ethnicity effects increase in power and significance and besides Indian the other two South Asian ethnicities become significant too. The gender effect, however, vanishes in this model. Looking at the inherited capitals, we find a negative correlation between household income and belonging to this group instead of the Gold Standard, which means, that this group is indeed less equipped with parental resources. This applies to cultural capitals as well, with parental higher education having a negative significant effect. This effect disappears however, once controlling for the young person's own occupation; the economic side however prevails. In the full model, we find also the gender effect being significant again, while the effects for white ethnic disappears. Turning to the SOC groups, we find again negative effects for almost all occupations, both for the most prestigious as well as service and elementary occupations. Lastly, there is a highly significant negative effect for fulltime studying, i.e. this group is significantly less likely to attend university than the Gold Standard.

Table 12: Multinomial logit model of Class membership for Feminised Precarity, Ref.: Gold Standard

Feminised Precarity	(1)		(2)		(3)	
White	0.455*	(0.22)	0.608**	(0.22)	0.348	(0.23)
Mixed	0.636*	(0.27)	0.797**	(0.27)	0.559*	(0.28)
Indian	-0.958***	(0.26)	-1.015***	(0.27)	-0.895***	(0.27)
Pakistani	-0.450	(0.26)	-0.657*	(0.27)	-0.706**	(0.27)
Bangladeshi	-0.373	(0.27)	-0.625*	(0.28)	-0.618*	(0.28)
Black Caribbean	0.500	(0.29)	0.556	(0.29)	0.455	(0.30)
Black African	-0.346	(0.31)	-0.321	(0.31)	-0.228	(0.31)
Other	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)
Male	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)
Female	0.153*	(0.07)	0.125	(0.07)	0.181*	(0.08)
Income <10,4k			0	(.)	0	(.)
<15,6k			-0.218	(0.14)	-0.224	(0.15)
<26k			-0.308*	(0.13)	-0.311*	(0.13)
<36,4k			-0.199	(0.13)	-0.151	(0.14)
<52k			-0.564***	(0.14)	-0.502***	(0.14)
>52k			-0.736***	(0.14)	-0.625***	(0.15)
Degree			-0.517***	(0.15	-0.258	(0.16)
Higher Education below degree			-0.259	(0.15)	-0.079	(0.15)
GCE A Level			-0.133	(0.14)	-0.022	(0.15)
GCSE A-C			-0.023	(0.14)	0.062	(0.14)
Qual Level 1			0.349	(0.19)	0.342	(0.19)
Other qual			-0.284	(0.27)	-0.198	(0.28)
No Qual			0	(.)	0	(.)
Managers and Senior Officials; Professional Occupations					-1.392***	(0.42)
Associate Professional and Technical Operations					-1.268***	(0.27)
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations					-0.775***	(0.23)
Skilled Trades occupations					-0.267	(0.25)
Personal Service Occupations					-0.780***	(0.20)
Sales and Customer Service Occupations					-1.017***	(0.18)
Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives					-0.550	(0.49)
Elementary Occupations					-0.770***	(0.19)
NEET					0	(.)
Full Time Student					-1.715***	(0.14)
Constant	-0.839***	(0.22)	-0.380	(0.25)	0.897**	(0.28)
Observations	7283		7283		7283	
Pseudo-R^2 (Nagelkerke)	0.079		0.153		0.256	
AIC	2.661		2.597		2.489	

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Finally, comparing the Gold Standard to the Male Working-Class Dividend, we find strong effects for male gender and white ethnic but also for mixed and Black Caribbean. In model two, all these effects prevail or are even fortified. Looking at their parental background, this group inherited significantly less economic and cultural capitals. In the full model we finally see the

positive effects for white, mixed and black Caribbean males and the lower inherited capitals also after controlling for own occupational status, where young people of this group occupy predominantly skilled trades occupations whereas they are hardly found at university or in white collar jobs but neither in elementary occupations.

Table 13: Multinomial logit model of Class membership for Male WC Dividend, Ref.: Gold Standard

Male Working-Class Dividend	(1)		(2)		(3)	
White	1.160***	(0.26)	1.407***	(0.27)	0.930***	(0.28)
Mixed	0.948**	(0.31)	1.196***	(0.32)	0.794*	(0.33)
Indian	-0.586	(0.31)	-0.650*	(0.31)	-0.462	(0.32)
Pakistani	-0.268	(0.31)	-0.552	(0.32)	-0.634	(0.33)
Bangladeshi	-0.250	(0.33)	-0.659*	(0.33)	-0.655	(0.34)
Black Caribbean	0.803*	(0.33)	0.990**	(0.34)	0.870*	(0.35)
Black African	-1.039*	(0.44)	-0.986*	(0.44)	-0.774	(0.45)
Other	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)
Male	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)
Female	-0.715***	(0.07)	-0.775***	(0.07)	-0.617***	(0.08)
Income <10,4k			0	(.)	0	(.)
<15,6k			0.126	(0.14)	0.0807	(0.15)
<26k			-0.124	(0.13)	-0.162	(0.14)
<36,4k			-0.116	(0.13)	-0.130	(0.14)
<52k			-0.287*	(0.14)	-0.288*	(0.15)
>52k			-0.641***	(0.15)	-0.576***	(0.15)
Degree			-1.415***	(0.16)	-1.033***	(0.17)
Higher Education below degree			-0.773***	(0.15)	-0.565***	(0.16)
GCE A Level			-0.458**	(0.14)	-0.389**	(0.15)
GCSE A-C			-0.059	(0.13)	-0.010	(0.14)
Qual Level 1			0.289	(0.18)	0.257	(0.19)
Other qual			0.058	(0.24)	0.156	(0.25)
No Qual			0	(.)	0	(.)
Managers and Senior Officials; Professional Occupations					-0.342	(0.34)
Associate Professional and Technical Operations					-0.909***	(0.26)
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations					-0.222	(0.22)
Skilled Trades occupations					0.698**	(0.23)
Personal Service Occupations					-0.234	(0.20)
Sales and Customer Service Occupations					-0.600***	(0.18)
Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives					0.655	(0.41)
Elementary Occupations					-0.435*	(0.18)
NEET					0	(.)
Full Time Student					-1.957***	(0.15)
Constant	-0.868**	(0.26)	-0.371	(0.29)	0.870**	(0.32)
Observations	7283		7283		7283	
Pseudo-R^2 (Nagelkerke)	0.079		0.153		0.256	
AIC	2.661		2.597		2.489	

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In conclusion, we saw the model fit significantly increase from model 1 to model 3, with most significant gains in explanatory as well as forecasting power for model 3, which included the current living situation on top of inherited cultural and economic capitals. Nonetheless, the models are still of rather modest power, which means that the states of precarity and the 4 trajectories through youth identified here are not explained by differences of ethnicity, gender, and different indicators of class alone.

6.4 Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter stood the question how to proceed with the analysis of precariousness among young people. It was established before, that the experience of precariousness is immanently individual, and time and age specific; however, by putting them into relation with the social environment we observe them in, we can understand them as precarity, as a socially and societally induced condition. The question now was, what to do with 28 latent classes of precariousness, which could already be understood as precarity through the descriptive analysis but did not yet reveal their interconnectedness. The answer was to situate them in relation to and with each other: to construct a heuristic space of precarity, in order to identify the forces at work which constitute this space. The result are three identified axes, which structure young people's lives and their individual suffering from precariousness: inequality of class, differences in lifestyles, and mental health. Young people's positions on these three dimensions in this space of experiences and practice constitute their classed youth, living the Gold Standard, in an Insecure Middle, enjoying a Male Working-Class Dividend, or enduring the hardship of Feminised Precarity.

The next and final chapter will now put the political back into the analysis, back into the classes, asking which one is the most alienated.

7 Precarious politics

This chapter combines the critique developed in chapter 1 with the analysis of precarity in the previous chapters. Picking up the main criticism expressed then, the question now is, whether the inherently political character of precarity, theoretically developed in chapter 2, holds true in the empirical analysis. Secondly, and related to that, it needs to be shown, what this model actually contributes beyond the standard SES model for political participation. Therefore, the first part of the chapter looks into the (reported) voting behaviour of young people in the 2010 General Election and also into the reason for abstention. The second section contrasts this, focussing on precarity instead, in order to make the point about the political consequence of the identified states of precarity. The third section will then combine the analysis to show that we need to look into their lifeworlds if we want to understand young people's political participation.

7.1 Back to basics – YPPP and the class/SES/resource model of voting

The first chapter elaborated on applicability problems of the classical approaches to voting behaviour when it comes to YPPP: class positions are not yet fully developed and thus cannot yet be condensed into a political will, which is promoted by one party or another (the Lazarsfeld and Berelson approach); for the same reasons, the SES approaches as put forward by Verba and Nie (1987, 1972 and Kim 1978) are hardly applicable since they also imply a certain degree of stability of socio-economic status; and finally, the resource model (Brady et al. 1995), although mainly an extension of the SES model, is also of little applicability to YPPP, since it does not reflect the age related power dynamics in the institutions where "civic skills" are attained. Nevertheless, and in line with the literature (Henn et al. 2005, Phelps 2012), we do expect differences in participation along the main lines of social differentiation, which we can describe once again as inherited cultural and economic capital, but also with respect to the young people's own social status at age 19/20, which also covers their educational careers.

Table 14 shows (reported) turnout according to the household income of young people's families. The tendencies are clear, there is a strong correlation between the annual household income and voting, ranging from less than two fifth among the young people who grew up in households with less than £ 10,000 to over two thirds voting participation in the group which grew up in

households with annual incomes of more than £ 52,000. In a similar way, there is a strong correlation with the type of housing the respondents grew up in, with those growing up on council estates and in rented houses or flats participating the least (less than 40% reported turnout) while people whose parents had full ownership of their house had the highest participation rates (64% reported turnout). It is noteworthy here, that this does not include any information about the worth of the property; as mentioned before, under some circumstances buying with a mortgage might indicate even more economic capital since buying a house worth £ 1 million with a mortgage requires more available economic capital than outright owning a house worth £ 50,000. Nevertheless, the data provides a clear correlation between parental economic capitals and young peoples' likeliness to vote.

Table 14: Inherited Economic capitals and voting at the 2010 General Election

		Voted	Total %
Household income	dk	51%	4%
	<5,2k	40%	1%
	<10,4k	38%	6%
	<15,6k	41%	11%
	<20,8k	48%	9%
	<26k	51%	9%
	<31,2k	53%	10%
	<36,4k	56%	9%
	<41,6	55%	7%
	<46,8k	57%	6%
	<52k	59%	6%
	>52k	67%	22%
Tenure	Owned outright	64%	10%
	Bought on mortgage	59%	63%
	Other	50%	2%
	Council housing	38%	13%
	Housing association	40%	8%
	Rented	37%	4%
	Σ	54%	100%

n=8,308

Similarly, Table 15 displaying cultural capitals of the young person's home shows strong correlations between formal education of parents and the young person's likeliness to vote, with 69% reported turnout among those with at least one parent holding a university degree to 35% among those, whose parents attained only Level 1 qualifications. There are however interesting deviations from the monotonous pattern, with higher participation rates among those

whose parents hold no or "other qualifications". This is not least a correlate of ethnic or migration background respectively. Finally, grandparents' education also correlates highly with voting, with over 80% reported turnout among young people where more than two grandparents went to university, and over two-thirds participation among those with two grandparents who attained higher education.

Table 15: Inherited Cultural capitals and Abstention at the 2010 General Election

		Voted	Total %
Parental Education	Degree	69%	19%
	HE below degree	61%	17%
	GCE A Level	52%	19%
	GCSE A-C	49%	26%
	Qual Level 1	35%	6%
	Other qualification	50%	2%
	No Qualification	43%	11%
Grandparents with HE	1GP attended Uni	62%	9%
	2GP attended Uni	68%	3%
	>2GP attended Uni	86%	1%
	0 GP attended Uni	52%	87%
	Σ	54%	100%

n=8,520

In addition to the inherited forms of capital presented above, we have also information on the young person's current occupation at age 19, using the Standard Occupational Classification codes (SOC). To better reflect the situation of young people, the SOC was extended to include Fulltime Students and people Not in Employment, Education, or Training (NEET). It is noteworthy that groups SOC 1 and 2 are rather small in this sample, which is due to the higher qualifications usually held by "Managers, Directors and Senior Officials" and by people in "Professional Occupations". This correlation between education or qualification and political participation is yet palpable, with over 60% turnout among fulltime students and people working in the top two occupations. This bolsters the argument about the importance of educational trajectories on political participation by (Phelps 2012). While case numbers of the major groups SOC 1 and 2 do not allow for a further investigation into respondent's occupations, it is in the following informative to look into subgroups of other occupations who were least likely to vote in 2010, using the three-digit SOC code.

Besides NEETs, people in elementary, skilled trades, and personal service occupations as well as process, plant, and machine operatives reported the lowest turnout. Starting with elementary occupations, the overwhelming majority of these people work as cleaners, in warehouses, or perform elementary clerical tasks. Occupations held by young people in major group 8 (process, plant, and machine operatives) are also mainly manual labour, including routine work on assembly lines (c.f. Jahoda 1982 on the psychological effects of these occupations); skilled trades on the other hand are mainly scaffolders, roofers, builders or electricians and plumbers. The category "personal service" finally collates mainly assistant, non-teaching work in kindergartens and nurseries. In other words, the occupational groups least likely to vote are blue-collar workers.

A turnout below the mean is also reported among major groups SOC 3 (associate professionals and technical operations) and SOC 7 (sales and customer service occupations), with jobs held in the latter being mainly in wholesale and retail (to a lesser extent in customer service), and jobs like fitness instructor or real estate agent in the former, i.e. the new lower rank white-collar and service occupations. The typical clerical jobs finally are found in SOC group 4 (administrative and secretarial occupations), although only a minority of this group works in classic secretarial occupations while the majority undertakes administrative tasks in (non-)governmental organisations. This group of more typical white-collar workers reported a slightly higher turnout.

Table 16: SOC Major Groups and Abstention at the 2010 General Election

	Voted	Total %
Managers and Senior Officials	63%	.9%
Professional Occupations	67%	.4%
Associate Professional and Technical Operations	49%	2%
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations	55%	4%
Skilled Trades occupations	46%	7%
Personal Service Occupations	47%	6%
Sales and Customer Service Occupations	51%	9%
Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives	45%	1%
Elementary Occupations	45%	9%
NEET	36%	12%
FT Student	63%	48%
Σ	54%	100%

n=7,992

At this point, we can combine the findings into a logit model to test the SES approach approximatively. For parsimony, the twelve income categories were combined into six, while the

remaining variables are all included as presented before. Additionally, gender and ethnicity are introduced as control variables. Model 1, the base model, includes the control variables only and indicates a highly significant effect for ethnicity, in particular positive for Bangladeshi and other South Asian ethnic but negative for Black Caribbean. Gender yields no significant effects. Model 2 tests the economic capital correlation and indicates a steady positive effect for income on the likeliness to vote, with the strongest effect in the top income bracket. For tenure on the other hand, we see significant and negative effects only for those who grew up on a council estate or in a rented home. Interestingly though, the ethnicity effect prevails for the South Asian groups but not for Black Caribbean. Testing for cultural capital in model 3, we find again significant effects for parental education with negative effects for level 1 education and strong positive effects for those whose parents hold a degree. However, when controlling for parental education, grandparents apparently do not count anymore – while the differences presented above were quite stark for this form of established inherited cultural capital, the effect vanishes in the multivariate model. This might be mainly due to the high correlation between parental and grandparental education, but also indicates that educational gains of this parental generation, which profited most of the educational expansion in the UK after World War II, do indeed overrule the educational advantages passed on by the preceding grandparents' generation.

Model 4 tests the young person's own occupational class and finds the aforementioned differences of blue collar and service workers opposite full time students and jobs with high qualifications. Interestingly, the effect for Black Caribbean, which had disappeared before, remerges and now the effect for Black African is negative and significant too.

Table 17: Logit Model on Voting

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
White	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)
Mixed	-0.058	(0.12)	0.058	(0.12)	-0.101	(0.12)	-0.071	(0.12)	-0.022	(0.12)
Indian	0.248**	(0.09)	0.270**	(0.10)	0.354***	(0.10)	0.053	(0.09)	0.120	(0.10)
Pakistani	0.456***	(0.11)	0.673***	(0.12)	0.660***	(0.12)	0.378***	(0.11)	0.561***	(0.12)
Bangladeshi	0.764***	(0.13)	1.205***	(0.14)	1.075***	(0.14)	0.688***	(0.13)	1.073***	(0.15)
Black Caribbean	-0.374*	(0.15)	-0.150	(0.15)	-0.395**	(0.15)	-0.458**	(0.15)	-0.294	(0.15)
Black African	-0.160	(0.15)	0.183	(0.16)	-0.194	(0.16)	-0.357*	(0.15)	-0.112	(0.16)
Other	-0.109	(0.15)	0.084	(0.16)	-0.059	(0.16)	-0.232	(0.16)	-0.082	(0.16)
Female	-0.022	(0.05)	-0.010	(0.05)	-0.012	(0.05)	-0.078	(0.05)	-0.051	(0.05)
Income <10,4k			0	(.)					0	(.)
<15,6k			-0.012	(0.10)					0.004	(0.10)
<26k			0.249**	(0.09)					0.235*	(0.09)
<36,4k			0.319***	(0.09)					0.242*	(0.10)
<52k			0.365***	(0.10)					0.217*	(0.10)
>52k			0.641***	(0.10)					0.371***	(0.10)
Tenure: owned			0.198	(0.22)					0.099	(0.22)
mortgage			-0.056	(0.21)					-0.128	(0.21)
other			0	(.)					0	(.)
council			-0.580**	(0.22)					-0.553*	(0.22)
housing ass			-0.454*	(0.23)					-0.438	(0.23)
rented			-0.594*	(0.25)					-0.571*	(0.25)
Degree					0.822***	(0.10)			0.335**	(0.11)
HE below deg.					0.573***	(0.10)			0.197	(0.11)
GCE A Level					0.265**	(0.09)			-0.030	(0.10)
GCSE A-C					0.168	(0.09)			-0.040	(0.09)
Qual Level 1					-0.301*	(0.13)			-0.364**	(0.13)
Other qual					0.196	(0.17)			0.142	(0.18)
No Qual					0	(.)			0	(.)

1GPUni					0.065	(0.08)			0.043	(0.09)
2GPUni					-0.015	(0.15)			-0.060	(0.15)
>2GPUni					0.300	(0.36)			0.192	(0.36)
0GPUni					0	(.)			0	(.)
Managers and Senior Officials							-0.125	(0.28)	-0.088	(0.28)
Professional Occupations							0.304	(0.42)	0.268	(0.43)
Associate Professional and Technical Operations							-0.450**	(0.17)	-0.361*	(0.17)
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations							-0.252*	(0.13)	-0.163	(0.13)
Skilled Trades occupations							-0.601***	(0.11)	-0.435***	(0.12)
Personal Service Occupations							-0.498***	(0.11)	-0.383***	(0.11)
Sales and Customer Service Occupations							-0.314***	(0.09)	-0.211*	(0.09)
Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives							-0.743**	(0.23)	-0.533*	(0.24)
Elementary Occupations							-0.606***	(0.09)	-0.482***	(0.10)
NEET							-0.913***	(0.09)	-0.646***	(0.09
FT Student							0	(.)	0	(.)
Constant	0.295***	(0.037)	0.063	(0.22)	-0.082	(0.08)	0.594***	(0.05)	0.377	(0.24)
Observations	7282		7282		7282		7282		7282	
Pseudo-R^2 (Nagelkerke)	0.013		0.052		0.044		0.042		0.076	
AIC	1.351		1.325		1.331		1.333		1.312	

Standard errors in parentheses; $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

The full model 5 includes both the inherited capitals and the current occupational status of young people as well as the control variables. Notably, this model has a significantly higher fit, i.e. it better predicts voting behaviour than any of the other models although still on a modest level. Most significantly, the largest effect sizes are observed for ethnicity, i.e. after controlling for the various socio-economic factors young people with Bangladeshi or Pakistani background were still much more likely to turn out on polling day.

We can still see the likeliness to vote increasing with each income bracket and gaining significance; among the housing categories, growing up on a council estate or in a rented accommodation retain a significant negative effect. The effects for cultural capital remain mainly the same, with positive effects for parents holding a degree and negative effects for level 1 qualifications. Finally, the young person's own occupational status also shows significant effects on voting, with highly significant negative effects for blue-collar workers and NEETs. In sum, these findings thus prove the SES hypothesis but correspond also to Evans and Tilley's *New Politics of Class* (2017) – the white, blue-collar working classes lose out on the ballot boxes.

7.2 Operationalisation of alienation and abstention

The dependent variable of the analysis is at first binary: respondents have either voted in or abstained from the 2010 General Election. However, respondents of the LSYPE were also asked for their reasons for abstention. This allows for a differentiation which talks to the literatures of political efficacy (Campbell et al. 1954), political alienation (Finifter 1970), and political apathy (DeLuca 1995).

As shown below, reasons for abstention are manifold, ranging from illness to simply forgetting to vote to missing deadlines for postal or proxy vote. However, the two most frequently stated reasons for abstention are 'don't care/not interested' and 'don't want to/don't believe in politics'. Other items are more directly associated with internal efficacy, like reasons indicating a lack of knowledge or competence, or external efficacy, e.g. the statement about how voting would not count or make a difference. While Campbell et al. (1954) suggested a unidimensional 'sense of efficacy' the literature has soon started to differentiate between internal and external political efficacy, the first indicating competence for political participation, the second effectiveness of

political participation (cf. Finkel 1985). In other words, internal political efficacy is the ability to articulate a political will; external political efficacy is one's belief to be heard. The concept of external political efficacy overlaps partly with Finifter's first dimension of political alienation, namely 'political powerlessness'. Borrowing from Durkheim, she also identified an anomic 'perceived political normlessness'; her theoretical framework further includes 'political meaninglessness', which corresponds with 'not sure who to vote for so abstained' in the LSYPE data set, i.e. rather a measure of internal political efficacy, and finally 'political isolation' which describes a rather active rejection of the polity, e.g. by questioning the legitimacy of the democratic process altogether. Finally, DeLuca (1995) develops an interesting concept of political apathy, drawing mainly on C Wright Mills (and Herbert Marcuse). In the former's sense,

> *'Apathy […] is a condition under which people suffer, caused by a suppression of political freedom through the subordination of political life itself. It is a complex form of depoliticization, hinged on the way mass society inhibits or channels political knowledge and restricts the ability to make use of it, and complicated by a dialectic between the present mobilization of bias and a complementary psychology, radiating through individuals, that helps social structure dynamically reconstitute itself.' (DeLuca 1995: 147)*

This condensed conclusion of Mills' account of political apathy is surprisingly similar to the one developed here building on Bourdieu and Jahoda. Political apathy is not an individual lack of knowledge or competence (internal political efficacy) nor is it a deliberate individual decision to abstain or retreat from the polity. Rather, political apathy understood with Mills is the product of a social and societal condition, which functions also as a means to legitimate the social order. Combining these with Bourdieu's ideas on the state, one could expand the integration-alienation function towards inclusion-exclusion in the polity via the ascription of a place in the social space.

Therefore, the dependent variable measuring YPPP was coded as a three-category variable, with respondents having either participated (1) in the 2010 election, abstained (3) for non-political

reasons such as illness, while all respondents who abstained for explicitly political reasons were coded as alienated (2).[91,92,93]

Table 18: Voting and reasons for abstention

	Voted	Abstained	Alienated	Σ
Not applicable	100%			53.8%
Out of country/area at the time		23.9%		2.9%
Not registered		20.8%		2.5%
Administrative errors		12.3%		1.5%
Other reasons		12.1%		1.5%
Refused		11.6%		1.4%
Didn't have time - exams/study		4.1%		0.5%
Missed postal/proxy deadline		3.1%		0.4%
Illness		2.9%		0.3%
Multiple reasons		9.3%	10.6%	4.7%
Don't care/not interested			16.7%	5.7%
Don't want to/Don't believe in politics			16.1%	5.5%
Don't know			11.9%	4.1%
Do not understand politics			11.6%	3.9%
Unsure who to vote for so abstained			10.6%	3.6%
Didn't have time - other			8.8%	3.0%
Didn't have time - work			4.4%	1.5%
Didn't think vote would count/make a difference			4.1%	1.4%
Forgot			3.6%	1.2%
Don't know how			1.6%	0.6%
Σ	100%	100%	100%	100%

n=8,625

Assessing the relevant factors for these reasons for non-participation, a logit model was fitted for all non-voters to identify socio-economic mechanisms leading to an alienation from politics. The full model in Table 19 shows no differences between Abstention and Alienation with regard to

[91] Although one could obviously argue, having no time to cast one's vote is in itself an indication of political apathy.

[92] The first-past-the-post electoral system is prone to produce a specific form of abstention because potential voters in a safe seat for the party they oppose might not cast their vote because their candidate would win/lose anyway. Thus, abstaining for these reasons could be understood as a rather informed decision, thus indicating not so much a retreat from the polity. On the other hand, the informed assessment of one's voting being futile can also be read as a case of the divergence of internal and external political efficacy, which Bright (2012) indeed identified as politically alienating.

[93] If at least one "Alienation" reason was mentioned, the respondent was coded as such; therefore, we find "multiple reasons" both among the "Alienation" and the "Abstention" respondents.

inherited economic and cultural capital – with the notable exception of grandparental education. Young people with one grandparent who attained higher education are significantly less likely to abstain for alienation reasons. The main effects for political alienation we can identify are the occupational classes of young people, with significant results again for blue-collar workers and NEETs. Most significant are however again the effects of ethnicity, with the three South Asian groups being least likely to abstain because of political alienation. It is however interesting that the group hierarchy is turned around compared to the findings on voting: among all, young people with Bangladeshi background were significantly more likely to vote than their white English peers, while young people of Indian background were just as likely to abstain as white young people. Among the non-voters however, youth of Indian background are least likely to have abstained for reasons of alienation, which indicates differences in the degree of political and societal integration of these two groups.

Table 19: Logit Model, SES on Alienation

	(1)	
Income <10,4k	0	(.)
<15,6k	-0.227	(0.16)
<26k	-0.163	(0.15)
<36,4k	0.106	(0.16)
<52k	-0.001	(0.17)
>52k	-0.235	(0.17)
Tenure: owned	0.166	(0.38)
mortgage	0.217	(0.36)
other	0	(.)
council	0.380	(0.37)
housing ass	0.325	(0.38)
rented	0.385	(0.41)
Degree	-0.327	(0.18)
HE below deg.	-0.093	(0.17)
GCE A Level	-0.082	(0.16)
GCSE A-C	0.042	(0.15)
Qual Level 1	0.373	(0.21)
Other qual	0.173	(0.30)
No Qual	0	(.)
1 grandparent with Uni	-0.292*	(0.14)
2 or more grandparents with Uni	-0.118	(0.23)
0 grandparents with Uni	0	(.)
Managers and Senior Officials; Professional Occupations	0.574	(0.42)
Associate Professional and Technical Operations	0.349	(0.27)
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations	0.863***	(0.24)
Skilled Trades occupations	1.134***	(0.22)
Personal Service Occupations	1.251***	(0.22)
Sales and Customer Service Occupations	0.567***	(0.15)
Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives	1.367**	(0.49)
Elementary Occupations	0.942***	(0.17)
NEET	0.860***	(0.15)
FT Student	0	(.)
White	0	(.)
Mixed	-0.038	(0.20)
Indian	-0.590***	(0.16)
Pakistani	-0.564**	(0.20)
Bangladeshi	-0.504*	(0.25)
Black Caribbean	0.293	(0.24)
Black African	-0.177	(0.24)
Other	-0.244	(0.25)
Male	0	(.)
Female	-0.121	(0.09)
Constant	0.485	(0.39)
Observations	3032	
Pseudo-R^2 (Nagelkerke)	0.115	
AIC	1.179	

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The tests of the classic approaches to political participation and abstention on the particular situation of young people yielded several unexpected findings: first, the inherited forms of capital turned out to be much less relevant than expected, especially grandparental education proved

largely insignificant for the likeliness to vote. Further, regarding economic capital, it appears that only the extremes retain relevant for voting, i.e. having grown up in a household with an annual income of more than £52,000 *or* having grown up on a council estate. Secondly, the main socio-economic variable is the young person's own occupational status, namely whether they study or work in white collar jobs – or work blue-collar jobs or not at all. This polarisation is in so far alarming, since it proves the aforementioned point about class politics, i.e. the results indicate that at the time of their first ever general election, young peoples' mobilisation to vote is already determined by their own occupational class position. Thirdly however, we found a quite striking effect of ethnicity on voting. Thus, summing up the first logit model, we found support for both the SES hypothesis for voting and evidence for white working-class demobilisation.

Investigating the reasons for abstention among non-voters, we did not find any parental effect at all in the full model, and only a minor although significant effect for grandparental education. It seems therefore that the very reason for not voting is finally determined by the current living and working conditions of young people, with blue-collar workers and NEETs feeling most alienated compared to fulltime students and white-collar workers. However, the largest effect sizes are yet again found for respondents' ethnicity, although with an interesting change of hierarchy compared to the vote vs. no vote model.

7.3 Bringing the lifeworld back in – voting as a precarious choice

The previous section laid the ground for the concluding question, whether youth trajectories, i.e. processes of integration and disintegration contribute significantly to the understanding of voting behaviour and the reasons for abstention. To this end, it is important to remember the substantial meaning of the clusters of states of precarity which were labelled Feminised Precarity, Male Working Class Dividend, Insecure Middle, and Gold Standard in the previous chapter: different individual experiences of precariousness throughout youth, i.e. across time, put into relation with each other and to their socio-economic positions. Thus, these four states do not only cover the recent states of insecurity or marginalisation and are not only descriptive of their upbringing. They are trajectories, the young people in each of these four clusters share experiences and their reactions to them respectively; not just the circumstances of their childhood but the parameters of their social, societal and not least political integration.

Therefore, we compare the full SES model on voting presented before (model 1 in Table 20) with one including the states of precarity (model 2). The overall picture regarding the economic and cultural capitals of their parental homes remains largely the same, with only minor changes in the effect sizes and no changes with regard to significance levels except for parental education on level 1. This changes when looking at the occupations of young people. Besides the large negative effect of being NEET or working elementary occupations, most effect sizes and significance levels decrease substantially when controlling for precarity. For ethnicity, we do not see major changes regarding the likeliness to vote among South Asian ethnic, but a small yet significant effect for Black Caribbean emerge. The states of precarity themselves are all highly significant, with the largest effects for Feminised Precarity and Male Working-Class Dividend who are much less likely to vote than Gold Standard youth; notably, also young people in the Insecure Middle are significantly less likely to vote, however by a smaller margin. Finally, inspecting the model fit criteria we find an increased explanatory and forecasting power of the model including the states of precarity, although still on a rather low level.

Table 20: Comparison Logit Model SES and precarity on voting

	(1)		(2)	
Income <10,4k	0	(.)	0	(.)
<15,6k	0.004	(0.10)	-0.000	(0.10)
<26k	0.235*	(0.09)	0.225*	(0.09)
<36,4k	0.242*	(0.10)	0.240*	(0.10)
<52k	0.217*	(0.10)	0.199*	(0.10)
>52k	0.371***	(0.10)	0.343***	(0.10)
Tenure: owned	0.099	(0.22)	0.086	(0.22)
mortgage	-0.128	(0.21)	-0.134	(0.21)
other	0	(.)	0	(.)
council	-0.553*	(0.22)	-0.535*	(0.23)
housing ass	-0.438	(0.23)	-0.427	(0.23)
rented	-0.571*	(0.25)	-0.579*	(0.25)
Degree	0.335**	(0.11)	0.306**	(0.11)
HE below deg.	0.197	(0.11)	0.182	(0.11)
GCE A Level	-0.030	(0.10)	-0.038	(0.10)
GCSE A-C	-0.040	(0.09)	-0.034	(0.10)
Qual Level 1	-0.364**	(0.13)	-0.341*	(0.13)
Other qual	0.142	(0.18)	0.144	(0.18)
No Qual	0	(.)	0	(.)
1 grandparent with Uni	0.043	(0.09)	0.042	(0.09)
2 grandparents with Uni	-0.060	(0.15)	-0.065	(0.15)
3 or more grandparents with Uni	0.192	(0.36)	0.197	(0.36)
0 grandparents with Uni	0	(.)	0	(.)
Managers and Senior Officials	-0.088	(0.28)	-0.026	(0.28)
Professional Occupations	0.268	(0.43)	0.360	(0.43)
Associate Professional and Technical Operations	-0.361*	(0.17)	-0.307	(0.17)
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations	-0.163	(0.13)	-0.071	(0.13)
Skilled Trades occupations	-0.435***	(0.12)	-0.282*	(0.12)
Personal Service Occupations	-0.383***	(0.11)	-0.286*	(0.12)
Sales and Customer Service Occupations	-0.211*	(0.09)	-0.137	(0.09)
Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives	-0.533*	(0.24)	-0.388	(0.24)
Elementary Occupations	-0.482***	(0.10)	-0.393***	(0.10)
NEET	-0.646***	(0.09)	-0.527***	(0.10)
FT Student	0	(.)	0	(.)
White	0	(.)	0	(.)
Mixed	-0.022	(0.12)	-0.022	(0.12)
Indian	0.120	(0.10)	0.043	(0.10)
Pakistani	0.561***	(0.12)	0.486***	(0.12)
Bangladeshi	1.073***	(0.15)	0.993***	(0.15)
Black Caribbean	-0.294	(0.15)	-0.300*	(0.15)
Black African	-0.112	(0.16)	-0.183	(0.16)
Other	-0.082	(0.16)	-0.121	(0.16)
Male	0	(.)	0	(.)
Female	-0.051	(0.05)	-0.065	(0.05)
Feminised Precarity			-0.419***	(0.07)
Insecure Middle			-0.195**	(0.06)
Gold Standard			0	(.)
Male Working-Class Dividend			-0.430***	(0.08)
Constant	0.377	(0.24)	0.608*	(0.24)
Observations	7282		7282	
Pseudo-R^2 (Nagelkerke)	0.076		0.084	
AIC	1.312		1.307	

Standard errors in parentheses; $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

In sum, the analysis of voting behaviour showed that states of precarity do make a difference for young people's likeliness to vote. Using the analogy of origin and destination once more, the information about psychosocial trajectories might not change where young people end up but how they got there makes a difference when it comes to political participation.

Turning to the reasons for abstention, the picture is mainly the same, with little to no changes for economic and cultural capitals. The differences between these models can be observed again regarding the occupational situation of young people, but this time with effects mainly on NEETs and elementary occupations. The states of precarity finally show firstly no effect for the insecure middle, i.e. their reasons for non-voting do not differ from those of gold standard. However, the two groups less likely to vote at all show very different values for alienation, showing Feminised Precarity most likely to abstain for reasons of alienation, while this applies significantly less to young people of the Male WC Dividend.

Table 21: Comparison Logit Model SES and precarity on alienation

	(1)		(2)	
Income <10,4k	0	(.)	0	(.)
<15,6k	-0.227	(0.16)	-0.221	(0.16)
<26k	-0.163	(0.15)	-0.133	(0.15)
<36,4k	0.106	(0.16)	0.120	(0.16)
<52k	-0.000502	(0.17)	0.0470	(0.17)
>52k	-0.235	(0.17)	-0.185	(0.17)
Tenure: owned	0.166	(0.38)	0.198	(0.38)
mortgage	0.217	(0.36)	0.232	(0.36)
other	0	(.)	0	(.)
council	0.380	(0.37)	0.383	(0.38)
housing ass	0.325	(0.38)	0.332	(0.39)
rented	0.385	(0.41)	0.438	(0.41)
Degree	-0.327	(0.18)	-0.304	(0.18)
HE below deg.	-0.0930	(0.17)	-0.0779	(0.17)
GCE A Level	-0.0817	(0.16)	-0.0841	(0.16)
GCSE A-C	0.0420	(0.15)	0.0348	(0.15)
Qual Level 1	0.373	(0.21)	0.344	(0.22)
Other qual	0.173	(0.30)	0.200	(0.30)
No Qual	0	(.)	0	(.)
1 grandparent with Uni	-0.292*	(0.14)	-0.278*	(0.14)
2 or more grandparents with Uni	-0.118	(0.23)	-0.083	(0.23)
0 grandparents with Uni	0	(.)	0	(.)
Managers and Senior Officials; Professional Occupations	0.574	(0.42)	0.545	(0.43)
Associate Professional and Technical Operations	0.349	(0.27)	0.281	(0.27)
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations	0.863***	(0.24)	0.736**	(0.24)
Skilled Trades occupations	1.134***	(0.22)	0.996***	(0.23)
Personal Service Occupations	1.251***	(0.22)	1.126***	(0.22)
Sales and Customer Service Occupations	0.567***	(0.15)	0.486**	(0.15)
Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives	1.367**	(0.49)	1.208*	(0.49)
Elementary Occupations	0.942***	(0.17)	0.837***	(0.17)
NEET	0.860***	(0.15)	0.720***	(0.16)
FT Student	0	(.)	0	(.)
White	0	(.)	0	(.)
Mixed	-0.038	(0.20)	-0.038	(0.20)
Indian	-0.590***	(0.16)	-0.481**	(0.16)
Pakistani	-0.564**	(0.20)	-0.471*	(0.20)
Bangladeshi	-0.504*	(0.25)	-0.396	(0.25)
Black Caribbean	0.293	(0.24)	0.313	(0.24)
Black African	-0.177	(0.24)	-0.129	(0.25)
Other	-0.244	(0.25)	-0.203	(0.25)
Male	0	(.)	0	(.)
Female	-0.121	(0.09)	-0.123	(0.09)
Feminised Precarity			0.556***	(0.13)
Insecure Middle			0.131	(0.11)
Gold Standard			0	(.)
Male Working-Class Dividend			0.404**	(0.13)
Constant	0.485	(0.39)	0.227	(0.40)
Observations	3032		3032	
Pseudo-R^2 (Nagelkerke)	0.115		0.125	
AIC	1.179		1.174	

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Wrapping up the findings for alienation, we see on the one hand highly significant effects for states of precarity on alienation, just as we expected since we understand psychosocial

developments as relevant for political integration. On the other hand, we observe again a reduced effect of young people's occupations. That this effect is strongest for NEETs and elementary occupation means, not too surprising though, that the detrimental effect of being NEET or doing dulling routine work is mainly a psychological one; keeping the latter constant, the effect decreases.

7.4 Conclusion

In summary, this chapter's findings are twofold. On the one hand, we have to revoke the claim that the SES model would not at all work for young people. The models fitted to assess voting behaviour showed how young people are subject to the very same power dynamics of class, with a pronounced divide between (future) white-collar and blue-collar workers when it comes to voting. The *New Politics of Class* (Evans and Tilley 2017) apply to them as well, with young people in traditional working-class occupations being more likely to abstain. This effect of class politics overrules the conditions of their upbringing, including (potential) stigmata like growing up on a council estate (e.g. Mckenzie 2015), which showed only minor effects when controlling for their own most current occupational and educational status. Similar applies for reasons of abstention, i.e. alienation or "non-political" abstention.

On the other hand, we did see important contributions of the clusters of states of youth precarity. Firstly, including these developmental categories adds both to the explanatory and the predictive power of the models on voting and alienation, i.e. precarity does matter. Secondly, the findings in both models underpin findings on the psychological determinants of voting (Ojeda 2015; Hassell and Settle 2017; Holbein 2017) which are especially palpable regarding the more precarious types of youth: while they are equally likely to abstain, the motivation not to vote does differ between Feminised Precarity and Male Working Class Dividend, where we see the detrimental experiences of the former prevail with regard to their political participation. Thirdly, the changes in effect size and in significance of the SES variables indicate that controlling for psycho-social integration provides new explanations for abstention since most effects of blue-collar workers' alienation was partly accounted for by the states of precarity. In other words, while the SES model show *that* some people are more likely to abstain than others, the states of precarity can tell us *why*.

Conclusion

The concluding remarks here shall highlight the relevant findings and discuss some limitations as well as alleys for future research.

Knowledge we built

This thesis developed a synthesis of theories of precarity by Marie Jahoda, Pierre Bourdieu, and Judith Butler in order to connect youth transitions and political participation. Empirically testing this approach, a space of precarity was developed in which young people transit between states of precarity, i.e. socially induced experiences of precariousness. Investigating this space of precarity, the 'condition of being conditioned', as Butler called it, turned out to be one of social class, lifestyles, and mental health. Precarity is not just politically induced but also affects political participation, as both Jahoda and Bourdieu have shown. Consequently, we found relevant effects of precarity on both voting and reasons for not-voting, thus proving the guiding hypothesis true.

The primary theoretical contribution made here is thus firstly the synthesis of three thinkers guiding this research. With Butler we can escape the various boxes of precarity (cf. Figure 1) and understand precariousness phenomenologically as an everyday, as a 'universal' experience. To understand these experiences sociologically, we turn to Bourdieu who shares not only the phenomenological foundations with Butler but also the emphasis of practice (or performance[94]). Bourdieu and Jahoda share the direct observations of precarity or *précarité*, and through her social psychology we can understand precarity as psychosocial integration. Her emphasis on the institutions catering for this integration then leads in turn back to Butler's notion about the significance of institutions as part of the political order inducing or preventing precariousness and subsequently, precarity.

Secondly, the approach presented here re-contextualises some common knowledge in the field of young people's political participation. With Bourdieu we understand that the state with all its institutions like education, employment, or the family, is Janus-faced, i.e. equipping some with symbolic power and subjugating others to symbolic violence. The significance of educational

[94] Notwithstanding aforementioned misunderstandings in some of Butler's earlier works.

institutions for political participation is thus not just one of efficacy and skills, as common knowledge has it, but one of position-taking, of endowing with the symbolic means to partake in the polity. On the other hand, we understand with Jahoda (and Bourdieu) how precarity shrinks temporal, spatial and objective horizons, most palpable in her dimension of Growth (i.e. the interest in things, others, and the future). The positive effects which free and liberal education or trade union membership have on political participation (which is indirectly and under-theorisedly observed by e.g. Flanagan and Bassett), is thus not just one of gaining skills and getting organised but alludes to this Jahoda dimension of Growth and to Bourdieu's seeing an *avenir* ahead, instead of a *future*.

Finally, this research also champions Multiple Correspondence Analysis for research into youth transitions, especially when using longitudinal data. In the present example, one particularly interesting finding is not least, how the most relevant experiences of precariousness, i.e. the modalities contributing the most to the axes in the space of precarity, are distributed across the waves, i.e. the years in the participants' youth, thus reflecting critical times during youth: the primary axis of bourgeois integration is predominantly characterised by states of the first four waves when participants are 13 to 16 years old, i.e. it most likely reflects social reproduction. The secondary axis on lifestyles on the other hand features mainly modalities of the latter two waves, i.e. lifestyles start to matter more at the end of the teenage years. The tertiary axis of mental health finally is carried mainly by modalities of the middle ages, i.e. years 15 to 18, thus indicating how (not too surprisingly) mental health is crucial in the heydays of puberty, but lastingly so. While it would be somewhat farfetched to deduct information from these findings about possible points for intervention, the findings are an invitation to utilise MCAs to investigate shifts of passages or departures.

Answers we found

This study's character was partly exploratory and partly inferential. The exploratory research question was, whether we can apply Jahoda's dimensions of positive mental health to young people to identify experiences of precariousness during youth, as developed in chapter 2. The inferential question was then, whether these experiences of precariousness bear the political (explanatory) weight the literature suggests.

Using logit modelling, the latter question can be affirmed. The states of precarity, i.e. the four different patterns of youth transitions we identified (Gold Standard, Insecure Middle, Male Working-Class Dividend and Feminised Precarity) yielded significant results for both the likeliness to vote and the reasons for abstention. Young people of the Gold Standard pattern had the least experiences of precariousness, i.e. the best psychosocial integration. Subsequently, those young people, were most likely to vote and least likely to abstain for reasons of political alienation. The Insecure Middle group was less likely to vote, but not more likely to be politically alienated than Gold Standard youth. This is insofar interesting, since this reflects the correspondence between political participation and the positions of each group in the spaces of precarity presented in Figure 8 and Figure 9 on page 147-148: the Insecure Middle clearly appears to be less integrated than the Gold Standard regarding dimensions related to social class and bourgeois values which are assumed to be most significant for voting, e.g. as civic duty (Henn and Foard 2014); on both horizontal dimensions however, we find the Insecure Middle with a tendency towards bohemian lifestyle and good mental health. While bohemian lifestyles might also be related to feelings of entitlement (Harrits 2011) the rather good mental health confirms the correlation between mental health and feelings of alienation and efficacy (Finifter 1970; DeLuca 1995; Ojeda 2015; Hassell and Settle 2017). However, the evidence suggests, that these effects are relevant mainly (or only?) from a certain level of bourgeois integration upwards, since the two remaining groups – Male Working-Class Dividend and Feminised Precarity – do not differ significantly regarding their voting behaviour. The Male Working-Class Dividend group is less likely than the aforementioned groups to vote and more likely to be politically alienated, and the Feminised Precarity group is overall least likely to vote and most likely to feel alienated. With reference to their respective positions in the space of precarity, we would however assume that the feelings of alienation among the latter are related to mental health issues or feelings of incompetence and lack of efficacy; among the Male Working-Class Dividend group abstaining from the ballot boxes is due to a lack of interest.[95] However, although adding the patterns of transition increased their explanatory power, all the models presented were of rather modest quality (see below).

[95] There might be a gender bias at work with males being more reluctant to admit ignorance or incompetence.

The findings on alienation however speak in parts to the literature on voting and values (Inglehart 2008; Blais and Rubenson 2013). While a direct comparison with respective research is not feasible due to the lack of the correct questions or variables – like alternative modes of participation or civic duty on the one hand and value scales on the other – the logistic regression models on alienation do indicate, that political efficacy is lower among young people at the bottom end of our space of precarity. Thus, we tend to rather reject Inglehart's theory of value change in its global claim but agree with the scarcity hypothesis, since the least precarious feel less alienated than young people who suffer from psycho-social disintegration.

These contrasts between groups were made visible through a Multiple Correspondence Analysis, which leads on to the exploratory research question that can be affirmed too. Applying an MCA on the experiences of precariousness yielded meaningful results and explained a relevant share of the total variance in the data. Moreover, along the relevant axes we were able to describe a three-dimensional conditioning of precariousness. Reiterating Butler's approach, the '[p]olitical orders, including economic and social institutions […] designed to address [precariousness]' (2016: 25) manifest themselves as positions on a class spectrum, a lifestyle spectrum, and a mental health spectrum, the latter correlating with gender. Notably, these axes are not cross-sectional snapshots but constituted the coordinate system of developments over time. Thus, we go somewhat beyond the originally developed synthesis of precarity and beyond Jahoda's and Bourdieu's empirical findings, since the precarity we observe here is a cumulative one, built up throughout youth. Notwithstanding the limitations of the study (see below), the concept of precarity appears viable and suitable for a political sociology of youth.

Table 22: Tabular overview of transition patterns in the space of precarity

	Gold Standard	Insecure Middle	Male WC Dividend	Fem. Precarity
Class	+	0	-	-
Lifestyle	0	+	-	0
Mental health	0	+	+	-

Legend: 0 = neutral/middle; Class + = bourgeoisie, - = working-class. Lifestyle + = bohemian, - = conservative. Mental health: + = good, - = bad.

While we argued in chapter 2 that our reading of Bourdieu puts more emphasis on the habitus formation than on an exploration of the field(s) as such, our findings about the space of precarity allude to the multitudes of fields which ultimately constitute the space constructed above. This way, we can understand the significance of class – with reference to the manifest variables which

contributed most to the LCAs – as an indication for the significance of the field of schooling and education, whereas lifestyles here are rather related the familial field and mental health not least to a field of peer relations and social life outside the family more generally. Nevertheless, the overall significance of the primary axis explaining the most of the variance in the MCA, i.e. *across* fields, makes an implicit point for the importance of transition studies (MacDonald et al. 2001) and for the relevance of class for the understanding of youth altogether (France et al. 2018),

Limitations we faced

Although several data related shortcomings were already mentioned in chapter 4, one elephant in the room needs addressing here: the spatial dimension. As MacDonald et al. (2005) and several others compellingly show, place is crucial for young people's experiences *and* transitions. While the inclusion of housing tenure tried to get a glimpse of this problem by associating housing (in particular council estates) with the social environments young people grow up in, the problem goes obviously far beyond this rather rough indicator. A proper inclusion of the spatial segregation could have included several data on regional level, e.g. on (quality of) schooling, (youth) unemployment, ethnic diversity, etc. These data, included as covariates into the LCA procedures would have likely altered the findings on precariousness or, if controlled for in the regression models in chapter 6, might have yielded areas of concerted youth precarity in England (similar to Savage et al. 2013).

Similarly, turnout at the General Election 2010 in England differed hugely between 77% in the constituency of Westmorland and Lonsdale and 44% in Manchester Central.[96] Thus, controlling for (Super) Output Area, constituency, or indeed including turn-out figures for the young individuals' constituency would have improved the accuracy of the models, and, given the modest quality of the logistic regression models, the spatial differences might had also contributed significantly to the overall model fit. Furlong (2019) recently presented evidence on constituency level, that over the last ten general election voters in "left-behind" areas are increasingly deserting the Labour party for the Tory party. Although he unfortunately did not regress on participation levels and did not include interaction effects, the variables on age and distance to a university can

[96] https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/media/3746

be understood as bolstering the Flanagan et al. argument about institutional contexts but also supporting the demobilisation argument by Evans and Tilley (2017). However contrary to their argument, Labour superiority over the Conservatives was (in 2017) still high in the most deprived areas, which is rather cold comfort, since many of the precarious non-voters of 2017 might have voted for the conservatives in 2019 (Furlong 2019). However, for this research project data on individual geographical identifiers was not accessible due to data protection regulations but could be envisaged in a follow up project.[97]

Then of course, given the constraints of using secondary data, the operationalisation is far from perfect and could have included more sophisticated indicators. As mentioned in chapter 4, the data deployed for this analysis was not collected for this kind of research. Instead, the LSYPE was designed for policy purposes in the fields of education and employment and thus suffers implicitly from the normativity of the education-to-employment approach to young people's lifeworlds, which is not surprising given its funding by the respective ministries. However, more recent studies like the Millennium Cohort Study look promising to provide better data for the assessment of psychosocial integration, as first results on mental health and social inequality indicate.[98] One special problem of lacking data concerns various context variables about the household composition and the socio-economic environments young people grow up in. While alternative class approaches (Atkinson and Rosenlund 2014) were tested, the lack of or inaccuracy of the available data impeded a further investigation thereinto. Of special interest in this regard had been data on savings or the value of the families' property.

In addition, the limited computational and software resources did not allow for some analyses which would have complemented the research. Firstly, using LCA on longitudinal data obviously suggests the application of Latent Transition Modelling instead of (plain vanilla) Repeated Measure LCA (Collins and Lanza 2010: 181). This would have had contributed to the analysis significantly regarding the question of trajectories between states but also regarding the change of the composition of the respective states between waves and had thus offered an even more

[97] Accessing this kind of micro data would have required an ESRC approved project with an ESRC accredited principal investigator.

[98] https://cls.ucl.ac.uk/poor-mental-health-is-more-prevalent-among-teenage-girls-from-poorer-backgrounds-new-findings-show/

sound and robust analysis. Secondly, while the chosen approach of a two-stage LCA was defended in chapter 4, a second-order LCA as suggested by Rijmen (2013) could have provided additional robustness checks for the RMLCA solution identified.

Lastly, this study operated on a highly aggregated level. Thus, the picture of young people in England 2004-2010 painted here is a rather expressionistic one, with broad brush and strong colours. For a more adequate depiction this study would have been supplemented with timely qualitative insights, which was of course not possible since the data collection was completed in 2010. Nevertheless, a harmonisation of longitudinal survey data with qualitative data of the same sample would be a fascinating opportunity to gain a more comprehensive picture of young people's lifeworlds.

Questions we'll keep asking

This thesis is a starting point and whereas the research undertaken here has its limitations, it opens up questions which ask for further investigation. Throughout it, this research tried was critical of the literature, in the Kantian sense, i.e. questioning its relevance and significance in order to push the frontiers of knowledge. Thus, the eclectic theoretical basis; thence, the unconventional methodological approach. However, this research does also address the ongoing debates in the field by arguing for a thorough integration of culture *and* transition approaches on the grounds of a serious engagement with the classification struggles of youth and the temporality thereof. The application of GDA methods on longitudinal data seems a useful approach to address the former problem; the latter, more conceptual problem shall guide future research.

One key to the understanding of precarity is the lack or failing of welfare state institutions which was found to be conditional of young people's class and background. Wacquant emphasises that neoliberalism aims at 'remaking the nexus of market, state, and *citizenship* from above.' (2010: 213) Since the UK and England in particular was at the forefront of the neoliberal transformation of these institutions, a comparison of welfare regimes or, following Roberts and Antonucci (2018), 'welfare mixes' could yield important insights into the correspondence between welfare states and the development of civic adulthood.

In the UK, the stereotypical right-wing populist voter is usually considered an old "Gammon".[99] But 30 years after the iron curtain came down, an excursus to East Germany is insightful (although frightful): at the latest state election in Saxony, a majority of young people, born after 1989, voted for the far-right party "Alternative for Germany"[100] and we find similar evidence all across Europe where right-wing populists grope particularly young people (Bartlett et al. 2012). Their appeal to them is not least founded on variations over the exclusion and integration theme: young people's experience of exclusion and their yearning for integration and belonging is met with a narrative of nationalist exclusionary integration around culture, ethnicity or plain racist differentiation.[101] Thus, understanding young people's precarity as a political matter, we would agree with Harrits' scepticism towards the idea of a 'widespread socialization producing a popular democratic *habitus*' (2011: 253; emphasis in original). Instead, embracing the demise of the 'citizen-as-worker'-democracy (Bessant 2004) a research program into youth precarity which puts the political meaning and relevance centre stage, could facilitate developing new ways of integration and bridging the economic- vs. civic-adulthood gap. In the research presented here, the precarious tuned out – in a lot of countries they have already turned right.

Although the empirical basis of this thesis comes to a close at age 20, the immediate future of the participants of this study is of paramount interest and importance. Almost half of the population in the analysed data attended university as full-time students at age 20 (see Table 16). However, in a hegemonic qualification narrative focussing on enrolment numbers, differentiations within (and partly produced by) higher education are often obscured. Expanding the notion of precarity onto this field could add to research into inequalities in the higher education experience, e.g. by Crozier et al. (2008a) or Roberts and Li (2017).

Finally, while there are no simple policy recommendations to be drawn from the present research, we would agree with Thoits (2010) who argues for targeted mental health support for children 'who are at long-term health risk due to early exposure to poverty, inadequate schools, and stressful family circumstances' (ibid.: 47), adding that a special focus should be given to girls and

[99] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/gammon-left-wing-political-insult-twitter-racism-debate-right-charles-dickens-a8352281.html

[100] https://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Wahlen/Grafiken_zu_aktuellen_Wahlen/Wahlen_2019/Sachsen_2019/

[101] In a sad irony, this reflects the FES study about 'Abgehängtes Prekariat' cited in chapter 1.

young women. While there appears to be some acknowledgement of a mental health crisis in Britain, the implications of the last decade in British politics is yet to be fully understood. The 1990 birth cohort, which this research is about, came of age during New Labour and mostly entered the labour market in the post-2008 years of austerity under the coalition and Tory governments. The participants of the Millennium Cohort Study in turn lived their formative years of 16 to 20 in the Brexit limbo. The fact that they had no say in this decision (since they were not eligible to vote at the time of the referendum) but will be struck the hardest by the negative consequences of it when they start entering the labour market, leads to a second policy recommendation, namely a lowering of the voting age. Combining the findings by van Deth (2016) and Bhatti and Hansen (2012), enfranchising young people earlier might help making them habitual voters. Evidence from Austria (Zeglovits and Zandonella 2013) and Sweden (Russo and Stattin 2017) point in a positive direction.

In the light of recent political developments, this thesis might appear dated at the time of publishing, regarding the main research question of abstention and voting. Even so, the three major findings persist: firstly, a psychosocial understanding of precarity and its inherently political character, that is, secondly, a substantial contribution for youth research and which can, thirdly, highlight the political dimension of youth transition research. If we understand youth as a time of position taking, we need a conversation about the symbolic violence young people are subjected to. One hundred years ago, women fought for and achieved universal suffrage against a “God-given” or “natural” order. Political equality today needs to pick up the fight against a disenfranchising social order.

References

Abbott, A. (1995). Sequence Analysis: New Methods for Old Ideas. *Annual Review of Sociology* 21: 93–113.

Amnå, E. (2012). How is civic engagement developed over time? Emerging answers from a multidisciplinary field. *Journal of adolescence* 35(3): 611–627. doi: 10.1016/j.adolescence.2012.04.011.

Amnå, E. & Ekman, J. (2013). Standby citizens: diverse faces of political passivity. *European Political Science Review* 6(2): 261–281. doi: 10.1017/S175577391300009X.

Aneshensel, C.S. (1992). Social Stress: Theory and Research. *Annual Review of Sociology* 18: 15–38.

Antonucci, L., Hamilton, M. & Roberts, S. (2014a). Constructing a Theory of Youth and Social Policy. In L. Antonucci, M. Hamilton & S. Roberts (eds), *Young People and Social Policy in Europe: Dealing with Risk, Inequality and Precarity in Times of Crisis*, pp. 13–34. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Antonucci, L., Hamilton, M. & Roberts, S. (eds) (2014b). *Young people and social policy in Europe: Dealing with risk, inequality and precarity in times of crisis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Arnett, J.J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. *American Psychologist* 55(5): 469–480. doi: 10.1037//0003-066X.55.5.469.

Arnett, J.J. (2006). Emerging Adulthood in Europe: A Response to Bynner. *Journal of Youth Studies* 9(1): 111–123. doi: 10.1080/13676260500523671.

Atkinson, W. (2010a). Class, Individualisation and Perceived (Dis)advantages: Not Either/Or but Both/And? *Sociological Research Online* 15(4). doi: 10.5153/sro.2214.

Atkinson, W. (2010b). *Class, individualization and late modernity: In search of the reflexive worker / Will Atkinson*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Atkinson, W. (2016). *Beyond Bourdieu: From genetic structuralism to relational phenomenology*. Cambridge UK, Malden MA: Polity Press.

Atkinson, W. (2017). *Class in the new millennium: The structure, homologies and experience of the Britain social space*. London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Atkinson, W. & Rosenlund, L. (2014). Mapping the British Social Space: Towards a Bourdieusian Class Scheme.

Avis, J. (2014). Beyond NEET: Precariousness, ideology and social justice - the 99%. *Power and Education* 6(1): 61. doi: 10.2304/power.2014.6.1.61.

Bacher, J., Pöge, A. & Wenzig, K. (2010). *Clusteranalyse: Anwendungsorientierte Einführung in Klassifikationsverfahren*. München: Oldenbourg.

Backhaus, K. et al. (2008). *Multivariate Analysemethoden: Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung*. Berlin: Springer.

Banks, M.H. & Ullah, P. (1987). Political attitudes and voting among unemployed and employed youth. *Journal of adolescence* 10(2): 201–216. doi: 10.1016/S0140-1971(87)80088-X.

Barbier, J.-C. (2002). A Survey of the Use of the Term précarité in French Economics and Sociology. Centre d'études de l'emploi.

Barth, A. & Schmitz, A. (2018). Response quality and ideological dispositions: an integrative approach using geometric and classifying techniques. *Quality & Quantity* 52(1): 175–194. doi: 10.1007/s11135-016-0458-3.

Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J. & Littler, M. (2012). *The new face of digital populism.* London: Demos.

Beck, U. (1983). Jenseits von Stand und Klasse?: Soziale Ungleichheiten, gesellschaftliche Individualisierungsprozesse und die Entstehung neuer sozialer Formationen und Identitäten. *Soziale Welt, Sonderband* (Nr. 2): 35–74.

Beck, U. (1986). *Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Beck, U. (1990). Ein Deutschland der Ungleichzeitigkeiten. *taz. die tageszeitung* (3294): 92–95.

Beck, U. (1992). *Risk society: Towards a new modernity / Ulrich Beck ; translated by Mark Ritter.* London: SAGE.

Beck, U. (1997). *The reinvention of politics: Rethinking modernity in the global social order / Ulrich Beck ; translated by Mark Ritter.* Cambridge: Polity.

Beck, U. & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2001). *Individualization: Institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences / Ulrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim.* London: SAGE.

Bessant, J. (2004). Mixed messages: Youth participation and democratic practice. *Australian Journal of Political Science* 39(2): 387–404. doi: 10.1080/1036114042000238573.

Bessant, J. (2018). Young precariat and a new work order? A case for historical sociology. *Journal of Youth Studies* 21(6): 780–798. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2017.1420762.

Bessant, J., Pickard, S. & Watts, R. (2019). Translating Bourdieu into youth studies. *Journal of Youth Studies* 6(2): 1–17. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2019.1702633.

Bhatti, Y. & Hansen, K.M. (2012). Leaving the Nest and the Social Act of Voting: Turnout among First-Time Voters. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 22(4): 380–406. doi: 10.1080/17457289.2012.721375.

Blais, A. & Rubenson, D. (2013). The Source of Turnout Decline. *Comparative Political Studies* 46(1): 95–117. doi: 10.1177/0010414012453032.

Bonikowski, B. (2015). The promise of Bourdieusian political sociology. *Theory and Society* 44(4): 385–391. doi: 10.1007/s11186-015-9246-7.

Bottero, W. & Crossley, N. (2011). Worlds, Fields and Networks: Becker, Bourdieu and the Structures of Social Relations. *Cultural Sociology* 5(1): 99–119. doi: 10.1177/1749975510389726.

Bottomore, T. (1979). *Political sociology.* London: Hutchinson.

Boulianne, S. (2015). Social media use and participation: a meta-analysis of current research. *Information, Communication & Society* 18(5): 524–538. doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2015.1008542.

Bourdieu, P. (1976). Systems of education and systems of thought. In R. Dale, G. Esland & M. MacDonald (eds), *Schooling and capitalism: A sociological reader*, pp. 192–200. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, in association with the Open University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1979). *Algeria 1960: The disenchantment of the world : the sense of honour : the Kabyle house or the world reversed : essays*. Cambridge [England], New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1985). The social space and the genesis of groups. *Theory and Society* 14(6). doi: 10.1007/BF00174048.

Bourdieu, P. (1987). What Makes a Social Class? On The Theoretical and Practical Existence Of Groups. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 32: 1–17. doi: 10.2307/41035356.

Bourdieu, P. (1989). Social Space and Symbolic Power. *Sociological Theory* 7(1): 14–25. doi: 10.2307/202060.

Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The logic of practice*. Cambridge: Polity.

Bourdieu, P. (1991). Genesis and structure of the religious field. *Comparative Social Research* 13: 1–44.

Bourdieu, P. et al. (1991). *Soziologie als Beruf: Wissenschaftstheoretische Voraussetzungen soziologischer Erkenntnis*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Bourdieu, P. (1993). *Sociology in question*. London, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE.

Bourdieu, P. (1998). *Acts of resistance: Against the tyranny of the market*. New York: New Press; Distributed by Norton.

Bourdieu, P. (2000). *Pascalian meditations*. Cambridge: Polity.

Bourdieu, P. (2001). *Masculine domination*. Stanford, Calif., Great Britain: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (2003). *Firing back: Against the tyranny of the market 2*. New York: New Press.

Bourdieu, P. (2005). *The social structures of the economy*. Cambridge, UK, Malden, MA: Polity.

Bourdieu, P. (2008). *The bachelors' ball: The crisis of peasant society in Béarn*. Cambridge: Polity.

Bourdieu, P. (2010[1984]). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste / Pierre Bourdieu ; translated by Richard Nice, with a new introduction by Tony Bennett*. London: Routledge.

Bourdieu, P. (2011[1986]). The forms of capital. *Cultural theory: An anthology* 1: 81–93.

Bourdieu, P. (2014). *On the state: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1989-1992*. Cambridge: Polity.

Bourdieu, P., Accardo, A. & Ferguson, P.P. (1999). *The weight of the world: Social suffering in contemporary society*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, J.C. (1990). *Reproduction in education, society and culture*. London: SAGE.

Bradley, H. & Ingram, N. (2012). Banking on the future: choices, aspirations and economic hardship in working-class student experience. In W. Atkinson, S. Roberts & M. Savage (eds), *Class inequality in austerity Britain: Power, difference and suffering / edited by Will Atkinson,*

Steven Roberts and Mike Savage. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brady, H.E., Verba, S. & Schlozman, K.L. (1995). Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation. *American Political Science Review* 89(02): 271–294. doi: 10.2307/2082425.

Brannen, J. & Nilsen, A. (2002). Young People's Time Perspectives: From Youth to Adulthood. *Sociology* 36(3): 513–537. doi: 10.1177/0038038502036003002.

Breman, J. (2013). A Bogus Concept? *New Left Review* 84.

Bright, N.G. (2012). A Practice of Concrete Utopia?: Informal Youth Support and the Possibility of 'Redemptive Remembering' in a UK Coal-Mining Area. *Power and Education* 4(3): 315–326. doi: 10.2304/power.2012.4.3.315.

Bröckling, U. (2002). Das unternehmerische Selbst und seine Geschlechter. *Leviathan* 30(2): 175–194. doi: 10.1007/s11578-002-0017-2.

Bröckling, U. (2007). *Das unternehmerische Selbst: Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Busch, M., Jeskow, J. & Stutz, R. (eds) (2010). *Zwischen Prekarisierung und Protest: Die Lebenslagen und Generationsbilder von Jugendlichen in Ost und West*. Bielefeld: Transcript-Verl.

Butler, J. (1997). *The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Butler, J. (2006 (2004)). *Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence / Judith Butler*. London: Verso.

Butler, J. (2016 (2009)). *Frames of war: When is life grievable?* London, New York: Verso.

Bynner, J. et al. (2002). *Young people's changing routes to independence*. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation/YPS.

Bynner, J. (2005). Rethinking the Youth Phase of the Life-course: The Case for Emerging Adulthood? *Journal of Youth Studies* 8(4): 367–384. doi: 10.1080/13676260500431628.

Campbell, A., Gurin, G. & Miller, W.E. (1953). Political Issues and the Vote: November, 1952. *The American Political Science Review* 47(2): 359–385. doi: 10.2307/1952028.

Campbell, A., Gurin, G. & Miller, W.E. (1954). *The voter decides*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Casas-Cortés, M. (2014). A Genealogy of Precarity: A Toolbox for Rearticulating Fragmented Social Realities in and out of the Workplace. *Rethinking Marxism* 26(2): 206–226. doi: 10.1080/08935696.2014.888849.

Castel, R. (2003). *From manual workers to wage laborers: Transformation of the social question / Robert Castel ; translated and edited by Richard Boyd*. New Brunswick, N.J., London: Transaction Publishers.

Chan, T.W. & Goldthorpe, J.H. (2005). The social stratification of theatre, dance and cinema attendance. *Cultural Trends* 14(3): 193–212. doi: 10.1080/09548960500436774.

Chan, T.W. & Goldthorpe, J.H. (2007a). Social Status and Newspaper Readership. *American Journal of Sociology* 112(4): 1095–1134. doi: 10.1086/508792.

Chan, T.W. & Goldthorpe, J.H. (2007b). Social stratification and cultural consumption: The visual arts in England. *Poetics* 35(2-3): 168–190. doi: 10.1016/j.poetic.2007.05.002.

Cleveland, M.J. et al. (2010). Does individual risk moderate the effect of contextual-level protective factors? A latent class analysis of substance use. *Journal of prevention & intervention in the community* 38(3): 213–228. doi: 10.1080/10852352.2010.486299.

Collins, L.M. & Lanza, S.T. (2010). *Latent class and latent transition analysis: With applications in the social behavioral, and health sciences.* Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Blackwell.

Coole, D. (2008). Butler's phenomenological existentialism. In T. Carver & S.A. Chambers (eds), *Judith Butler's precarious politics: Critical encounters / edited by Terrell Carver and Samuel A. Chambers.* London: Routledge.

Côté, J. & Bynner, J.M. (2008). Changes in the transition to adulthood in the UK and Canada: the role of structure and agency in emerging adulthood. *Journal of Youth Studies* 11(3): 251–268. doi: 10.1080/13676260801946464.

Côté, J.E. (2014). The Dangerous Myth of Emerging Adulthood: An Evidence-Based Critique of a Flawed Developmental Theory. *Applied Developmental Science* 18(4): 177–188. doi: 10.1080/10888691.2014.954451.

Craig, S.C., Niemi, R.G. & Silver, G.E. (1990). Political efficacy and trust: A report on the NES pilot study items. *Political Behavior* 12(3): 289–314. doi: 10.1007/BF00992337.

Crozier, G. et al. (2008a). Different strokes for different folks: Diverse students in diverse institutions – experiences of higher education. *Research Papers in Education* 23(2): 167–177. doi: 10.1080/02671520802048703.

Crozier, G. et al. (2008b). White middle-class parents, identities, educational choice and the urban comprehensive school: Dilemmas, ambivalence and moral ambiguity. *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 29(3): 261–272. doi: 10.1080/01425690801966295.

Crozier, G. & Reay, D. (2011). Capital accumulation: Working-class students learning how to learn in HE. *Teaching in Higher Education* 16(2): 145–155. doi: 10.1080/13562517.2010.515021.

Crozier, G., Reay, D. & James, D. (2011). Making it work for their children: White middle-class parents and working-class schools. *International Studies in Sociology of Education* 21(3): 199–216. doi: 10.1080/09620214.2011.616343.

Davier, M. von & Rost, J. (1996). Die Erfassung transsituativer Copingstile durch Stimulus-Response Inventare. *Diagnostica* 92(4): 313–332.

DeLuca, T. (1995). *The two faces of political apathy.* Philadelphia,N. Y.: Temple University Press.

Derobertis, E.M. (2016). Charlotte Bühler's Existential-Humanistic Contributions to Child and Adolescent Psychology. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 46(1): 48–76. doi: 10.1177/0022167805277116.

Dörre, K. (2010). Génération Précaire - ein europäisches Phänomen? In M. Busch, J. Jeskow & R. Stutz (eds), *Zwischen Prekarisierung und Protest: Die Lebenslagen und Generationsbilder von Jugendlichen in Ost und West*, pp. 39–74. Bielefeld: Transcript-Verl.

Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. *Journal of Political Economy* 65(2): 135–150.

Eder, K. (2013). Der Klassenhabitus in Abgrenzung zum Klassenbewusstsein bei Karl Marx. In A. Lenger, C. Schneickert & F. Schumacher (eds), *Pierre Bourdieus Konzeption des Habitus*, pp. 57–73. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.

Evans, G. & Tilley, J. (2017). *The New Politics of Class*. Oxford University Press.

Evans-Polce, R., Lanza, S.T. & Maggs, J. (2016). Heterogeneity of alcohol, tobacco, and other substance use behaviors in U.S. college students: A latent class analysis. *Addictive behaviors* 53: 80–85. doi: 10.1016/j.addbeh.2015.10.010.

Fenton, S. & Dermott, E. (2006). Fragmented careers?: Winners and losers in young adult labour markets. *Work, Employment & Society* 20(2): 205–221. doi: 10.1177/0950017006064111.

Finifter, A.W. (1970). Dimensions of Political Alienation. *American Political Science Review* 64(02): 389–410. doi: 10.2307/1953840.

Finkel, S.E. (1985). Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science* 29(4): 891. doi: 10.2307/2111186.

Flanagan, C.A. et al. (2011). Political Incorporation and the Protracted Transition to Adulthood: The Need for New Institutional Inventions. *Parliamentary Affairs* 65(1): 29–46. doi: 10.1093/pa/gsr044.

Flanagan, C.A. & Levine, P. (2010). Civic Engagement and the Transition to Adulthood. *The Future of Children* 20(1): 159–179. doi: 10.1353/foc.0.0043.

Flemmen, M. (2014). The Politics of the Service Class. *European Societies* 16(4): 543–569. doi: 10.1080/14616696.2013.817597.

Flemmen, M.P. & Haakestad, H. (2018). Class and politics in twenty-first century Norway: a homology of positions and position-taking. *European Societies* 20(3): 401–423. doi: 10.1080/14616696.2017.1371318.

Foucault, M. (1971). *Madness and civilization*. S.l.: Tavistock.

Fox, E. (2014). Bourdieu's Relational View of Interactions: A Reply to Bottero and Crossley. *Cultural Sociology* 8(2): 204–211. doi: 10.1177/1749975513507242.

France, A. & Roberts, S. (2015). The problem of social generations: a critique of the new emerging orthodoxy in youth studies. *Journal of Youth Studies* 18(2): 215–230. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2014.944122.

France, A., Roberts, S. & Wood, B. (2018). Youth, social class and privilege in the antipodes: Towards a new research agenda for youth sociology. *Journal of Sociology* 54(3): 362–380. doi: 10.1177/1440783318786580.

Fryer, D. (1986). The social psychology of the invisible: An interview with Marie Jahoda. *New Ideas in Psychology* 4(1): 107–118. doi: 10.1016/0732-118X(86)90063-2.

Fryer, D. (1998). The simultaneity of the unsimultaneous: A conversation between Marie Jahoda and David Fryer. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology* 8(2): 89–100. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1298(199803/04)8:2<89::AID-CASP460>3.0.CO;2-7.

Fuchs-Heinritz, W. & König, A. (2005). *Pierre Bourdieu: Eine Einführung.* Stuttgart: UTB GmbH.

Furlong, A. & Cartmel, F. (2011). Social Change and Political Engagement Among Young People: Generation and the 2009/2010 British Election Survey. *Parliamentary Affairs* 65(1): 13–28. doi: 10.1093/pa/gsr045.

Furlong, A., Woodman, D. & Wyn, J. (2011). Changing times, changing perspectives: Reconciling 'transition' and 'cultural' perspectives on youth and young adulthood. *Journal of Sociology* 47(4): 355–370. doi: 10.1177/1440783311420787.

Furlong, J. (2019). The changing electoral geography of England and Wales: Varieties of "left-behindedness". *Political Geography* 75: 102061. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102061.

Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. (2005). Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. Available online at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/

Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age.* Cambridge: Polity.

Giddens, A. (1994). *Beyond left and right: The future of radical politics / Anthony Giddens.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Goodman, L.A. (2016). On the Assignment of Individuals to Latent Classes. *Sociological Methodology* 37(1): 1–22. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9531.2007.00184.x.

Grasso, M.T. (2014). Age, period and cohort analysis in a comparative context: Political generations and political participation repertoires in Western Europe. *Electoral Studies* 33: 63–76. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.003.

Groh-Samberg, O. (2006). Arbeitermilieus in der Ära der Deindustrialisierung. In H. Bremer & A. Lange-Vester (eds), *Soziale Milieus und Wandel der Sozialstruktur: Die gesellschaftlichen Herausforderungen und die Strategien der sozialen Gruppen*, pp. 237–261. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Hacket, C. (2004). Young people and Political Participation. In J. Roche (ed.), *Youth in society: Contemporary theory, policy and practice / edited by Jeremy Roche … [et al.]*, pp. 74–80. London: SAGE.

Haller, M. (2007). Kritik oder Rechtfertigung sozialer Ungleichheit? Die deutsche 'Sozialstrukturideologie' vom Ende der Klassengesellschaft in historischer und vergleichender Perspektive. Eine wissenssoziologische Analyse. In G. Nollmann (ed.), *Sozialstruktur und Gesellschaftsanalyse: Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung zwischen Daten, Methoden und Begriffen*, pp. 107–159. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Harrits, G.S. et al. (2010). Class and Politics in Denmark: Are Both Old and New Politics Structured by Class? *Scandinavian Political Studies* 33(1): 1–27. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9477.2008.00232.x.

Harrits, G.S. (2011). Political power as symbolic capital and symbolic violence. *Journal of Political Power* 4(2): 237–258. doi: 10.1080/2158379X.2011.589178.

Harrits, G.S. (2013). Class, Culture and Politics: On the Relevance of a Bourdieusian Concept of Class in Political Sociology. *The Sociological Review* 61(1): 172–202. doi: 10.1111/1467-954X.12009.

Hassell, H.J.G. & Settle, J.E. (2017). The Differential Effects of Stress on Voter Turnout. *Political Psychology* 38(3): 533–550. doi: 10.1111/pops.12344.

Henn, M. & Foard, N. (2014). Social differentiation in young people's political participation: The impact of social and educational factors on youth political engagement in Britain. *Journal of Youth Studies* 17(3): 360–380. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2013.830704.

Henn, M. & Weinstein, M. (2006). Young people and political (in)activism: Why don't young people vote? *Policy & Politics* 34(3): 517–534. doi: 10.1332/030557306777695316.

Henn, M., Weinstein, M. & Forrest, S. (2005). Uninterested Youth?: Young People's Attitudes towards Party Politics in Britain. *Political Studies* 53(3): 556–578. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00544.x.

Hill, K.Q., Leighley, J.E. & Hinton-Andersson, A. (1995). Lower-Class Mobilization and Policy Linkage in the U.S. States. *American Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 75–86. doi: 10.2307/2111758.

Hjellbrekke, J. (2019). *Multiple correspondence analysis for the social sciences.* London, New York: Routledge.

Holbein, J.B. (2017). Childhood Skill Development and Adult Political Participation. *American Political Science Review* 111(3): 572–583. doi: 10.1017/S0003055417000119.

Husserl, E. (1928). *Edmund Husserls Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Herausgegeben von Martin Heidegger.*

Hybels, C.F. et al. (2009). Profiles of depressive symptoms in older adults diagnosed with major depression: latent cluster analysis. *The American journal of geriatric psychiatry : official journal of the American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry* 17(5): 387–396. doi: 10.1097/JGP.0b013e31819431ff.

Inglehart, R.F. (2008). Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006. *West European Politics* 31(1-2): 130–146. doi: 10.1080/01402380701834747.

Jahoda, M. (1958). *Current concepts of positive mental health.* New York: Basic Books.

Jahoda, M. et al. (1972). *Marienthal: The sociography of an unemployed community.* Translation from the German by the authors with John Reginall and Thomas Elsaesser. London: Tavistock Publications.

Jahoda, M. (1977). *Freud and the dilemmas of psychology.* London: Hogarth Press.

Jahoda, M. (1982). *Employment and unemployment: A social-psychological analysis.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jahoda, M. (1989). Why a non-reductionist social psychology is almost too difficult to be tackled but too fascinating to be left alone. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 28(1): 71–78. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1989.tb00847.x.

Jahoda, M. (2017 [1932]). *Lebensgeschichtliche Protokolle der arbeitenden Klasse 1850-1930: Dissertation 1932.* Innsbruck: Studien Verlag.

Jahoda, M., Lazarsfeld, P.F. & Zeisel, H. (1975). *Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal: Ein soziographischer Versuch über die Wirkungen langandauernder Arbeitslosigkeit.* Suhrkamp Verlag.

Jahoda, M. & Warren, N. (1965). The Myths of Youth. *Sociology of Education* 38(2): 138. doi: 10.2307/2112196.

Jarness, V., Flemmen, M.P. & Rosenlund, L. (2019). From Class Politics to Classed Politics. *Sociology* 20(3): 003803851983874. doi: 10.1177/0038038519838740.

Jones, G. (2009). *Youth.* Cambridge: Polity.

Jørgensen, M.B. (2016). Precariat - What it Is and Isnt - Towards an Understanding of What it Does. *Critical Sociology* 42(7-8): 959–974. doi: 10.1177/0896920515608925.

Kalleberg, A.L. (2009). Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in Transition. *American Sociological Review* 74(1): 1–22. doi: 10.1177/000312240907400101.

Karlson, K.B., Holm, A. & Breen, R. (2012). Comparing Regression Coefficients Between Same-sample Nested Models Using Logit and Probit. *Sociological Methodology* 42(1): 286–313. doi: 10.1177/0081175012444861.

Keere, K. de (2018). Political distinction: searching for a structural similarity between class and politics in Flanders (Belgium). *European Societies* 20(3): 375–400. doi: 10.1080/14616696.2017.1371320.

King, G. et al. (2001). Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation. *American Political Science Review* 95(1): 49–69.

Korupp, S.E., Ganzeboom, H.B.G. & van der Lippe, T. (2002). Do Mothers Matter? A Comparison of Models of the Influence of Mothers' and Fathers' Educational and Occupational Status on Children's Educational Attainment. *Quality & Quantity* 36(1): 17–42. doi: 10.1023/A:1014393223522.

Krais, B. & Gebauer, G. (2002). *Habitus.* Bielefeld: Transcript.

Kranebitter, A. & Reinprecht, C. (2018). Marxism underground. Latent Marxism in Austrian empirical sociology. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 43(3): 219–229. doi: 10.1007/s11614-018-0314-x.

Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin* 108(3): 480–498. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480.

Lanza, S.T. & Bray, B.C. (2010). Transitions in Drug Use among High-Risk Women: An Application of Latent Class and Latent Transition Analysis. *Advances and applications in statistical sciences* 3(2): 203–235.

Lanza, S.T., Flaherty, B.P. & Collins, L.M. (2003). Latent Class Analysis and Latent Transition Analysis. In J.A. Schinka, W.F. Velicer & I.B. Weiner (eds), *Research methods in psychology*, pp. 663–685. New York, Great Britain: Wiley.

Lanza, S.T., Patrick, M.E. & Maggs, J. (2010). Latent Transition Analysis: Benefits of a Latent Variable Approach to Modeling Transitions in Substance Use. *Journal of drug issues* 40(1): 93–120.

Lazarsfeld, P.F. (1944). The Election Is Over. *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 8(3): 317–330.

Lazarsfeld, P.F. (1955). Recent Developments in Latent Structure Analysis. *Sociometry* 18(4): 391. doi: 10.2307/2785875.

Lazarsfeld, P.F., Berelson, B.R. & Gaudet, H. (1993 [1948]). *The people's choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign.* Ann Arbor (Mich.): U.M.I.

Le Roux, B. & Rouanet, H. (2005). *Geometric Data Analysis: From Correspondence Analysis to Structured Data Analysis.* Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.

Le Roux, B. & Rouanet, H. (2010). *Multiple correspondence analysis.* Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications.

Leighley, J.E. & Nagler, J. (1992). Socioeconomic Class Bias in Turnout, 1964–1988: The Voters Remain the Same. *American Political Science Review* 86(03): 725–736. doi: 10.2307/1964134.

Leighley, J.E. & Nagler, J. (2007). Unions, Voter Turnout, and Class Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1964–2004. *The Journal of Politics* 69(2): 430–441. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00541.x.

Leighley, J.E. & Nagler, J. (2014). *Who votes now?: Demographics, issues, inequality, and turnout in the United States / Jan E. Leighley, Jonathan Nagler.* Princeton, New Jersey, Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Levine, A., Sober, E. & Wright, E.O. (1987). Marxism and Methodological Individualism. *New Left Review* I/162.

Levitas, R. (2000). *The inclusive society?: Social exclusion and New Labour.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Linzer, D.A. & Lewis, J.B. (2011). poLCA : An R Package for Polytomous Variable Latent Class Analysis. *Journal of Statistical Software* 42(10). doi: 10.18637/jss.v042.i10.

Lipset, S.M. (1983[1959]). *Political man: The social bases of politics.* London: Heinemann.

Lipset, S.M. & Rokkan, S. (eds) (1967). *Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives.* Free Press.

Lipset, S.M. & Rokkan, S. (1990). Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignment. In P. Mair (ed.), *The West European party system*, pp. 91–138. Oxford [England], New York: Oxford University Press.

Loader, B.D., Vromen, A. & Xenos, M.A. (2014). The networked young citizen: Social media, political participation and civic engagement. *Information, Communication & Society* 17(2): 143–150. doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2013.871571.

Loader, B.D., Vromen, A. & Xenos, M.A. (2016). Performing for the young networked citizen?: Celebrity politics, social networking and the political engagement of young people. *Media, Culture & Society* 38(3): 400–419. doi: 10.1177/0163443715608261.

Lorey, I. (2015). *State of insecurity: Government of the precarious.* London, New York: Verso.

MacDonald, R. et al. (2001). Snakes & Ladders: In Defence of Studies of Youth Transition. *Sociological Research Online* 5(4): 1–13. doi: 10.5153/sro.552.

MacDonald, R. et al. (2005). Growing Up in Poor Neighbourhoods. *Sociology* 39(5): 873–891. doi: 10.1177/0038038505058370.

MacDonald, R. & Marsh, J. (2000). Employment, Unemployment and Social Polarization: Young People and Cyclical Transitions. *The Sociological Review* 47(2_suppl): 120–140. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-954X.1999.tb03498.x.

Mannheim, K. (1928). Das Problem der Generationen. *Kölner Vierteljahreshefter für Soziologie* (7).

Marchart, O. (2013). *Die Prekarisierungsgesellschaft: Prekäre Proteste ; Politik und Ökonomie im Zeichen der Prekarisierung*. Bielefeld: Transcript-Verlag.

Marsh, D., O'Toole, T. & Jones, S. (2007). *Young people and politics in the UK: Apathy or alienation? / David Marsh, Therese O' Toole, and Su Jones*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Marshall, T.H. (1950). *Citizenship and social class, and other essays*. Cambridge U.P.

Martelli, A. & Pitti, I. (2015). Searching for adulthood: young people, citizenship and participation. SocietàMutamentoPolitica, Vol 5, N° 10 (2014): Youth for What? New Generations and Social Change / SocietàMutamentoPolitica, Vol 5, N° 10 (2014): Youth for What? New Generations and Social Change. doi: 10.13128/SMP-15411.

Mattila, M. & Rapeli, L. (2017). Just sick of it?: Health and political trust in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 39(6): 1490. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12218.

Mckenzie, L. (2015). *Getting by: Estates, class and culture in austerity Britain*. Bristol: The Policy Press.

Melo, D.F. & Stockemer, D. (2014). Age and political participation in Germany, France and the UK: A comparative analysis. *Comparative European Politics* 12(1): 33–53. doi: 10.1057/cep.2012.31.

Müller-Hilmer, R. (2006). Gesellschaft im Reformprozess: Umfrage im Auftrag der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Mycock, A. & Tonge, J. (eds) (2014). *Beyond the Youth Citizenship Commission: Young people and politics*. [London]: Political Studies Association.

Nash, R. (2010). Bourdieu, 'Habitus', and Educational Research: Is it all worth the candle? *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 20(2): 175–187. doi: 10.1080/01425699995399.

Neilson, B. & Rossiter, N. (2008). Precarity as a Political Concept, or, Fordism as Exception. *Theory, Culture & Society* 25(7-8): 51–72. doi: 10.1177/0263276408097796.

Nentwich, J.C., Ozbilgin, M.F. & Tatli, A. (2014). Change agency as performance and embeddedness: Exploring the possibilities and limits of Butler and Bourdieu. *Culture and Organization* 21(3): 235–250. doi: 10.1080/14759551.2013.851080.

Niemi, R.G., Craig, S.C. & Mattei, F. (1991). Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study. *The American Political Science Review* 85(4): 1407. doi: 10.2307/1963953.

Ojeda, C. (2015). Depression and Political Participation. *Social science quarterly* 96(5): 1226–1243. doi: 10.1111/ssqu.12173.

O'Toole, T. (2015). Beyond Crisis Narratives:Changing Modes and Repertoires of Political Participation Among Young People. In K. Kallio, S. Mills & T. Skelton (eds), *Politics, Citizenship and Rights*, pp. 1–15. Singapore: Springer Singapore.

O'Toole, T. & Gale, R. (2010). Contemporary grammars of political action among ethnic minority young activists. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(1): 126–143. doi: 10.1080/01419870903118122.

O'Toole, T., Marsh, D. & Jones, S. (2003). Political Literacy Cuts Both Ways: The Politics of Non-participation among Young People. *The Political Quarterly* 74(3): 349–360. doi: 10.1111/1467-923X.00544.

Özbilgin, M. & Vassilopoulou, J. (2018). Relational Methods in Organization Studies: A Critical Overview. In M. Ciesielska & D. Jemielniak (eds), *Qualitative Methodologies in Organization Studies: Volume II: Methods and Possibilities*, pp. 151–177. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Palmer, B.D. (2013). Reconsiderations of class: Precariousness as proletarianization. *Socialist Register* 50(50).

Parker, I. (2015). Dilemmas of psychoanalysis and psychology: critical conceptions of subjectivity in the work of Marie Jahoda. *South African Journal of Psychology* 45(2): 147–154. doi: 10.1177/0081246314543057.

Pelizzari, A. (2007). Verunsicherung und Klassenlage: Anmerkungen im Anschluss an die Prekarisierungsforschung von Pierre Bourdieu. In R. Klautke (ed.), *Prekarität, Neoliberalismus, Deregulierung: Beiträge des "Kritischen Bewegungsdiskurses"*, pp. 62–78. Hamburg: VSA-Verl.

Phelps, E. (2012). Understanding Electoral Turnout Among British Young People: A Review of the Literature. *Parliamentary Affairs* 65(1): 281–299. doi: 10.1093/pa/gsr056.

Piketty, T. (1995). Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110(3): 551–584. doi: 10.2307/2946692.

Piketty, T. (1998). Self-fulfilling beliefs about social status. *Journal of Public Economics* 70(1): 115–132. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00063-2.

Pitkin, H.F. (1972). *The concept of representation.* Berkeley, London: University of California Press.

Portes, A. (1998). Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology* 24: 1–24.

Precarias a la deriva (2004). Adrift through the circuits of feminized precarious work. Available online at: http://eipcp.net/transversal/0704/precarias1/en

Puar, J. et al. (2012). Precarity Talk: A Virtual Roundtable with Lauren Berlant, Judith Butler, Bojana Cvejić, Isabell Lorey, Jasbir Puar, and Ana Vujanović. *TDR: The Drama Review* 56(4): 163–177.

Putnam, R.D. (1995). Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. *Journal of Democracy* 6(1): 65–78. doi: 10.1353/jod.1995.0002.

Rademacher, C. (2001). Geschlechterrevolution — rein symbolisch? In C. Rademacher & P. Wiechens (eds), *Geschlecht -- Ethnizität -- Klasse*, pp. 31–51. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Reay, D. (2005). Beyond Consciousness? *Sociology* 39(5): 911–928. doi: 10.1177/0038038505058372.

Reay, D. (2012). 'We never get a fair chance': Working-Class Experiences of Education in the Twenty-First Century. In W. Atkinson, S. Roberts & M. Savage (eds), *Class inequality in austerity Britain: Power, difference and suffering / edited by Will Atkinson, Steven Roberts and Mike Savage.* Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Reay, D. (2015). Habitus and the psychosocial: Bourdieu with feelings. *Cambridge Journal of Education* 45(1): 9–23. doi: 10.1080/0305764X.2014.990420.

Rijmen, F. (2013). The Latent Class Model as a Measurement Model for Situational Judgment Tests. *Psychologica Belgica* 51(3-4): 197. doi: 10.5334/pb-51-3-4-197.

Roberts, K. (1997). Prolonged transitions to uncertain destinations: The implications for careers guidance. *British Journal of Guidance & Counselling* 25(3): 345–360. doi: 10.1080/03069889708253813.

Roberts, K. (2013). Education to Work Transitions: How the Old Middle Went Missing and Why the New Middle Remains Elusive. *Sociological Research Online* 18(1). doi: 10.5153/sro.2650.

Roberts, S. (2010). Misrepresenting 'choice biographies'?: a reply to Woodman. *Journal of Youth Studies* 13(1): 137–149. doi: 10.1080/13676260903233720.

Roberts, S. (2011). Beyond 'NEET' and 'tidy' pathways: considering the 'missing middle' of youth transition studies. *Journal of Youth Studies* 14(1): 21–39. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2010.489604.

Roberts, S. (2012). One step forward, one step Beck: a contribution to the ongoing conceptual debate in youth studies. *Journal of Youth Studies* 15(3): 389–401. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2012.663896.

Roberts, S. & Antonucci, L. (2018). Youth Transitions, Welfare Policy and Contemporary Europe. In A. Lange et al. (eds), *Handbuch Kindheits- und Jugendsoziologie*, pp. 281–293. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.

Roberts, S. & Li, Z. (2017). Capital limits: social class, motivations for term-time job searching and the consequences of joblessness among UK university students. *Journal of Youth Studies* 20(6): 732–749. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2016.1260697.

Rothmüller, B. (2010). *Habitus, Inkorporierung und soziale Reproduktion: Eine Konfrontation der aktuellen Bildungsforschung mit der Gesellschaftstheorie Pierre Bourdieus.* Vienna: Universität Wien.

Rubin, D.B. (1976). Inference and Missing Data. *Biometrika* 63(3): 581. doi: 10.2307/2335739.

Rubin, D.B. (1987). *Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys.* Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Russo, S. & Stattin, H. (2017). Stability and Change in Youths' Political Interest. *Social Indicators Research* 132(2): 643–658. doi: 10.1007/s11205-016-1302-9.

Ryder, N.B. (1965). The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change. *American Sociological Review* 30(6): 843. doi: 10.2307/2090964.

Sartori, G. (1990). The sociology of parties: a critical review. In P. Mair (ed.), *The West European party system.* Oxford [England], New York: Oxford University Press.

Savage, M. et al. (2013). A New Model of Social Class?: Findings from the BBC's Great British Class Survey Experiment. *Sociology* 47(2): 219–250. doi: 10.1177/0038038513481128.

Schäfer, A. & Schoen, H. (2013). Mehr Demokratie, aber nur für wenige?: Der Zielkonflikt zwischen mehr Beteiligung und politischer Gleichheit. *Leviathan* 41(1): 94–120.

Schmitz, A. & Bayer, M. (2017). Strukturale Psychologie. Zum Verhältnis von Sozialraum, Habitus und Persönlichkeit. *Berliner Journal für Soziologie* 27(3-4): 455–483. doi: 10.1007/s11609-018-0364-8.

Siddiqui, N., Boliver, V. & Gorard, S. (2019). Reliability of Longitudinal Social Surveys of Access to Higher Education: The Case of Next Steps in England. *Social Inclusion* 7(1): 80. doi: 10.17645/si.v7i1.1631.

Silva, E.B. (2016a). Habitus: Beyond Sociology. *The Sociological Review* 64(1): 73–92. doi: 10.1111/1467-954X.12345.

Silva, E.B. (2016b). Unity and Fragmentation of the Habitus. *The Sociological Review* 64(1): 166–183. doi: 10.1111/1467-954X.12346.

Sloam, J. (2014a). 'The outraged young': young Europeans, civic engagement and the new media in a time of crisis. *Information, Communication & Society* 17(2): 217–231. doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2013.868019.

Sloam, J. (2014b). New Voice, Less Equal. *Comparative Political Studies* 47(5): 663–688. doi: 10.1177/0010414012453441.

Smets, K. & van Ham, C. (2013). The embarrassment of riches?: A meta-analysis of individual-level research on voter turnout. *Electoral Studies* 32(2): 344–359. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2012.12.006.

Standing, G. (2014a). *Precariat charter: From denizens to citizens*. London [u.a.]: Bloomsbury.

Standing, G. (2014b). *The precariat: The new dangerous class*. London, UK, New York, NY: Bloomsbury.

Steinmetz, G. (2006). Bourdieu's Disavowal of Lacan: Psychoanalytic Theory and the Concepts of "Habitus" and "Symbolic Capital". *Constellations* 13(4): 445–464. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8675.2006.00415.x.

Steinmetz, G. (2013). Toward Socioanalysis: The 'Traumatic' Kernel of Psychoanalysis and Neo-Bourdieusian Theory. In P.S. Gorski (ed.), *Bourdieu and historical analysis*, pp. 108–130. Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press.

Swartz, D. (2013). *Symbolic power, politics, and intellectuals: The political sociology of Pierre Bourdieu / David L. Swartz*. Chicago, Illinois, London: The University of Chicago Press.

Swartz, D.L. (2016). *Bourdieu's Concept of Field*.

Thoits, P.A. (1994). Stressors and Problem-Solving: The Individual as Psychological Activist. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 35(2): 143. doi: 10.2307/2137362.

Thoits, P.A. (2010). Stress and health: major findings and policy implications. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 51 Suppl: S41-53. doi: 10.1177/0022146510383499.

Threadgold, S. (2011). Should I pitch my tent in the middle ground? On 'middling tendency', Beck and inequality in youth sociology. *Journal of Youth Studies* 14(4): 381–393. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2010.538042.

Turner, C. (2019). Social types and sociological analysis. *History of the Human Sciences:* 0952695118807125. doi: 10.1177/0952695118807125.

Ullah, P. (1987). Unemployed black youths in a northern city. In D. Fryer & P. Ullah (eds), *Unemployed people: Social and psychological perspectives / edited by David Fryer and Philip Ullah*, pp. 111–147. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

University of London, Institute of Education & Centre for Longitudinal Studies (2012). Next Steps: Waves 1-7, 2004-2010.

Uprichard, E. (2008). Children as 'Being and Becomings': Children, Childhood and Temporality. *Children & Society* 22(4): 303–313. doi: 10.1111/j.1099-0860.2007.00110.x.

van Buuren, S. & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, K. (2011). mice : Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations in R. *Journal of Statistical Software* 45(3). doi: 10.18637/jss.v045.i03.

van der Heijden, Peter G. M., Falguerolles, A. de & de Leeuw, J. (1989). A Combined Approach to Contingency Table Analysis Using Correspondence Analysis and Log-Linear Analysis. *Applied Statistics* 38(2): 249. doi: 10.2307/2348058.

van Deth, J.W. (2009). New Modes of Participation and Norms of Citizenship. Paper prepared for delivery at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research Workshop "Professionalization and Individualized Collective Action: Analyzing New 'Participatory' Dimensions in Civil Society" Lisbon (Portugal), April 14-19 2009. Available online at: https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/c8b57aab-51d9-4aca-b65d-4510ccfc19a3.pdf

van Deth, J.W. (2016). Youth and Democracy: The Endless Story of an Awkward Relationship.: Keynote address: "Youth Political Participation: The Diverse Roads to Democracy". Montreal.

Vasilenko, S.A. et al. (2015). Patterns of adolescent sexual behavior predicting young adult sexually transmitted infections: a latent class analysis approach. *Archives of sexual behavior* 44(3): 705–715. doi: 10.1007/s10508-014-0258-6.

Verba, S. & Nie, N.H. (1987, 1972). *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality / Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie.* Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press.

Verba, S., Nie, N.H. & Kim, J.-o. (1978). *Participation and political equality: A Seven-nation Comparison.* S.l.: Cambridge University Press.

Vester, M. (2006). Die ständische Kanalisierung der Bildungschancen. In W. Georg (ed.), *Soziale Ungleichheit im Bildungssystem: Eine empirisch-theoretische Bestandsaufnahme.* Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft.

Villa, P.-I. (2011). Symbolische Gewalt und ihr potenzielles Scheitern. Eine Annäherung zwischen Butler und Bourdieu. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 36(4): 51–69. doi: 10.1007/s11614-011-0003-5.

Vromen, A. (2003). 'People Try to Put Us Down …': Participatory Citizenship of 'Generation X'. *Australian Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 79–99. doi: 10.1080/1036114032000056260.

Vromen, A. & Coleman, W. (2013). Online Campaigning Organizations and Storytelling Strategies: GetUp! in Australia. *Policy & Internet* 5(1): 76–100. doi: 10.1002/poi3.23.

Vromen, A. & Collin, P. (2010). Everyday youth participation?: Contrasting views from Australian policymakers and young people. *Young* 18(1): 97–112. doi: 10.1177/110330880901800107.

Vromen, A., Xenos, M.A. & Loader, B.D. (2014). Young people, social media and connective action: From organisational maintenance to everyday political talk. *Journal of Youth Studies* 18(1): 80–100. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2014.933198.

Wacker, A. (1998). Marie Jahoda und die Österreichische Wirtschaftspsychologische Forschungsstelle - zur Idee einer nicht-reduktionistischen Sozialpsychologie. doi: 10.23668/PSYCHARCHIVES.571.

Wacquant, L. (2010). Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity1. *Sociological Forum* 25(2): 197–220. doi: 10.1111/j.1573-7861.2010.01173.x.

Wacquant, L. & Bourdieu, P. (2005). *Pierre Bourdieu and democratic politics: The mystery of ministry*. Cambridge, UK, Malden, MA: Polity.

Weldes, J. (1989). Marxism and methodological individualism. *Theory and Society* 18(3). doi: 10.1007/BF00183387.

Wilkinson, R.G. & Pickett, K.G. (2010). *The spirit level: Why equality is better for everyone*. London: Penguin.

Willis, P.E. (1983[1977]). *Learning to labour: How working class kids get working class jobs / Paul E. Willis*. Aldershot: Gower.

Woodman, D. (2009). The mysterious case of the pervasive choice biography: Ulrich Beck, structure/agency, and the middling state of theory in the sociology of youth. *Journal of Youth Studies* 12(3): 243–256. doi: 10.1080/13676260902807227.

Woodman, D. (2010). Class, individualisation and tracing processes of inequality in a changing world: a reply to Steven Roberts. *Journal of Youth Studies* 13(6): 737–746. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2010.506533.

Wright, E.O. (2015). *Understanding class*. London, Brooklyn, NY: Verso.

Xenos, M.A., Vromen, A. & Loader, B.D. (2014). The great equalizer?: Patterns of social media use and youth political engagement in three advanced democracies. *Information, Communication & Society* 17(2): 151–167. doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2013.871318.

Zawadzki, B. & Lazarsfeld, P.F. (1935). The Psychological Consequences of Unemployment. *The Journal of Social Psychology* 6(2): 224–251. doi: 10.1080/00224545.1935.9921639.

Zeglovits, E. & Zandonella, M. (2013). Political interest of adolescents before and after lowering the voting age: The case of Austria. *Journal of Youth Studies* 16(8): 1084–1104. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2013.793785.

Annexes

List of Annex Figures

List of Annex Tables

Annex chapter 4

Annex Table 1: Variables used in wave 1 for construction of LCAs and number/share of imputed values

Wave 1			
	N	N imputed	% imputed
L1quahourYP YP: How much this matters in deciding on a job: To have a job with regular hours	8349	67	0.8%
L1nextyearYP YP: Agreement with statement about importance in future: I don't really think mu	8349	67	0.8%
L1mightyrYP YP: Agreement with statement about importance in future: doing something that I	8349	67	0.8%
W1endupYP YP: Agreement with statement about importance in future: I'll just wait and see	8227	189	2.2%
L1yys4YP YP: Feelings about school: Most of the time I don't want to go to school	8252	164	1.9%
L1yys6YP YP: Feelings about school: On the whole I like being at school	8252	164	1.9%
L1yys9YP YP: Feelings about school: I am bored in lessons	8252	164	1.9%
L1Relig5YP Attendance Relig Centre	8320	96	1.1%
L1plann16YP YP: YP's intentions after Year 11	8349	67	0.8%
L1quapromYP YP: How much this matters in deciding on a job: To have a job where I can get pr	8349	67	0.8%
L1impjobYP YP: Agreement with statement about importance in future: Having a job or career	8349	67	0.8%
L1ambitYP YP: Whether any ideas about what want to do after finishing full-time education	8349	67	0.8%
L1yys2YP YP: Feelings about school: School is a waste of time for me	8252	164	1.9%
L1yys3YP YP: Feelings about school: School work is worth doing	8252	164	1.9%
L1yys7YP YP: Feelings about school: I work as hard as I can in school	8252	164	1.9%
L1yys10YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is a waste of time	8252	164	1.9%
L1yys11YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is interesting to me	8252	164	1.9%
L1talkmumYP YP: How often talk to (step-)mother about things that matter to YP	8192	224	2.7%
L1talkdadYP YP: How often talk to (step-)father about things that matter to YP	8191	225	2.7%
L1HEPlan	8349	67	0.8%
L1squietYP YP: Frequency of misbehaviour or troublemaking in classes (by others)	8349	67	0.8%
L1snodisYP YP: How often in last year has been difficult to study or follow teacher because	8349	67	0.8%
L1impfamYP YP: Agreement with statement about importance in future: Raising a family in the	8349	67	0.8%
L1yys8YP YP: Feelings about school: In a lesson, I often count the minutes till it ends	8252	164	1.9%
L1namesYP YP: Whether have been upset by name-calling inc text or email in last 12 months	8140	276	3.3%
L1excpalYP YP: Whether have been excluded from a group of friends in last 12 months	8193	223	2.6%
L1moneyYP YP: Whether have been made to hand over money or possessions in last 12 months	8223	193	2.3%
L1thhitYP YP: Whether have been threatened with violence by students in last 12 months	8203	213	2.5%
L1achitYP YP: Whether have experienced violence from students in last 12 months	8186	230	2.7%
L1quaworkYP YP: How much this matters in deciding on a job: To be my own boss or have my ow	8349	67	0.8%
L1yys12YP YP: Feelings about school: I get good marks for my work	8252	164	1.9%
L1jobYP YP: Whether work in paid job at all during term-time	8348	68	0.8%
L1famsupYP YP: Whether receive any pocket money or allowance or support from parents or	8348	68	0.8%
L1mothdecYP YP: How true it is to say (step-)mother likes YP to make own decisions	8173	243	2.9%
L1fathdecYP YP: How true it is to say (step-)father likes YP to make own decisions	8177	239	2.8%
L1talkschYP YP: How often parents talk to YP about day at school	8218	198	2.4%
L1quahelpYP YP: How much this matters in deciding on a job: To have a job where I help other	8349	67	0.8%
L1quavarYP YP: How much this matters in deciding on a job: To have a job that's interesting	8349	67	0.8%
L1yys5YP YP: Feelings about school: People think my school is a good school	8252	164	1.9%
L1mgetonYP YP: How well get on with (step-)mother	8187	229	2.7%
L1fgetonYP YP: How well get on with (step-)father	8178	238	2.8%
L1mquarreYP YP: How often fall out with (step-)mother	8155	261	3.1%
L1fquarreYP YP: How often fall out with (step-)father	8142	274	3.3%
L1ALC	7799	617	7.3%
L1SMOKE	8011	405	4.8%
L1sruleYP YP: Level of rules in school	8349	67	0.8%
L1sdiscYP YP: Level of discipline in school	8349	67	0.8%
L1squiet2YP YP: Frequency of misbehaviour or troublemaking in classes (by self)	8349	67	0.8%
L1quawageYP YP: How much this matters in deciding on a job: To have a job which pays well	8349	67	0.8%
L1yys1YP YP: Feelings about school: I am happy when I am at school	8252	164	1.9%
L1truantYP YP: Whether played truant in last 12 months	8118	298	3.5%
L1canntryYP YP: Whether ever tried Cannabis	8180	236	2.8%
L1sprayYP YP: Whether ever graffittied on walls	8221	195	2.3%
L1smashYP YP: Whether ever vandalised public property	8196	220	2.6%
L1shopYP YP: Whether ever shoplifted	8167	249	3.0%
L1fightYP YP: Whether ever taken part in fighting or public disturbance	8196	220	2.6%
L1palhomeYP YP: How many times YP had friends round to house in last 7 days	8349	67	0.8%
L1paloutYP YP: How many times gone out with friends in last 7 days	8349	67	0.8%
L1whofreeYP YP: How mainly spend free time	8349	67	0.8%
W1quapromYP YP: How much this matters in deciding on a job: To have a job where I can get pr	8278	138	1.6%
W1impjobYP YP: Agreement with statement about importance in future: Having a job or career	8310	106	1.3%
W1ambitYP YP: Whether any ideas about what want to do after finishing full-time education	8130	286	3.4%
W1yys2YP YP: Feelings about school: School is a waste of time for me	8080	336	4.0%
W1yys3YP YP: Feelings about school: School work is worth doing	8177	239	2.8%
W1yys7YP YP: Feelings about school: I work as hard as I can in school	8065	351	4.2%
W1yys10YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is a waste of time	8098	318	3.8%
W1yys11YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is interesting to me	7904	512	6.1%
W1talkmumYP YP: How often talk to (step-)mother about things that matter to YP	7800	616	7.3%
W1talkdadYP YP: How often talk to (step-)father about things that matter to YP	8191	225	2.7%

Annex Table 2: Variables used in wave 2 for construction of LCAs and number/share of imputed values

Wave 2			
	N	N imputed	% imputed
L2YYS4YP YP: Feelings about school: Most of the time I don't want to go to school	8266	150	1.8%
L2YYS6YP YP: Feelings about school: On the whole I like being at school	8266	150	1.8%
L2YYS9YP YP: Feelings about school: I am bored in lessons	8266	150	1.8%
L2Fat1YP YP: Statements about success: If someone is not a success in life, it is usually	8209	207	2.5%
L2Fat7YP YP: Statements about success: How well you get on in this world is mostly a matt	8222	194	2.3%
L2Fat8YP YP: Statements about success: If you work hard at something you'll usually succe	8243	173	2.1%
L2hea1cYP YP: Quality of YP's health in last 12 months	8157	259	3.1%
L2concenYP YP: YP's recent concentration levels	8245	171	2.0%
L2nosleepYP YP: Whether YP has recently lost much sleep over worry	8246	170	2.0%
L2usefulYP YP: How useful YP has felt recently	8227	189	2.2%
L2decideYP YP: How capable of making decisions YP has felt recently	8239	177	2.1%
L2strainYP YP: How much constantly under strain YP has felt recently	8235	181	2.2%
L2difficYP YP: How much YP has felt couldn't overcome their difficulties recently	8222	194	2.3%
L2activYP YP: How much YP has been able to enjoy normal day-to-day activities recently	8242	174	2.1%
L2probsYP YP: How YP has been able to face up to problems recently	8223	193	2.3%
L2depressYP YP: How much YP has been feeling unhappy and depressed recently	8205	211	2.5%
L2noconfYP YP: How much YP has been losing confidence in themselves recently	8226	190	2.3%
L2wthlessYP YP: How much YP has been thinking of themselves as a worthless person recently	8215	201	2.4%
L2happyYP YP: How much YP has been feeling reasonably happy recently	8232	184	2.2%
L2Relig5YP Attendance Relig Centre	8352	64	0.8%
L2plann16YP YP: YP's intentions after Year 11	8351	65	0.8%
L2modap2YP YP: Whether YP has talked to anyone about getting training or apprenticeship aft	8349	67	0.8%
L2YYS2YP YP: Feelings about school: School is a waste of time for me	8266	150	1.8%
L2YYS3YP YP: Feelings about school: School work is worth doing	8266	150	1.8%
L2YYS7YP YP: Feelings about school: I work as hard as I can in school	8266	150	1.8%
L2YYS10YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is a waste of time	8266	150	1.8%
L2YYS11YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is interesting to me	8266	150	1.8%
L2HEPlan	8351	65	0.8%
L2YYS8YP YP: Feelings about school: In a lesson, I often count the minutes till it ends	8266	150	1.8%
L2namesYP YP: Whether have been upset by name-calling inc text or email in last 12 months	8170	246	2.9%
L2excpalYP YP: Whether have been excluded from a group of friends in last 12 months	8203	213	2.5%
L2moneyYP YP: Whether have been made to hand over money or possessions in last 12 months	8227	189	2.2%
L2thhitYP YP: Whether have been threatened with violence by students in last 12 months	8212	204	2.4%
L2achitYP YP: Whether have experienced violence from students in last 12 months	8216	200	2.4%
L2YYS12YP YP: Feelings about school: I get good marks for my work	8266	150	1.8%
L2Fat5YP YP: Statements about success: I can pretty much decide what will happen in my li	8217	199	2.4%
L2jobYP YP: Whether work in paid job at all during term-time	8347	69	0.8%
L2famsupYP YP: Whether receive any pocket money or allowance or support from parents or	8345	71	0.8%
L2YYS5YP YP: Feelings about school: People think my school is a good school	8266	150	1.8%
L2comp2YP YP: How likely YP is to get punished if caught breaking school rules, compared w	8200	216	2.6%
L2comp3YP YP: How heavily YP gets punished for breaking school rules, compared with others	8215	201	2.4%
L2comp4YP YP: How much interest teachers take in YP's work, compared with others	8214	202	2.4%
L2comp5YP YP: How likely YP is to receive praise, compared with others	8230	186	2.2%
L2comp6YP YP: How likely teachers are to blame YP if there is trouble in class, compared w	8200	216	2.6%
L2SMOKE	8416	0	0.0%
L2ALC	8144	272	3.2%
L2YYS1YP YP: Feelings about school: I am happy when I am at school	8266	150	1.8%
L2truantYP YP: Whether played truant in last 12 months	8127	289	3.4%
L2canntryYP YP: Whether ever tried Cannabis	8197	219	2.6%
L2sprayYP YP: Whether graffittied on walls in the last year	8236	180	2.1%
L2smashYP YP: Whether vandalised public property in the last year	8228	188	2.2%
L2shopYP YP: Whether shoplifted in the last year	8214	202	2.4%
L2fightYP YP: Whether taken part in fighting or public disturbance in the last year	8225	191	2.3%
L2palhomeYP YP: How many times YP had friends round to house in last 7 days	8347	69	0.8%
L2paloutYP YP: How many times gone out with friends in last 7 days	8347	69	0.8%
L2whofreeYP YP: How mainly spend free time	8347	69	0.8%

Annex Table 3: Variables used in wave 3 for construction of LCAs and number/share of imputed values

Wave 3			
	N	N imputed	% imputed
L3hea1cYP YP: Quality of YP's health in last 12 months	8364	52	0.6%
L3ambitbYP YP: How much it matters to the YP to be self employed/have own business in the f	8365	51	0.6%
L3yys4YP YP: Feelings about school: Most of the time I don't want to go to school	8306	110	1.3%
L3yys6YP YP: Feelings about school: On the whole I like being at school	8306	110	1.3%
L3yys9YP YP: Feelings about school: I am bored in lessons	8306	110	1.3%
L3plann16YP YP: YP's intentions after Year 11	8365	51	0.6%
L3dec16aYP YP: When YP decided to stay on FTE after Year 11	8043	373	4.4%
L3HEPlan	8365	51	0.6%
L3yys2YP YP: Feelings about school: School is a waste of time for me	8306	110	1.3%
L3yys3YP YP: Feelings about school: School work is worth doing	8306	110	1.3%
L3yys7YP YP: Feelings about school: I work as hard as I can in school	8306	110	1.3%
L3yys10YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is a waste of time	8306	110	1.3%
L3yys11YP YP: Feelings about school: The work I do in lessons is interesting to me	8306	110	1.3%
L3yys8YP YP: Feelings about school: In a lesson, I often count the minutes till it ends	8306	110	1.3%
L3namesYP YP: Whether YP upset by name-calling, inc. text/ email, since last interview/ in	8249	167	2.0%
L3excpalYP YP: Whether YP excluded from a group of friends since last interview/ in last 12	8266	150	1.8%
L3moneyYP YP: Whether YP made to hand over money or possessions since last interview/ in l	8286	130	1.5%
L3thhitYP YP: Whether YP has been threatened with violence by students in last 12 months	8274	142	1.7%
L3achitYP YP: Whether YP experienced violence from students since last interview/ in last	8281	135	1.6%
L3yys12YP YP: Feelings about school: I get good marks for my work	8306	110	1.3%
L3jobYP YP: Whether YP works in paid job at all during term-time	8365	51	0.6%
L3jobfamYP YP: Whether YP does any paid or unpaid work for business run or owned by family	8365	51	0.6%
L3famsupYP YP: Whether YP receives any pocket money/ allowance/ support from parents/ relat	8362	54	0.6%
L3yys5YP YP: Feelings about school: People think my school is a good school	8306	110	1.3%
L3ALC	8223	193	2.3%
L3SMOKE	8416	0	0.0%
L3yys1YP YP: Feelings about school: I am happy when I am at school	8306	110	1.3%
L3truantYP YP: Whether YP played truant in last 12 months	8207	209	2.5%
L3canntryYP YP: Whether YP ever tried Cannabis	8252	164	1.9%
L3sprayYP YP: Whether graffitied on walls in the last year?	8286	130	1.5%
L3smashYP YP: Whether vandalised public property in the last year?	8277	139	1.7%
L3shopYP YP: Whether shoplifted in the last year?	8284	132	1.6%
L3fightYP YP: Whether taken part in fighting or public disturbance in the last year?	8265	151	1.8%

Annex Table 4: Variables used in wave 4 for construction of LCAs and number/share of imputed values

Wave 4			
	N	N imputed	% imputed
L4Hea1CYP YP: General health of YP in the last 12 months	8248	168	2.0%
L4ConcenYP YP: Whether YP has been able to concentrate on whatever doing recently	8245	171	2.0%
L4NoSleepYP YP: Whether YP recently lost much sleep over worry	8211	205	2.4%
L4UsefulYP YP: Whether YP has felt they were playing a useful part in things recently	8196	220	2.6%
L4DecideYP YP: Whether YP recently felt capable of making decisions about things	8235	181	2.2%
L4StrainYP YP: Whether YP has recently felt they are constantly under strain	8202	214	2.5%
L4DifficYP YP: Whether YP recently felt couldn't overcome difficulties	8205	211	2.5%
L4ActivYP YP: Whether YP recently been able to enjoy normal day to day activities	8246	170	2.0%
L4ProbsYP YP: Whether YP recently been able to face up to problems	8224	192	2.3%
L4DepressYP YP: Whether YP recently felt unhappy or depressed	8186	230	2.7%
L4NoConfYP YP: Whether YP recently been losing confidence in self	8210	206	2.4%
L4LthlessYP YP: Whether YP has thought of themself as a worthless person recently	8202	214	2.5%
L4HappyYP YP: Whether YP recently felt reasonably happy, all things considered	8203	213	2.5%
L4Relig5YP Attendance Relig Centre	8326	90	1.1%
L4School2YP YP: YP Agreement with statement : School has helped give me confidence to make d	8337	79	0.9%
L4School3YP YP: YP Agreement with statement : School has done little to prepare me for when	8337	79	0.9%
L4School4YP YP: YP Agreement with statement : School has taught me things which would be use	8337	79	0.9%
L4School5YP YP: YP Agreement with statement : My school work in Year 11 was usually worth do	8337	79	0.9%
L4Heposs9YP YP: Likelihood of YP ever applying to university to do a degree	8337	79	0.9%
L4Youth1YP Attendance Youth Centre	8327	89	1.1%
L4NextyrYP YP: What YP thinks they are most likely to be doing in two years' time	8337	79	0.9%
L4School1YP YP: YP Agreement with statement : Most of the time I found Year 11 boring	8337	79	0.9%
L4Spares6YP YP: Whether YP believes anything is better than staying at home, even if nowhere	8255	161	1.9%
L4HE2YP YP: Whether YP agrees with statement : The best jobs go to people who have been	8241	175	2.1%
L4HE6YP YP: Whether YP agrees with statement : People like me don't go to university	8235	181	2.2%
L4Spares4YP YP: Whether YP usually has enough money to do what they like	8253	163	1.9%
L4HE4YP YP: Whether YP agrees with statement : Most of my friends are planning to go to	8255	161	1.9%
L4Spares3YP YP: Whether YP believes it is safe to be out and about on streets where they liv	8257	159	1.9%
L4AlcEverYP YP: Whether YP ever had proper alcoholic drink	8216	200	2.4%
L4CannTryYP YP: Whether YP ever tried Cannabis	8213	203	2.4%
L4LhoisYP YP: Person YP is most likely to talk to	8249	167	2.0%
L4YelevenYP YP: Whether YP found year 11 enjoyable	8331	85	1.0%
L4Spares1YP YP: Whether YP finds plenty of enjoyable things to do in spare time	8261	155	1.8%
L4Spares2YP YP: Whether YP spends most of spare time at home/friends house	8261	155	1.8%
L4Spares5YP YP: Whether YP often gets bored	8256	160	1.9%
L4PubberYP YP: How often YP goes to pubs/bars	8260	156	1.9%
L4ClubberYP YP: How often YP goes to nightclubs	8259	157	1.9%

Annex Table 5: Variables used in wave 6 for construction of LCAs and number/share of imputed values

Wave 6			
	N	N imputed	% imputed
L6PaystatYP0b YP: Work and pay statements - Some people earn more on benefits than working	8399	17	0.2%
L6PaystatYP0d YP: Work and pay statements - Important to keep a job even if you don't like it	8400	16	0.2%
L6PaystatYP0e YP: Work and pay statements - If I didn't like a job I'd leave	8397	19	0.2%
L6PaystatYP0g YP: Work and pay statements - Women with young children should never work full t	8390	26	0.3%
L6EducYP YP: Whether currently going to school or college	8411	5	0.1%
L6VolLrkYP YP: Whether currently doing voluntary work	8412	4	0.0%
L6PaystatYP0c YP: Work and pay statements - Having a job is best way to be independent	8396	20	0.2%
L6PaystatYP0f YP: Work and pay statements - Having any job is better than unemployment	8396	20	0.2%
L6FriendFamilyYP YP: Whether close friends or close ties with family is more important	8360	56	0.7%
L6FriendNumYP YP: Number of close friends	8360	56	0.7%
L6RELATIONX	8416	0	0.0%
L6FirstComfortYP	8350	66	0.8%
L6JobYP YP: Whether currently doing paid work	8395	21	0.2%
L6PaystatYP0a YP: Work and pay statements - Benefits give a more stable income than a wage	8387	29	0.3%
L6ALC	8416	0	0.0%
L6CANN	8299	117	1.4%
L6DRUG	8316	100	1.2%

Annex Table 6: Variables used in wave 7 for construction of LCAs and number/share of imputed values

Wave 7			
	N	N imputed	% imputed
L7PaystatYP0b YP: Work and pay statements - Some people earn more on benefits than they do wor	8409	7	0.1%
L7PaystatYP0d YP: Work and pay statements - Once you have a job it is important to hang on to	8402	14	0.2%
L7PaystatYP0e YP: Work and pay statements - If I didn't like a job I'd pack it in even if I di	8409	7	0.1%
L7PaystatYP0g YP: Work and pay statements - Women with young children should never work full t	8394	22	0.3%
L7Fat1YP YP: Statements about success - If someone is not a success in life, it is usuall	8354	62	0.7%
L7Fat7YP YP: Statements about success - How well you get on in this world is mostly a mat	8359	57	0.7%
L7Fat8YP YP: Statements about success - If you work hard at something you'll usually succ	8363	53	0.6%
L7QuaHourYP YP: Statements about the future - To have a job with regular hours	8416	0	0.0%
L7PaystatYP0c YP: Work and pay statements - Having a job is the best way to be an independent	8408	8	0.1%
L7PaystatYP0f YP: Work and pay statements - Having almost any job is better than being unemplo	8407	9	0.1%
L7Pla16YP YP: Work and pay statements - Having a job that leads somewhere is important	8416	0	0.0%
L7ImpJobYP YP: Statements about the future - Having a job or career in the future is import	8416	0	0.0%
L7ImpFamYP0a YP: Statements about the future - Studying to gain qualifications is important t	8416	0	0.0%
L7NextYearYP YP: Statements about the future - I don't really think much about what I might b	8416	0	0.0%
L7QuaPromYP YP: Statements about the future - To have a job where I can get promoted and get	8416	0	0.0%
L7DonateYP YP: Whether donate to charity / good causes	8348	68	0.8%
L7VolunteerOYP YP: Whether provided unpaid help in last 12 months (other than donating money)	8380	36	0.4%
L7ImpFamYP0b YP: Statements about the future - Raising a family in the future is important to	8416	0	0.0%
L7FriendNumYP YP: Number of close friends	8344	72	0.9%
L7RELATIONX	8416	0	0.0%
L7FirstComfortYP	8338	78	0.9%
L7PaystatYP0a YP: Work and pay statements - Benefits give a more stable income than trying to	8390	26	0.3%
L7Fat5YP YP: Statements about success - I can pretty much decide what will happen in my l	8356	60	0.7%
L7QuaWorkYP YP: Statements about the future - To be my own boss/have my own business	8416	0	0.0%
L7QuaHelpYP YP: Statements about the future - To have a job where I help other people	8416	0	0.0%
L7QuaVarYP YP: Statements about the future - To have a job that's interesting and not routi	8416	0	0.0%
L7OSatisYP YP: Whether satisfied with life so far	8348	68	0.8%
L7CANN	8308	108	1.3%
L7DRUG	8315	101	1.2%
L7ALC	8416	0	0.0%
L7QuaWageYP YP: Statements about the future - To have a job which pays well	8415	1	0.0%

Annex chapter 5

Annex Table 7: Conditional response probabilities L1quahourYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT1_LC1	0.44	0.39	0.16	0.01
AT1_LC2	0.42	0.38	0.18	0.01
AT1_LC3	0.42	0.44	0.10	0.04
AT1_LC4	0.52	0.32	0.16	0.01

Annex Table 8: Conditional response probabilities L1nextyearYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT1_LC1	0.02	0.11	0.34	0.53	0.00
AT1_LC2	0.11	0.32	0.26	0.29	0.02
AT1_LC3	0.12	0.50	0.32	0.04	0.03
AT1_LC4	0.04	0.12	0.21	0.63	0.01

Annex Table 9: Conditional response probabilities L1mightyrYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
AT1_LC1	0.26	0.39	0.23	0.08	0.03	0.01
AT1_LC2	0.36	0.40	0.12	0.04	0.03	0.04
AT1_LC3	0.31	0.54	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.04
AT1_LC4	0.33	0.34	0.17	0.10	0.04	0.02

Annex Table 10: Conditional response probabilities L1endupYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT1_LC1	0.01	0.05	0.19	0.75	0.00
AT1_LC2	0.08	0.22	0.25	0.43	0.02
AT1_LC3	0.12	0.32	0.46	0.07	0.04
AT1_LC4	0.04	0.06	0.16	0.73	0.01

Annex Table 11: Conditional response probabilities L1yys4YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT1_LC1	0.00	0.18	0.70	0.09	0.03
AT1_LC2	0.27	0.59	0.08	0.02	0.05
AT1_LC3	0.01	0.19	0.58	0.17	0.04
AT1_LC4	0.02	0.02	0.25	0.71	0.00

Annex Table 12: Conditional response probabilities L1yys6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT1_LC1	0.14	0.81	0.03	0.00	0.01
AT1_LC2	0.06	0.40	0.38	0.11	0.06
AT1_LC3	0.22	0.73	0.04	0.00	0.01
AT1_LC4	0.73	0.26	0.00	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 13: Conditional response probabilities L1yys9YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT1_LC1	0.02	0.32	0.57	0.02	0.07
AT1_LC2	0.31	0.56	0.06	0.02	0.05
AT1_LC3	0.02	0.28	0.58	0.05	0.07
AT1_LC4	0.01	0.10	0.56	0.31	0.02

Annex Table 14: Conditional response probabilities L1Relig5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT1_LC1	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.53	0.32
AT1_LC2	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.49	0.41
AT1_LC3	0.13	0.03	0.01	0.57	0.25
AT1_LC4	0.14	0.04	0.03	0.58	0.21

Annex Table 15: Estimated class population shares, Attitudes wave 1

0.38	0.17	0.21	0.24

Annex Table 16: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Attitudes wave 1

0.39	0.17	0.21	0.23

Annex Table 17: Fit statistics, Attitudes wave 1

AIC(4):	155764.10
BIC(4):	156686.10

Annex Table 18: Conditional response probabilities L1plann16YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR1_LC1	0.95	0.02	0.01	0.02
GR1_LC2	0.36	0.49	0.02	0.13
GR1_LC3	0.93	0.03	0.01	0.03
GR1_LC4	0.88	0.03	0.02	0.06
GR1_LC5	0.88	0.05	0.02	0.05

Annex Table 19: Conditional response probabilities L1quapromYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR1_LC1	0.63	0.32	0.05	0.00
GR1_LC2	0.49	0.32	0.16	0.04
GR1_LC3	0.69	0.23	0.07	0.01
GR1_LC4	0.56	0.35	0.09	0.01
GR1_LC5	0.53	0.39	0.08	0.01

Annex Table 20: Conditional response probabilities L1impjobYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR1_LC1	0.95	0.05	0.00	0.00
GR1_LC2	0.70	0.24	0.03	0.03
GR1_LC3	0.96	0.04	0.00	0.00
GR1_LC4	0.88	0.11	0.00	0.01
GR1_LC5	0.87	0.12	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 21: Conditional response probabilities L1ambitYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
GR1_LC1	0.82	0.16	0.02
GR1_LC2	0.75	0.21	0.04
GR1_LC3	0.84	0.14	0.02
GR1_LC4	0.72	0.26	0.02
GR1_LC5	0.80	0.17	0.03

Annex Table 22: Conditional response probabilities L1yys2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR1_LC1	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.91	0.01
GR1_LC2	0.06	0.16	0.48	0.21	0.09
GR1_LC3	0.02	0.01	0.10	0.86	0.01
GR1_LC4	0.01	0.04	0.47	0.44	0.04
GR1_LC5	0.00	0.02	0.56	0.41	0.01

Annex Table 23: Conditional response probabilities L1yys3YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR1_LC1	0.79	0.17	0.00	0.03	0.00
GR1_LC2	0.24	0.55	0.13	0.04	0.05
GR1_LC3	0.84	0.12	0.00	0.03	0.00
GR1_LC4	0.29	0.63	0.05	0.02	0.01
GR1_LC5	0.22	0.74	0.02	0.01	0.01

Annex Table 24: Conditional response probabilities L1yys7YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR1_LC1	0.42	0.53	0.05	0.00	0.00
GR1_LC2	0.23	0.41	0.28	0.05	0.03
GR1_LC3	0.64	0.33	0.02	0.00	0.00
GR1_LC4	0.13	0.54	0.25	0.02	0.07
GR1_LC5	0.13	0.67	0.17	0.01	0.03

Annex Table 25: Conditional response probabilities L1yys10YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR1_LC1	0.01	0.01	0.30	0.68	0.01
GR1_LC2	0.08	0.19	0.51	0.17	0.05
GR1_LC3	0.02	0.01	0.25	0.71	0.01
GR1_LC4	0.00	0.11	0.68	0.16	0.04
GR1_LC5	0.00	0.04	0.80	0.14	0.02

Annex Table 26: Conditional response probabilities L1yys11YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR1_LC1	0.20	0.75	0.04	0.00	0.01
GR1_LC2	0.09	0.44	0.33	0.06	0.07
GR1_LC3	0.37	0.59	0.02	0.00	0.01
GR1_LC4	0.02	0.57	0.28	0.03	0.10
GR1_LC5	0.00	0.73	0.20	0.00	0.07

Annex Table 27: Conditional response probabilities L1talkmumYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
GR1_LC1	0.13	0.43	0.28	0.14	0.01	0.01	0.00
GR1_LC2	0.32	0.19	0.14	0.20	0.06	0.05	0.04
GR1_LC3	0.82	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03
GR1_LC4	0.06	0.01	0.17	0.54	0.11	0.01	0.09
GR1_LC5	0.31	0.40	0.24	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.00

Annex Table 28: Conditional response probabilities L1talkdadYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
GR1_LC1	0.00	0.23	0.32	0.23	0.04	0.16	0.00
GR1_LC2	0.14	0.10	0.12	0.22	0.09	0.30	0.03
GR1_LC3	0.48	0.18	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.20	0.02
GR1_LC4	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.48	0.23	0.17	0.08
GR1_LC5	0.10	0.24	0.30	0.13	0.01	0.22	0.00

Annex Table 29: Conditional response probabilities L1HEPlan

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
GR1_LC1	0.80	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.07
GR1_LC2	0.11	0.06	0.09	0.18	0.43	0.13
GR1_LC3	0.78	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.09
GR1_LC4	0.63	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.04	0.12
GR1_LC5	0.66	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.10

Annex Table 30: Estimated class population shares, Growth wave 1

0.29	0.11	0.23	0.13	0.24

Annex Table 31: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Growth wave 1

0.29	0.10	0.23	0.13	0.25

Annex Table 32: Fit statistics, Growth wave 1

AIC(5):	189024.30
BIC(5):	190741.60

Annex Table 33: Conditional response probabilities L1squietYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN1_LC1	0.49	0.28	0.18	0.05	0.00
IN1_LC2	0.36	0.22	0.22	0.20	0.00
IN1_LC3	0.09	0.24	0.34	0.33	0.00
IN1_LC4	0.06	0.12	0.26	0.52	0.04
IN1_LC5	0.75	0.14	0.08	0.03	0.00

Annex Table 34: Conditional response probabilities L1snodisYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN1_LC1	0.23	0.31	0.27	0.19	0.00
IN1_LC2	0.10	0.10	0.24	0.42	0.14
IN1_LC3	0.00	0.10	0.23	0.57	0.09
IN1_LC4	0.00	0.01	0.11	0.62	0.27
IN1_LC5	0.40	0.25	0.18	0.12	0.04

Annex Table 35: Conditional response probabilities L1impfamYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN1_LC1	0.62	0.28	0.05	0.02	0.04
IN1_LC2	0.53	0.32	0.07	0.04	0.04
IN1_LC3	0.53	0.36	0.05	0.02	0.04
IN1_LC4	0.58	0.33	0.04	0.01	0.04
IN1_LC5	0.50	0.34	0.08	0.04	0.05

Annex Table 36: Conditional response probabilities L1yys4YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN1_LC1	0.02	0.16	0.53	0.28	0.02
IN1_LC2	0.17	0.52	0.26	0.01	0.05
IN1_LC3	0.02	0.23	0.47	0.25	0.02
IN1_LC4	0.01	0.11	0.53	0.32	0.02
IN1_LC5	0.16	0.30	0.31	0.18	0.05

Annex Table 37: Conditional response probabilities L1yys8YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN1_LC1	0.05	0.31	0.48	0.13	0.02
IN1_LC2	0.40	0.57	0.00	0.00	0.03
IN1_LC3	0.10	0.36	0.41	0.10	0.02
IN1_LC4	0.02	0.28	0.52	0.13	0.04
IN1_LC5	0.24	0.40	0.25	0.08	0.04

Annex Table 38: Conditional response probabilities L1namesYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN1_LC1	0.24	0.74	0.02
IN1_LC2	0.18	0.79	0.03
IN1_LC3	0.65	0.31	0.04
IN1_LC4	0.10	0.89	0.02
IN1_LC5	0.72	0.23	0.04

Annex Table 39: Conditional response probabilities L1excpalYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN1_LC1	0.13	0.86	0.01
IN1_LC2	0.13	0.84	0.03
IN1_LC3	0.32	0.63	0.06
IN1_LC4	0.05	0.94	0.01
IN1_LC5	0.41	0.52	0.07

Annex Table 40: Conditional response probabilities L1moneyYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN1_LC1	0.01	0.99	0.00
IN1_LC2	0.02	0.98	0.01
IN1_LC3	0.07	0.92	0.01
IN1_LC4	0.01	0.99	0.00
IN1_LC5	0.12	0.85	0.03

Annex Table 41: Conditional response probabilities L1thhitYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN1_LC1	0.03	0.96	0.00
IN1_LC2	0.04	0.95	0.01
IN1_LC3	0.67	0.29	0.04
IN1_LC4	0.02	0.97	0.00
IN1_LC5	0.72	0.24	0.04

Annex Table 42: Conditional response probabilities L1achitYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN1_LC1	0.04	0.96	0.00
IN1_LC2	0.05	0.94	0.01
IN1_LC3	0.59	0.40	0.02
IN1_LC4	0.03	0.96	0.01
IN1_LC5	0.59	0.39	0.03

Annex Table 43: Estimated class population shares, integration wave 1

0.24	0.15	0.11	0.39	0.12

Annex Table 44: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), integration wave 1

0.23	0.15	0.11	0.41	0.11

Annex Table 45: Fit statistics, integration wave 1

AIC(5):	144278.10
BIC(5):	145361.90

Annex Table 46: Conditional response probabilities L1quaworkYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU1_LC1	0.21	0.36	0.42	0.01
AU1_LC2	0.21	0.33	0.43	0.03
AU1_LC3	0.30	0.31	0.36	0.03
AU1_LC4	0.20	0.40	0.39	0.01

Annex Table 47: Conditional response probabilities L1mightyrYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
AU1_LC1	0.33	0.40	0.16	0.07	0.03	0.02
AU1_LC2	0.31	0.39	0.14	0.07	0.04	0.04
AU1_LC3	0.39	0.32	0.18	0.06	0.02	0.04
AU1_LC4	0.27	0.44	0.18	0.05	0.03	0.02

Annex Table 48: Conditional response probabilities L1ambitYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
AU1_LC1	0.82	0.15	0.02
AU1_LC2	0.74	0.22	0.03
AU1_LC3	0.73	0.24	0.03
AU1_LC4	0.80	0.17	0.03

Annex Table 49: Conditional response probabilities L1yys12YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU1_LC1	0.31	0.63	0.04	0.00	0.02
AU1_LC2	0.14	0.64	0.11	0.01	0.10
AU1_LC3	0.29	0.57	0.07	0.03	0.04
AU1_LC4	0.23	0.69	0.06	0.00	0.02

Annex Table 50: Conditional response probabilities L1jobYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
AU1_LC1	0.22	0.78
AU1_LC2	0.17	0.83
AU1_LC3	0.16	0.84
AU1_LC4	0.21	0.79

Annex Table 51: Conditional response probabilities L1famsupYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
AU1_LC1	0.83	0.17
AU1_LC2	0.78	0.22
AU1_LC3	0.77	0.23
AU1_LC4	0.79	0.21

Annex Table 52: Conditional response probabilities L1mothdecYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU1_LC1	0.01	0.06	0.90	0.03	0.00
AU1_LC2	0.02	0.19	0.16	0.03	0.60
AU1_LC3	0.63	0.19	0.11	0.05	0.03
AU1_LC4	0.02	0.88	0.07	0.02	0.01

Annex Table 53: Conditional response probabilities L1fathdecYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU1_LC1	0.00	0.05	0.76	0.19	0.01
AU1_LC2	0.00	0.09	0.08	0.24	0.59
AU1_LC3	0.55	0.09	0.06	0.29	0.00
AU1_LC4	0.03	0.66	0.11	0.18	0.01

Annex Table 54: Conditional response probabilities L1talkschYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU1_LC1	0.03	0.42	0.54	0.01
AU1_LC2	0.09	0.54	0.30	0.07
AU1_LC3	0.14	0.42	0.41	0.02
AU1_LC4	0.05	0.53	0.41	0.02

Annex Table 55: Estimated class population shares, Autonomy wave 1

0.41	0.10	0.08	0.41

Annex Table 56: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Autonomy wave 1

0.40	0.10	0.07	0.44

Annex Table 57: Fit statistics, Autonomy wave 1

AIC(4):	138375.20
BIC(4):	139156.40

Annex Table 58: Conditional response probabilities L1quahelpYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
PE1_LC1	0.35	0.52	0.13	0.01
PE1_LC2	0.40	0.49	0.11	0.01
PE1_LC3	0.42	0.47	0.10	0.01

Annex Table 59: Conditional response probabilities L1quavarYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
PE1_LC1	0.68	0.26	0.05	0.00
PE1_LC2	0.71	0.23	0.05	0.01
PE1_LC3	0.66	0.26	0.06	0.01

Annex Table 60: Conditional response probabilities L1yys5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE1_LC1	0.22	0.49	0.19	0.06	0.05
PE1_LC2	0.28	0.51	0.13	0.03	0.05
PE1_LC3	0.22	0.45	0.20	0.06	0.06

Annex Table 61: Conditional response probabilities L1yys10YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE1_LC1	0.02	0.07	0.57	0.32	0.03
PE1_LC2	0.01	0.03	0.41	0.54	0.01
PE1_LC3	0.02	0.06	0.48	0.41	0.03

Annex Table 62: Conditional response probabilities L1yys11YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE1_LC1	0.09	0.63	0.20	0.02	0.06
PE1_LC2	0.21	0.68	0.08	0.00	0.02
PE1_LC3	0.16	0.63	0.15	0.02	0.05

Annex Table 63: Conditional response probabilities L1yys12YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE1_LC1	0.20	0.68	0.08	0.01	0.03
PE1_LC2	0.32	0.63	0.03	0.00	0.02
PE1_LC3	0.23	0.66	0.07	0.01	0.04

Annex Table 64: Conditional response probabilities L1mgetonYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE1_LC1	0.37	0.55	0.03	0.01	0.05
PE1_LC2	0.95	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00
PE1_LC3	0.62	0.31	0.02	0.00	0.04

Annex Table 65: Conditional response probabilities L1fgetonYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE1_LC1	0.34	0.58	0.06	0.02	0.00
PE1_LC2	0.90	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00
PE1_LC3	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99

Annex Table 66: Conditional response probabilities L1mquarreYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
PE1_LC1	0.10	0.28	0.32	0.22	0.02	0.04	0.02
PE1_LC2	0.01	0.02	0.16	0.59	0.22	0.00	0.01
PE1_LC3	0.07	0.15	0.23	0.40	0.10	0.04	0.01

Annex Table 67: Conditional response probabilities L1fquarreYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
PE1_LC1	0.09	0.23	0.32	0.30	0.04	0.00	0.02
PE1_LC2	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.58	0.27	0.00	0.01
PE1_LC3	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.99	0.00

Annex Table 68: Conditional response probabilities L1ALC

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE1_LC1	0.44	0.23	0.19	0.09	0.05
PE1_LC2	0.65	0.19	0.10	0.03	0.03
PE1_LC3	0.51	0.25	0.15	0.05	0.04

Annex Table 69: Conditional response probabilities L1SMOKE

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE1_LC1	0.88	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.01
PE1_LC2	0.98	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
PE1_LC3	0.91	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.01

Annex Table 70:Conditional response probabilities L1HEPlan

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
PE1_LC1	0.62	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.09
PE1_LC2	0.74	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.09
PE1_LC3	0.59	0.04	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.10

Annex Table 71: Estimated class population shares, Perception wave 1

0.38	0.42	0.20

Annex Table 72: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Perception wave 1

0.36	0.43	0.20

Annex Table 73: Fit statistics, Perception wave 1

AIC(3):	220474.60
BIC(3):	221649.90

Annex Table 74: Conditional response probabilities L1sruleYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA1_LC1	0.22	0.69	0.08	0.01
MA1_LC2	0.25	0.69	0.06	0.01
MA1_LC3	0.16	0.77	0.06	0.01
MA1_LC4	0.57	0.36	0.06	0.01
MA1_LC5	0.50	0.34	0.13	0.03

Annex Table 75: Conditional response probabilities L1sdiscYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA1_LC1	0.14	0.65	0.20	0.01
MA1_LC2	0.17	0.69	0.13	0.01
MA1_LC3	0.13	0.72	0.15	0.00
MA1_LC4	0.46	0.40	0.14	0.01
MA1_LC5	0.38	0.32	0.27	0.03

Annex Table 76: Conditional response probabilities L1squiet2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA1_LC1	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.47	0.46
MA1_LC2	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.62	0.29
MA1_LC3	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.36	0.59
MA1_LC4	0.09	0.14	0.21	0.52	0.04
MA1_LC5	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.56	0.30

Annex Table 77: Conditional response probabilities L1quawageYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA1_LC1	0.60	0.36	0.04
MA1_LC2	0.65	0.31	0.04
MA1_LC3	0.66	0.28	0.05
MA1_LC4	0.77	0.20	0.03
MA1_LC5	0.69	0.23	0.08

Annex Table 78: Conditional response probabilities L1impfamYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA1_LC1	0.52	0.36	0.05	0.02	0.05
MA1_LC2	0.58	0.33	0.04	0.02	0.03
MA1_LC3	0.69	0.23	0.03	0.02	0.03
MA1_LC4	0.55	0.32	0.07	0.03	0.03
MA1_LC5	0.40	0.37	0.09	0.08	0.06

Annex Table 79: Conditional response probabilities L1yys1YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA1_LC1	0.10	0.83	0.04	0.00	0.03
MA1_LC2	0.27	0.69	0.03	0.00	0.01
MA1_LC3	0.83	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00
MA1_LC4	0.18	0.59	0.16	0.04	0.03
MA1_LC5	0.01	0.17	0.51	0.19	0.13

Annex Table 80: Conditional response probabilities L1yys6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA1_LC1	0.10	0.83	0.04	0.00	0.02
MA1_LC2	0.24	0.71	0.04	0.00	0.01
MA1_LC3	0.81	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00
MA1_LC4	0.18	0.56	0.19	0.04	0.03
MA1_LC5	0.01	0.20	0.52	0.18	0.09

Annex Table 81: Conditional response probabilities L1truantYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA1_LC1	0.04	0.93	0.03
MA1_LC2	0.05	0.93	0.03
MA1_LC3	0.05	0.94	0.02
MA1_LC4	0.48	0.48	0.04
MA1_LC5	0.16	0.79	0.05

Annex Table 82: Conditional response probabilities L1canntryYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
MA1_LC1	0.02	0.98
MA1_LC2	0.05	0.95
MA1_LC3	0.01	0.99
MA1_LC4	0.33	0.67
MA1_LC5	0.05	0.95

Annex Table 83: Conditional response probabilities L1sprayYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
MA1_LC1	0.01	0.99
MA1_LC2	0.01	0.99
MA1_LC3	0.01	0.99
MA1_LC4	0.27	0.73
MA1_LC5	0.03	0.97

Annex Table 84: Conditional response probabilities L1smashYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA1_LC1	0.02	0.98	0.01
MA1_LC2	0.03	0.96	0.01
MA1_LC3	0.01	0.98	0.00
MA1_LC4	0.42	0.55	0.03
MA1_LC5	0.05	0.94	0.01

Annex Table 85: Conditional response probabilities L1shopYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA1_LC1	0.04	0.96	0.01
MA1_LC2	0.05	0.95	0.01
MA1_LC3	0.02	0.98	0.00
MA1_LC4	0.41	0.58	0.01
MA1_LC5	0.07	0.91	0.02

Annex Table 86: Conditional response probabilities L1fightYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA1_LC1	0.04	0.95	0.01
MA1_LC2	0.10	0.88	0.02
MA1_LC3	0.04	0.96	0.00
MA1_LC4	0.58	0.40	0.02
MA1_LC5	0.13	0.83	0.05

Annex Table 87: Conditional response probabilities L1jobYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
MA1_LC1	0.14	0.86
MA1_LC2	0.28	0.72
MA1_LC3	0.12	0.88
MA1_LC4	0.26	0.74
MA1_LC5	0.18	0.82

Annex Table 88: Conditional response probabilities L1palhomeYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA1_LC1	0.66	0.31	0.03	0.01
MA1_LC2	0.17	0.44	0.28	0.12
MA1_LC3	0.58	0.35	0.06	0.01
MA1_LC4	0.23	0.34	0.24	0.19
MA1_LC5	0.48	0.34	0.10	0.08

Annex Table 89: Conditional response probabilities L1paloutYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA1_LC1	0.49	0.47	0.04	0.00
MA1_LC2	0.00	0.29	0.44	0.27
MA1_LC3	0.42	0.45	0.11	0.02
MA1_LC4	0.08	0.22	0.31	0.40
MA1_LC5	0.30	0.35	0.21	0.14

Annex Table 90: Conditional response probabilities L1whofreeYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
MA1_LC1	0.21	0.14	0.36	0.09	0.19	0.00	0.02
MA1_LC2	0.67	0.25	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01
MA1_LC3	0.22	0.15	0.42	0.09	0.11	0.00	0.01
MA1_LC4	0.70	0.16	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.01
MA1_LC5	0.36	0.19	0.18	0.07	0.19	0.00	0.01

Annex Table 91: Estimated class population shares, Mastery wave 1

0.28	0.34	0.19	0.13	0.07

Annex Table 92: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Mastery wave 1

0.27	0.35	0.18	0.13	0.06

Annex Table 93: Fit statistics, Mastery wave 1

AIC(5):	212274.10
BIC(5):	213956.20

Annex Table 94: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS4YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.05	0.15	0.40	0.38	0.02
AT2_LC2	0.15	0.32	0.36	0.14	0.03
AT2_LC3	0.02	0.17	0.48	0.31	0.02
AT2_LC4	0.10	0.32	0.32	0.15	0.11
AT2_LC5	0.04	0.25	0.51	0.18	0.03

Annex Table 95: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.41	0.50	0.06	0.01	0.01
AT2_LC2	0.16	0.51	0.21	0.08	0.03
AT2_LC3	0.25	0.66	0.06	0.01	0.01
AT2_LC4	0.11	0.56	0.19	0.06	0.08
AT2_LC5	0.16	0.70	0.10	0.02	0.02

Annex Table 96: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS9YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.05	0.23	0.51	0.15	0.05
AT2_LC2	0.19	0.44	0.30	0.03	0.05
AT2_LC3	0.03	0.26	0.56	0.08	0.06
AT2_LC4	0.15	0.39	0.26	0.03	0.17
AT2_LC5	0.06	0.39	0.47	0.03	0.05

Annex Table 97: Conditional response probabilities L2Fat1YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.27	0.43	0.20	0.05	0.05
AT2_LC2	0.13	0.38	0.33	0.09	0.07
AT2_LC3	0.11	0.52	0.26	0.02	0.08
AT2_LC4	0.15	0.33	0.22	0.05	0.26
AT2_LC5	0.10	0.46	0.33	0.02	0.08

Annex Table 98: Conditional response probabilities L2Fat7YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.09	0.20	0.39	0.27	0.05
AT2_LC2	0.06	0.21	0.49	0.17	0.07
AT2_LC3	0.01	0.10	0.57	0.24	0.07
AT2_LC4	0.04	0.21	0.31	0.07	0.38
AT2_LC5	0.02	0.16	0.60	0.17	0.06

Annex Table 99: Conditional response probabilities L2Fat8YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.61	0.35	0.02	0.01	0.00
AT2_LC2	0.34	0.54	0.08	0.01	0.02
AT2_LC3	0.37	0.60	0.02	0.00	0.01
AT2_LC4	0.26	0.54	0.05	0.01	0.14
AT2_LC5	0.29	0.66	0.03	0.00	0.01

Annex Table 100: Conditional response probabilities L2hea1cYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.59	0.37	0.01	0.00	0.03
AT2_LC2	0.23	0.59	0.08	0.02	0.09
AT2_LC3	0.55	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.01
AT2_LC4	0.28	0.60	0.04	0.01	0.07
AT2_LC5	0.37	0.59	0.02	0.00	0.02

Annex Table 101: Conditional response probabilities L2concenYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.47	0.47	0.04	0.01	0.01
AT2_LC2	0.08	0.42	0.38	0.12	0.01
AT2_LC3	0.06	0.90	0.03	0.00	0.01
AT2_LC4	0.13	0.53	0.14	0.02	0.17
AT2_LC5	0.05	0.80	0.13	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 102: Conditional response probabilities L2nosleepYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.62	0.24	0.09	0.04	0.02
AT2_LC2	0.10	0.24	0.38	0.26	0.02
AT2_LC3	0.74	0.23	0.02	0.00	0.01
AT2_LC4	0.39	0.23	0.10	0.06	0.22
AT2_LC5	0.23	0.58	0.17	0.02	0.01

Annex Table 103: Conditional response probabilities L2usefulYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.48	0.41	0.03	0.02	0.06
AT2_LC2	0.13	0.46	0.21	0.11	0.10
AT2_LC3	0.09	0.83	0.01	0.01	0.06
AT2_LC4	0.08	0.28	0.04	0.03	0.57
AT2_LC5	0.10	0.81	0.04	0.01	0.04

Annex Table 104: Conditional response probabilities L2decideYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.71	0.24	0.02	0.01	0.02
AT2_LC2	0.24	0.48	0.18	0.06	0.03
AT2_LC3	0.17	0.81	0.01	0.00	0.01
AT2_LC4	0.14	0.46	0.05	0.02	0.33
AT2_LC5	0.21	0.75	0.03	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 105: Conditional response probabilities L2strainYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.58	0.21	0.12	0.05	0.04
AT2_LC2	0.05	0.16	0.37	0.40	0.03
AT2_LC3	0.61	0.31	0.06	0.01	0.01
AT2_LC4	0.27	0.18	0.09	0.06	0.41
AT2_LC5	0.10	0.57	0.28	0.04	0.01

Annex Table 106: Conditional response probabilities L2difficYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.64	0.19	0.09	0.05	0.03
AT2_LC2	0.07	0.18	0.41	0.32	0.02
AT2_LC3	0.69	0.27	0.02	0.01	0.02
AT2_LC4	0.23	0.18	0.07	0.04	0.48
AT2_LC5	0.12	0.70	0.15	0.01	0.02

Annex Table 107: Conditional response probabilities L2activYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.66	0.29	0.02	0.02	0.01
AT2_LC2	0.10	0.43	0.32	0.13	0.02
AT2_LC3	0.11	0.87	0.01	0.00	0.00
AT2_LC4	0.21	0.55	0.05	0.01	0.18
AT2_LC5	0.11	0.81	0.07	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 108: Conditional response probabilities L2probsYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.71	0.26	0.02	0.01	0.01
AT2_LC2	0.20	0.38	0.27	0.12	0.02
AT2_LC3	0.11	0.88	0.01	0.00	0.01
AT2_LC4	0.23	0.47	0.04	0.04	0.22
AT2_LC5	0.18	0.77	0.05	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 109: Conditional response probabilities L2depressYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.70	0.20	0.06	0.02	0.01
AT2_LC2	0.03	0.08	0.39	0.49	0.00
AT2_LC3	0.81	0.17	0.01	0.00	0.00
AT2_LC4	0.30	0.23	0.13	0.08	0.26
AT2_LC5	0.09	0.66	0.22	0.02	0.01

Annex Table 110: Conditional response probabilities L2noconfYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.83	0.11	0.04	0.01	0.00
AT2_LC2	0.08	0.16	0.38	0.38	0.00
AT2_LC3	0.87	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.00
AT2_LC4	0.36	0.21	0.12	0.05	0.26
AT2_LC5	0.24	0.59	0.15	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 111: Conditional response probabilities L2wthlessYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.89	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.00
AT2_LC2	0.17	0.24	0.29	0.28	0.02
AT2_LC3	0.97	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00
AT2_LC4	0.53	0.11	0.05	0.04	0.26
AT2_LC5	0.49	0.44	0.06	0.00	0.01

Annex Table 112: Conditional response probabilities L2happyYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.69	0.27	0.01	0.02	0.01
AT2_LC2	0.07	0.36	0.38	0.15	0.04
AT2_LC3	0.19	0.79	0.01	0.00	0.01
AT2_LC4	0.17	0.34	0.03	0.02	0.44
AT2_LC5	0.16	0.77	0.05	0.01	0.01

Annex Table 113: Conditional response probabilities L2Relig5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT2_LC1	0.14	0.03	0.03	0.58	0.23
AT2_LC2	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.54	0.32
AT2_LC3	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.58	0.31
AT2_LC4	0.10	0.03	0.02	0.58	0.27
AT2_LC5	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.56	0.30

Annex Table 114: Conditional response probabilities w1atti

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT2_LC1	0.32	0.13	0.21	0.35
AT2_LC2	0.42	0.27	0.14	0.17
AT2_LC3	0.40	0.11	0.22	0.27
AT2_LC4	0.28	0.29	0.31	0.13
AT2_LC5	0.43	0.17	0.22	0.18

Annex Table 115: Estimated class population shares, Attitudes wave 2

0.18	0.13	0.30	0.08	0.31

Annex Table 116: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Attitudes wave 2

0.18	0.13	0.30	0.07	0.31

Annex Table 117: Fit statistics, Attitudes wave 2

AIC(5):	364477.70
BIC(5):	367426.60

Annex Table 118: Conditional response probabilities L2plann16YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR2_LC1	0.43	0.43	0.02	0.13
GR2_LC2	0.52	0.35	0.01	0.11
GR2_LC3	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.01
GR2_LC4	0.95	0.01	0.01	0.04
GR2_LC5	0.99	0.00	0.00	0.01

Annex Table 119: Conditional response probabilities L2modap2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
GR2_LC1	0.36	0.62	0.02
GR2_LC2	0.43	0.55	0.02
GR2_LC3	0.13	0.87	0.01
GR2_LC4	0.13	0.86	0.01
GR2_LC5	0.12	0.88	0.00

Annex Table 120: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR2_LC1	0.08	0.28	0.48	0.05	0.11
GR2_LC2	0.02	0.03	0.41	0.51	0.03
GR2_LC3	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.88	0.01
GR2_LC4	0.00	0.05	0.73	0.19	0.03
GR2_LC5	0.02	0.01	0.14	0.83	0.01

Annex Table 121: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS3YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR2_LC1	0.04	0.57	0.25	0.04	0.10
GR2_LC2	0.43	0.48	0.02	0.07	0.00
GR2_LC3	0.85	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.00
GR2_LC4	0.11	0.78	0.09	0.01	0.02
GR2_LC5	0.61	0.33	0.00	0.06	0.00

Annex Table 122: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS7YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR2_LC1	0.07	0.34	0.44	0.08	0.07
GR2_LC2	0.22	0.60	0.13	0.02	0.03
GR2_LC3	0.69	0.30	0.01	0.00	0.00
GR2_LC4	0.09	0.58	0.26	0.01	0.05
GR2_LC5	0.16	0.71	0.10	0.01	0.02

Annex Table 123: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS10YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR2_LC1	0.10	0.28	0.49	0.02	0.11
GR2_LC2	0.02	0.02	0.58	0.37	0.01
GR2_LC3	0.02	0.00	0.18	0.79	0.00
GR2_LC4	0.01	0.09	0.82	0.04	0.05
GR2_LC5	0.01	0.01	0.51	0.47	0.01

Annex Table 124: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS11YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR2_LC1	0.02	0.26	0.49	0.10	0.12
GR2_LC2	0.09	0.70	0.14	0.02	0.05
GR2_LC3	0.45	0.52	0.01	0.01	0.00
GR2_LC4	0.01	0.59	0.30	0.01	0.08
GR2_LC5	0.02	0.84	0.09	0.01	0.04

Annex Table 125: Conditional response probabilities L2HEPlan

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
GR2_LC1	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.22	0.45	0.10
GR2_LC2	0.08	0.03	0.14	0.25	0.37	0.13
GR2_LC3	0.84	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.06
GR2_LC4	0.67	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.02	0.12
GR2_LC5	0.85	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.07

Annex Table 126: Conditional response probabilities L2Relig5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR2_LC1	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.49	0.45
GR2_LC2	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.53	0.39
GR2_LC3	0.14	0.04	0.03	0.60	0.19
GR2_LC4	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.56	0.29
GR2_LC5	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.59	0.26

Annex Table 127: Conditional response probabilities w1grow

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR2_LC1	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.17	0.21
GR2_LC2	0.18	0.32	0.19	0.08	0.24
GR2_LC3	0.37	0.02	0.53	0.03	0.06
GR2_LC4	0.19	0.04	0.11	0.23	0.42
GR2_LC5	0.45	0.00	0.21	0.10	0.23

Annex Table 128: Estimated class population shares, Growth wave 2

0.10	0.12	0.19	0.27	0.33

Annex Table 129: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Growth wave 2

0.09	0.12	0.17	0.27	0.35

Annex Table 130: Fit statistics, Growth wave 2

AIC(5):	157547.80
BIC(5):	158913.20

Annex Table 131: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS4YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
INT2_LC1	0.11	0.28	0.38	0.20	0.02
INT2_LC2	0.01	0.19	0.57	0.21	0.02
INT2_LC3	0.01	0.11	0.49	0.38	0.01
INT2_LC4	0.14	0.46	0.27	0.05	0.08

Annex Table 132: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS8YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
INT2_LC1	0.20	0.42	0.28	0.07	0.03
INT2_LC2	0.05	0.47	0.42	0.04	0.02
INT2_LC3	0.03	0.29	0.53	0.12	0.03
INT2_LC4	0.32	0.48	0.12	0.02	0.06

Annex Table 133: Conditional response probabilities L2Fat8YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
INT2_LC1	0.37	0.55	0.06	0.01	0.02
INT2_LC2	0.33	0.63	0.02	0.00	0.02
INT2_LC3	0.46	0.51	0.02	0.00	0.00
INT2_LC4	0.26	0.59	0.07	0.01	0.06

Annex Table 134: Conditional response probabilities L2namesYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
INT2_LC1	0.68	0.30	0.02
INT2_LC2	0.19	0.80	0.01
INT2_LC3	0.05	0.95	0.00
INT2_LC4	0.15	0.79	0.06

Annex Table 135: Conditional response probabilities L2excpalYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
INT2_LC1	0.38	0.57	0.05
INT2_LC2	0.10	0.89	0.01
INT2_LC3	0.03	0.97	0.00
INT2_LC4	0.11	0.82	0.06

Annex Table 136: Conditional response probabilities L2moneyYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
INT2_LC1	0.07	0.91	0.01
INT2_LC2	0.01	0.99	0.00
INT2_LC3	0.00	0.99	0.00
INT2_LC4	0.01	0.95	0.04

Annex Table 137: Conditional response probabilities L2thhitYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
INT2_LC1	0.77	0.20	0.02
INT2_LC2	0.06	0.94	0.00
INT2_LC3	0.05	0.95	0.01
INT2_LC4	0.04	0.91	0.05

Annex Table 138: Conditional response probabilities L2achitYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
INT2_LC1	0.56	0.42	0.02
INT2_LC2	0.01	0.99	0.00
INT2_LC3	0.04	0.96	0.00
INT2_LC4	0.06	0.90	0.04

Annex Table 139: Conditional response probabilities L2nosleepYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
INT2_LC1	0.27	0.34	0.24	0.13	0.02
INT2_LC2	0.09	0.60	0.25	0.05	0.00
INT2_LC3	0.72	0.23	0.03	0.00	0.01
INT2_LC4	0.45	0.27	0.10	0.09	0.09

Annex Table 140: Conditional response probabilities L2usefulYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
INT2_LC1	0.20	0.55	0.11	0.05	0.10
INT2_LC2	0.11	0.77	0.06	0.01	0.05
INT2_LC3	0.21	0.71	0.01	0.01	0.07
INT2_LC4	0.12	0.52	0.08	0.06	0.23

Annex Table 141: Conditional response probabilities L2depressYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
INT2_LC1	0.20	0.31	0.27	0.20	0.03
INT2_LC2	0.04	0.58	0.29	0.09	0.01
INT2_LC3	0.76	0.21	0.02	0.00	0.01
INT2_LC4	0.40	0.26	0.13	0.13	0.08

Annex Table 142: Conditional response probabilities w1inte

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
INT2_LC1	0.14	0.10	0.28	0.15	0.34
INT2_LC2	0.27	0.12	0.09	0.48	0.04
INT2_LC3	0.27	0.06	0.06	0.57	0.04
INT2_LC4	0.16	0.43	0.06	0.21	0.15

Annex Table 143: Estimated class population shares, Integration wave 2

0.18	0.23	0.41	0.19

Annex Table 144: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Integration wave 2

0.17	0.24	0.41	0.18

Annex Table 145: Fit statistics, Integration wave 2

AIC(4):	171661.60
BIC(4):	172752.50

Annex Table 146: Conditional response probabilities L2modap2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
AU2_LC1	0.19	0.77	0.04
AU2_LC2	0.21	0.78	0.01
AU2_LC3	0.19	0.81	0.00
AU2_LC4	0.16	0.83	0.01

Annex Table 147: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS12YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU2_LC1	0.09	0.50	0.13	0.02	0.27
AU2_LC2	0.16	0.59	0.17	0.04	0.04
AU2_LC3	0.21	0.70	0.06	0.01	0.02
AU2_LC4	0.13	0.73	0.10	0.01	0.02

Annex Table 148: Conditional response probabilities L2Fat5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU2_LC1	0.06	0.30	0.17	0.02	0.45
AU2_LC2	0.17	0.42	0.26	0.08	0.08
AU2_LC3	0.18	0.50	0.21	0.05	0.07
AU2_LC4	0.11	0.50	0.27	0.06	0.06

Annex Table 149: Conditional response probabilities L2Fat7YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU2_LC1	0.04	0.18	0.27	0.04	0.47
AU2_LC2	0.09	0.24	0.43	0.17	0.08
AU2_LC3	0.04	0.13	0.53	0.25	0.04
AU2_LC4	0.02	0.18	0.61	0.16	0.03

Annex Table 150: Conditional response probabilities L2decideYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU2_LC1	0.14	0.54	0.04	0.03	0.26
AU2_LC2	0.22	0.46	0.19	0.08	0.05
AU2_LC3	0.36	0.61	0.02	0.00	0.01
AU2_LC4	0.21	0.73	0.05	0.00	0.01

Annex Table 151: Conditional response probabilities L2noconfYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU2_LC1	0.42	0.24	0.10	0.02	0.22
AU2_LC2	0.03	0.07	0.37	0.52	0.01
AU2_LC3	0.86	0.12	0.02	0.01	0.00
AU2_LC4	0.06	0.69	0.24	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 152: Conditional response probabilities L2wthlessYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU2_LC1	0.59	0.15	0.04	0.01	0.22
AU2_LC2	0.06	0.12	0.38	0.42	0.02
AU2_LC3	0.96	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00
AU2_LC4	0.31	0.60	0.08	0.00	0.01

Annex Table 153: Conditional response probabilities L2jobYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
AU2_LC1	0.16	0.84
AU2_LC2	0.26	0.74
AU2_LC3	0.26	0.74
AU2_LC4	0.28	0.72

Annex Table 154: Conditional response probabilities L2famsupYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
AU2_LC1	0.79	0.21
AU2_LC2	0.76	0.24
AU2_LC3	0.79	0.21
AU2_LC4	0.80	0.20

Annex Table 155: Conditional response probabilities w1auto

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU2_LC1	0.30	0.25	0.11	0.34
AU2_LC2	0.35	0.13	0.09	0.43
AU2_LC3	0.44	0.07	0.06	0.43
AU2_LC4	0.38	0.08	0.06	0.49

Annex Table 156: Estimated class population shares, Autonomy wave 2

0.09	0.10	0.55	0.26

Annex Table 157: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Autonomy wave 2

0.08	0.09	0.56	0.27

Annex Table 158: Fit statistics, Autonomy wave 2

AIC(4):	153641.50
BIC(4):	154535.30

Annex Table 159: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE2_LC1	0.16	0.38	0.26	0.17	0.03
PE2_LC2	0.12	0.55	0.21	0.05	0.06
PE2_LC3	0.32	0.54	0.08	0.02	0.04
PE2_LC4	0.10	0.42	0.20	0.10	0.18
PE2_LC5	0.23	0.47	0.21	0.06	0.03

Annex Table 160: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS10YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE2_LC1	0.07	0.18	0.56	0.16	0.04
PE2_LC2	0.01	0.05	0.72	0.20	0.02
PE2_LC3	0.01	0.01	0.33	0.65	0.00
PE2_LC4	0.02	0.07	0.55	0.23	0.13
PE2_LC5	0.01	0.05	0.54	0.38	0.02

Annex Table 161: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS11YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE2_LC1	0.04	0.42	0.39	0.08	0.07
PE2_LC2	0.01	0.68	0.24	0.01	0.06
PE2_LC3	0.24	0.72	0.02	0.01	0.01
PE2_LC4	0.06	0.47	0.24	0.03	0.21
PE2_LC5	0.14	0.70	0.13	0.01	0.02

Annex Table 162: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS12YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE2_LC1	0.08	0.53	0.28	0.05	0.06
PE2_LC2	0.04	0.79	0.11	0.01	0.05
PE2_LC3	0.30	0.68	0.01	0.00	0.01
PE2_LC4	0.08	0.58	0.12	0.02	0.21
PE2_LC5	0.33	0.63	0.02	0.00	0.01

Annex Table 163: Conditional response probabilities L2comp2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE2_LC1	0.66	0.11	0.20	0.02	0.00
PE2_LC2	0.06	0.04	0.83	0.06	0.01
PE2_LC3	0.07	0.02	0.64	0.25	0.01
PE2_LC4	0.16	0.04	0.38	0.15	0.27
PE2_LC5	0.14	0.39	0.27	0.18	0.02

Annex Table 164: Conditional response probabilities L2comp3YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE2_LC1	0.51	0.13	0.34	0.00	0.02
PE2_LC2	0.01	0.02	0.94	0.02	0.00
PE2_LC3	0.04	0.01	0.88	0.06	0.01
PE2_LC4	0.08	0.03	0.57	0.07	0.26
PE2_LC5	0.09	0.34	0.48	0.08	0.01

Annex Table 165: Conditional response probabilities L2comp4YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
PE2_LC1	0.13	0.49	0.31	0.07
PE2_LC2	0.02	0.03	0.93	0.02
PE2_LC3	0.09	0.01	0.89	0.01
PE2_LC4	0.09	0.08	0.47	0.37
PE2_LC5	0.47	0.11	0.37	0.04

Annex Table 166: Conditional response probabilities L2comp5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
PE2_LC1	0.12	0.52	0.30	0.06
PE2_LC2	0.01	0.03	0.95	0.01
PE2_LC3	0.05	0.01	0.93	0.01
PE2_LC4	0.08	0.07	0.50	0.35
PE2_LC5	0.37	0.18	0.42	0.03

Annex Table 167: Conditional response probabilities L2comp6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
PE2_LC1	0.57	0.15	0.24	0.04
PE2_LC2	0.05	0.13	0.79	0.03
PE2_LC3	0.01	0.18	0.78	0.03
PE2_LC4	0.09	0.17	0.44	0.30
PE2_LC5	0.07	0.52	0.36	0.06

Annex Table 168: Conditional response probabilities L2SMOKE

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE2_LC1	0.59	0.07	0.10	0.23	0.02
PE2_LC2	0.80	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.01
PE2_LC3	0.97	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00
PE2_LC4	0.83	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.03
PE2_LC5	0.90	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 169: Conditional response probabilities L2ALC

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE2_LC1	0.25	0.21	0.27	0.25	0.03
PE2_LC2	0.25	0.30	0.29	0.12	0.03
PE2_LC3	0.58	0.22	0.14	0.03	0.02
PE2_LC4	0.48	0.23	0.13	0.08	0.09
PE2_LC5	0.50	0.22	0.19	0.08	0.01

Annex Table 170: Conditional response probabilities L2difficYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE2_LC1	0.32	0.30	0.17	0.14	0.07
PE2_LC2	0.32	0.47	0.12	0.05	0.03
PE2_LC3	0.53	0.33	0.08	0.03	0.02
PE2_LC4	0.24	0.29	0.14	0.07	0.27
PE2_LC5	0.37	0.36	0.18	0.07	0.02

Annex Table 171: Conditional response probabilities L2probsYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE2_LC1	0.33	0.49	0.10	0.06	0.02
PE2_LC2	0.21	0.72	0.05	0.02	0.01
PE2_LC3	0.29	0.68	0.02	0.01	0.01
PE2_LC4	0.20	0.54	0.07	0.04	0.15
PE2_LC5	0.32	0.57	0.10	0.01	0.01

Annex Table 172: Conditional response probabilities L2HEPlan

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
PE2_LC1	0.36	0.07	0.07	0.20	0.21	0.09
PE2_LC2	0.56	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.13	0.11
PE2_LC3	0.82	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.07
PE2_LC4	0.45	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.19	0.18
PE2_LC5	0.79	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.05

Annex Table 173: Conditional response probabilities w1perc

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
PE2_LC1	0.53	0.21	0.26
PE2_LC2	0.44	0.35	0.21
PE2_LC3	0.21	0.63	0.16
PE2_LC4	0.40	0.34	0.26
PE2_LC5	0.35	0.48	0.17

Annex Table 174: Estimated class population shares, Perception wave 2

0.13	0.31	0.30	0.09	0.16

Annex Table 175: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Perception wave 2

0.13	0.32	0.31	0.08	0.16

Annex Table 176: Fit statistics, Perception wave 2

AIC(5):	252387.50
BIC(5):	254386.20

Annex Table 177: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS1YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA2_LC1	0.12	0.59	0.19	0.06	0.04
MA2_LC2	0.21	0.75	0.03	0.00	0.01
MA2_LC3	0.02	0.13	0.54	0.19	0.12
MA2_LC4	0.82	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00
MA2_LC5	0.08	0.86	0.03	0.00	0.03

Annex Table 178: Conditional response probabilities L2YYS6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA2_LC1	0.12	0.58	0.21	0.06	0.03
MA2_LC2	0.18	0.76	0.04	0.00	0.02
MA2_LC3	0.00	0.13	0.60	0.17	0.09
MA2_LC4	0.79	0.20	0.00	0.01	0.00
MA2_LC5	0.08	0.85	0.04	0.00	0.02

Annex Table 179: Conditional response probabilities L2truantYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA2_LC1	0.70	0.27	0.02
MA2_LC2	0.12	0.86	0.02
MA2_LC3	0.27	0.68	0.05
MA2_LC4	0.05	0.93	0.01
MA2_LC5	0.08	0.90	0.02

Annex Table 180: Conditional response probabilities L2canntryYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
MA2_LC1	0.62	0.38
MA2_LC2	0.13	0.87
MA2_LC3	0.16	0.84
MA2_LC4	0.04	0.96
MA2_LC5	0.03	0.97

Annex Table 181: Conditional response probabilities L2sprayYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA2_LC1	0.24	0.76	0.00
MA2_LC2	0.01	0.99	0.00
MA2_LC3	0.02	0.97	0.01
MA2_LC4	0.00	1.00	0.00
MA2_LC5	0.00	0.99	0.00

Annex Table 182: Conditional response probabilities L2smashYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA2_LC1	0.37	0.61	0.02
MA2_LC2	0.03	0.96	0.01
MA2_LC3	0.03	0.95	0.02
MA2_LC4	0.01	0.99	0.00
MA2_LC5	0.01	0.98	0.01

Annex Table 183: Conditional response probabilities L2shopYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA2_LC1	0.33	0.66	0.02
MA2_LC2	0.03	0.96	0.00
MA2_LC3	0.04	0.95	0.02
MA2_LC4	0.01	0.99	0.00
MA2_LC5	0.02	0.98	0.00

Annex Table 184: Conditional response probabilities L2fightYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA2_LC1	0.57	0.41	0.02
MA2_LC2	0.09	0.89	0.01
MA2_LC3	0.11	0.85	0.03
MA2_LC4	0.03	0.96	0.00
MA2_LC5	0.04	0.96	0.00

Annex Table 185: Conditional response probabilities L2activYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA2_LC1	0.26	0.57	0.10	0.04	0.03
MA2_LC2	0.24	0.69	0.05	0.01	0.01
MA2_LC3	0.11	0.56	0.17	0.09	0.07
MA2_LC4	0.33	0.61	0.04	0.01	0.01
MA2_LC5	0.14	0.74	0.09	0.02	0.02

Annex Table 186: Conditional response probabilities L2happyYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA2_LC1	0.27	0.51	0.11	0.04	0.07
MA2_LC2	0.28	0.62	0.05	0.01	0.03
MA2_LC3	0.12	0.48	0.16	0.10	0.14
MA2_LC4	0.39	0.55	0.02	0.01	0.02
MA2_LC5	0.18	0.68	0.09	0.02	0.03

Annex Table 187: Conditional response probabilities L2jobYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
MA2_LC1	0.29	0.71
MA2_LC2	0.34	0.66
MA2_LC3	0.22	0.78
MA2_LC4	0.18	0.82
MA2_LC5	0.18	0.82

Annex Table 188: Conditional response probabilities L2palhomeYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA2_LC1	0.29	0.34	0.21	0.16
MA2_LC2	0.18	0.45	0.26	0.11
MA2_LC3	0.46	0.34	0.12	0.08
MA2_LC4	0.55	0.39	0.05	0.01
MA2_LC5	0.69	0.28	0.03	0.01

Annex Table 189: Conditional response probabilities L2paloutYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA2_LC1	0.07	0.20	0.32	0.41
MA2_LC2	0.01	0.29	0.43	0.28
MA2_LC3	0.26	0.37	0.22	0.16
MA2_LC4	0.35	0.46	0.16	0.03
MA2_LC5	0.47	0.45	0.08	0.01

Annex Table 190: Conditional response probabilities L2whofreeYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
MA2_LC1	0.70	0.20	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.00
MA2_LC2	0.70	0.25	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00
MA2_LC3	0.44	0.18	0.05	0.11	0.19	0.01	0.01
MA2_LC4	0.33	0.16	0.13	0.26	0.10	0.01	0.00
MA2_LC5	0.26	0.14	0.12	0.27	0.20	0.01	0.01

Annex Table 191: Conditional response probabilities w1mast

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA2_LC1	0.09	0.22	0.02	0.62	0.06
MA2_LC2	0.14	0.67	0.09	0.08	0.03
MA2_LC3	0.21	0.31	0.04	0.13	0.31
MA2_LC4	0.23	0.15	0.58	0.02	0.01
MA2_LC5	0.57	0.15	0.20	0.02	0.06

Annex Table 192: Estimated class population shares, Mastery wave 2

0.13	0.35	0.09	0.16	0.27

Annex Table 193: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Mastery wave 2

0.13	0.36	0.09	0.16	0.27

Annex Table 194: Fit statistics, Mastery wave 2

AIC(5):	191991.00
BIC(5):	193567.50

Annex Table 195: Conditional response probabilities L3hea1cYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT3_LC1	0.60	0.37	0.02	0.00
AT3_LC2	0.74	0.24	0.01	0.00
AT3_LC3	0.50	0.44	0.05	0.01

Annex Table 196: Conditional response probabilities L3ambitbYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT3_LC1	0.27	0.36	0.34	0.03
AT3_LC2	0.27	0.31	0.38	0.03
AT3_LC3	0.32	0.33	0.33	0.03

Annex Table 197: Conditional response probabilities L3yys4YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT3_LC1	0.00	0.18	0.72	0.07	0.03
AT3_LC2	0.01	0.01	0.24	0.74	0.00
AT3_LC3	0.31	0.57	0.07	0.02	0.02

Annex Table 198: Conditional response probabilities L3yys6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT3_LC1	0.12	0.83	0.03	0.00	0.02
AT3_LC2	0.67	0.31	0.00	0.01	0.00
AT3_LC3	0.04	0.32	0.43	0.16	0.05

Annex Table 199: Conditional response probabilities L3yys9YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT3_LC1	0.02	0.40	0.53	0.01	0.05
AT3_LC2	0.01	0.09	0.66	0.21	0.02
AT3_LC3	0.36	0.54	0.06	0.01	0.03

Annex Table 200: Conditional response probabilities w2atti

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT3_LC1	0.14	0.13	0.29	0.08	0.37
AT3_LC2	0.28	0.07	0.39	0.03	0.24
AT3_LC3	0.13	0.29	0.17	0.14	0.28

Annex Table 201: Estimated class population shares, Attitudes wave 3

0.52	0.32	0.17

Annex Table 202: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Attitudes wave 3

0.54	0.31	0.15

Annex Table 203: Fit statistics, Attitudes wave 3

AIC(3):	111224.30
BIC(3):	111702.90

Annex Table 204: Conditional response probabilities L3plann16YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
GR3_LC1	0.48	0.42	0.10
GR3_LC2	0.81	0.00	0.19
GR3_LC3	0.81	0.00	0.19
GR3_LC4	0.64	0.27	0.08
GR3_LC5	0.81	0.01	0.19

Annex Table 205: Conditional response probabilities L3dec16aYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
GR3_LC1	0.10	0.21	0.16	0.16	0.34	0.02	0.01
GR3_LC2	0.04	0.11	0.17	0.15	0.44	0.01	0.09
GR3_LC3	0.01	0.04	0.09	0.12	0.61	0.01	0.13
GR3_LC4	0.08	0.18	0.26	0.18	0.26	0.01	0.02
GR3_LC5	0.02	0.07	0.10	0.12	0.56	0.00	0.12

Annex Table 206: Conditional response probabilities L3HEPlan

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
GR3_LC1	0.09	0.03	0.05	0.16	0.58	0.08
GR3_LC2	0.71	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.10
GR3_LC3	0.91	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.04
GR3_LC4	0.07	0.04	0.15	0.21	0.39	0.14
GR3_LC5	0.86	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.06

Annex Table 207: Conditional response probabilities L3yys2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR3_LC1	0.12	0.24	0.48	0.06	0.10
GR3_LC2	0.00	0.04	0.70	0.24	0.02
GR3_LC3	0.01	0.00	0.09	0.90	0.00
GR3_LC4	0.01	0.01	0.41	0.57	0.01
GR3_LC5	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.92	0.01

Annex Table 208: Conditional response probabilities L3yys3YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR3_LC1	0.06	0.57	0.22	0.06	0.09
GR3_LC2	0.14	0.77	0.07	0.01	0.02
GR3_LC3	0.68	0.26	0.00	0.06	0.00
GR3_LC4	0.51	0.44	0.02	0.04	0.00
GR3_LC5	0.90	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.00

Annex Table 209: Conditional response probabilities L3yys7YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR3_LC1	0.07	0.32	0.46	0.10	0.05
GR3_LC2	0.09	0.58	0.29	0.02	0.03
GR3_LC3	0.15	0.76	0.08	0.00	0.01
GR3_LC4	0.22	0.62	0.13	0.01	0.02
GR3_LC5	0.73	0.26	0.01	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 210: Conditional response probabilities L3yys10YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR3_LC1	0.12	0.30	0.47	0.02	0.09
GR3_LC2	0.01	0.08	0.85	0.03	0.03
GR3_LC3	0.00	0.01	0.52	0.47	0.01
GR3_LC4	0.01	0.02	0.58	0.37	0.01
GR3_LC5	0.03	0.01	0.17	0.80	0.00

Annex Table 211: Conditional response probabilities L3yys11YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR3_LC1	0.01	0.25	0.50	0.13	0.11
GR3_LC2	0.02	0.59	0.30	0.01	0.07
GR3_LC3	0.02	0.85	0.10	0.01	0.02
GR3_LC4	0.07	0.71	0.17	0.02	0.03
GR3_LC5	0.47	0.49	0.01	0.02	0.01

Annex Table 212: Conditional response probabilities w2grow

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR3_LC1	0.59	0.18	0.01	0.19	0.03
GR3_LC2	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.61	0.26
GR3_LC3	0.00	0.01	0.13	0.19	0.68
GR3_LC4	0.12	0.54	0.06	0.17	0.11
GR3_LC5	0.00	0.04	0.63	0.06	0.27

Annex Table 213: Estimated class population shares, Growth wave 3

0.10	0.25	0.33	0.14	0.18

Annex Table 214: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Growth wave 3

0.10	0.25	0.32	0.14	0.19

Annex Table 215: Fit statistics, Growth wave 3

AIC(5):	151648.10
BIC(5):	152978.30

Annex Table 216: Conditional response probabilities L3yys4YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN3_LC1	0.00	0.06	0.51	0.43	0.01
IN3_LC2	0.12	0.28	0.40	0.17	0.03
IN3_LC3	0.12	0.39	0.40	0.04	0.04

Annex Table 217: Conditional response probabilities L3yys8YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN3_LC1	0.01	0.24	0.60	0.13	0.02
IN3_LC2	0.19	0.44	0.31	0.05	0.02
IN3_LC3	0.24	0.59	0.13	0.01	0.03

Annex Table 218: Conditional response probabilities L3namesYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN3_LC1	0.04	0.95	0.01
IN3_LC2	0.57	0.41	0.03
IN3_LC3	0.07	0.91	0.01

Annex Table 219: Conditional response probabilities L3excpalYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN3_LC1	0.03	0.97	0.00
IN3_LC2	0.33	0.64	0.03
IN3_LC3	0.08	0.91	0.01

Annex Table 220: Conditional response probabilities L3moneyYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN3_LC1	0.00	1.00	0.00
IN3_LC2	0.05	0.93	0.02
IN3_LC3	0.01	0.99	0.01

Annex Table 221: Conditional response probabilities L3thhitYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN3_LC1	0.02	0.98	0.00
IN3_LC2	0.65	0.32	0.03
IN3_LC3	0.02	0.98	0.01

Annex Table 222: Conditional response probabilities L3achitYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN3_LC1	0.01	0.98	0.00
IN3_LC2	0.43	0.55	0.02
IN3_LC3	0.02	0.97	0.01

Annex Table 223: Conditional response probabilities w2inte

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
IN3_LC1	0.06	0.28	0.61	0.05
IN3_LC2	0.64	0.12	0.12	0.12
IN3_LC3	0.12	0.23	0.21	0.43

Annex Table 224: Estimated class population shares, Integration wave 3

0.54	0.16	0.30

Annex Table 225: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Integration wave 3

0.58	0.16	0.27

Annex Table 226: Fit statistics, Integration wave 3

AIC(3):	85870.33
BIC(3):	86327.79

Annex Table 227: Conditional response probabilities L3dec16aYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
AU3_LC1	0.08	0.17	0.19	0.17	0.34	0.01	0.05
AU3_LC2	0.04	0.13	0.20	0.15	0.43	0.01	0.05
AU3_LC3	0.02	0.05	0.10	0.12	0.58	0.01	0.13

Annex Table 228: Conditional response probabilities L3ambitbYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU3_LC1	0.33	0.33	0.30	0.03
AU3_LC2	0.27	0.42	0.31	0.01
AU3_LC3	0.25	0.33	0.39	0.03

Annex Table 229: Conditional response probabilities L3yys12YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU3_LC1	0.00	0.67	0.20	0.02	0.11
AU3_LC2	0.11	0.74	0.11	0.01	0.03
AU3_LC3	0.32	0.68	0.01	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 230: Conditional response probabilities L3jobYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
AU3_LC1	0.13	0.87
AU3_LC2	1.00	0.00
AU3_LC3	0.17	0.83

Annex Table 231: Conditional response probabilities L3jobfamYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
AU3_LC1	0.07	0.93
AU3_LC2	0.22	0.78
AU3_LC3	0.06	0.94

Annex Table 232: Conditional response probabilities L3famsupYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
AU3_LC1	0.80	0.20
AU3_LC2	0.53	0.47
AU3_LC3	0.83	0.17

Annex Table 233: Conditional response probabilities w2auto

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU3_LC1	0.18	0.14	0.39	0.30
AU3_LC2	0.03	0.11	0.54	0.33
AU3_LC3	0.04	0.07	0.66	0.23

Annex Table 234: Estimated class population shares, Autonomy wave 3

0.32	0.13	0.54

Annex Table 235: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Autonomy wave 3

0.25	0.16	0.59

Annex Table 236: Fit statistics, Autonomy wave 3

AIC(3):	102635.30
BIC(3):	103050.60

Annex Table 237: Conditional response probabilities L3plann16YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
PE3_LC1	0.82	0.01	0.17
PE3_LC2	0.79	0.01	0.20
PE3_LC3	0.50	0.43	0.06
PE3_LC4	0.59	0.31	0.10
PE3_LC5	0.81	0.00	0.19

Annex Table 238: Conditional response probabilities L3HEPlan

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
PE3_LC1	0.82	0.01	0.08	0.02	0.01	0.07
PE3_LC2	0.87	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04
PE3_LC3	0.00	0.03	0.10	0.23	0.55	0.09
PE3_LC4	0.15	0.05	0.05	0.17	0.50	0.09
PE3_LC5	0.71	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.12

Annex Table 239: Conditional response probabilities L3yys5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE3_LC1	0.24	0.53	0.16	0.05	0.02
PE3_LC2	0.41	0.48	0.08	0.02	0.02
PE3_LC3	0.13	0.57	0.21	0.06	0.03
PE3_LC4	0.11	0.29	0.26	0.24	0.10
PE3_LC5	0.12	0.55	0.20	0.04	0.09

Annex Table 240: Conditional response probabilities L3yys10YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE3_LC1	0.01	0.05	0.69	0.24	0.01
PE3_LC2	0.02	0.01	0.29	0.68	0.00
PE3_LC3	0.00	0.06	0.68	0.25	0.01
PE3_LC4	0.11	0.26	0.48	0.06	0.09
PE3_LC5	0.00	0.04	0.68	0.25	0.03

Annex Table 241: Conditional response probabilities L3yys11YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE3_LC1	0.01	0.69	0.25	0.01	0.03
PE3_LC2	0.30	0.67	0.01	0.01	0.00
PE3_LC3	0.03	0.72	0.22	0.00	0.03
PE3_LC4	0.02	0.17	0.52	0.15	0.13
PE3_LC5	0.02	0.71	0.19	0.01	0.07

Annex Table 242: Conditional response probabilities L3yys12YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE3_LC1	0.11	0.83	0.05	0.00	0.01
PE3_LC2	0.45	0.54	0.00	0.00	0.00
PE3_LC3	0.05	0.71	0.18	0.00	0.05
PE3_LC4	0.02	0.42	0.37	0.05	0.14
PE3_LC5	0.06	0.83	0.05	0.00	0.06

Annex Table 243: Conditional response probabilities L3ALC

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE3_LC1	0.01	0.20	0.48	0.31	0.00
PE3_LC2	0.48	0.25	0.21	0.05	0.01
PE3_LC3	0.19	0.27	0.35	0.18	0.01
PE3_LC4	0.12	0.20	0.28	0.35	0.05
PE3_LC5	0.54	0.27	0.14	0.01	0.05

Annex Table 244: Conditional response probabilities L3SMOKE

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE3_LC1	0.59	0.11	0.18	0.12	0.00
PE3_LC2	0.95	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00
PE3_LC3	0.70	0.04	0.07	0.19	0.01
PE3_LC4	0.46	0.05	0.12	0.34	0.03
PE3_LC5	0.95	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01

Annex Table 245: Conditional response probabilities w2perc

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE3_LC1	0.15	0.57	0.09	0.03	0.15
PE3_LC2	0.02	0.10	0.64	0.03	0.21
PE3_LC3	0.21	0.51	0.12	0.07	0.09
PE3_LC4	0.50	0.26	0.01	0.20	0.03
PE3_LC5	0.08	0.34	0.27	0.15	0.17

Annex Table 246: Estimated class population shares, Perception wave 3

0.21	0.31	0.11	0.10	0.27

Annex Table 247: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Perception wave 3

0.22	0.31	0.10	0.10	0.27

Annex Table 248: Fit statistics, Perception wave 3

AIC(5):	155391.00
BIC(5):	156650.80

Annex Table 249: Conditional response probabilities L3yys1YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA3_LC1	0.08	0.88	0.02	0.00	0.01
MA3_LC2	0.00	0.14	0.53	0.23	0.10
MA3_LC3	0.84	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00
MA3_LC4	0.15	0.62	0.15	0.06	0.03

Annex Table 250: Conditional response probabilities L3yys6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA3_LC1	0.09	0.88	0.03	0.00	0.01
MA3_LC2	0.00	0.08	0.60	0.22	0.10
MA3_LC3	0.84	0.15	0.00	0.01	0.00
MA3_LC4	0.15	0.63	0.16	0.05	0.02

Annex Table 251: Conditional response probabilities L3truantYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA3_LC1	0.12	0.86	0.02
MA3_LC2	0.33	0.63	0.04
MA3_LC3	0.07	0.92	0.01
MA3_LC4	0.73	0.25	0.02

Annex Table 252: Conditional response probabilities L3canntryYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
MA3_LC1	0.12	0.88
MA3_LC2	0.26	0.74
MA3_LC3	0.08	0.92
MA3_LC4	0.76	0.24

Annex Table 253: Conditional response probabilities L3sprayYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
MA3_LC1	0.01	0.99
MA3_LC2	0.02	0.98
MA3_LC3	0.01	0.99
MA3_LC4	0.18	0.82

Annex Table 254: Conditional response probabilities L3smashYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA3_LC1	0.01	0.98	0.01
MA3_LC2	0.05	0.94	0.00
MA3_LC3	0.01	0.99	0.00
MA3_LC4	0.30	0.68	0.02

Annex Table 255: Conditional response probabilities L3shopYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
MA3_LC1	0.02	0.98
MA3_LC2	0.04	0.96
MA3_LC3	0.02	0.98
MA3_LC4	0.30	0.70

Annex Table 256: Conditional response probabilities L3fightYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
MA3_LC1	0.05	0.95	0.01
MA3_LC2	0.13	0.86	0.01
MA3_LC3	0.04	0.96	0.00
MA3_LC4	0.49	0.50	0.01

Annex Table 257: Conditional response probabilities L3jobYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
MA3_LC1	0.27	0.73
MA3_LC2	0.21	0.79
MA3_LC3	0.24	0.76
MA3_LC4	0.33	0.67

Annex Table 258: Conditional response probabilities w2mast

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA3_LC1	0.03	0.44	0.06	0.08	0.39
MA3_LC2	0.12	0.20	0.51	0.01	0.16
MA3_LC3	0.02	0.31	0.01	0.45	0.21
MA3_LC4	0.67	0.23	0.05	0.00	0.04

Annex Table 259: Estimated class population shares, Mastery wave 3

0.51	0.09	0.26	0.14

Annex Table 260: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Mastery wave 3

0.55	0.09	0.22	0.14

Annex Table 261: Fit statistics, Mastery wave 3

AIC(4):	93309.53
BIC(4):	93949.98

Annex Table 262: Conditional response probabilities w3atti

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
AT4_LC1	0.51	0.39	0.10
AT4_LC2	0.58	0.24	0.18
AT4_LC3	0.49	0.22	0.28
AT4_LC4	0.47	0.37	0.16
AT4_LC5	0.59	0.28	0.13

Annex Table 263: Conditional response probabilities L4Hea1CYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT4_LC1	0.69	0.29	0.02	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.36	0.53	0.10	0.01
AT4_LC3	0.23	0.47	0.21	0.08
AT4_LC4	0.63	0.33	0.04	0.01
AT4_LC5	0.46	0.49	0.04	0.01

Annex Table 264: Conditional response probabilities L4ConcenYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT4_LC1	0.10	0.87	0.02	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.08	0.58	0.31	0.03
AT4_LC3	0.07	0.35	0.39	0.19
AT4_LC4	0.45	0.48	0.06	0.01
AT4_LC5	0.06	0.83	0.11	0.00

Annex Table 265: Conditional response probabilities L4NoSleepYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT4_LC1	0.75	0.22	0.02	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.11	0.35	0.42	0.13
AT4_LC3	0.05	0.16	0.38	0.41
AT4_LC4	0.51	0.32	0.13	0.04
AT4_LC5	0.22	0.60	0.16	0.02

Annex Table 266: Conditional response probabilities L4UsefulYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT4_LC1	0.14	0.84	0.01	0.00	0.01
AT4_LC2	0.16	0.62	0.17	0.03	0.01
AT4_LC3	0.09	0.35	0.34	0.21	0.01
AT4_LC4	0.55	0.40	0.03	0.01	0.01
AT4_LC5	0.15	0.79	0.05	0.00	0.01

Annex Table 267: Conditional response probabilities L4DecideYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT4_LC1	0.27	0.72	0.01	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.29	0.57	0.12	0.02
AT4_LC3	0.18	0.37	0.31	0.14
AT4_LC4	0.79	0.19	0.01	0.01
AT4_LC5	0.28	0.68	0.03	0.00

Annex Table 268: Conditional response probabilities L4StrainYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT4_LC1	0.60	0.31	0.08	0.01	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.05	0.24	0.53	0.17	0.00
AT4_LC3	0.02	0.09	0.35	0.54	0.00
AT4_LC4	0.41	0.34	0.18	0.05	0.01
AT4_LC5	0.11	0.59	0.27	0.03	0.00

Annex Table 269: Conditional response probabilities L4DifficYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT4_LC1	0.74	0.23	0.02	0.00	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.09	0.39	0.45	0.06	0.01
AT4_LC3	0.05	0.13	0.34	0.48	0.00
AT4_LC4	0.60	0.26	0.09	0.05	0.01
AT4_LC5	0.18	0.70	0.11	0.01	0.01

Annex Table 270: Conditional response probabilities L4ActivYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT4_LC1	0.19	0.78	0.03	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.10	0.57	0.29	0.04
AT4_LC3	0.03	0.25	0.48	0.24
AT4_LC4	0.61	0.32	0.05	0.02
AT4_LC5	0.17	0.75	0.07	0.00

Annex Table 271: Conditional response probabilities L4ProbsYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT4_LC1	0.10	0.89	0.01	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.18	0.58	0.22	0.02
AT4_LC3	0.09	0.26	0.39	0.26
AT4_LC4	0.67	0.31	0.01	0.01
AT4_LC5	0.17	0.80	0.03	0.00

Annex Table 272: Conditional response probabilities L4DepressYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT4_LC1	0.91	0.08	0.01	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.05	0.25	0.57	0.12
AT4_LC3	0.02	0.02	0.22	0.75
AT4_LC4	0.67	0.23	0.08	0.02
AT4_LC5	0.25	0.62	0.13	0.01

Annex Table 273: Conditional response probabilities L4NoConfYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT4_LC1	0.93	0.07	0.01	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.18	0.33	0.43	0.06
AT4_LC3	0.03	0.10	0.23	0.64
AT4_LC4	0.81	0.14	0.04	0.01
AT4_LC5	0.41	0.52	0.06	0.01

Annex Table 274: Conditional response probabilities L4LthlessYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT4_LC1	0.99	0.01	0.00	0.00
AT4_LC2	0.39	0.35	0.24	0.03
AT4_LC3	0.12	0.14	0.26	0.47
AT4_LC4	0.89	0.08	0.02	0.01
AT4_LC5	0.69	0.29	0.02	0.00

Annex Table 275: Conditional response probabilities L4HappyYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT4_LC1	0.22	0.77	0.01	0.00	0.01
AT4_LC2	0.07	0.60	0.30	0.02	0.01
AT4_LC3	0.03	0.18	0.53	0.24	0.00
AT4_LC4	0.66	0.30	0.01	0.02	0.00
AT4_LC5	0.16	0.81	0.02	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 276: Conditional response probabilities L4Relig5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT4_LC1	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.84
AT4_LC2	0.08	0.05	0.11	0.77
AT4_LC3	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.73
AT4_LC4	0.12	0.06	0.08	0.75
AT4_LC5	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.79

Annex Table 277: Estimated class population shares, Attitudes wave 4

0.25	0.21	0.06	0.20	0.29

Annex Table 278: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Attitudes wave 4

0.25	0.20	0.06	0.19	0.29

Annex Table 279: Fit statistics, Attitudes wave 4

AIC(5):	227560.40
BIC(5):	229277.60

Annex Table 280: Conditional response probabilities w3grow

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR4_LC1	0.50	0.23	0.03	0.22	0.02
GR4_LC2	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.40	0.10
GR4_LC3	0.02	0.37	0.44	0.04	0.13
GR4_LC4	0.00	0.11	0.46	0.02	0.41

Annex Table 281: Conditional response probabilities L4School2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR4_LC1	0.02	0.31	0.49	0.15	0.03
GR4_LC2	0.15	0.74	0.10	0.00	0.01
GR4_LC3	0.04	0.71	0.22	0.01	0.01
GR4_LC4	0.41	0.57	0.02	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 282: Conditional response probabilities L4School3YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR4_LC1	0.14	0.50	0.28	0.04	0.04
GR4_LC2	0.02	0.12	0.70	0.15	0.00
GR4_LC3	0.02	0.20	0.68	0.08	0.01
GR4_LC4	0.01	0.02	0.42	0.54	0.00

Annex Table 283: Conditional response probabilities L4School4YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR4_LC1	0.02	0.33	0.50	0.12	0.03
GR4_LC2	0.19	0.70	0.11	0.00	0.00
GR4_LC3	0.05	0.66	0.26	0.02	0.01
GR4_LC4	0.41	0.55	0.03	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 284: Conditional response probabilities L4School5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR4_LC1	0.02	0.40	0.45	0.09	0.04
GR4_LC2	0.17	0.76	0.07	0.00	0.00
GR4_LC3	0.08	0.77	0.14	0.01	0.00
GR4_LC4	0.48	0.50	0.01	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 285: Conditional response probabilities L4Heposs9YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR4_LC1	0.02	0.09	0.26	0.59	0.03
GR4_LC2	0.01	0.15	0.44	0.37	0.04
GR4_LC3	0.68	0.30	0.01	0.00	0.01
GR4_LC4	0.84	0.14	0.01	0.00	0.01

Annex Table 286: Conditional response probabilities L4Youth1YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR4_LC1	0.05	0.02	0.07	0.86
GR4_LC2	0.06	0.03	0.07	0.83
GR4_LC3	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.84
GR4_LC4	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.79

Annex Table 287: Conditional response probabilities L4Relig5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR4_LC1	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.92
GR4_LC2	0.05	0.02	0.07	0.86
GR4_LC3	0.08	0.06	0.09	0.77
GR4_LC4	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.68

Annex Table 288: Conditional response probabilities L4NextyrYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)	Pr(8)
GR4_LC1	0.05	0.13	0.63	0.10	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03
GR4_LC2	0.07	0.20	0.59	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02
GR4_LC3	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.91	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01
GR4_LC4	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.93	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 289: Estimated class population shares, Growth wave 4

0.13	0.23	0.35	0.28

Annex Table 290: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Growth wave 4

0.13	0.24	0.36	0.27

Annex Table 291: Fit statistics, Growth wave 4

AIC(4):	145389.00
BIC(4):	146451.80

Annex Table 292: Conditional response probabilities w3inte

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
IN4_LC1	0.85	0.06	0.09
IN4_LC2	0.34	0.33	0.33
IN4_LC3	0.69	0.16	0.16
IN4_LC4	0.21	0.18	0.60

Annex Table 293: Conditional response probabilities L4School1YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN4_LC1	0.01	0.11	0.71	0.17	0.00
IN4_LC2	0.09	0.36	0.47	0.07	0.01
IN4_LC3	0.01	0.15	0.71	0.12	0.00
IN4_LC4	0.13	0.53	0.32	0.00	0.02

Annex Table 294: Conditional response probabilities L4NoSleepYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
IN4_LC1	0.64	0.30	0.05	0.01
IN4_LC2	0.05	0.20	0.45	0.30
IN4_LC3	0.10	0.59	0.27	0.03
IN4_LC4	0.53	0.35	0.10	0.02

Annex Table 295: Conditional response probabilities L4UsefulYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN4_LC1	0.26	0.72	0.01	0.00	0.01
IN4_LC2	0.16	0.45	0.26	0.11	0.02
IN4_LC3	0.21	0.71	0.08	0.00	0.00
IN4_LC4	0.23	0.68	0.05	0.02	0.02

Annex Table 296: Conditional response probabilities L4DepressYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
IN4_LC1	0.85	0.13	0.01	0.01
IN4_LC2	0.03	0.09	0.44	0.43
IN4_LC3	0.06	0.60	0.32	0.02
IN4_LC4	0.57	0.32	0.10	0.00

Annex Table 297: Conditional response probabilities L4Spares6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN4_LC1	0.04	0.18	0.59	0.17	0.03
IN4_LC2	0.17	0.30	0.39	0.11	0.03
IN4_LC3	0.03	0.22	0.60	0.13	0.03
IN4_LC4	0.11	0.31	0.47	0.07	0.04

Annex Table 298: Estimated class population shares, Integration wave 4

0.34	0.16	0.27	0.23

Annex Table 299: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Integration wave 4

0.35	0.15	0.28	0.22

Annex Table 300: Fit statistics, Integration wave 4

AIC(4):	107980.60
BIC(4):	108564.70

Annex Table 301: Conditional response probabilities w3auto

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
AU4_LC1	0.10	0.10	0.79
AU4_LC2	0.32	0.17	0.51
AU4_LC3	0.38	0.21	0.41

Annex Table 302: Conditional response probabilities L4School2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU4_LC1	0.25	0.66	0.08	0.01	0.00
AU4_LC2	0.11	0.59	0.25	0.04	0.01
AU4_LC3	0.11	0.62	0.22	0.04	0.02

Annex Table 303: Conditional response probabilities L4DecideYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU4_LC1	0.42	0.55	0.03	0.00
AU4_LC2	0.22	0.56	0.17	0.05
AU4_LC3	0.44	0.55	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 304: Conditional response probabilities L4NoConfYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU4_LC1	0.68	0.25	0.06	0.00
AU4_LC2	0.04	0.36	0.39	0.22
AU4_LC3	0.75	0.22	0.03	0.00

Annex Table 305: Conditional response probabilities L4LthlessYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU4_LC1	0.90	0.09	0.00	0.00
AU4_LC2	0.14	0.43	0.28	0.15
AU4_LC3	0.88	0.11	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 306: Conditional response probabilities L4HE2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU4_LC1	0.28	0.50	0.20	0.01	0.02
AU4_LC2	0.22	0.41	0.28	0.05	0.04
AU4_LC3	0.08	0.22	0.50	0.15	0.05

Annex Table 307: Conditional response probabilities L4HE6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU4_LC1	0.01	0.01	0.34	0.62	0.02
AU4_LC2	0.04	0.12	0.45	0.33	0.06
AU4_LC3	0.05	0.14	0.54	0.17	0.10

Annex Table 308: Conditional response probabilities L4Spares4YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU4_LC1	0.20	0.57	0.19	0.03	0.01
AU4_LC2	0.09	0.40	0.34	0.16	0.01
AU4_LC3	0.19	0.51	0.23	0.06	0.01

Annex Table 309: Conditional response probabilities L4NextyrYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)	Pr(8)
AU4_LC1	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.95	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00
AU4_LC2	0.03	0.04	0.21	0.65	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.02
AU4_LC3	0.05	0.16	0.53	0.17	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03

Annex Table 310: Estimated class population shares, Autonomy wave 4

0.41	0.25	0.34

Annex Table 311: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Autonomy wave 4

0.42	0.25	0.33

Annex Table 312: Fit statistics, Autonomy wave 4

AIC(3):	158160.70
BIC(3):	158892.60

Annex Table 313: Conditional response probabilities w3perc

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE4_LC1	0.58	0.26	0.00	0.01	0.14
PE4_LC2	0.27	0.19	0.05	0.14	0.35
PE4_LC3	0.01	0.28	0.07	0.03	0.61
PE4_LC4	0.18	0.05	0.36	0.35	0.07
PE4_LC5	0.01	0.74	0.01	0.00	0.24

Annex Table 314: Conditional response probabilities L4DifficYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE4_LC1	0.32	0.48	0.18	0.01	0.00
PE4_LC2	0.01	0.11	0.44	0.43	0.00
PE4_LC3	0.39	0.43	0.14	0.02	0.02
PE4_LC4	0.46	0.40	0.11	0.03	0.01
PE4_LC5	0.49	0.34	0.14	0.03	0.00

Annex Table 315: Conditional response probabilities L4ProbsYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
PE4_LC1	0.22	0.72	0.06	0.00
PE4_LC2	0.15	0.18	0.46	0.22
PE4_LC3	0.22	0.73	0.04	0.01
PE4_LC4	0.29	0.66	0.04	0.01
PE4_LC5	0.32	0.64	0.03	0.00

Annex Table 316: Conditional response probabilities L4HE4YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE4_LC1	0.27	0.55	0.17	0.00	0.02
PE4_LC2	0.31	0.41	0.17	0.05	0.06
PE4_LC3	0.08	0.49	0.25	0.02	0.16
PE4_LC4	0.03	0.16	0.50	0.15	0.15
PE4_LC5	0.53	0.37	0.06	0.02	0.03

Annex Table 317: Conditional response probabilities L4HE6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE4_LC1	0.00	0.02	0.45	0.52	0.00
PE4_LC2	0.05	0.10	0.38	0.39	0.08
PE4_LC3	0.01	0.08	0.63	0.18	0.11
PE4_LC4	0.08	0.22	0.48	0.12	0.10
PE4_LC5	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.76	0.02

Annex Table 318: Conditional response probabilities L4Spares3YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE4_LC1	0.18	0.56	0.22	0.02	0.01
PE4_LC2	0.18	0.37	0.30	0.12	0.02
PE4_LC3	0.11	0.59	0.20	0.05	0.05
PE4_LC4	0.19	0.47	0.24	0.07	0.03
PE4_LC5	0.33	0.50	0.13	0.03	0.01

Annex Table 319: Conditional response probabilities L4Spares6YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE4_LC1	0.04	0.22	0.62	0.10	0.01
PE4_LC2	0.19	0.26	0.40	0.12	0.03
PE4_LC3	0.03	0.24	0.59	0.07	0.07
PE4_LC4	0.13	0.34	0.44	0.07	0.03
PE4_LC5	0.06	0.16	0.50	0.27	0.01

Annex Table 320: Conditional response probabilities L4AlcEverYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
PE4_LC1	1.00	0.00	0.00
PE4_LC2	0.78	0.22	0.01
PE4_LC3	0.54	0.45	0.01
PE4_LC4	0.94	0.05	0.01
PE4_LC5	0.53	0.46	0.01

Annex Table 321: Conditional response probabilities L4CannTryYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
PE4_LC1	0.51	0.49	0.00
PE4_LC2	0.42	0.57	0.01
PE4_LC3	0.05	0.95	0.01
PE4_LC4	0.55	0.45	0.00
PE4_LC5	0.05	0.95	0.00

Annex Table 322: Conditional response probabilities L4LhoisYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)	Pr(8)	Pr(9)	Pr(10)
PE4_LC1	0.26	0.05	0.01	0.23	0.33	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.03
PE4_LC2	0.11	0.05	0.02	0.17	0.20	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.27	0.12
PE4_LC3	0.33	0.10	0.05	0.10	0.24	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.08
PE4_LC4	0.31	0.07	0.04	0.23	0.15	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.10	0.05
PE4_LC5	0.38	0.11	0.03	0.08	0.28	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.03

Annex Table 323: Estimated class population shares, Perception wave 4

0.26	0.08	0.23	0.22	0.21

Annex Table 324: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Perception wave 4

0.26	0.07	0.24	0.22	0.21

Annex Table 325: Fit statistics, Perception wave 4

AIC(5):	190506.10
BIC(5):	191941.80

Annex Table 326: Conditional response probabilities w3mast

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA4_LC1	0.38	0.11	0.15	0.36
MA4_LC2	0.64	0.06	0.27	0.03
MA4_LC3	0.44	0.05	0.44	0.07
MA4_LC4	0.46	0.22	0.09	0.23
MA4_LC5	0.66	0.05	0.16	0.12

Annex Table 327: Conditional response probabilities L4YelevenYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA4_LC1	0.31	0.51	0.12	0.07
MA4_LC2	0.31	0.61	0.07	0.02
MA4_LC3	0.51	0.43	0.03	0.03
MA4_LC4	0.15	0.56	0.21	0.08
MA4_LC5	0.24	0.66	0.09	0.02

Annex Table 328: Conditional response probabilities L4ActivYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA4_LC1	0.29	0.56	0.13	0.02
MA4_LC2	0.20	0.67	0.11	0.02
MA4_LC3	0.51	0.43	0.05	0.02
MA4_LC4	0.11	0.47	0.32	0.10
MA4_LC5	0.16	0.75	0.08	0.01

Annex Table 329: Conditional response probabilities L4HappyYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA4_LC1	0.28	0.60	0.10	0.02	0.00
MA4_LC2	0.21	0.70	0.08	0.01	0.01
MA4_LC3	0.51	0.44	0.03	0.01	0.00
MA4_LC4	0.11	0.48	0.30	0.09	0.01
MA4_LC5	0.19	0.73	0.07	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 330: Conditional response probabilities L4Spares1YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA4_LC1	0.32	0.50	0.16	0.01	0.00
MA4_LC2	0.11	0.75	0.12	0.00	0.02
MA4_LC3	0.77	0.22	0.00	0.01	0.00
MA4_LC4	0.02	0.25	0.59	0.12	0.01
MA4_LC5	0.12	0.77	0.10	0.00	0.01

Annex Table 331: Conditional response probabilities L4Spares2YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA4_LC1	0.15	0.49	0.33	0.03	0.01
MA4_LC2	0.15	0.68	0.15	0.01	0.01
MA4_LC3	0.41	0.31	0.23	0.04	0.00
MA4_LC4	0.32	0.56	0.10	0.02	0.00
MA4_LC5	0.08	0.69	0.21	0.01	0.01

Annex Table 332: Conditional response probabilities L4Spares5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA4_LC1	0.10	0.41	0.41	0.09	0.00
MA4_LC2	0.05	0.41	0.48	0.03	0.02
MA4_LC3	0.07	0.17	0.51	0.25	0.00
MA4_LC4	0.49	0.44	0.03	0.03	0.00
MA4_LC5	0.03	0.43	0.51	0.02	0.01

Annex Table 333: Conditional response probabilities L4PubberYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
MA4_LC1	0.08	0.35	0.45	0.11	0.00	0.01	0.00
MA4_LC2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.74	0.00
MA4_LC3	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.17	0.38	0.35	0.00
MA4_LC4	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.19	0.41	0.25	0.00
MA4_LC5	0.00	0.03	0.15	0.36	0.42	0.02	0.01

Annex Table 334: Conditional response probabilities L4ClubberYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
MA4_LC1	0.02	0.13	0.44	0.26	0.12	0.04	0.00
MA4_LC2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.93	0.00
MA4_LC3	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.09	0.33	0.55	0.01
MA4_LC4	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.13	0.36	0.48	0.00
MA4_LC5	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.27	0.52	0.18	0.01

Annex Table 335: Estimated class population shares, Mastery wave 4

0.13	0.25	0.17	0.16	0.29

Annex Table 336: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Mastery wave 4

0.13	0.27	0.17	0.15	0.28

Annex Table 337: Fit statistics, Mastery wave 4

AIC(5):	167123.60
BIC(5):	168453.70

Annex Table 338: Conditional response probabilities w4atti

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT6_LC1	0.21	0.22	0.10	0.23	0.24
AT6_LC2	0.26	0.18	0.05	0.21	0.30
AT6_LC3	0.27	0.22	0.06	0.15	0.30
AT6_LC4	0.27	0.20	0.03	0.16	0.34

Annex Table 339: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0b

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT6_LC1	0.29	0.38	0.12	0.13	0.07
AT6_LC2	0.05	0.58	0.29	0.03	0.06
AT6_LC3	0.08	0.52	0.26	0.04	0.09
AT6_LC4	0.05	0.31	0.05	0.02	0.56

Annex Table 340: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0d

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT6_LC1	0.43	0.35	0.15	0.07	0.00
AT6_LC2	0.07	0.73	0.18	0.00	0.02
AT6_LC3	0.00	0.00	0.88	0.12	0.01
AT6_LC4	0.03	0.32	0.37	0.06	0.23

Annex Table 341: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0e

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT6_LC1	0.07	0.05	0.24	0.63	0.01
AT6_LC2	0.00	0.12	0.77	0.11	0.00
AT6_LC3	0.03	0.32	0.60	0.00	0.06
AT6_LC4	0.01	0.09	0.45	0.10	0.35

Annex Table 342: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0g

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT6_LC1	0.10	0.19	0.37	0.29	0.05
AT6_LC2	0.01	0.27	0.61	0.06	0.04
AT6_LC3	0.02	0.19	0.61	0.16	0.02
AT6_LC4	0.02	0.13	0.36	0.11	0.38

Annex Table 343: Estimated class population shares, Attitudes wave 6

0.19	0.45	0.26	0.09

Annex Table 344: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Attitudes wave 6

0.16	0.42	0.36	0.06

Annex Table 345: Fit statistics, Attitudes wave 6

AIC(4):	105634.00
BIC(4):	106218.20

Annex Table 346: Conditional response probabilities w4grow

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR6_LC1	0.26	0.50	0.18	0.06
GR6_LC2	0.32	0.53	0.15	0.00
GR6_LC3	0.01	0.03	0.57	0.39
GR6_LC4	0.01	0.04	0.43	0.52

Annex Table 347: Conditional response probabilities L6EducYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
GR6_LC1	0.27	0.73	0.00
GR6_LC2	0.26	0.73	0.01
GR6_LC3	0.17	0.16	0.67
GR6_LC4	0.24	0.23	0.53

Annex Table 348: Conditional response probabilities L6VolLrkYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
GR6_LC1	0.05	0.95
GR6_LC2	0.06	0.94
GR6_LC3	0.11	0.89
GR6_LC4	0.13	0.87

Annex Table 349: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0c

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR6_LC1	0.00	0.91	0.06	0.03
GR6_LC2	0.67	0.29	0.03	0.01
GR6_LC3	0.22	0.69	0.07	0.02
GR6_LC4	0.73	0.25	0.01	0.01

Annex Table 350: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0f

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR6_LC1	0.00	0.84	0.12	0.01	0.03
GR6_LC2	0.48	0.42	0.08	0.01	0.01
GR6_LC3	0.00	0.69	0.24	0.01	0.06
GR6_LC4	0.45	0.48	0.06	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 351: Estimated class population shares, Growth wave 6

0.19	0.23	0.33	0.25

Annex Table 352: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Growth wave 6

0.22	0.19	0.34	0.26

Annex Table 353: Fit statistics, Growth wave 6

AIC(4):	74850.57
BIC(4):	75237.66

Annex Table 354: Conditional response probabilities w4inte

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
IN6_LC1	0.34	0.17	0.27	0.22
IN6_LC2	0.27	0.19	0.32	0.23
IN6_LC3	0.42	0.10	0.29	0.19
IN6_LC4	0.27	0.22	0.18	0.33

Annex Table 355: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0b

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN6_LC1	0.14	0.54	0.20	0.04	0.09
IN6_LC2	0.10	0.55	0.19	0.05	0.10
IN6_LC3	0.07	0.47	0.28	0.06	0.12
IN6_LC4	0.15	0.41	0.21	0.05	0.18

Annex Table 356: Conditional response probabilities L6FriendFamilyYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
IN6_LC1	0.04	0.06	0.71	0.10	0.09	0.00
IN6_LC2	0.07	0.12	0.76	0.03	0.00	0.01
IN6_LC3	0.02	0.02	0.71	0.12	0.13	0.00
IN6_LC4	0.04	0.03	0.36	0.10	0.38	0.09

Annex Table 357: Conditional response probabilities L6FriendNumYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
IN6_LC1	0.00	0.03	0.33	0.32	0.17	0.14
IN6_LC2	0.00	0.03	0.26	0.33	0.21	0.18
IN6_LC3	0.00	0.01	0.27	0.36	0.19	0.16
IN6_LC4	0.13	0.16	0.37	0.10	0.02	0.22

Annex Table 358: Conditional response probabilities L6RELATIONX

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN6_LC1	0.13	0.32	0.50	0.05	0.00
IN6_LC2	0.01	0.17	0.11	0.01	0.69
IN6_LC3	0.00	0.12	0.07	0.00	0.81
IN6_LC4	0.07	0.09	0.16	0.00	0.68

Annex Table 359: Conditional response probabilities L6FirstComfortYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)	Pr(8)	Pr(9)	Pr(10)
IN6_LC1	0.23	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.71	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
IN6_LC2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.84	0.02	0.05	0.01
IN6_LC3	0.35	0.05	0.17	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.32	0.00	0.01	0.02
IN6_LC4	0.42	0.06	0.09	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.16	0.06

Annex Table 360: Estimated class population shares, Integration wave 6

0.25	0.26	0.41	0.08

Annex Table 361: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Integration wave 6

0.26	0.33	0.36	0.05

Annex Table 362: Fit statistics, Integration wave 6

AIC(4):	132294.60
BIC(4):	133160.20

Annex Table 363: Conditional response probabilities w4auto

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
AU6_LC1	0.41	0.25	0.34
AU6_LC2	0.75	0.25	0.00
AU6_LC3	0.26	0.23	0.51
AU6_LC4	0.37	0.29	0.34

Annex Table 364: Conditional response probabilities L6JobYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
AU6_LC1	0.60	0.40
AU6_LC2	0.26	0.74
AU6_LC3	0.68	0.32
AU6_LC4	0.36	0.64

Annex Table 365: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0a

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU6_LC1	0.05	0.17	0.29	0.47	0.03
AU6_LC2	0.00	0.14	0.54	0.30	0.03
AU6_LC3	0.01	0.27	0.58	0.09	0.06
AU6_LC4	0.02	0.13	0.38	0.16	0.31

Annex Table 366: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0c

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU6_LC1	0.85	0.14	0.01	0.00
AU6_LC2	0.32	0.62	0.06	0.00
AU6_LC3	0.12	0.85	0.03	0.00
AU6_LC4	0.13	0.55	0.18	0.14

Annex Table 367: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0f

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU6_LC1	0.53	0.39	0.06	0.01	0.01
AU6_LC2	0.02	0.70	0.25	0.01	0.03
AU6_LC3	0.10	0.81	0.08	0.00	0.00
AU6_LC4	0.06	0.39	0.30	0.04	0.21

Annex Table 368: Estimated class population shares, Autonomy wave 6

0.33	0.21	0.35	0.11

Annex Table 369: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Autonomy wave 6

0.34	0.22	0.36	0.07

Annex Table 370: Fit statistics, Autonomy wave 6

AIC(4):	82318.41
BIC(4):	82733.65

Annex Table 371: Conditional response probabilities w4perc

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE6_LC1	0.01	0.07	0.46	0.06	0.39
PE6_LC2	0.45	0.11	0.02	0.39	0.03
PE6_LC3	0.44	0.06	0.09	0.31	0.10

Annex Table 372: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0a

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE6_LC1	0.02	0.20	0.44	0.23	0.10
PE6_LC2	0.02	0.19	0.45	0.29	0.04
PE6_LC3	0.02	0.18	0.46	0.29	0.05

Annex Table 373: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0g

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE6_LC1	0.04	0.25	0.50	0.13	0.08
PE6_LC2	0.04	0.24	0.54	0.12	0.06
PE6_LC3	0.02	0.19	0.59	0.14	0.06

Annex Table 374: Conditional response probabilities L6ALC

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE6_LC1	0.03	0.28	0.29	0.39	0.00
PE6_LC2	0.32	0.57	0.09	0.02	0.01
PE6_LC3	0.12	0.61	0.26	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 375: Conditional response probabilities L6CANN

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
PE6_LC1	0.01	0.02	0.96	0.00
PE6_LC2	0.48	0.48	0.03	0.01
PE6_LC3	0.05	0.25	0.69	0.00

Annex Table 376: Conditional response probabilities L6DRUG

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
PE6_LC1	0.00	0.00	1.00
PE6_LC2	0.18	0.40	0.42
PE6_LC3	0.00	0.01	0.99

Annex Table 377: Estimated class population shares, Perception wave 6

0.43	0.17	0.41

Annex Table 378: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Perception wave 6

0.46	0.15	0.39

Annex Table 379: Fit statistics, Perception wave 6

AIC(3):	104704.80
BIC(3):	105162.20

Annex Table 380: Conditional response probabilities w4mast

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA6_LC1	0.17	0.12	0.23	0.05	0.42
MA6_LC2	0.16	0.19	0.19	0.26	0.20
MA6_LC3	0.00	0.60	0.09	0.24	0.06
MA6_LC4	0.16	0.22	0.16	0.13	0.34

Annex Table 381: Conditional response probabilities L6JobYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)
MA6_LC1	0.45	0.55
MA6_LC2	0.65	0.35
MA6_LC3	0.27	0.73
MA6_LC4	0.69	0.31

Annex Table 382: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0d

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA6_LC1	0.01	0.18	0.65	0.12	0.04
MA6_LC2	0.65	0.26	0.02	0.07	0.00
MA6_LC3	0.05	0.35	0.49	0.05	0.07
MA6_LC4	0.07	0.67	0.24	0.00	0.02

Annex Table 383: Conditional response probabilities L6PaystatYP0e

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA6_LC1	0.05	0.33	0.51	0.02	0.10
MA6_LC2	0.06	0.04	0.17	0.73	0.00
MA6_LC3	0.02	0.21	0.62	0.04	0.11
MA6_LC4	0.00	0.05	0.75	0.20	0.00

Annex Table 384: Conditional response probabilities L6FriendNumYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
MA6_LC1	0.01	0.01	0.19	0.33	0.25	0.21
MA6_LC2	0.03	0.05	0.32	0.25	0.13	0.22
MA6_LC3	0.02	0.06	0.39	0.30	0.13	0.09
MA6_LC4	0.00	0.03	0.29	0.35	0.18	0.16

Annex Table 385: Estimated class population shares, Mastery wave 6

0.25	0.11	0.22	0.41

Annex Table 386: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Mastery wave 6

0.23	0.08	0.22	0.46

Annex Table 387: Fit statistics, Mastery wave 6

AIC(4):	101054.80
BIC(4):	101582.60

Annex Table 388: Conditional response probabilities w6atti

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT7_LC1	0.45	0.37	0.16	0.03
AT7_LC2	0.11	0.68	0.17	0.04
AT7_LC3	0.08	0.33	0.32	0.27
AT7_LC4	0.04	0.17	0.73	0.06

Annex Table 389: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0b

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT7_LC1	0.38	0.33	0.10	0.14	0.05
AT7_LC2	0.10	0.57	0.25	0.04	0.04
AT7_LC3	0.09	0.42	0.10	0.04	0.35
AT7_LC4	0.12	0.50	0.26	0.08	0.05

Annex Table 390: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0d

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT7_LC1	0.41	0.38	0.15	0.06	0.01
AT7_LC2	0.13	0.75	0.11	0.00	0.01
AT7_LC3	0.04	0.33	0.32	0.08	0.24
AT7_LC4	0.00	0.12	0.76	0.10	0.02

Annex Table 391: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0e

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT7_LC1	0.03	0.07	0.28	0.61	0.01
AT7_LC2	0.00	0.07	0.70	0.22	0.01
AT7_LC3	0.01	0.10	0.49	0.09	0.31
AT7_LC4	0.02	0.22	0.66	0.05	0.05

Annex Table 392: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0g

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT7_LC1	0.11	0.18	0.36	0.29	0.06
AT7_LC2	0.01	0.30	0.59	0.05	0.05
AT7_LC3	0.03	0.16	0.34	0.09	0.39
AT7_LC4	0.02	0.20	0.59	0.15	0.03

Annex Table 393: Conditional response probabilities L7Fat1YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT7_LC1	0.18	0.36	0.32	0.12	0.03
AT7_LC2	0.03	0.41	0.51	0.03	0.02
AT7_LC3	0.02	0.19	0.41	0.07	0.32
AT7_LC4	0.05	0.34	0.51	0.08	0.02

Annex Table 394: Conditional response probabilities L7Fat7YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT7_LC1	0.07	0.26	0.43	0.21	0.02
AT7_LC2	0.01	0.30	0.63	0.03	0.02
AT7_LC3	0.01	0.24	0.44	0.05	0.26
AT7_LC4	0.02	0.22	0.66	0.09	0.01

Annex Table 395: Conditional response probabilities L7Fat8YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AT7_LC1	0.56	0.38	0.04	0.01	0.00
AT7_LC2	0.21	0.75	0.03	0.00	0.00
AT7_LC3	0.18	0.67	0.05	0.00	0.09
AT7_LC4	0.27	0.68	0.05	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 396: Conditional response probabilities L7QuaHourYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AT7_LC1	0.66	0.20	0.13	0.00
AT7_LC2	0.64	0.27	0.09	0.00
AT7_LC3	0.42	0.34	0.16	0.08
AT7_LC4	0.43	0.40	0.17	0.00

Annex Table 397: Estimated class population shares, Attitudes wave 7

0.22	0.37	0.09	0.32

Annex Table 398: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Attitudes wave 7

0.21	0.38	0.08	0.33

Annex Table 399: Fit statistics, Attitudes wave 7

AIC(4):	169017.30
BIC(4):	169995.60

Annex Table 400: Conditional response probabilities w6grow

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR7_LC1	0.36	0.15	0.38	0.11
GR7_LC2	0.22	0.52	0.05	0.21
GR7_LC3	0.35	0.14	0.44	0.07
GR7_LC4	0.06	0.03	0.45	0.46

Annex Table 401: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0c

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR7_LC1	0.24	0.72	0.03	0.00	0.00
GR7_LC2	0.84	0.14	0.01	0.01	0.00
GR7_LC3	0.24	0.51	0.14	0.02	0.09
GR7_LC4	0.69	0.28	0.02	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 402: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0f

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR7_LC1	0.05	0.78	0.16	0.00	0.01
GR7_LC2	0.59	0.35	0.05	0.01	0.01
GR7_LC3	0.09	0.45	0.26	0.05	0.15
GR7_LC4	0.25	0.56	0.14	0.01	0.03

Annex Table 403: Conditional response probabilities L7Pla16YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR7_LC1	0.08	0.87	0.06	0.00
GR7_LC2	0.50	0.43	0.06	0.01
GR7_LC3	0.06	0.51	0.28	0.15
GR7_LC4	0.52	0.45	0.02	0.01

Annex Table 404: Conditional response probabilities L7ImpJobYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR7_LC1	0.66	0.33	0.01	0.00
GR7_LC2	0.89	0.11	0.01	0.00
GR7_LC3	0.49	0.43	0.04	0.04
GR7_LC4	0.95	0.05	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 405: Conditional response probabilities L7ImpFamYP0a

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR7_LC1	0.17	0.67	0.14	0.00	0.02
GR7_LC2	0.32	0.41	0.21	0.03	0.03
GR7_LC3	0.16	0.45	0.19	0.04	0.15
GR7_LC4	0.84	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 406: Conditional response probabilities L7NextYearYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
GR7_LC1	0.02	0.25	0.65	0.06	0.02
GR7_LC2	0.06	0.19	0.44	0.29	0.02
GR7_LC3	0.08	0.32	0.34	0.14	0.11
GR7_LC4	0.02	0.09	0.45	0.44	0.01

Annex Table 407: Conditional response probabilities L7QuaPromYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
GR7_LC1	0.62	0.34	0.04	0.00
GR7_LC2	0.71	0.22	0.07	0.00
GR7_LC3	0.11	0.50	0.32	0.06
GR7_LC4	0.76	0.21	0.02	0.00

Annex Table 408: Conditional response probabilities L7DonateYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
GR7_LC1	0.56	0.44	0.01
GR7_LC2	0.55	0.44	0.01
GR7_LC3	0.57	0.39	0.04
GR7_LC4	0.71	0.27	0.01

Annex Table 409: Conditional response probabilities L7VolunteerOYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
GR7_LC1	0.27	0.71	0.02
GR7_LC2	0.27	0.71	0.01
GR7_LC3	0.27	0.64	0.09
GR7_LC4	0.43	0.54	0.02

Annex Table 410: Estimated class population shares, Growth wave 7

0.34	0.21	0.09	0.36

Annex Table 411: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Growth wave 7

0.35	0.20	0.07	0.38

Annex Table 412: Fit statistics, Growth wave 7

AIC(4):	151630.20
BIC(4):	152552.20

Annex Table 413: Conditional response probabilities w6inte

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
IN7_LC1	0.10	0.90	0.00	0.00
IN7_LC2	0.08	0.27	0.38	0.28
IN7_LC3	0.81	0.09	0.04	0.05
IN7_LC4	0.14	0.48	0.37	0.01
IN7_LC5	0.11	0.29	0.55	0.06
IN7_LC6	0.11	0.13	0.73	0.03

Annex Table 414: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0b

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN7_LC1	0.16	0.55	0.20	0.05	0.05
IN7_LC2	0.16	0.39	0.16	0.07	0.23
IN7_LC3	0.24	0.51	0.15	0.06	0.04
IN7_LC4	0.15	0.53	0.19	0.06	0.07
IN7_LC5	0.26	0.35	0.18	0.15	0.07
IN7_LC6	0.06	0.52	0.30	0.05	0.07

Annex Table 415: Conditional response probabilities L7Pla16YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
IN7_LC1	0.24	0.67	0.07	0.02
IN7_LC2	0.24	0.57	0.10	0.09
IN7_LC3	0.32	0.58	0.08	0.02
IN7_LC4	0.33	0.61	0.05	0.02
IN7_LC5	0.70	0.27	0.03	0.00
IN7_LC6	0.15	0.78	0.06	0.00

Annex Table 416: Conditional response probabilities L7ImpFamYP0b

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN7_LC1	0.40	0.46	0.09	0.02	0.04
IN7_LC2	0.28	0.33	0.12	0.05	0.22
IN7_LC3	0.65	0.30	0.03	0.01	0.02
IN7_LC4	0.59	0.33	0.04	0.01	0.03
IN7_LC5	0.69	0.23	0.05	0.02	0.01
IN7_LC6	0.42	0.50	0.05	0.00	0.02

Annex Table 417: Conditional response probabilities L7Fat8YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
IN7_LC1	0.20	0.74	0.05	0.00	0.00
IN7_LC2	0.19	0.61	0.11	0.02	0.07
IN7_LC3	0.29	0.65	0.04	0.01	0.01
IN7_LC4	0.30	0.66	0.02	0.00	0.01
IN7_LC5	0.65	0.33	0.01	0.01	0.00
IN7_LC6	0.18	0.79	0.04	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 418: Conditional response probabilities L7FriendNumYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
IN7_LC1	0.00	0.02	0.23	0.32	0.24	0.19	0.00
IN7_LC2	0.13	0.08	0.37	0.20	0.07	0.10	0.07
IN7_LC3	0.01	0.06	0.32	0.33	0.16	0.12	0.00
IN7_LC4	0.00	0.02	0.22	0.35	0.20	0.19	0.01
IN7_LC5	0.01	0.03	0.26	0.33	0.19	0.17	0.00
IN7_LC6	0.00	0.02	0.24	0.35	0.20	0.19	0.00

Annex Table 419: Conditional response probabilities L7RELATIONX

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
IN7_LC1	0.01	0.14	0.10	0.01	0.73	0.02
IN7_LC2	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.85	0.03
IN7_LC3	0.31	0.06	0.60	0.02	0.01	0.00
IN7_LC4	0.04	0.52	0.34	0.07	0.01	0.01
IN7_LC5	0.01	0.11	0.08	0.01	0.79	0.01
IN7_LC6	0.01	0.13	0.07	0.01	0.79	0.01

Annex Table 420: Conditional response probabilities L7FirstComfortYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)	Pr(8)	Pr(9)	Pr(10)
IN7_LC1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.86	0.07	0.01	0.04	0.01
IN7_LC2	0.28	0.07	0.09	0.02	0.01	0.15	0.04	0.02	0.22	0.10
IN7_LC3	0.23	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.61	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
IN7_LC4	0.18	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.72	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
IN7_LC5	0.30	0.04	0.13	0.02	0.01	0.40	0.05	0.00	0.03	0.01
IN7_LC6	0.35	0.05	0.15	0.02	0.00	0.36	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.01

Annex Table 421: Estimated class population shares, Integration wave 7

0.17	0.07	0.21	0.11	0.19	0.25

Annex Table 422: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Integration wave 7

0.20	0.06	0.21	0.11	0.17	0.25

Annex Table 423: Fit statistics, Integration wave 7

AIC(6):	159920.00
BIC(6):	161559.80

Annex Table 424: Conditional response probabilities w6auto

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU7_LC1	0.12	0.39	0.14	0.34
AU7_LC2	0.60	0.13	0.24	0.02
AU7_LC3	0.19	0.17	0.36	0.29
AU7_LC4	0.17	0.15	0.62	0.06
AU7_LC5	0.53	0.12	0.33	0.02
AU7_LC6	0.21	0.59	0.13	0.07

Annex Table 425: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0a

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU7_LC1	0.05	0.25	0.41	0.20	0.10
AU7_LC2	0.08	0.15	0.20	0.54	0.02
AU7_LC3	0.03	0.10	0.28	0.20	0.38
AU7_LC4	0.01	0.27	0.55	0.13	0.04
AU7_LC5	0.03	0.15	0.25	0.55	0.02
AU7_LC6	0.00	0.04	0.39	0.56	0.01

Annex Table 426: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0c

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU7_LC1	0.28	0.42	0.24	0.04	0.03
AU7_LC2	0.80	0.17	0.01	0.01	0.00
AU7_LC3	0.28	0.57	0.02	0.00	0.14
AU7_LC4	0.18	0.78	0.04	0.00	0.00
AU7_LC5	0.85	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00
AU7_LC6	0.50	0.48	0.02	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 427: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0f

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU7_LC1	0.02	0.27	0.54	0.09	0.08
AU7_LC2	0.57	0.34	0.07	0.02	0.00
AU7_LC3	0.08	0.54	0.10	0.01	0.26
AU7_LC4	0.07	0.80	0.12	0.00	0.01
AU7_LC5	0.45	0.50	0.04	0.00	0.01
AU7_LC6	0.01	0.67	0.27	0.01	0.04

Annex Table 428: Conditional response probabilities L7NextYearYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU7_LC1	0.09	0.20	0.42	0.26	0.02
AU7_LC2	0.09	0.14	0.23	0.52	0.02
AU7_LC3	0.03	0.22	0.39	0.08	0.28
AU7_LC4	0.03	0.27	0.63	0.06	0.01
AU7_LC5	0.02	0.15	0.53	0.29	0.01
AU7_LC6	0.00	0.12	0.52	0.36	0.00

Annex Table 429: Conditional response probabilities L7Fat5YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU7_LC1	0.09	0.37	0.38	0.14	0.02
AU7_LC2	0.37	0.32	0.12	0.16	0.02
AU7_LC3	0.02	0.25	0.28	0.06	0.40
AU7_LC4	0.03	0.53	0.41	0.02	0.01
AU7_LC5	0.09	0.57	0.30	0.03	0.02
AU7_LC6	0.05	0.66	0.25	0.02	0.02

Annex Table 430: Conditional response probabilities L7Fat7YP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
AU7_LC1	0.08	0.31	0.48	0.09	0.03
AU7_LC2	0.09	0.19	0.33	0.35	0.03
AU7_LC3	0.01	0.22	0.30	0.07	0.40
AU7_LC4	0.01	0.33	0.61	0.03	0.02
AU7_LC5	0.02	0.28	0.64	0.04	0.02
AU7_LC6	0.00	0.13	0.74	0.11	0.02

Annex Table 431: Conditional response probabilities L7QuaWorkYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
AU7_LC1	0.19	0.30	0.46	0.04
AU7_LC2	0.34	0.27	0.37	0.02
AU7_LC3	0.11	0.17	0.53	0.19
AU7_LC4	0.23	0.37	0.40	0.00
AU7_LC5	0.20	0.39	0.41	0.00
AU7_LC6	0.12	0.36	0.51	0.01

Annex Table 432: Estimated class population shares, Autonomy wave 7

0.07	0.13	0.05	0.29	0.32	0.15

Annex Table 433: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Autonomy wave 7

0.05	0.10	0.04	0.31	0.34	0.15

Annex Table 434: Fit statistics, Autonomy wave 7

AIC(6):	148732.00
BIC(6):	150034.00

Annex Table 435: Conditional response probabilities w6perc

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
PE7_LC1	0.04	0.20	0.76
PE7_LC2	0.03	0.79	0.18
PE7_LC3	0.52	0.04	0.44
PE7_LC4	0.96	0.00	0.03
PE7_LC5	0.47	0.03	0.51

Annex Table 436: Conditional response probabilities L7QuaHelpYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
PE7_LC1	0.47	0.39	0.13	0.01
PE7_LC2	0.36	0.45	0.19	0.00
PE7_LC3	0.15	0.25	0.48	0.12
PE7_LC4	0.69	0.25	0.06	0.01
PE7_LC5	0.48	0.43	0.08	0.00

Annex Table 437: Conditional response probabilities L7QuaVarYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
PE7_LC1	0.74	0.22	0.04	0.00
PE7_LC2	0.75	0.19	0.05	0.01
PE7_LC3	0.30	0.39	0.26	0.05
PE7_LC4	0.68	0.24	0.07	0.01
PE7_LC5	0.74	0.23	0.03	0.00

Annex Table 438: Conditional response probabilities L7OSatisYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
PE7_LC1	0.26	0.52	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.01
PE7_LC2	0.23	0.49	0.15	0.09	0.05	0.01
PE7_LC3	0.15	0.41	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.05
PE7_LC4	0.28	0.51	0.13	0.05	0.03	0.01
PE7_LC5	0.32	0.55	0.08	0.04	0.01	0.00

Annex Table 439: Conditional response probabilities L7CANN

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
PE7_LC1	0.36	0.63	0.01
PE7_LC2	0.82	0.13	0.05
PE7_LC3	0.08	0.05	0.87
PE7_LC4	0.02	0.03	0.96
PE7_LC5	0.06	0.03	0.91

Annex Table 440: Conditional response probabilities L7DRUG

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)
PE7_LC1	0.02	0.13	0.85
PE7_LC2	0.59	0.16	0.25
PE7_LC3	0.01	0.00	0.99
PE7_LC4	0.00	0.00	1.00
PE7_LC5	0.00	0.01	0.99

Annex Table 441: Conditional response probabilities L7ALC

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
PE7_LC1	0.17	0.59	0.21	0.02	0.00
PE7_LC2	0.31	0.62	0.06	0.01	0.00
PE7_LC3	0.13	0.36	0.31	0.16	0.04
PE7_LC4	0.00	0.02	0.27	0.71	0.00
PE7_LC5	0.10	0.61	0.29	0.00	0.00

Annex Table 442: Estimated class population shares, Perception wave 7

0.16	0.13	0.07	0.23	0.41

Annex Table 443: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Perception wave 7

0.18	0.13	0.04	0.24	0.41

Annex Table 444: Fit statistics, Perception wave 7

AIC(5):	103239.30
BIC(5):	104006.50

Annex Table 445: Conditional response probabilities w6mast

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA7_LC1	0.57	0.03	0.18	0.21
MA7_LC2	0.06	0.25	0.09	0.60
MA7_LC3	0.11	0.02	0.24	0.63
MA7_LC4	0.21	0.04	0.52	0.23

Annex Table 446: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0d

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA7_LC1	0.03	0.17	0.65	0.12	0.04
MA7_LC2	0.47	0.47	0.05	0.01	0.00
MA7_LC3	0.04	0.66	0.28	0.00	0.02
MA7_LC4	0.04	0.26	0.45	0.13	0.12

Annex Table 447: Conditional response probabilities L7PaystatYP0e

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA7_LC1	0.03	0.21	0.62	0.07	0.07
MA7_LC2	0.01	0.03	0.29	0.66	0.00
MA7_LC3	0.00	0.06	0.80	0.14	0.01
MA7_LC4	0.04	0.28	0.43	0.06	0.18

Annex Table 448: Conditional response probabilities L7ImpFamYP0b

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)
MA7_LC1	0.57	0.36	0.04	0.01	0.02
MA7_LC2	0.62	0.28	0.05	0.02	0.02
MA7_LC3	0.47	0.45	0.05	0.00	0.02
MA7_LC4	0.37	0.34	0.10	0.04	0.14

Annex Table 449: Conditional response probabilities L7QuaWageYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)
MA7_LC1	0.57	0.38	0.05	0.00
MA7_LC2	0.74	0.22	0.03	0.00
MA7_LC3	0.71	0.27	0.02	0.00
MA7_LC4	0.56	0.34	0.08	0.03

Annex Table 450: Conditional response probabilities L7OSatisYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)
MA7_LC1	0.42	0.52	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00
MA7_LC2	0.30	0.46	0.14	0.07	0.03	0.00
MA7_LC3	0.22	0.60	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.00
MA7_LC4	0.10	0.40	0.27	0.12	0.07	0.04

Annex Table 451: Conditional response probabilities L7FriendNumYP

	Pr(1)	Pr(2)	Pr(3)	Pr(4)	Pr(5)	Pr(6)	Pr(7)
MA7_LC1	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.33	0.30	0.24	0.00
MA7_LC2	0.01	0.05	0.29	0.31	0.16	0.17	0.00
MA7_LC3	0.01	0.03	0.28	0.35	0.16	0.16	0.00
MA7_LC4	0.06	0.07	0.43	0.27	0.09	0.04	0.04

Annex Table 452: Estimated class population shares, Mastery wave 7

0.26	0.25	0.36	0.14

Annex Table 453: Predicted class memberships (by modal posterior prob.), Mastery wave 7

0.25	0.25	0.39	0.11

Annex Table 454: Fit statistics, Mastery wave 7

AIC(4):	134895.60
BIC(4):	135733.10

Annex Table 455: Jahoda Dimensions and aggregates of precariousness wave 1

		1	2	3	Total
Attitudes	1	2908	219	149	3277
	2	88	1622	4	1715
	3	1447	194	138	1779
	4	165	62	1528	1755
Growth	1	1300	153	858	2312
	2	340	891	22	1253
	3	744	110	892	1746
	4	592	461	15	1068
	5	1633	482	31	2146
Integration	1	1224	174	473	1871
	2	429	955	18	1402
	3	576	187	192	955
	4	2050	120	1006	3176
	5	330	661	131	1122
Autonomy	1	1753	671	1009	3433
	2	396	362	95	853
	3	225	250	106	581
	4	2235	814	609	3657
Perception	1	1796	1122	342	3260
	2	1882	354	1139	3375
	3	931	621	338	1890
Environmental Mastery	1	1602	286	203	2090
	2	2321	396	482	3200
	3	157	34	1062	1253
	4	485	827	66	1378
	5	43	554	7	604
Class population shares (row percent)		54%	25%	21%	100%

Annex Table 456: Fit statistics for 3 versions of LCA model of aggregates of precariousness wave 1

	AIC	BIC	entropy
2 classes	128542.1	128830.6	0.6690376
3 classes	126321.8	126758.2	0.7025362
4 classes	125974.3	126558.5	0.6647628

Annex Table 457: Jahoda Dimensions and aggregates of precariousness wave 2

		1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
Attitudes	1	16	684	30	26	0	640	1395
	2	202	0	8	959	18	0	1187
	3	0	1111	15	0	0	1431	2557
	4	14	10	630	23	9	7	693
	5	847	7	36	23	1779	1	2692
Growth	1	0	0	283	252	281	310	1126
	2	55	129	142	157	273	558	1314
	3	358	782	32	36	2	10	1219
	4	67	95	178	350	791	731	2212
	5	599	806	85	235	459	469	2653
Integration	1	209	145	139	513	401	237	1645
	2	638	121	49	184	853	85	1931
	3	180	1482	74	13	250	1282	3280
	4	52	64	458	319	301	473	1668
Autonomy	1	30	28	481	22	66	71	698
	2	100	2	39	687	39	9	875
	3	366	1707	137	90	497	1814	4610
	4	583	75	63	231	1204	185	2341
Perception	1	3	8	169	451	339	431	1400
	2	109	60	106	323	1204	1228	3032
	3	642	1441	43	11	1	54	2192
	4	30	32	373	92	87	118	731
	5	295	271	29	153	175	248	1170
Environmental Mastery	1	19	33	190	342	337	421	1343
	2	394	639	173	197	781	996	3180
	3	16	7	195	314	199	149	880
	4	280	676	25	18	21	68	1088
	5	371	456	137	159	467	444	2034
Class population shares (row percent)		13%	21%	8%	12%	21%	24%	100%

Annex Table 458: Fit statistics for 3 versions of LCA model of aggregates of precariousness wave 2

	AIC	BIC	entropy
5 classes	123831.1	124633.4	0.8212355
6 classes	122754.1	123718.3	0.8292001
7 classes	122187.7	123313.8	0.8131289

Annex Table 459: Jahoda Dimensions and aggregates of precariousness wave 3

		1	2	3	4	Total
Attitudes	1	367	1177	286	2754	4584
	2	0	326	1786	243	2355
	3	1404	39	17	127	1586
Growth	1	978	255	0	0	1233
	2	449	111	23	1441	2024
	3	63	9	783	1518	2373
	4	246	1155	138	39	1578
	5	34	12	1144	127	1317
Integration	1	85	893	1828	1725	4532
	2	528	265	187	523	1503
	3	1158	383	73	875	2490
Autonomy	1	1058	600	155	630	2443
	2	282	436	212	617	1548
	3	430	506	1721	1877	4534
Perception	1	240	102	236	1398	1976
	2	28	32	1615	543	2219
	3	292	947	22	0	1260
	4	1030	194	1	0	1225
	5	182	266	214	1183	1845
Environmental Mastery	1	249	1100	727	2438	4513
	2	897	32	9	43	981
	3	1	117	1315	140	1574
	4	623	294	37	504	1458
Class population shares (row percent)		19%	17%	22%	42%	100%

Annex Table 460: Fit statistics for 3 versions of LCA model of aggregates of precariousness wave 3

	AIC	BIC	entropy
3 classes	102922.5	103295.5	0.799535
4 classes	100958.7	101458.4	0.817146
5 classes	100134.6	100761	0.8135228

Annex Table 461: Jahoda Dimensions and aggregates of precariousness wave 4

		1	2	3	Total
Attitudes	1	1307	970	0	2278
	2	56	195	1400	1651
	3	0	0	496	496
	4	947	678	10	1634
	5	1009	1217	240	2466
Growth	1	1162	0	436	1598
	2	1923	25	475	2424
	3	199	1552	926	2677
	4	34	1483	309	1826
Integration	1	1241	1565	33	2839
	2	79	43	1167	1289
	3	462	1013	724	2200
	4	1537	439	221	2198
Autonomy	1	81	2702	211	2995
	2	198	207	1705	2109
	3	3040	151	229	3421
Perception	1	408	1236	610	2254
	2	19	21	534	574
	3	812	594	325	1731
	4	1957	118	545	2621
	5	122	1091	131	1345
Environmental Mastery	1	631	343	345	1319
	2	769	776	354	1899
	3	506	762	82	1350
	4	407	112	854	1374
	5	1006	1068	510	2583
Class population shares (row percent)		39%	36%	25%	100%

Annex Table 462: Fit statistics for 3 versions of LCA model of aggregates of precariousness wave 4

	AIC	BIC	entropy
2 classes	131204.1	131492.6	0.8249363
3 classes	123154.9	123591.2	0.8796935
4 classes	120615.2	121199.3	0.8649293

Annex Table 463: Jahoda Dimensions and aggregates of precariousness wave 6

		1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
Attitudes	1	474	786	1	116	46	20	1442
	2	1189	35	43	2161	306	16	3750
	3	178	0	672	299	321	1348	2818
	4	35	3	78	65	126	207	514
Growth	1	0	41	0	1695	84	529	2348
	2	923	518	235	298	8	39	2021
	3	23	20	34	648	600	1023	2349
	4	930	244	525	0	108	0	1807
Integration	1	612	255	217	889	65	430	2468
	2	574	260	274	824	250	601	2783
	3	606	238	266	773	406	516	2804
	4	84	70	38	155	79	45	470
Autonomy	1	1667	648	644	0	1	0	2960
	2	81	14	137	183	482	643	1539
	3	128	139	13	2335	139	665	3420
	4	0	22	0	123	177	283	605
Perception	1	586	222	307	729	756	484	3084
	2	359	180	144	552	0	335	1572
	3	931	420	343	1360	43	772	3869
Environmental Mastery	1	0	48	559	92	33	1257	1989
	2	0	774	2	12	3	0	791
	3	199	0	233	294	563	301	1590
	4	1677	2	0	2242	200	33	4154
Class population shares (row percent)		23%	10%	9%	32%	7%	19%	100%

Annex Table 464: Fit statistics for 3 versions of LCA model of aggregates of precariousness wave 6

	AIC	BIC	entropy
5 classes	108468.4	109094.8	NaN
6 classes	107555.5	108308.6	NaN
7 classes	107029.2	107908.9	NaN

Annex Table 465: Jahoda Dimensions and aggregates of precariousness wave 7

		1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
Attitudes	1	1603	2	82	132	0	73	1893
	2	28	11	105	1779	1388	92	3403
	3	6	82	431	33	22	80	655
	4	0	1267	163	1	2	1142	2575
Growth	1	108	1092	231	1723	0	7	3161
	2	950	0	61	0	722	299	2032
	3	37	163	367	98	15	0	679
	4	542	107	122	126	674	1080	2652
Integration	1	209	375	94	486	291	237	1693
	2	75	9	337	64	28	10	522
	3	476	295	124	514	345	347	2102
	4	179	160	56	221	183	149	947
	5	555	29	47	33	228	378	1270
	6	144	495	123	628	336	266	1991
Autonomy	1	9	131	166	29	19	77	431
	2	578	17	25	8	91	142	861
	3	18	12	283	23	16	0	352
	4	84	797	168	1553	111	81	2793
	5	908	131	87	228	1027	607	2989
	6	40	275	52	105	148	478	1098
Perception	1	367	313	113	416	292	267	1767
	2	282	242	65	285	235	198	1307
	3	55	36	185	96	35	15	421
	4	249	169	201	257	212	229	1317
	5	686	602	218	892	637	677	3712
Environmental Mastery	1	96	851	89	113	18	874	2041
	2	1288	0	54	382	570	0	2293
	3	191	319	159	1421	803	390	3283
	4	64	192	479	30	20	122	908
Class population shares (row percent)		19%	16%	8%	23%	17%	17%	100%

Annex Table 466: Fit statistics for 3 versions of LCA model of aggregates of precariousness wave 7

	AIC	BIC	entropy
5 classes	128886.8	129724.3	0.7926371
6 classes	128067.6	129074	0.8224609
7 classes	127759.5	128934.9	0.8160613

Annex Table 467: Degrees of precariousness wave 1, tabular overview

	Precarious 1	Precarious 2	Precarious 3
Attitudes	Tendency toward the middle in most items; no extremes	Instant gratification; leaving things to chance; negative attitudes towards school;	Social desirability; strong rejection of leaving things to chance; positive feelings towards school and efforts; highest share of religious practice
Growth	Balanced relationship with parents, regular but not daily exchange;	Least future orientation; significant amount of "don't know" answers; school a waste of time, not worth the effort; negative or illusive attitudes toward HE; rather bad relationship with parents; over 25% are children of single parents	Most future oriented; firm and strong positions on most future items; regarding HE, all strong conviction they would get in; very close relationship with parents but much less close with fathers than with mother.
Integration	School environment ok; no significant amount of physical or verbal violence	School environment troublesome; regular experiences of physical or verbal violence	School environment very orderly; hardly any physical or verbal violence experienced
Autonomy	Just assessment of gratification for efforts; medium feeling of trust by parents	Bad or unclear assessment of just marks; high degree of strive for independence; low level of trust between children and parents and high share of "don't know"	Very high degree of just assessment (98%) for good marks; high degree of mutual trust between parents and child
Perception	Strong tendency toward the middle; alcohol and tobacco tried by many but hardly any repeated users	Low social desirability in responses; own school perceived as bad; falling out with parents often; alcohol and tobacco are present (20% drink min. once a month, 12% smoke at least sometimes)	Ambitions regarding own role in job future; awareness of school status; very good relationships with mothers; 2/3 never tried alcohol, 98% never tried tobacco
Mastery	Little misbehaviour and good compliance with rules at school; occasional deviant behaviour/petty crime; balanced social life	Polarised views on rules and discipline, either too much or too little; materialist orientation also twofold between high importance of income and none; rather high values for all kinds of deviant behaviour incl. smoking cannabis, shoplifting, and vandalising public goods; social life mainly outside home with pals but also spent alone, not with family	High compliance with school rules and level of discipline; materialist orientation somewhat polarised; hardly any misbehaviour at school or deviant behaviour in public; free time mainly spent with family.

Annex Table 468: Degrees of precariousness wave 2, tabular overview

	Precarious 1	Precarious 2	Precarious 3	Precarious 4	Precarious 5	Precarious 6
Attitudes	Positive attitudes toward school; very strong belief in own abilities and hard work as drivers of success; good physical health; fair mental health	Very positive attitudes toward school (90%); very strong belief in own abilities and hard work as drivers of success, very good physical health; excellent mental health	Negative attitudes toward school; weak belief in own abilities and doubts about hard work as drivers of success; good physical health; partly impaired mental health, many "don't know" responses	Preponderantly negative attitudes toward school; weak belief in own abilities and doubts about hard work as drivers of success; overall good physical health but 10% reporting impaired health; preponderantly bad mental health	Neutral attitudes toward school; rather strong belief in own abilities and hard work as drivers of success; good physical health; good mental health	Neutral attitudes toward school; average belief in own abilities and hard work as drivers of success; very good physical health; excellent mental health
Growth	Stay in FT education; little enthusiastic about schooling; over 85% HE oriented	Stay in FT education; very enthusiastic about schooling; over 80% HE oriented	Highest share for leaving FT education but also for "don't know"; doesn't want to be at school; over 20% considering apprenticeship	Lowest shares for school attachment and usefulness of school; over 20% considering apprenticeship; highest share for applying to HE but considering themselves without a chance to get in	School is a necessary nuisance; not likely to apply for HE	Second highest share for leaving FT education; future orientated, school is useful; over 25% considering apprenticeship
Integration		Hardly any physical or verbal violence experienced		Regular physical or verbal violence experienced		
Autonomy	Second highest degree of self-determination	Highest degree of self-determination	Little self-determination	Little self-determination	Average to little self-determination; works during term-time	Average to high self-determination; works during term-time
Perception	Own school perceived as good; feel less likely to get punished at school, teachers give special attention and praise; no relevant alcohol and/or tobacco use	Own school perceived as good; teachers give special attention and praise; no relevant alcohol and/or tobacco use	Own school perceived as bad; feel more likely to get punished; teachers give less attention and praise; 17% smoke and 24% percent drink sometimes to regularly	Own school perceived as bad; feel more and less likely to get punished; teachers give less attention and praise; 27% smoke and 45% percent drink sometimes to regularly	Own school perceived as average; teachers give less to average attention and praise; 15% smoke and 43% percent drink sometimes to regularly	Own school perceived as average; feel more likely to get punished; teachers give less to average attention and praise; 13% smoke and 40% percent drink sometimes to regularly
Mastery	No deviant behaviour; little friends at home or going out; free time spend mainly alone or with other family members	No deviant behaviour; little friends at home or going out; free time spend mainly with family members	Truant, cannabis, graffiti, vandalism, public fights; mainly hanging out with friends but also other family members	Truant, cannabis, graffiti, vandalism, shoplifting; public fights; hanging out with friends or spending time alone	Truant, cannabis, vandalism, shoplifting; public fights; going out with friends or hanging out at home	Cannabis, graffiti, vandalism, public fights; going out with friends

Annex Table 469: Degrees of precariousness wave 3, tabular overview

	Precarious 1	Precarious 2	Precarious 3	Precarious 4
Attitudes	Fair physical health; overall very negative attitudes toward schooling, especially regarding efforts; do not feel comfortable at school	Good physical health; positive attitudes toward schooling	Excellent physical health; most positive attitudes toward schooling;	Good physical health; preponderately positive attitudes toward schooling
Growth	Over 20% intend to leave FT education; 60% decided on future in last 12 months; HE very unlikely;	Over 30% intend to leave FT education; 55% decided on future in last 6 months; HE very unlikely;	Intention to stay or return to FT education; over 70% decided on future over a year ago; most likely to go to HE	over 60% decided on future over a year ago; most likely to go to HE
Integration	Regular physical or verbal violence experienced		Hardly any physical or verbal violence experienced	
Autonomy	Rather low degree of self-determination	Good degree of self-determination; Over 1/3 work during term-time, over 10% work (paid or unpaid) in family businesses, 28% do not receive pocket money	Excellent degree of self-determination	Good degree of self-determination
Perception	Own school preponderately perceived as bad or indifferent; 58% drink, 38% smoke sometimes to regularly	Own school preponderately perceived as good; 46% drink, 19% smoke sometimes to regularly	Own school preponderately perceived as very good; 28% drink sometimes to regularly; over 90% never tried tobacco	Own school preponderately perceived as good; 42% drink sometimes to regularly; over 80% never tried tobacco but 13% smoke sometimes to regularly
Mastery	Frequent deviant behaviour (truant, cannabis, graffiti, vandalism, shoplifting, public fights)		Hardly any deviant behaviour	

Annex Table 470: Degrees of precariousness wave 4, tabular overview

	Precarious 1	Precarious 2	Precarious 3
Attitudes	Excellent mental health; neutral to negative attitudes toward school, which they intend to leave anyway	Good mental health; positive attitudes toward schoolwork	Bad mental health
Growth	Work orientation; shapes assessment of year 11 at school	HE orientation	Mixed orientations but feeling of not being well equipped by school
Integration			Home as conflict zone and unsafe in the streets
Autonomy			Perceived lack of money; little self-determination
Perception	Over 80% had "proper alcoholic drinks"		Over 40% smoked cannabis
Mastery	Closest with parents but also boyfriend/girlfriend	Closest with parents and friends from school	Almost 1/5 has no one to talk to about problems; get bored easily and often and find little things enjoyable

Annex Table 471: Degrees of precariousness wave 6, tabular overview

	Precarious 1	Precarious 2	Precarious 3	Precarious 4	Precarious 5	Precarious 6
Attitudes	Some social envy; resilience in work	Social envy and resilience polarised: very high and very low values;	Little resilience in work	Low social envy; resilience in work;	Lowest social envy; medium work resilience;	Second lowest social envy; low work resilience
Growth	High work ethos; importance of emancipatory function of employment	But high importance of emancipatory function of employment	Highest importance of emancipatory function of employment	Work orientation with little work ethos	Little work orientation; medium importance of emancipatory function of employment	medium importance of emancipatory function of employment
Integration	Hand full of close friends; 23% in long time relationships without cohabiting; first comfort from/with partner	Family-friends balance polarised; number of friends none, one, or don't know; over 5% cohabit with partner, majority in relationship; first comfort from mother/partner	Family-friends balance skewed toward friends; higher number of close friends;	Family-friends balance kept; majority in relationships; turn to mother or partner;	Family-friends balance skewed toward family; 82% singles; seek comfort with siblings or friends (2-5 close friends), not partners but also highest share for "no one" to turn to;	Family-friends balance kept; majority not in relationships; seeks comfort with friends (4-9 close)
Autonomy						
Perception	Medium alcohol risk; normal cannabis use; no other drugs	Highest share (16%) for high alcohol risk; increased number of cannabis users; highest share for other drug use	Low alcohol and drug use	Medium alcohol risk; above average cannabis use and other drug trials	Lowest alcohol risk; hardly any cannabis and no other drug use	High alcohol risk; highest cannabis and above average other drug use
Mastery						

Annex Table 472: Degrees of precariousness wave 7, tabular overview

	Precarious 1	Precarious 2	Precarious 3	Precarious 4	Precarious 5	Precarious 6
Attitudes	Polarised social envy and views on luck; high work ethos and resilience; need for stability; rejection of hedonistic approaches	Low social envy; self-actualisation in job; self-determination	Many don't know responses; little work resilience; some mistrust in meritocratic principle	Medium social envy; high work ethos and resilience; need for stability;	Very high social envy; very high work ethos and resilience; mixed views on self-determination; high meritocratic beliefs; need for stability	Low social envy; low work ethos and resilience; negative view on self-determination;
Growth	High work and career aspirations; Polarised future orientation	Not working at any cost; little career aspirations;	Low future orientation; Not working at any cost; little career aspirations;	High work and career orientation; functional approach to education; least donations/volunteer work	High work and career orientation; Very strong future orientation; Donations and volunteer work	Very high work and career orientation, incl. education but not working at any cost; Very strong future orientation; Donations and volunteer work
Integration	Strong family aspiration; 10% living with partner; first comfort partner	Medium family aspiration; first comfort friends	Some family aspiration; high share of don't know; 68% singles; first comfort family but 11% "no one"	Medium family aspiration; 9% living with partner; first comfort friends	Strong family aspiration; 9% living with partner; first comfort partner and friends	Strong family aspiration; long term relationships, non-cohabit; first comfort partner and mother;
Autonomy	Polarised; high entrepreneurship; aspirational	Mixed positive; low entrepreneurship	Mixed negative; very low entrepreneurship, non-aspirational	Mixed positive; medium entrepreneurship	Positive; high entrepreneurship; aspirational	Very Positive; medium-low entrepreneurship; aspirational
Perception	Life satisfaction polarised; alcohol risk polarised	Medium life satisfaction; highest cannabis/other drug use; medium to high alcohol risk	Low life satisfaction; least cannabis/other drug use/trial; low to no alcohol risk	Medium life satisfaction; medium to low alcohol risk	Medium life satisfaction; medium to low alcohol risk	High life satisfaction; medium to low alcohol risk
Mastery						

Annex chapter 6

Annex Figure 1: Space of precarity, including supplementary variables